KUNKLEMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

DAVID RANDALL KUNKLEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25cv1872-TKW-HTC

DENA MARIE KUNKLEMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff David Randall Kunkleman, proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and a litany of motions (Docs. 3, 6, 8,

10-12) related to the state court proceedings that dissolved his marriage and required

him to pay child support. He has also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

Doc. 13. After reviewing the complaint, the undersigned finds: (1) it fails to comply

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the requests for declaratory and

injunctive relief are barred by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (3) it fails to

state a claim for relief under federal law; and (4) it sues state agencies who are

immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, this case should be

DISMISSED without prejudice and the pending motions should be terminated as

MOOT.

I. Background

Kunkleman sues the following Defendants: (1) his ex-wife, Dena Marie

Kunkleman (“Ms. Kunkleman”); (2) Ms. Kunkleman’s attorney, Angela Guttmann;

(3) the Guttmann Law Firm; (4) Ms. Kunkleman’s parents, Joe and Susan Badeaux;

(5) the Florida Department of Revenue (“FDOR”); (6) the Santa Rosa County Clerk

of Court & Comptroller, Jason English; (7) the Florida Department of Children and

Families (“DCF”); (8) DCF Investigator Paris; and (9) ten John/Jane Does.

In October 2023, Ms. Kunkleman filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.

See Santa Rosa County Case No. 2023 DR 1716. The state court entered a final

judgment of dissolution on July 2, 2025. Kunkleman’s complaint in this case sets

forth the following allegations regarding the state court proceedings, many of which

are vague and disjointed:

• In 2024, Kunkleman paid $19,838 in direct support “which was ignored,

creating phantom arrears.”

• Guttman threatened Kunkleman with contempt and jail on February 6,

2025, “despite unrebutted affidavit of impossibility.”

• A “parallel IV-D action” was opened in June 2025 despite the ongoing

proceedings in state court, which Kunkleman claims constitutes “double

enforcement.”

• During an unspecified proceeding in state court, a bailiff muted

Kunkleman’s microphone and threatened him.

• The July 2025 final judgment “imposed contradictory child-support

figures ($6,550.40 vs. $5,030.40 worksheets).”

• Kunkleman filed “affidavits of financial impossibility” on July 11 and

September 15 of 2025 showing he had a net income of $1,818 per month;

these affidavits were “unrebutted but ignored.”

• In July and August of 2025, the FDOR issued a certification for passport

denial, a delinquency notice, and a notice of driver’s license suspension,

“all on false arrears.”

• On September 12, 2025, Ms. Kunkleman submitted a proposed order

seeking to impose a $15,000 contempt purge despite Kunkleman’s

“affidavit of financial impossibility” and “without lawful findings of

ability to pay.” The proposed order “exemplifies the pattern of attempting

to enforce phantom arrears through coercive sanctions.”

• In an October 2, 2025 affidavit, a paralegal who worked at the law firm

that previously represented Kunkleman indicated the firm submitted a

financial affidavit to the court which mistakenly listed Kunkleman’s gross

sales rather than net income.

• At some unspecified time, a DCF Investigator named “Paris” refused to

provide his “name/ID/email,” mocked Kunkleman by asking “English or

Spanish,” and demanded an in-home visit.

• “Federal preservation notices and transparency filings were docketed and

ignored.”

• Kunkleman’s Social Security number “was submitted in duplicative IV-D

certifications tied to false arrears.”

• Kunkleman’s obligations “were securitized or reimbursed through

Treasury flows, concealed by refusal to produce ledgers and FOIA

records.”

• A “Global Damages Rider preserved over 100 frauds … suppressed in state

court, and establishes self-executing damages of $17,451,747.17

escalating to $174,510,747.17 with treble damages and $1,000/day

sanctions.” The Rider “further preserves a two-year role-reversal remedy:

obligations wrongfully enforced against [Kunkleman] must be reversed in

kind for the same period, requiring [Ms. Kunkleman] to bear the burdens

fraudulently imposed.”

Based on the foregoing, Kunkleman brings eight claims, which will be

described below. As relief, he seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction “halting all enforcement and contempt actions pending audit”; a

“declaratory judgment voiding phantom arrears enforcement as unconstitutional”; a

rescission of driver’s license and passport sanctions; an order compelling production

of certain documents; monetary damages; the return of silver purportedly possessed

by Ms. Kunkleman’s parents; and an order requiring “a two-year role reversal”

whereby Ms. Kunkleman assumes the responsibilities imposed on him by the final

judgment. Doc. 1 at 4-5.

II. Discussion

For the reasons discussed below, this action should be sua sponte dismissed

without prejudice. First, Kunkleman’s complaint fails to comply with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

are barred by Younger because they would interfere with the ongoing state court

proceedings. Third, he has failed to state a claim for relief under federal law. And

finally, he sues state agencies immune from suit.

A. Kunkleman’s complaint fails to comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

Kunkleman’s complaint does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure because it is an impermissible shotgun pleading. The complaint is a

shotgun pleading because it asserts “multiple claims against multiple defendants

without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or

omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” See Weiland v.

Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Only two

Counts in the complaint specify which Defendants the claim is being brought

against—the First Amendment claim against DCF Investigator Paris and the

conversion claim against the Badeauxes. Doc. 1 at 3-4. The other six Counts

provide no indication as to which Defendant or Defendants the Counts implicate.

And the complaint suggests Defendant English, the Santa Rosa County Clerk, is

being sued “for prospective injunctive relief regarding docketing and records

practices” (Doc. 1 at 2), but there are no allegations in the complaint regarding

English or those practices.

Shotgun pleadings violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because “they

fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants

adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim

rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Because Kunkleman’s complaint is a shotgun

pleading, it is subject to dismissal.1 See Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d

1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A district court has the ‘inherent authority to control

its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits,’ which includes the ability

to dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds.”) (citation omitted).

1 Kunkleman’s complaint also fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 because it attempts to bring

unrelated claims against different Defendants in the same case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)

(stating multiple defendants may be joined in one action if: (1) any right to relief asserted against

them arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

(2) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action). For example,

the claim that DCF Investigator Paris violated the First Amendment by mocking Kunkleman and

demanding an in-home visit does not share common questions of law or fact with Kunkleman’s

other claims.

B. Kunkleman’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are

subject to dismissal under Younger.

Through this action, Kunkleman primarily seeks a different forum to contest

the decisions rendered by the state court related to his child support obligations, as

well the actions to enforce those obligations. See Doc. 1 at 4-5 (seeking to halt “all

enforcement and contempt actions pending audit,” to void “phantom arrears

enforcement as unconstitutional,” to rescind driver’s license and passport sanctions,

and to reverse the obligations imposed on him and his ex-wife by the judgment).

However, because the state court proceedings are ongoing, this Court cannot issue

declaratory or injunctive relief that interferes with those proceedings.

“The Younger doctrine bars federal court intervention in state noncriminal

proceedings where the proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding,

the proceedings implicate important state interests, and there is an adequate

opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Adams v.

State of Florida, 185 F. App’x 816, 816-17 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 31 Foster

Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003)). This case meets all the

factors for Younger abstention.

First, the state court proceedings are ongoing. Although the circuit court

entered final judgment on July 2, 2025, Kunkleman has appealed the judgment and

the appeal remains pending.2 See First DCA Case No. 1D2025-1799; Redner v.

Citrus Cnty., Fla., 919 F.2d 646, 649 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A state’s trial and appeals

process is considered ‘a unitary system,’ and Younger prevents a federal court from

disrupting the process while a case is on appeal.”) (citation omitted). Furthermore,

the relief requested in this action would clearly interfere with the state court

proceedings, as Kunkleman is attempting to use this case to invalidate the state

court’s decisions regarding child support and prevent enforcement of those

decisions. See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1276 (noting the first factor in

Younger abstention analysis considers whether the federal proceeding will interfere

with an ongoing state court proceeding, which involves looking “to the relief

requested and the effect it would have on the state proceedings”).

Second, proceedings related to child support implicate important state

interests. See Adams, 185 F. App’x at 817 (“The ability to collect child support

payments is an important state interest.”); see also Davis v. Self, 547 F. App’x 927,

930 (11th Cir. 2013) (“There is no doubt that matters involving domestic relations

and child custody implicate important state interests.”). Lastly, Kunkleman has not

shown he cannot present his federal claims related to the sufficiency of the evidence

2 Because the appeal is still pending, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the Court of

jurisdiction over this case. See Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (“state

proceedings have not ended for purposes of Rooker-Feldman when an appeal from the state court

judgment remains pending at the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action that

complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment and invites review and rejection of that

judgment”).

supporting the child support determinations to either the circuit court or on appeal.

See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279 (noting “plaintiffs have the burden of

establishing that the state proceedings do not provide an adequate remedy for their

federal claims” and “[a] federal court ‘should assume that state procedures will

afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the

contrary’”) (citations omitted); see also Leonard v. Ala. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61

F.4th 902, 909 (11th Cir. 2023) (“To demonstrate that claims are procedurally

prevented in state tribunals, plaintiffs should provide evidence of state laws, rules,

or procedures that would allow a district court to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s

federal claims will effectively be shut out from the judicial system and cut off from

effective review in the courts.”).

Based on the foregoing, because the state court proceedings are ongoing,

Kunkleman’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are subject to dismissal

under Younger. See Adams, 185 F. App’x at 817 (affirming dismissal under Younger

of § 1983 complaint that sought to enjoin “a civil contempt finding accompanied by

a threat of jail” related to child support).

C. Kunkleman has failed to state a claim for relief under federal law.

By moving to proceed in forma pauperis, Kunkleman has invoked the

screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Whitted v. Sarasota Mem’l

Hosp., 2024 WL 4392784, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2024) (construing a pro se

litigant’s “failure to pay the filing fee as a request to proceed in forma pauperis”

when screening and dismissing his complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss his

complaint, or any portion thereof, if it determines the complaint is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To state a claim,

Kunkleman must plead factual content which allows the Court to draw the

reasonable inference the Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must liberally construe pro se

allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but conclusory

allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to a

presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986). Here, the factual allegations in Kunkleman’s complaint fail to state a claim

under federal law.

1. Count 1

Count 1, titled “§ 1983 Procedural Due Process,” claims: (1) “enforcement

proceeded on false ledgers and contradictory income figures without ability-to-pay

findings”; and (2) “unrebutted affidavits [were] ignored” and “admitted facts denied

effect.” Doc. 1 at 3. As an initial matter, and as discussed above, the complaint does

not identify which Defendant is responsible for the alleged due process violation.

To the extent this claim is brought against Ms. Kunkleman or her attorney,

they are not state actors and cannot be sued under § 1983. See Jefferies v. Ga.

Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 922 (11th Cir. 1982) (“It is well settled that the

fourteenth amendment proscription against deprivations of property without due

process of law reaches only government action and does not inhibit the conduct of

purely private persons in their ordinary activities.”) (citation omitted); see also Cobb

v. Ga. Power Co., 757 F.2d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[O]ne who has obtained a

state court order or judgment is not engaged in state action merely because it used

the state court legal process.”). And to the extent the claim complains about the

actions of the state court judge, they are not named as a Defendant and would, in any

event, be immune from suit. See Higdon v. Tusan, 746 F. App’x 805, 810 (11th Cir.

2018) (“A judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for actions

taken while acting in [their] judicial capacity, unless [they] acted in the ‘clear

absence of all jurisdiction.’”) (citation omitted); id. (“This immunity applies even

when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or in excess of [their] jurisdiction[.]”).

Furthermore, “[a] procedural due process violation is only cognizable under

§ 1983 ‘when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the

procedural deprivation.’” Collier v. Conway, 672 F. App’x 950, 952 (11th Cir. 2016)

(citation omitted). Florida provides a remedy for Kunkleman to challenge the

rulings he perceives were unfair in the circuit court—he can file an appeal with the

First DCA, which he has done. Thus, he has failed to state a procedural due process

claim.

2. Count 2

In Count 2, Kunkleman alleges two individuals retaliated against him in

violation of the First Amendment when: (1) a bailiff muted his microphone and made

unspecified threats; and (2) DCF Investigator Paris mocked him by asking “English

or Spanish?” and intimidated him by demanding an in-home visit. Doc. 1 at 3-4.

First, the bailiff is not a Defendant, so the vague allegations regarding him are

irrelevant. Second, Kunkleman has failed to state a retaliation claim because: (1)

the conduct described is not likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from the

exercise of his First Amendment rights; and (2) the allegations do not establish a

causal connection between any protected speech and the bailiff or Paris’s actions.

See Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016) (“To state a claim for

retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he

engaged in protected speech; (2) the defendant’s conduct adversely affected the

protected speech; and (3) a causal connection exists between the speech and the

defendant’s retaliatory actions.”); see also id. at 481 (“[A] defendant adversely

affects protected speech if his alleged retaliatory conduct ‘would likely deter a

person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights.’”) (citation

omitted).

3. Counts 3 & 4

Count 3, asserting a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, fails to state a claim

because the allegation that private actors and state officials “conspired to deprive

[Kunkleman] of rights by enforcing phantom arrears and concealing assets” is

entirely conclusory. The complaint is devoid of allegations supporting the existence

of a conspiracy to violate Kunkleman’s rights; indeed, the complaint fails to even

specify who allegedly participated in the conspiracy. See Guillaume v. United

States, 2025 WL 2610053, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025) (holding plaintiff failed

to state a § 1985 claim because his allegations consisted of “conclusory statements

that assume the defendants had conspired with each other without providing facts

that plausibly state such a claim”); Coker v. Warren, 2025 WL 1575578, at *7 (11th

Cir. June 4, 2025) (affirming dismissal of § 1985 claim when “complaint presented

vague and general allegations of misconduct by many different actors, and there

were no facts alleged that tied each individual defendant’s alleged misconduct to any

overarching conspiracy”).

Furthermore, a § 1985 claim also requires “some racial, or perhaps otherwise

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action,”

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), but the complaint does not suggest

any of the Defendants’ actions were motivated by Kunkleman’s membership in an

identifiable group. See Dean v. Warren, 12 F.4th 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2021) (“That

animus standard requires that the defendant proceeded on his course of conduct

‘because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’”)

(citation omitted); see also Coker, 2025 WL 1575578, at *7 (affirming dismissal of

§ 1985 claim when complaint “did not explain what the motivation for the

defendants’ alleged conspiracy was, and the defendants were not alleged to have

been engaged in the conspiracy because of any class-based animus rather than

personal animus against [plaintiff] as an individual”); White v. Berger, 709 F. App’x

532, 538 (11th Cir. 2017) (Section 1985 “protects individuals from conspiracies to

harm them motivated by their membership in classes having common characteristics

of an inherent nature—i.e., those kinds of classes offered special protection under

the equal protection clause.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,

Kunkleman has failed to state a claim under § 1985.

Count 4, asserting a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, also fails to state a claim

because a § 1986 claim is dependent on the existence of a viable § 1985 claim. See

Guillaume, 2025 WL 2610053, at *3 (“Section 1986 is a derivative claim under §

1985 and, where there is no underlying conspiracy to support a § 1985 claim, the

derivative § 1986 claim must also fail.”) (citation omitted).

4. Count 5

Count 5 alleges a violation of the Supremacy Clause and Title IV-D of the

Social Security Act. Doc. 1 at 4. In support, Kunkleman asserts: “Duplicative IV-

D actions and refusal to produce remittance logs violate federal supremacy;

enforcement must halt until transparent audit produced.” Id. However, Kunkleman

does not specify what provision of Title IV-D was allegedly violated or who

allegedly violated it. Moreover, neither the Supremacy Clause nor Title IV-D create

a cause of action. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324-

25 (2015) (stating the Supremacy Clause “creates a rule of decision” requiring courts

not to “give effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws” but noting the Clause

“is not the ‘source of any federal rights’ and certainly does not create a cause of

action”) (citations omitted); Sheetz v. Norwood, 608 F. App’x 401, 405 (7th Cir.

2015) (“no court of appeals has ever concluded that a provision of [Title IV-D]

creates a private right of action”); Quinn v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,

2020 WL 4468728, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 2020) (“Because Title IV-D does not

create a private right of action, Plaintiff cannot raise a Title IV-D claim in this

case.”). Thus, Kunkleman has failed to state a claim in Count 5.

5. Count 6

Count 6 alleges a RICO claim. To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff “must

plausibly allege six elements: that the defendants (1) operated or managed (2) an

enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity that included at least two

predicate acts of racketeering, which (5) caused (6) injury to the business or property

of the plaintiff.” Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2020).

Kunkleman’s conclusory allegations do not come close to establishing these six

elements.

First, Kunkleman does not allege who participated in the RICO enterprise,

what the relationships were among the participants, or how the participants shared a

purpose. See id. (establishing an association-in-fact enterprise requires showing “a

group of persons shares three structural features: (1) a purpose, (2) relationships

among those associated with the enterprise, and (3) longevity sufficient to permit

these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose”) (cleaned up).

Second, Kunkleman’s allegations come nowhere near establishing a pattern

of racketeering activity. With respect to predicate acts, Kunkleman states only

“mail/wire fraud, extortion … , securities/CUSIP fraud, [and] Title IV-D incentive

misuse.” But Kunkleman’s references to fraud are devoid of any detail. See id. at

1215-16 (explaining plaintiffs “must put forward enough facts with respect to each

predicate act to make it independently indictable as a crime” and plaintiffs alleging

mail and wire fraud are “required to plead ‘(1) the precise statements, documents, or

misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and person responsible for the

statement; (3) the content and manner in which these statements misled the Plaintiff;

and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged fraud’”) (citation omitted).

Furthermore, while Kunkleman mentions his ex-wife’s attorney sent him a

letter in February 2025 threatening contempt and jail, a warning that there could be

consequences for failing to pay child support does not amount to extortion. And

courts have held litigation-related activities like those alleged by Kunkleman cannot

constitute the predicate acts needed to sustain a RICO claim. See Raney v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004) (“neither the threat to litigate nor the

fabrication of evidence behind the lawsuit made the action ‘wrongful’ within the

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and therefore could not be a predicate act under

RICO”). Accordingly, Kunkleman has not stated a RICO claim.

6. Count 83

In Count 8, Kunkleman alleges a violation of the Privacy Act, asserting Social

Security number “certifications [were] transmitted falsely to federal databases” and

“improper federal reimbursements” were claimed. Doc. 1 at 4. However,

Kunkleman has failed to state a Privacy Act claim because that statute only applies

to federal agencies and there are no allegations that a federal agency mishandled

Kunkleman’s data and no federal agency is a Defendant.4 See Schwier v. Cox, 340

3 In Count 7, Kunkleman seeks to assert a state law claim for “conversion/unjust enrichment”

related to the disposition of silver Kunkleman claims was a marital asset. However, in the absence

of a viable federal law claim, the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

law claim and it should also be dismissed. See Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089 (encouraging “district

courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed

prior to trial”) (citing L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir.

1984)).

4 Count 8 also references the Tucker Act, but the Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute that does

not create substantive rights. See Fulton v. Fulton County Bd. of Comm’rs, 148 F.4th 1224, 1263

(11th Cir. 2025). Moreover, the Tucker Act permits claims against the United States; Kunkleman’s

complaint does not name the United States as a Defendant and nothing in it suggests he would be

entitled to relief from the federal government.

F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting the private right of action created by the

Privacy Act only applies to federal agencies).

D. The FDOR and DCF are immune from suit.

Kunkleman sues the FDOR and DCF. However, the Eleventh Amendment

prevents state agencies from being sued in federal court unless: (1) Congress

overrides the state’s sovereign immunity; or (2) the state consents to suit or waives

its immunity. Brown v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue Off. of Child Support Enf’t, 697 F.

App’x 692, 692 (11th Cir. 2017). “Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment

immunity in § 1983 cases, and the State of Florida has not waived sovereign

immunity or consented to suit with respect to such actions.” Driessen v. Univ. of

Miami Sch. of Law Children & Youth Clinic, 835 F. App’x 489, 492 (11th Cir. 2020).

Thus, the FDOR and DCF are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh

Amendment, regardless of the relief sought. See Carter v. Dep’t of Children &

Families, 2022 WL 2921310, at *3 (11th Cir. July 26, 2022) (holding state agencies

like DCF are immune from suit); Brown, 697 F. App’x at 693 (holding FDOR is

immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment); see also Stevens v. Gay, 864

F.2d 113, 115 (11th Cir. 1989) (“This Eleventh Amendment bar applies regardless of

whether the plaintiff seeks money damages or prospective injunctive relief.”).

III. Conclusion

As described above, Kunkleman’s complaint: (1) fails to comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that is

barred by Younger; (3) fails to state a claim under federal law; and (4) sues state

agencies which are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, this

case should be dismissed without prejudice.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

1 That this case be DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. That all pending motions (Docs. 3, 6, 8, 10-13) be TERMINATED as

moot.

3. That the clerk close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 15th day of October, 2025.

/s/ Hope Thai Cannon

HOPE THAI CANNON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations may be filed within 14

days of the date of this Report and Recommendation. Any different deadline that

may appear on the electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not

control. A copy of objections shall be served upon the Magistrate Judge and all other

parties. A party failing to object to a Magistrate Judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the

district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th

Cir. R. 3-1.