Hickman v. Kreisher, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

HUNTER HICKMAN, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-1819

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

v. )

)

STEPHANIE KREISHER, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

) ORDER

Defendants. )

)

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Hunter Hickman has filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Stephanie Kreisher, in her position as a Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) appointed by the

Crawford County Domestic Relations Court, Crawford County, and Crawford County Domestic

Relations Court Magistrate Timothy Roston. (Doc. No. 1). The complaint stems from proceedings

in the Crawford County Domestic Relations Court (Case No. 24-CR-0176) concerning Plaintiff’s

parental rights. (See id. at PageID #1–6).

With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2).

That motion is GRANTED. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, so his complaint is subject to initial screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, federal district courts are expressly required

to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any

such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal

standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) governs

dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Id. at

471. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading

that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

meet this pleading standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even though the standard of review for pro

se pleadings is liberal, the generous construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading

requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf or “guess at the

nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

III. DISCUSSION

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: (i) Violation of Procedural Due Process

(14th Amendment), based on Defendants denying “Plaintiff access to his children without fair

process”; (ii) Equal Protection Violation (14th Amendment); and (iii) Supervisory

Liability/County Responsibility, based on Crawford County failing to maintain procedural

safeguards and allowing GAL misconduct. (ECF No. 1, PageID #5). Plaintiff requests the

following relief: (i) an order declaring Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights; (ii) an

order prohibiting the defendants from interfering with Plaintiff’s parenting rights; (iii) an order

appointing third-party supervision of visitation if deemed appropriate; and (iv) monetary relief.

(Id. at PageID #6). The Court lacks jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the “domestic-relations exception.”

Federal courts lack jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. Danforth v. Celebrezze,

76 F. App’x 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703, 112 S. Ct.

2206, 119 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1992) (“[T]he domestic relations exception . . . divests the federal courts

of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”). “Although this domestic

relations exception to federal jurisdiction does not apply to a civil action that merely has domestic

relations overtones, . . . federal courts lack jurisdiction where the action is a mere pretense and the

suit is actually concerned with domestic relations issues.” Danforth, 76 F. App’x at 616 (internal

citation omitted). Plaintiff cannot evade the exception by “artfully cast[ing] a suit seeking to

modify or interpret the terms of a divorce, alimony, or child-custody decree as a state-law contract

or tort claim in order to access federal courts.” Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 795–96

(6th Cir. 2015).

Here, although Plaintiff alleges due process and equal protection violations, the core

concern in Plaintiff’s complaint is domestic relations. See, e.g., Partridge v. Ohio, 79 F. App’x

844, 845 (6th Cir. 2003) (“While [the plaintiff] attempts to assert civil rights claims, he essentially

raises domestic relations issues by challenging Ohio court child custody and divorce decisions and

by seeking relief in the form of shared custody of his children.”). Even though he seeks monetary

damages and declaratory relief, Plaintiff primarily seeks to overturn the state court’s decisions

concerning Plaintiff’s parental rights, including child custody, and he requests that the Court issue

orders with respect to those issues. The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such a case or grant such

relief. See Edelstein v. Flottman, No. 24-3156, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 570, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan.

10, 2025) (affirming the district court’s dismissal when the plaintiffs “couched their claims . . . in

terms of constitutional violations” but “the substance of the claims revolves around the state

courts’ decisions in the domestic-relations proceedings as they relate to [child] custody and [child]

visitation rights”); Sefa v. Kentucky, 510 F. App’x 435, 437–38 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]o the extent

[Plaintiff] seeks a declaration that the state’s child-custody determination was unlawful, an

injunction for the minor children’s release, and monetary damages arising from the child-custody

decision, these claims constitute collateral attacks on the state court judgments terminating . . .

parental rights and were properly excluded from consideration by the district court.”) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s claims are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final judgments,

as well as interlocutory orders, from state courts. See Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child

and Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2010); RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon

Forge, 4 F.4th 380, 396 (6th Cir. 2021); see also Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir.

2013) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents a federal court from exercising

jurisdiction over a claim alleging error in a state court decision”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[A] federal court lacks jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court,

as only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.” Higgs

v. Dupuis, No. 5:19-cv-192, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104359, at *5 (W.D. Ky. June 3, 2021); see

also District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), Rooker v. Fid. Tr.

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A party

raising a federal question must appeal a state court decision through the state system and then

directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.”). Federal courts may raise the issue

of abstention sua sponte. See O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding

that “abstention may be raised by the court sua sponte”); see also Louisville Country Club v. Watts,

Nos. 97-5758 and 97-5829, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7828, *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 1999).

