The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
SHELLY FOLLOWELL )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-cv-3122
)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF )
CLINTON COMMUNITY UNIT )
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 15, )
JESSICA PATRICK, AND CURT )
NETTLES, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Board of
Education of Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15’s
(“School District”), Jessica Patrick’s, and Curt Nettles’ (collectively,
“Defendants”) Partial Motion to Dismiss and Strike Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint and Supporting Memorandum (d/e 10) and
Plaintiff Shelley Followell’s (“Plaintiff”) Response in Opposition (d/e
12). Because Count I of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (d/e 8) does
not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but also does
not seek punitive damages against Defendant School District,
Defendants’ Motion (d/e 10) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint (d/e 8) and are accepted as true at the motion to dismiss
stage. Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639
(7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff worked at Defendant School District as a first-grade
paraprofessional starting in 2020. See d/e 8, ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges
that throughout the 2023-2024 school year, Defendants routinely
pressured Plaintiff to fraudulently bill Medicaid by billing Medicaid
for unused minutes with students. Id. at ¶ 13. That same year,
Plaintiff repeatedly reported to her coworkers, as well as Defendant
School District staff members and administrators, her good faith
belief that Defendant School District was engaging in, or attempting
to engage in, Medicaid billing fraud. Id. at ¶ 12.
On or about February 13, 2024, Plaintiff met with several
Defendant School District employees, including Defendant Patrick—
one of Defendant School District’s elementary school’s principals
and one of Plaintiff’s supervisors who had final policymaking
authority. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5, 14. At the meeting, Defendant Patrick
threatened to terminate Plaintiff if she did not bill Medicaid 20
minutes daily, even if Plaintiff did not provide a qualifying student
with 20 minutes of services. Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff indicated that she
would only submit billing to Medicaid for actual minutes provided
to a qualifying student. Id. at ¶ 16.
On February 15, 2024, Defendants sent Plaintiff a letter
threatening to fire her if she did not bill Medicaid 20 minutes daily,
even if the minutes were not provided to a student. Id. at ¶ 17.
Plaintiff refused to do so. Id. at ¶ 18.
On or about April 6, 2024, Plaintiff was called into a meeting
with Defendant Patrick as well as Defendant Nettles—Defendant
School District’s superintendent, who had final policymaking
authority—and Kari Veldman, whose title is not specified and who
is not a defendant in this case. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5, 19. Veldman insisted
that Plaintiff bill Medicaid for minutes she spent just sitting by a
qualifying child, and Plaintiff refused. Id. at ¶ 20. Defendant Nettles
demanded that Plaintiff bill the 20 minutes daily to Medicaid
because the school received money as a result and told Plaintiff that
if she would not do so, “we will have to sever our relationship and
part ways.” Id. at ¶ 21. The meeting ended, and Defendant Nettles
walked Plaintiff to her classroom and said that he “hoped this could
be fixed.” Id. at ¶ 22.
After the April 6, 2024 meeting, Plaintiff did not hear anything
else about the Medicaid billing issue until May 28, 2024, when
Defendants notified Plaintiff of her termination with an effective
termination date of June 25, 2024. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 23, 25. Plaintiff
alleges that she was terminated because of her reports of and
refusal to engage in Medicaid fraud. Id. at ¶ 25.
On June 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in
this Court. See d/e 8. As relevant here, Count I of the Amended
Complaint asserts that Plaintiff “engaged in activity protected by the
First Amendment when she, inter alia, continually expressed and
reported her concerns relating to Medicaid fraud and refused to
engage in Medicaid fraud.” Id. at ¶ 32. Count I further asserts that
“Plaintiff reported her concerns and refused to defraud the
government because she, inter alia, wanted to protect the public
taxpayers, necessary Medicaid recipients, and the Medicaid system
from abuse, waste, and fraud,” such that her “speech was a matter
of public concern.” Id. at ¶ 33.
On July 2, 2025, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss
and Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Supporting
Memorandum. See d/e 10. On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a
Response in Opposition. See d/e 12.
II. JURISDICTION
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s
claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is a federal statute, and
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See 28
U.S.C. ' 1331 (AThe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States@). Venue is proper because Defendant School
District is located in DeWitt County, Illinois, in the Central District
of Illinois and because a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Central District of
Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) challenges the complaint’s sufficiency. Christensen v. Cnty.
of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). A complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief” that puts the defendant on notice of the
allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), see also Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d
437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court accepts all well-pled facts
alleged and draws all possible inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
The complaint must put forth plausible grounds to
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007). A plausible claim is one from which the court can
draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Additionally, the complaint must raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556. A complaint merely reciting a cause of action or conclusory
legal statements is insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
IV. ANALYSIS
For a public employee plaintiff to show that her speech is
protected under the First Amendment, she must demonstrate that
“(1) [s]he made the speech as a private citizen, (2) the speech
addressed a matter of public concern, and (3) [her] interest in
expressing that speech was not outweighed by the state's interests
as an employer in promoting effective and efficient public service.”
Davis v. City of Chicago, 889 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal
citations omitted). On the issue of private citizen speech, the
Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
“that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421.
Defendants argue in their Partial Motion to Dismiss and Strike
that Plaintiff’s “speech was not constitutionally protected as it was
made pursuant to her official job duties as a paraprofessional,”
such that Plaintiff “did not speak as a private citizen, [and]
dismissal of Count I with prejudice is appropriate.” d/e 10, p. 4.
Defendants point to Plaintiff’s assertions in her Amended
Complaint indicating that “billing Medicaid was squarely within the
scope of expectations for [her] employment and was part of her
work assignments.” Id. at p. 5 (citing d/e 8, ¶¶ 16, 20). Defendants
argue that since Plaintiff’s allegedly protected “speech was due and
in response to her official duties as a paraprofessional responsible
for billing Medicaid, she engaged in employee speech, which is not
protected by the First Amendment.” d/e 10, p. 5.
Plaintiff argues in her Response that, because the Court must
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor at the motion to dismiss stage, and
because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pled that she “spoke as a
private citizen, she is afforded constitutional protection.” d/e 12,
pp. 1-2. Plaintiff cites to her Amended Complaint, which pleads that
Plaintiff “reported her concerns and refused to defraud the
government because she, inter alia, wanted to protect the public
taxpayers, necessary Medicaid recipients, and the Medicaid system
from abuse, waste, and fraud” and “intended to, inter alia, deter
Defendants from engaging in Medicaid fraud.” Id. at p. 2, see also
d/e 8, ¶¶ 33-34. Plaintiff argues that her “explicitly pled, private
motivation removes her speech from the purview of Garcetti and
makes Davis…inapposite.” d/e 12, p. 2.
However, the Supreme Court in Garcetti referenced “the
powerful network of legislative enactments—such as whistle-blower
protection laws and labor codes—available to those who seek to
expose wrongdoing.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. Against that
backdrop, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly
rejected such claims for a whistleblower carve-out from the category
of unprotected employee speech.” Ulrey v. Reichhart, 941 F.3d 255,
259 (7th Cir. 2019).
In Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh
Circuit considered a prison guard who reported her supervisor for
letting a vehicle pass without the required contraband search. See
id. at 965-66. The Seventh Circuit determined that the guard
“spoke as an employee, not a citizen, because ensuring compliance
with prison security policy was part of what she was employed to
do.” Id. at 966. That the guard’s “statements highlighted potential
misconduct by prison officers [did] not change the fact that she was
speaking pursuant to her official responsibilities, not as a citizen
‘contributi[ng] to the civic discourse.’” Id. at 967 (quoting Garcetti,
547 U.S. at 422).
In Ulrey v. Reichhart, 941 F.3d 255, (7th Cir. 2019), an
assistant principal alleged that after she called the school board
president because she disagreed with the superintendent’s
disciplinary decision, the superintendent forced her to resign in
retaliation for the call. Id. at 258-59. The Seventh Circuit noted that
the assistant principal’s “written job description included duties to
‘coordinate and administer student attendance and discipline
policies,’” such that “[e]ven if Superintendent Reichhart violated
school district policy by making an exception,” the assistant
principal’s “speech fell within her official duties.” Id. at 260.
Therefore, in light of Garcetti, Spiegla and Ulrey, that Plaintiff
“wanted to protect [others] from abuse, waste, and fraud”—even if
she thought Defendants were perpetuating “unlawful” “fraud[]”—
does not categorically determine that Plaintiff spoke as a private
citizen. d/e 8, ¶¶ 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 33.
Here, Plaintiff pleads that her work responsibilities included
“submit[ting] billing to Medicaid for actual minutes provided to a
qualifying student.” Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff pleads that she reported
that Defendant School District committed Medicaid fraud during
the 2023-2024 school year to her coworkers and to Defendant
School District staff members and administrators—all of whom she
exclusively identifies relative to her employment and employer. Id.
at ¶ 12.
When Plaintiff indicated on or around February 13, 2024 that
she would only submit billing to Medicaid for actual minutes
provided to a qualifying student, it was at a meeting with Defendant
School District employees, at which her supervisor, Defendant
Patrick, threatened to terminate Plaintiff if she did not bill Medicaid
20 minutes daily, even if Plaintiff did not provide a qualifying
student with 20 minutes of services. Id. at ¶¶ 14-16.
When Plaintiff again refused to bill Medicaid 20 minutes daily,
even if the minutes were not provided to a student, she was
responding to a February 15, 2024 letter from Defendants
threatening to fire her if she did not do so. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
When Plaintiff on or around April 6, 2024 refused to bill
Medicaid for minutes even if she just sat by a qualifying child, it
was at a meeting with Defendant Patrick and Defendant Nettles,
who demanded that Plaintiff bill the 20 minutes daily to Medicaid,
said that otherwise they would “sever [their] relationship and part
ways,” and walked Plaintiff to her classroom. Id. at ¶¶ 19-22.
In sum, Plaintiff’s allegedly protected speech of “continually
express[ing] and report[ing] her concerns relating to Medicaid fraud”
was made during or in response to communications with her
employer or coworkers regarding her work responsibility to “submit
billing to Medicaid for actual minutes provided to a qualifying
student” in her capacity as a public employee. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 16, 25,
32. Plaintiff’s allegedly protected speech of “refus[ing] to engage in
Medicaid fraud” directly involved her work responsibility to “submit
billing to Medicaid for actual minutes provided to a qualifying
student” as specified by Defendants—namely, her employer and
supervisor—in work meetings and correspondence. Id. at ¶¶ 2-4,
16, 18, 20, 25, 32. Therefore, all of the allegedly protected speech
Plaintiff pleads was made “pursuant to her official duties.” Garcetti,
547 U.S. at 421.
Plaintiff points to Swearengin v. Board of Education of City of
Chicago, No. 24 C 5279, 2025 WL 588624 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2025)
as instructive. In Swearengin, after a public school principal
ignored a school employee’s reports that her son was being bullied
at the school, the principal fired the school employee after she
“reposted [her son’s] assailants’ videos [of the bullying] for
commentary on social media and posted that Principal Barlow had
done nothing about the incidents.” Id. at *2. When the school
employee filed a First Amendment retaliation claim, the school and
principal moved to dismiss, arguing that the school employee was
“acting in her role as a [school] employee when she reported” the
misconduct. Id. at *3 (internal citations omitted). The magistrate
judge disagreed, finding the school employee pled that she spoke as
a private citizen:
Yes, the complaint says at one point that the plaintiff is a
teacher, but, more importantly, the complaint repeatedly
makes clear that plaintiff is the mother of the student who,
according to the complaint, was being bullied. Being a
teacher does not trump being a mother, nor does the
former eliminate the fact of the latter. Here, as always,
“reality must dominate judgment.” Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774 (1984). There
is more than enough in the complaint to allege that
plaintiff was speaking as a private citizen, and the
allegations in the complaint make it certainly more than
just plausible that that was the greater motivation for her
speaking out. Tellingly, the defendant seems to
unwittingly concede this when it argues that plaintiff was
not speaking on a matter of public concern because she
was motivated out of “concerns about her own child.”
Swearengin, 2025 WL 588624 at *3 (internal complaint citations
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff argues that, “like the dual roles of plaintiff-
teacher and plaintiff-mother in Swearengin, Plaintiff here had the
dual roles of plaintiff-paraprofessional and plaintiff-taxpayer or
plaintiff-Medicaid advocate/defender; Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint makes clear that she was speaking as the latter—not the
former.” d/e 12, p. 3. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, the allegations in
her “Amended Complaint evidence [h]er speech as private and make
it ‘certainly more than just plausible that [her private concern] was
the greater motivation for her speaking out.’” Id. at pp. 3-4 (quoting
Swearengin, 2025 WL 588624 at *3).
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Response misquotes
paragraphs 32-36 of Count I of her Amended Complaint as pleading
that Plaintiff “reported her private concerns,” d/e 12, p. 2, when the
Amended Complaint does not include the word “private” in those
paragraphs or anywhere in Count I. See d/e 8, ¶¶ 32-36. Further,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint identifies Plaintiff exclusively as a
paraprofessional employed by Defendant School District. See id. at
¶ 9. Plaintiff does not plead that she identifies as a “taxpayer” or a
“Medicaid advocate/defender.” Even if Plaintiff pleading that she
made her allegedly protected speech were to implicitly indicate that
she was a “taxpayer” and “Medicaid advocate/defender,” both
identities are considerably broader and more amorphous than the
Swearengin school employee’s identity as a mother, which she held
regardless of her contested speech. Therefore, the Court finds that
Plaintiff did not plead that she was speaking from a separate,
private identity.
As discussed earlier, because all of Plaintiff’s allegedly
protected speech as pled was made “pursuant to her official duties,”
Plaintiff was “not speaking as [a] citizen[] for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate [her]
communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
421. Plaintiff does not plead that she “made the speech as a private
citizen,” such that, as a public employee, she cannot “show that her
speech is protected under the First Amendment.” Davis, 889 F.3d at
845 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, Count I of
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not sufficiently plead that Plaintiff is
entitled to relief and Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss and
Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (d/e 10) is GRANTED as to
Count I of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (d/e 8). See Fed. Rs. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) and 8(a)(2), see also Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439
(7th Cir. 2002).
Defendants also argue in their Partial Motion to Dismiss and
Strike that punitive and exemplary damages are not recoverable
against Defendant School Board and should be struck from
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See d/e 10, pp. 6-7. But, Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint states that “[p]unitive damages are not sought
from” Defendant School Board. d/e 12, p. 7 n. 1. Defendants’
Partial Motion to Dismiss and Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(d/e 10) is, therefore, DENIED as to punitive and exemplary
damages.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss
and Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (d/e 10) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. Count I of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(d/e 8) is DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
ENTERED: November 14, 2025.
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE