Davenport

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KAREEM DAVENPORT, )

M49922, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

ANTHONY WILLS, )

ROB JEFFREYS, )

MENARD CORR. CTR., )

ILL. DEPT. OF CORR., ) Case No. 25-cv-176-MAB

LACY MEZO, )

DEVIN W. EGGERS, )

TROY L. SLINKARD, )

S. GEE, )

BRANDON K. GARCIA, )

WELGE, )

KORONDO, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Kareem Davenport, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.

Specifically, Plaintiff challenges issues surrounding his ongoing requests for placement

in protective custody. The Complaint (Doc. 1) was dismissed for violating Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for containing misjoined claims. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner

complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion

of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune

from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth

Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s original pleading concerned discrete interactions with 30 individual

defendants over the course of two years. (Doc. 1). The Court reviewed the pleading and

found that it did not contain a short plain statement of the facts, and it likely contained

claims that were misjoined because they concerned many different factual scenarios and

did not share common defendants or causes of action. The amended pleading still

concerns events that span nearly two years, but it has been reduced from 30 defendants

to 11, and Plaintiff has tried to narrow his focus to incidents that impacted his placement

in protective custody. Plaintiff argues that by making these modifications, he is now

focused on First and Eighth Amendment violations that all pertain to the same

“transaction.” (Doc. 15 at 23).

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of

a Magistrate Judge, and the limited consent by the Illinois Department of Corrections to the exercise of

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between this Court and

the Illinois Department of Corrections.

Plaintiff first alleges that on April 21, 2022, he attempted to speak to Defendant

Mezo about his desire for protective custody while he was being moved from the

Medium Security Unit (MSU) to the East cell house. (Doc. 15 at 14). Mezo informed

Plaintiff that he would need to raise the issue with the sergeant at the cellhouse, but

Plaintiff continued to try to press the conversation. Plaintiff alleges that during this

encounter he was walking slowly due to preexisting injuries, which he voiced to Mezo,

but despite his contentions, Mezo became frustrated with his pace and ultimately issued

him a disciplinary ticket for slowing the line movement. Plaintiff further alleges that the

disciplinary proceedings that followed were not adequate because the committee

inaccurately reported that he admitted guilt and they did not review video footage. (Doc.

15 at 14). Additionally, he faults Defendants Wills and Jeffreys for their role in the

grievance appeal of the discipline. He ultimately received 7 days of segregation and a 1-

month grade-reduction.

Plaintiff complains that Mezo violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights in

this interaction because the disciplinary ticket was retaliatory, and the conditions in

segregation were atypical and significant. He alleges that Mezo deliberately subjected

him to cruel and unusual punishment. He claims he was not given any bedding, soap,

or clothes beyond the jumpsuit on his back, for the entire 7 days. (Doc. 15 at 15).

Second, Plaintiff alleges that on September 1, 2022, he was denied protective

custody and had a 24 hour wait until he could reapply. He explains that the first attempt

to place him with a cellmate failed, which then led to staff promising him a single cell.

Despite the promise, he alleges that Defendants Eggers and Slinkard were surprised to

find someone in the cell that should have been a single-cell, and they gave Plaintiff no

alternative options. (Doc. 15 at 15-16). Slinkard and Eggers allegedly got frustrated with

Plaintiff, which Plaintiff attributes in part to a prior encounter with Slinkard in July of

2022 about the same topic (protective custody). Eggers promised a crisis team, but when

Plaintiff was escorted downstairs Defendant Gee refused assistance and simply walked

him to segregation. (Doc. 15 at 16-17). Plaintiff again alleges the associated disciplinary

hearing was mishandled, but he admits that the offense was ultimately reduced, and the

segregation term was stricken. (Doc. 15 at 17).

He alleges that in association with this instance, Defendants Slinkard, Eggers and

Gee violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights by retaliating when he requested

protective custody, or a crisis team, and by relegating him to poor conditions in

segregation. (Doc. 15 at 17-18).

In Claim 3, Plaintiff complains that for five days in November of 2022, and for

about two weeks in December of 2022, he was housed in protective custody intake. (Doc.

15 at 18). On these occasions, he was housed in the receiving and classification building,

a building that he alleges has no electricity, no cable, and no wifi. He also complains that

he could not shop commissary or attend video visits. Plaintiff claims that these

conditions violated the Eighth Amendment because those awaiting protective custody

(or in protective custody) are supposed to receive the same standard of living as general

population inmates. (Doc. 15 at 18-19). He faults Defendants Wills, Menard, IDOC, and

Jeffreys for choosing to place protective custody intake inmates in these conditions.

In Claims 4 and 5, Plaintiff alleges that on November 15, 2023, he asked for a crisis

team and to be placed in protective custody. (Doc. 15 at 19-20). Defendant Slinkard was

assigned to walk him to the protective custody intake area, and on the walk Slinkard gave

Plaintiff grief about making yet another request for protective custody. (Id.). Plaintiff

alleges that ultimately Slinkard retaliated against him in some fashion during this

encounter by issuing him a disciplinary ticket and placing him in segregation. (Doc. 15

at 20). He alleges that his water and toilet were not operational for the first 24 hours, and

he was forced to go weeks without any way to clean his cell. He alleges the conditions

were atypical.

After Slinkard left Plaintiff at restrictive housing, Plaintiff alleges he experienced

a mental health crisis. He alleges that the crisis led to his placement on suicide watch.

(Doc. 15 at 21). At some point during this encounter, he alleges that Defendant Garcia

maced him without provocation. (Doc. 15 at 21). He claims that Garcia then handcuffed

him behind his back, attached restraints to the side of the holding cage, and proceeded to

mace him a second time. Plaintiff claims that a nurse medically cleared him, at which

point Defendants Korondo and Welge escorted him to a cell coated with feces, urine, and

chemical residue. Korondo disabled the water to the cell for 24 hours, and Plaintiff alleges

he went weeks without proper cleaning supplies. (Doc. 15 at 21-22). Garcia charged him

with a disciplinary offense for spitting on an officer, which Plaintiff contended at a

hearing, but he was still found guilty.

In relation to Claims 4 and 5, Plaintiff faults Slinkard and Garcia for violating his

First and Eighth Amendment rights, and Welge and Korondo for violating his Eighth

Amendment rights. He alleges that all events described in the complaint are instances of

retaliation for times when he sought protective custody or a crisis team. (Doc. 15 at 23).

Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages, as well as permanent injunctive

relief to protect him from future harm and to be transferred to another facility.

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint the Court designates the

following counts:

Claim 1: First or Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Mezo

for alleged retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment

on April 21, 2022;

Claim 2: First or Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants

Slinkard, Eggers, and Gee for alleged retaliation and cruel

and unusual punishment on September 1, 2022;

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

against Defendants Jeffreys, Wills, IDOC, and Menard for

the conditions of confinement in the receiving and

classification area in November and December of 2022;

Claim 4: First or Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant

Slinkard for his alleged conduct on November 15, 2023;

Claim 5: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, and/or

First/Fourteenth Amendment discipline claim against

Defendant Garcia for his alleged conduct on November 15,

2023;

Claim 6: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

against Defendants Korondo and Welge for placing

Plaintiff in a filthy cell on November 15, 2023.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

DISCUSSION

A successful claim for First Amendment retaliation requires that a plaintiff show,

“(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a

deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the

First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to

take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)). “To make a prima facie showing of

causation the plaintiff must show only that the defendant's conduct was a sufficient

condition of the plaintiff's injury.” Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011). Then

the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie showing by establishing

that “his conduct was not a necessary condition of the harm—the harm would have

occurred anyway.” Id.

Inmates retain a First Amendment right to complain about prison staff, whether

orally or in writing, but only in ways consistent with their status as prisoners. See Turner

v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987). However, name calling, backtalk, or arguments are

not protected speech. See e.g., Caffey v. Maue, 679 Fed. App’x 487, 490-91 (7th Cir. 2017);

Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 834 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding an inmate engaged in

unprotected backtalk when he insisted on talking to a lawyer after a guard said no).

In Claim 1, Plaintiff faults Defendant Mezo for retaliating against him when he

voiced concerns about his imminent placement in the East cell house, but he also states

that Mezo merely deferred to another officer and that she asked him to keep moving but

he did not comply or provide reasons why he believed he could not comply. Mezo

ultimately issued him a disciplinary ticket for slowing down the movement of inmates,

which Plaintiff attached to the complaint. (Doc. 15 at 28). The disciplinary report

indicates that he attended the hearing and made a statement on his own behalf. He

received 7 days of segregation. He complains the conditions were atypical because he

lacked bedding and cleaning supplies and wore only the jumpsuit he had at the time the

incident arose.

These events do not support a claim for retaliation or cruel and unusual

punishment against Mezo. As to retaliation, an inmate can voice complaints about prison

staff or he can voice a desire for healthcare, but when the speech crosses into the territory

of being combative or argumentative, it is not longer protected. See e.g. Kervin, 787 F.3d

at 834 (finding an inmate engaged in unprotected backtalk when he insisted on talking to

a lawyer after a guard said no). By Plaintiff’s own description of his encounter with

Mezo, he began with a request about protective custody, but he veered into the territory

of unprotected speech when Mezo clearly delegated that issue to another employee and

asked him to keep moving, and Plaintiff resisted. Plaintiff’s claim that he had to walk

slowly due to prior injuries is not enough to push his claim into the territory of retaliation.

Mezo gave clear orders and issued discipline when she felt there was a lack of

compliance. This has nothing to do with Plaintiff’s verbal request for protective custody,

thus there is not a valid First Amendment claim.

Plaintiff also faults Mezo for the conditions of confinement he endured for seven

days in segregation, but he does not say anything that links the conditions personally to

Mezo. For example, he does not allege Mezo knew where he would be housed and how

he would be treated, nor does he allege he complained to Mezo once he was placed. The

key for any § 1983 claim is personal involvement. Because Mezo is not personally linked

to the conditions, Claim 1 is insufficient to state a claim against Mezo.

Plaintiff mentions additional individuals in association with the disciplinary

proceeding who were not named as defendants, and he faults Jeffreys and Wills for their

role in the grievance process after the fact. However, he does not formally delineate a

claim against any of these individuals. It is also not apparent that these allegations would

support any sort of plausible claim because for a seven-day term of segregation Plaintiff

was only entitled to informal due process, which he undisputedly received. See e.g., Ealy

v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 965 (7th Cir. 2024). As to the allegations against Wills or Jeffreys

about grievance processing, a mere role in processing a grievance, without participation

in the underlying conduct, is insufficient to state a claim. Thus, Claim 1 is insufficient in

all respects.

In Claim 2, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Eggers, Gee, and Slinkard acted in a

retaliatory fashion in regard to his requests for a crisis team. He alleges that this

encounter also resulted in unfounded discipline in the form of a ticket for refusing

housing. As a premise for this claim, he alleges that this was not his first encounter with

Slinkard, and that Slinkard explicitly mentioned he was getting tired of Plaintiff’s

requests for protective custody. This assertion transforms the situation compared to the

encounter with Mezo, because here, Plaintiff alleges that Slinkard explicitly used

Plaintiff’s present and past requests for a crisis team and protective custody as a reason

to deny him assistance when he verbalized the request in September of 2022. This

assertion could form a possible causal link between Plaintiff’s speech in July of 2022 (the

first encounter with Slinkard) and September of 2022 the encounter with Slinkard, Eggers,

and Gee. Claim 2 may proceed on a theory of alleged retaliation against Defendants

Eggers, Gee, and Slinkard.

By contrast, in Claim 2 Plaintiff also faults these three officers for cruel and

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment related to conditions he ultimately

claims he faced in segregation. However, Plaintiff does not contend or even suggest that

these three individuals had any knowledge of the specific conditions he would face, or

that they had any personal control over it. He admits that he had a disciplinary hearing

before other officers prior to placement in segregation, and though he complains about

the hearing, he has not actually made a formal legal challenge to the process he was

afforded. He served 14 days in segregation under conditions similar to those explained

in Claim 1. And as best the Court can tell, it appears Plaintiff received all the process he

was entitled to prior to this happening. In total, the Court finds the Eighth Amendment

allegations against Gee, Eggers, and Slinkard to be too speculative as pled to proceed.

In Claim 3, Plaintiff faults Defendants Jeffreys (former IDOC director) and Wills

(Menard Warden) for the conditions in the receiving and classification area of the prison

where he was housed briefly in November and December of 2022. He complains of no

cable or wifi, no access to commissary, and missed video visits. He also alleges the

building lacked electricity.

To establish a conditions of confinement claim, an inmate must establish (1) a

deprivation that is, from an objective standpoint, sufficiently serious that it results in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2) where prison officials

are deliberately indifferent to this state of affairs. Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th

Cir. 2016), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 824 (1994). Conditions may be

considered collectively when analyzing a conditions of confinement claim, and the

duration of the allegedly harmful conditions is relevant to the existence of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Id. Many conditions standing alone are not sufficient to give rise

to an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, but they must also be

considered collectively. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). Although “the

Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349

(1981), inmates are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene

materials, and sanitation. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009).

The majority of the conditions that Plaintiff mentions are not related to necessities

like food, clothing, shelter, bedding, or hygiene. Plaintiff’s complaints largely focus on a

lack of amenities like cable, wifi, or commissary. While the lack of electricity could

conceivably have an impact on life’s necessities, Plaintiff has not explained how it

impacted him physically or otherwise. And with respect to Plaintiff’s contention that he

missed out on video visits, in the context of discipline, restrictions on access to visits is

generally not considered a constitutional violation. See e.g., Lekas v. Briley. But even if

missing out on family visits might invoke some protected right, Plaintiff does not

associate a discrete harm with this issue.

Claim 3 is also insufficient as pled because Plaintiff does not adequately connect

the conditions in the receiving and classification area to personal actions of Defendants

Jeffreys or Wills. At most he says they chose to place people requesting protective

custody in this area of the prison, but choosing that location is different from knowing

the conditions are deplorable and choosing it to dole out punishment. Plaintiff says

nothing about any personal effort to notify Wills or Jeffreys that the conditions are infirm.

Their mere role as supervisors or higher-ups in the prison administration is not sufficient

to attribute knowledge or personal responsibility. See e.g., Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d at

592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely based on their

positions). As for Plaintiff’s allegations against IDOC or Menard, these cannot survive

because neither entity is a suable person under § 1983. See e.g., Smith v. Knox County Jail,

666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (the jail or prison itself is not a suable entity). Thus,

Claim 3 will be dismissed as insufficiently pled.

In Claim 4, Plaintiff alleges that he had another run-in with Defendant Slinkard

about his desire for a crisis team or protective custody placement. He alleges Slinkard

retaliated against him by refusing a crisis team and disciplining him for refusing housing.

As with Claim 3, these allegations are sufficient to proceed under the First Amendment.

By contrast, Plaintiff faults Slinkard under the Eighth Amendment, but again does not

say anything about Slinkard knowing of or refusing to help him with poor conditions of

confinement in segregation. Claim 4 will proceed only under the First Amendment.

In Claim 5, Plaintiff alleges that he had a mental health breakdown upon arriving

at segregation, during which Defendant Garcia gratuitously pepper sprayed him when

he was nonthreatening, and even after he was restrained. These allegations are sufficient

to proceed under an Eighth Amendment theory of excessive force against Garcia.

Plaintiff also complains Garcia wrote him an improper disciplinary ticket and that

Garcia’s actions were retaliatory, but neither of these theories are adequately supported.

He does not identify any protected speech he participated in directly with Garcia before

the use of force, that might have formed a basis for retaliation. He also does not provide

adequate assertions about if he had atypical and significant conditions of confinement for

a lengthy period of time. The disciplinary proceedings Plaintiff described appear to

satisfy informal due process, so for now any claim against Garcia is inadequate as to the

discipline. Plaintiff may proceed against Garcia only under the Eighth Amendment for

the alleged use of force.

Finally, in Claim 6, Plaintiff alleges that after Garcia’s use of force, Defendants

Welge and Korondo placed him in a cell covered in feces and urine and disabled his water

for 24 hours. He claims Korondo and Welge saw the mace incident, and knew he did not

have a way to at least clean himself off but did nothing. He claims the conditions

persisted for weeks and that Korondo was his gallery officer but did not help. Given that

Plaintiff alleges the two saw the application of a chemical agent, and they intentionally

disabled his water and toilet, he has alleged enough for now to proceed under the Eighth

Amendment against Welge and Korondo either on a theory of deliberate indifference or

for inhumane conditions of confinement.

In sum, Plaintiff may proceed on Claim 2 against Slinkard, Eggers, and Gee under

the First Amendment; on Claim 4 against Slinkard under the First Amendment; on Claim

5 against Garcia under the Eighth Amendment; and on Claim 6 against Korondo and

Welge under the Eighth Amendment. All other claims and parties are dismissed as

insufficiently pled.

DISPOSITION

Claim 2 may proceed against Defendants Gee, Slinkard, and Eggers; Claim 4 may

proceed against Slinkard; Claim 5 may proceed against Garcia, and Claim 6 may proceed

against Welge, and Korondo. Claims 1 and 3 are dismissed in full for failure to state a

claim. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendants Mezo, Wills,

Menard Correctional Center, Jeffreys, and IDOC, because Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim against these parties.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Slinkard, Gee, Eggers,

Garcia, Welge, and Korondo: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive

Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is

DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 15), and this

Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.

If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the

Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate

steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay

the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case

because it will involve the exchange of medical records.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 14, 2025

/s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been

achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint.

It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’

Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the

defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing

important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.

Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed

by the Court.