Based on the pleadings, the Court cannot ascertain whether a final judgment has been

entered in the underlying state court proceedings. That said, the Sixth Circuit has held that Rooker-

Feldman abstention does not require a state court judgment to have been finalized after the

exhaustion of all appeal rights. See RLR Invs., LLC, 4 F.4th at 393–96; see also T.M. v. Univ. of

Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 139 F.4th 344, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2025) (adopting the same approach); Parker

Law Firm v. Travelers Indem. Co., 985 F.3d 579, 584 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Even so, that an appeal is

pending in the New York state courts does not mean that a federal district court has jurisdiction to

consider a parallel appeal. This court, like other circuits, has concluded that Rooker-Feldman

applies to state court judgments that are not yet final.”). Regardless, Younger1 abstention would

also apply.

“Younger abstention requires a federal court to abstain from granting injunctive or

declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.” O’Neill v.

Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41

(1971)). “The Younger abstention doctrine provides that a federal court should abstain from

interfering in a state court action when (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) the

state proceeding implicates important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in

the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Graves v. Mahoning Cnty., 534 F. App’x

1 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

399, 406 (6th Cir. 2013). The doctrine is designed to prevent federal courts from interfering with

the functions of state courts in order to preserve the principles equity and comity. Doe v. Univ. of

Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2017). To the extent that the underlying state court action

is pending, the Court finds that all three factors supporting Younger abstention are present.

Whether the state court proceedings are final or ongoing, the Court finds that this action is

“essentially an impermissible appeal of the state court judgment as it raises specific grievances

regarding decisions of Ohio’s domestic relations courts.” See Partridge, 79 F. App’x at 845–46.

Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action.

Alternatively, any claims for damages against Defendants would need to be dismissed for

failure to state a claim. First, state court judges are immune from civil suits for money damages.

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997).

They are accorded broad protection to ensure that the independent and impartial exercise of their

judgment in a case is not impaired by the exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes,

105 F.3d at 1115. For this reason, absolute immunity is overcome only when: (1) the conduct

alleged is performed at a time when the defendant is not acting as a judge; or (2) the conduct

alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction

of the court over which he or she presides. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116.

A state court judge will not be deprived of immunity even if the action at issue was performed in

error, done maliciously, or was in excess of his or her authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.

349, 356 (1978); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 1984) (acting in excess of authority

does not preclude immunity).

Neither exception to absolute immunity applies here. Plaintiff’s allegations against

Magistrate Roston concern decisions he made in connection with Plaintiff’s child custody

proceedings. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Magistrate Roston intimidated and threatened

Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff’s motions to remove Defendant Kreisher as the GAL. Magistrate

Roston was acting as a judicial officer when he addressed Plaintiff’s motions in the underlying

state court proceedings. Plaintiff has also not established, nor is there any indication, that

Magistrate Roston acted clearly outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he

presides. Thus, Magistrate Roston is entitled to absolute immunity.

Second, if Defendant Kreisher was the court-appointed GAL who reports to the state court

as an independent investigator, or acts as an advocate of the child, she is not considered a state

actor for purposes of § 1983. See Reguli v. Guffee, 371 F. App’x 590, 601–02 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Holley v. Deal, 948 F.

Supp. 711, 715 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (finding that a guardian ad litem is not a state actor when the

“state exercised no coercive power over [the guardian’s] independent judgment . . .”). Otherwise,

even if Kreisher were found to be acting “under color of law” for purposes of § 1983, she would

still be entitled to absolute immunity. See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.

1984) (holding that a guardian ad litem, like witnesses and other persons who are integral parts of

the judicial process, is entitled to absolute immunity); Holley, 948 F. Supp. at 715 (finding that a

guardian ad litem, if found to be a state actor, would be absolutely immune from damages). Thus,

Defendant Kreisher is ultimately not subject to suit under § 1983.

Finally, Plaintiff’s claims against Crawford County also fail. Section 1983 does not permit

a plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. New

York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692–94, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). A

plaintiff may only hold a local government entity liable under Section 1983 for the entity’s own

wrongdoing. Id. A local government entity violates § 1983 when its official policy or custom

actually deprives an individual of his or her constitutional rights. /d. at 694. To state a claim for

relief against a municipality under § 1983, Plaintiff must: “(1) identify the municipal policy or

custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that [his or] her particular injury

was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003)

(citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 363 (6th Cir.1993)). Plaintiffs complaint

contains no factual allegations plausibly suggesting that the constitutional injuries he alleges were

the result of any specific policy or custom of Crawford County. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a

claim against Crawford County. Because Plaintiffs claims are barred by the domestic-relations

exception, the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines, as well as absolute immunity,

and he otherwise fails to state a claim against Defendants, this action must be dismissed under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court

CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be

taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 14, 2025 “ads Hue

CHARLES E.FLEMING ts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE