Elkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KIMBERLANA ELKINS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 18-1035-JWD-EWD

JOE EDWARD BRADSHAW, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on a number of interrelated motions. First, Plaintiff

Kimberlana Elkins (“Plaintiff” or “Elkins”) has filed a Motion To For [sic] Declaratory Judgment

(“Motion for Declaratory Judgment”) (Doc. 131), asking the Court to declare that the confidential

high/low settlement agreement which she entered into with Defendants Joe Bradshaw (“Defendant

Bradshaw” or “Bradshaw”) and GEICO Casualty Company (“Defendant GEICO” or “GEICO”)

(collectively, “Defendants”) is invalid in sum or in part. (Doc. 131 at 1.) Defendants oppose this

motion. (Doc. 140.) Plaintiff has also filed Plaintiff’s Alternative Motion for Relief from Jury

Verdict for New Trial Pursuant to FRCP 59(a) (“Motion for New Trial”) (Doc. 133). Defendants

likewise oppose this motion. (Doc. 139.) In addition, Bayou Medical Management, PPO LLC

(“Bayou Medical Management” or “BMM”) has filed a Motion to Intervene on Behalf of Bayou

Medical Management, Preferred Provider Organization, LLC (“Motion to Intervene”) (Doc. 156),

which Defendant GEICO opposes. (Doc. 150.) Finally, Defendant GEICO has filed a Motion to

Enforce Settlement (Doc. 168), asking the Court for an order enforcing the high/low settlement

agreement. Plaintiff opposes this motion, (Doc. 171), as does Bayou Medical Management, (Doc.

170).

I. BACKGROUND

This action stems from a trial involving an automobile crash between Plaintiff and

Defendant Bradshaw that occurred on March 31, 2017. (Doc. 109 at 4.) Both were insured. (Id. at

4–5.) Bradshaw was insured by GEICO. (Id. at 5.) A four-day jury trial was held beginning on

October 18, 2021. (Docs. 117, 121.) On October 22, 2021, the jury returned a verdict apportioning

liability/fault as follows: 55% to Defendant Bradshaw and 45% to Plaintiff. (Doc. 124 at 2.)

During the trial, the parties signed a high/low settlement agreement, setting the upper and

lower damages that could be awarded to Plaintiff. (Doc. 131-2.) After the jury returned their verdict

and judgment was entered, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Declaratory Judgment, asking the Court

to vacate that agreement. (Doc. 131.) She also moved for a new trial. (Doc. 133.)

In March 2023, Bayou Medical Management moved for leave to file a motion to intervene

in this matter. (Doc. 148.) The Court granted the motion for leave to file without ruling on the

merits of the motion to intervene. (Doc. 151.) Defendant GEICO filed a motion to dismiss the

motion to intervene, arguing that Bayou Medical Management had not properly served Defendant.

(Doc. 158 at 1.) The Court denied this motion, again without ruling on the merits of the motion to

intervene. (Doc. 167.)

Also in March 2023, Defendant GEICO filed a Notice to Court of Death of Joe Edward

Bradshaw, informing the Court that Defendant Bradshaw had passed away on July 2, 2022. (Doc.

149 at 1.)

In April 2025, GEICO filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement (Doc. 168), which

both Plaintiff and Bayou Medical Management oppose. (Docs. 170, 171.)

II. MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (DOC. 131)

A. Parties’ Arguments

a. Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 131)

According to Plaintiff, on October 22, 2021, “Counsel for Defendant GEICO confected a

napkin agreement which purported to be a CONFIDENTIAL HIGH/LOW SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT” (“the Agreement”). (Doc. 131-1 at 1.) Although “Bradshaw did not sign the

document, the other parties and counsel did sign the document.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this

agreement is unenforceable because there was no true meeting of the minds. (Id.) She asserts that

“there was no way that the parties could have known that the jury voir doir [sic] . . . was not

answered truthfully under oath[,]” for which she provides no evidence. (Id.) She further contends

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, again providing no support for this assertion.

(Id.) Plaintiff argues that she and her counsel would not have signed this agreement “had the

Plaintiff known of the proclivity of the Jury to decide the case apparently disregarding the jury

charges and the evidence[.]” (Id. at 1–2.)

Plaintiff contends that the contract “lead[s] to absurd consequences as the Jury did not have

evidence to find that Ms. Elkins was 45% at fault.” (Id. at 2.) She further argues that there was no

clear meeting of the minds, asserting that the Agreement applied only to GEICO, not to Defendant

Bradshaw. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff then attempts to relitigate the case, arguing that the jury was wrong

in believing Bradshaw. (Id. at 3–7.) Plaintiff admits that she “has no better explanation of why the

jury found as they did than to listen to Mr. Bradshaw say he didn’t think it should all be his fault.”

(Id. at 7.) In addition, Plaintiff maintains that “the general damage award of $20,000.00 for pain

and suffering and $20.000.00 for mental anguish” is “grossly under value[.]” (Id.) She disagrees

with the jury’s choices of which expert witnesses to believe. (Id. at 7–8.)

Plaintiff further argues that the Court “should grant the limited Motion to void any waiver

of any associated entitlements to a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, namely interest, costs and

expenses.” (Id. at 8.) She contends that this suit “began life in the 19th Judicial District Court

where filing fees, etc. were incurred.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the high/low agreement “uses

similar language in addressing ‘costs, expenses, liens, interest’ when the verdict falls above or

below the High/Low limits and specifically does not use the word ‘waive’ in those eventualities.”

(Id.) On the other hand, she claims, “when the verdict is rendered in value between $150,000.00

and $1,400,000.00, the Agreement written by Defendants does contain the word ‘waive’ in relation

to recovering ‘costs, expenses, liens, interest, etc.’” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, such waiver was

contemplated for verdicts below $150,000, but the “partial sentence containing the word [waiver]

near the bottom of page 1 of the Agreement was ‘scratched out’ and initialed[.]” (Id. at 8–9.) She

states “[w]ords have meanings[]” and argues that defense counsel “sought to treat the scenario

where the jury verdict fell between the high and low extremes differently than when the extremes

were invoked[,]” which she argues is demonstrated by the scratched out word. (Id. at 9.)

Plaintiff’s motion then states, “Counsel understands the great weight given the verdict of a

jury, the fact-finder in the case at hand.” (Id.) She admits that the “parties freely contracted in

High/Low Settlement Agreement.” (Id.) However, she argues that the Agreement “is conditioned

. . . on the verdict, in the least, being supported by the evidence.” (Id.) She further argues that “[a]ll

post-trial relief is thwarted by the Agreement, which in the extreme, could yield a verdict with 95%

of fault on the plaintiff-leading motorist and a damage award of $2,000,000.00, which in our

setting, would result in a Judgment of $100,000.00 and raised to the Low of $150,000.00.” (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that this “could be completely incredulous to all who saw or heard it, with the

exception of the jurors[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that because she “could not contemplate being

held 45% at fault” in this action or “the unreasonable general damage awards and lack of future

medical or loss of any future wage or loss of earning capacity[,]” this “agreement did not confect

a meeting of the mind [sic] of the parties.” (Id. at 9–10.)

b. Defendants’ Opposition to the Motion for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 140)

Defendants, on the other hand, argue that it was Plaintiff who initially sought the

Agreement when, on the evening of October 21, 2021, “Plaintiff’s counsel sent a text to counsel

for Defendants proposing a ‘high-low’ agreement of $275,000.00 (low) and $1.4 million (high).”

(Doc. 140 at 1.) Defendants made a counter-proposal on October 22, 2021, “of $150,000.00 (low)

and $1.4 million (high).” (Id. at 2.) Defense counsel “explained that the agreement was for

everything and whatever the outcome, the amount of the jury verdict is what would be paid and

would be inclusive of all costs, expenses, liens, interest, et cetera.” (Id.) According to Defendants,

“[c]ounsel for Defendants also noted that if the ‘low’ was triggered, or if the amount came in below

the amount offered in Offer of Judgment dated June 23, 2021, the Defendants would forego their

rights to any relief to which they may be entitled under Rule 68.” (Id.) Defendants assert that

“Plaintiff’s counsel did not express any misunderstanding of the terms and accepted on behalf of

her client.” (Id.) The parties then “memorialized the agreement on two (2) pages, with signature

lines for Plaintiff, GEICO’s representative, and all counsel, which was signed.” (Id.)

Defendants acknowledge that “Mr. Bradshaw was not present for the trial by leave of the

Court and was (and has always been) represented by the undersigned.” (Id.) They argue that the

lack of signature from Bradshaw does not mean there was no “meeting of the minds” because “Mr.

Bradshaw’s signature on the agreement was not necessary[.]” (Id.) They argue that “a) the

agreement secured a release of claims against him without the need to make any personal

contribution to the payment required under the agreement; and, b) by operation of the express

language of the GEICO policies at issue, GEICO retained the sole authority by which to enter into

a settlement agreement (i.e., Mr. Bradshaw’s consent was unnecessary).” (Id. at 2–3.) Defendants

assert that Plaintiff’s argument “runs contrary to the Civil Code Articles on compromise/settlement

and reams of Louisiana jurisprudence, as well as common sense.” (Id. at 3.)

Furthermore, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s Motion ignores ‘black letter’ Louisiana law

regarding transaction and compromise, as well as what constitutes a settlement and the

presumption that one has read and understands a document they [sic] have signed.” (Id. at 3.) They

point to Article 3701 et seq. of the Louisiana Civil Code to argue that this agreement “meets the

requirements of Louisiana law as to an enforceable settlement agreement.” (Id.) Defendants argue

that Louisiana courts “have held parties to the terms of contracts that they admitted they never

reviewed prior to signing them and where they claimed the provisions of the contract at issue had

not been pointed out or explained to them.” (Id. at 3–4.)

In addition, Defendants argue that the language of the Agreement is not ambiguous but “is

clear that regardless of the jury verdict: whether the ‘low’ or ‘high’ was triggered, or whether the

verdict came in between those numbers, the amount of the jury verdict would constitute the entirety

of what would be paid to the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 4.) Defendants claim that this means “[t]here would

be no recovery of costs, interest, liens, et cetera, by anyone, regardless of the amount awarded.”

(Id. (emphasis omitted.)) They contend that all parties “expressly waived their rights to any post-

judgment relief other than for the enforcement of the agreement[,]” which Defendants argue makes

this motion “unquestionably contrary to the agreement[.]” (Id. (emphasis omitted).)

Defendants note that “no one ‘knows’ what a jury (or finder of fact) is going to do after a

presentation of evidence at trial, and no one ‘knew’ what the jury was going to do in this case. It

is the inherent uncertainty of that outcome that results in settlements[.]” (Id.) They argue that this

is “nothing more than ‘buyer’s remorse[,]’” and assert that Plaintiff’s argument that “she made a

‘bad bargain’” is not grounds “for the Court to undo a contract she signed (along with her

counsel).” (Id. at 4–5.)

Finally, Defendants argue that this motion “is clearly without a good faith foundation and

is meritless.” (Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).) They therefore seek sanctions. (Id.)

c. Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 138)

In reply, Plaintiff argues again that the high/low agreement is founded on the jury verdict

and cannot be enforced absent a valid jury verdict. (Doc. 138 at 2.) She repeats that there was no

valid jury verdict because the jury “had no basis in fact or law to accept” Defendants’ version of

events. (Id. at 3–4.) Plaintiff’s argument relies, yet again, on relitigating the case. (Id. at 4–5.) She

argues that the jury was incorrect and that “[t]he Court simply cannot let these eight (8) jurors be

the final arbiter of facts.” (Id. at 5–6.)

B. Legal Standards

“Louisiana jurisprudence has a ‘strong policy favoring compromise agreements and

finality of settlements.’” Thompson v. Hebert, 23-284 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/13/2023), 377 So. 3d

912, 920 (quoting Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So. 2d 741, 757). The law

“does not sanction the solemn acts of contending parties settling their disagreements being lightly

brushed aside, unless there be present evidence of bad faith, error, fraud, etc.” Id. (quoting Beck v.

Cont’l Cas. Co., 145 So. 810, 811 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1933)).

C. Analysis

First, the Court addresses the question of whether the Confidential High/Low Settlement

Agreement (Doc. 131-2) between the parties is valid. If so, the Court will not set it aside absent

“present evidence of bad faith, error, fraud, etc.” Thompson, 377 So. 3d at 920 (quoting Beck, 145

So. at 811). The Agreement defines the parties as Kimberlana Elkins, Joe Edward Bradshaw, and

GEICO Casualty Company. (Doc. 131-2 at 1.) The Agreement states that “[t]he parties have agreed

to a ‘high/low’ agreement regarding the verdict of the jury in the trial of this matter.” (Id.) It defined

the low, “which will apply to any verdict under $150,000.00[,]” as $150,000.00. (Id.) It defined

the high, “which will apply to any verdict above $1,400,000.00[,]” as $1,400,00.00.” (Id.) The

Agreement stated that “[a]ny verdict below the ‘low’ will be paid by GEICO in the amount of

$150,000.00 . . . inclusive of any costs, expenses, liens, interest, etc.” while “[a]ny verdict above

the ‘high’ will be paid by GEICO in the amount of $1,400,000.00 . . . inclusive of any costs,

expenses, liens, interest, etc.” (Id.) All parties waived “any right to recover costs, expenses, liens,

interest, etc. for any verdict between the high/low amounts.” (Id.) Likewise, the parties “waive[d]

all rights to:” “appeal[,]” “motion for new trial[,]” “jnov[,]” “additur/remittitur[,]” “or any post

judgment relief other than the right to enforce this agreement.” (Id. at 2.) It was signed by Plaintiff

and by counsel for all parties. (Id.) The Agreement did not contemplate that Defendant Bradshaw

would pay any sum. (See id. at 1–2.)

Plaintiff objects to the absence of Defendant Bradshaw’s signature. However, Louisiana

courts have previously upheld agreements between plaintiffs and auto insurer defendants, without

the individual driver defendant. See Thompson, 377 So. 3d at 914, 922–23 (upholding a high/low

agreement entered into by the plaintiff and the auto insurer, releasing all claims against all

defendants). As in this matter, the agreement in Thompson contemplated the insurer, not the driver,

paying all agreed-upon sums to the plaintiff. Id.; see also Randall v. Martin, 03-1311 (La. App. 5

Cir. 02/23/2004), 868 So. 2d 913, 916–918 (finding a release of claims signed by the plaintiff and

the insurance adjuster to be an enforceable agreement under Louisiana law); Boudreaux v. LeBlanc,

517 So. 2d 911, 912, 914 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987) (upholding a compromise and release negotiated

exclusively between the plaintiff and the insurance adjuster).

Plaintiff’s other arguments for invalidating the Agreement are no more availing: Nearly all

of them argue, in essence, that she would not have entered this agreement had she known what the

jury was going to do. (Doc. 131-1 at 1–2.) All settlement agreements are entered into without

knowing what the jury is going to do. Many parties might wish, in a hypothetical alternative

universe, that they had not entered into the Agreement because of the jury’s ultimate actions. This

wish does not provide grounds to invalidate the Agreement. Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory

Judgment here begins to overlap with her Motion for New Trial, which the Court will address

separately. She argues that she would not have entered into the Agreement had she known that the

jury would disregard the jury charges and the weight of the evidence in reaching its conclusion, or

that the foreperson had allegedly misled the attorneys in voir dire. (Id. at 3–9.)

Plaintiff has not asserted that Defendants engaged in “error, fraud, duress, or undue

influence in the confection and execution” of this agreement. Joseph v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.,

18-2061 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So. 3d 579, 591. She instead argues that the jury engaged error and

fraud or, at most, that Defendant Bradshaw engaged in fraud in his testimony before the jury. (Doc.

131-1 at 2, 4–7, 9.) But this is not what Louisiana law contemplates when it bars “error, fraud,

duress, or undue influence in the confection and execution” of this agreement. Joseph, 347 So. 3d

at 591. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that Defendants committed any wrongdoing in the

confection and execution of the Agreement.

As such, the Court will not invalidate the Agreement.

III. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (DOC. 133)

In the Agreement, Plaintiff waived her rights to appeal, motion for new trial, JNOV,

additur/remittitur, or any post-judgment relief other than the right to enforce the Agreement. (Doc.

131-2 at 2.) However, for the sake of completeness, the Court finds each of Plaintiff’s arguments

in her motion for a new trial to be without merit.

A. Parties’ Arguments

a. Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial (Doc. 133)

As an alternative to her Motion for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 131), Plaintiff has also

filed a Motion for New Trial (Doc. 133). She argues that “first, the jury foreman did not answer

voir doir [sic] questions in a manner that allowed for the Plaintiff to assess the jury foreman or to

use the information to attempt to rehabilitate”; next, that “there was a systematic exclusion of

persons of color from jury service”; third, that “there was misconduct by opposing counsel in the

introduction of testimony which wrongfully interjected evidence of Medicaid immediately prior

to deliberations of the Jury”; and fourth, that “the clear weight of the evidence showed serious

error on division of liability to Ms. Elkins in a rear end car accident.” (Doc. 133-1 at 1.)

Plaintiff argues that during voir dire, although the Court asked prospective members of the

jury if they had previously been involved in litigation, “there was no mention of any other litigation

by the jury foreman.” (Id. at 2.) The foreperson was Black, but Plaintiff takes issue with the fact

that she was “the only African American on the jury[.]” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff argues that the panel of

potential jurors was not reflective of the racial demography “of the parishes making up the Middle

District of Louisiana[.]” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff argues that this juror “had not responded to a question

on voir dire seeking to elicit information about previous lawsuits, in particular, the juror had filed

for bankruptcy protection less than a year ago and had multiple cases that went undisclosed.” (Id.

at 3.) According to Plaintiff, “the juror’s failure to disclose money issues that were discovered

through the bankruptcy case filed . . . denied Ms. Elkins the right to an impartial jury.” (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff next contends that “[i]ntroduction of irrelevant and inadmissible evidence of

Medicaid through the reading of the testimony of Dr. Jackson during the trial was prejudicial error

that was read immediately prior to the retirement of the Jury should be reversed.” (Id.) Plaintiff

argues that this information was subject to Louisiana’s law of privilege under the collateral source

rule. (Id. at 4–5.) Although Plaintiff acknowledges that the Court had previously instructed the

parties to confer and redact the depositions so that only the relevant portions would be shared with

the jury, she does not explain in her motion whether the evidence she objects to was read despite

agreed-upon redactions or if it was not redacted. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also acknowledges that she did

not object to Dr. Jackson’s testimony at trial, but she argues that this was because of the Court’s

previous instructions. (Id. at 6.) She argues that she “had no need [to] renew an objection or offer

proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that references to Medicaid

were prejudicial, particularly because the jury foreperson was a medical coder. (Id. at 7.)

In addition, Plaintiff argues that the evidence did “not support an award of 45% fault[]”

and that “there was uncontroverted evidence of injury to the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 2.) She asserts that

the “damages were abusively low.” (Id. at 7.) She argues that “there was no reason” for the jury to

award liability as it did. (Id. at 9.) As such, she urges the Court to grant her motion for alternative

relief. (Id. at 10.)

b. Defendants’ Opposition to the Motion for New Trial (Doc. 139)

In opposition, Defendants again argue that this motion is barred under the high/low

agreement. (Doc. 139 at 1.) Even absent the high/low agreement, however, Defendants assert that

Plaintiff’s argument is meritless. (Id.) First, Defendants point out that Plaintiff “not[ed] the racial

composition of the venire” at the beginning of jury selection, at which point “[t]he Court noted

that there was no racial bias in the manner by which the venire is selected and presented.” (Id. at

2.) Defendants point to a notice from the Clerk of Court’s office that “sets forth the method of the

selection of petit jurors, and the ‘properly programmed electronic data processing system for pure

randomized selection’ that is utilized.” (Id. (citing 139-1).) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims

on this point are unfounded. (Id.)

Next, Defendants turn to Plaintiff’s claim that “because the prospective juror did not

disclose her previous bankruptcy proceeding, [] the Plaintiff was somehow prejudiced in her ability

to assess this potential juror due to this non-disclosure.” (Id.) Defendants point out that “being a

debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding would not have been a basis for a ‘for cause’ strike of a

prospective juror[.]” (Id.) They also note that Plaintiff “is apparently objecting that she did not

have the opportunity for an ‘all-white’ jury by peremptorily striking the only black juror.” (Id.) In

addition, Defendants argue, the information of this juror’s bankruptcy proceedings was “available

for the Plaintiff at any time prior to the verdict in this case (the names of the jurors were provided

to counsel before voir dire even began).” (Id. at 2–3 (emphasis omitted).) Defendants note that

there was “an entire day after the jury was selected and prior to presenting evidence where this

information could have been obtained[.]” (Id. at 3.) They argue that had the Court “deemed this

non-disclosure sufficient grounds to remove the juror, the case would have proceeded with the

seven (7) remaining jurors[,]” which, Defendants argue, would have made no difference in the

unanimous verdict. (Id. (emphasis omitted).)

As to Plaintiff’s argument “that there were ‘improper’ references to Medicaid in Dr. Joe

Jackson’s deposition (which was read to the jury as part of the Defendants’ case)[,]” Defendants

point out that Plaintiff had multiple opportunities to object to these inclusions—but did not do so.

(Id.) As per the Court’s order, Plaintiff was provided with the redacted deposition prior to trial and

did not object to any of the references to Medicaid. (Id.) Nor did she do so at trial. (Id.) In addition,

Defendants assert that “the references to Medicaid had nothing to do with the Plaintiff’s post-

accident medical treatment (or ability to pay [or have someone else to pay for her treatment]), but

whether the Plaintiff would have had an MRI in 2011.” (Id.) They argue further that in Louisiana,

“there is no prohibition to a jury knowing that a plaintiff is a Medicaid beneficiary[.]” (Id.) As a

last note on this point, they argue that “there is no evidence of prejudice to the Plaintiff as the jury

awarded 100% of her claimed past medical expenses in its verdict.” (Id. at 3–4.)

Finally, Defendants turn to Plaintiff’s argument “that the jury erred in its determination of

comparative fault and the assessment of fault on her.” (Id. at 4.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff

misunderstands “the law regarding the presumption of fault on a following motorist[.]” (Id.)

Defendants note that Plaintiff objected multiple times “to an instruction for sudden

emergency/comparative fault being given to the jury.” (Id.) The Court ruled that “there was

sufficient evidence presented that would allow a jury to consider sudden emergency and allocate

comparative fault.” (Id.) Defendants argue that the jury chose to believe the statement of Plaintiff

herself “to the officer at the scene (as well as to a number of her medical providers) as to how the

accident happened[.]” (Id.) As a result, Defendants contend, “there was more than sufficient

evidence before the jury for them to apportion fault to the Plaintiff and they were reasonable in

doing so.” (Id.) Defendants argue that there was no error, “much less ‘prejudicial’ error, which

would provide basis for a new trial[,]” and that “[t]he fact that the Plaintiff did not like or agree

with the outcome of the trial does not make it ‘unfair’ warranting a new trial.” (Id. at 5.) Defendants

ask the Court to not only deny Plaintiff’s motion but to impose sanctions. (Id. at 5–6.)

c. Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 141)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that she may have been able to look into jurors as soon as she

received their names, but she “had no reason to suspect any inordinate behavior by any prospective

juror . . . until the Jury Verdict was read by the Court . . . and [questions] arose first in the form of

the Jury Foreperson.” (Doc. 141 at 1–2.) She contends that if the foreperson had been removed,

the verdict may have been different because of “the dynamics of the Jury deliberations[.]” (Id. at

2.) Plaintiff then again attempts to relitigate the case and claims that she is “asking the Judge to

substitute his Judgement based on the Evidence from any fact finding at trial that was NOT based

on the Evidence.” (Id. at 2–3.)

B. Legal Standards

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the Court “may, on motion, grant a new

trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party—as follows: (A) after a jury trial, for any reason

for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(a)(1)(A). “Under Rule 59, a new trial may be granted if ‘the verdict is against the weight of

the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was

committed in its course.’” Gaddy v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 3d 140, 149 (E.D. La.

2020) (quoting Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations

omitted)) (citing McFadden v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 04-2547, 2006 WL 3087164, at *2 (E.D. La.

Oct. 27, 2006)). “A district court, however, should attempt to avoid substituting its judgment for

the jury’s considered verdict, so as to not violate the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sorina v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., No. 90-2967,

1992 WL 40840, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 20, 1992)) (citing Wright v. Nat’l Interstate Ins. Co., No. 16-

16214, 2018 WL 2017567, at *3 (E.D. La. May 1, 2018), aff’d, 762 F. App’x 201 (5th Cir. 2019)).

C. Analysis

Most seriously, Plaintiff argues that people of color were improperly excluded from jury

service. (Doc. 133-1 at 1.) She argues both that the only Black member of the jury withheld

relevant information, (id. at 3), an argument which the Court will address below, and that the panel

was not representative of the racial makeup of East Baton Rouge Parish, (id. at 4). Plaintiff points

to Duren v. Missouri, in which the Supreme Court emphasized “that ‘jury wheels, pools of names,

panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups

in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.’” Duren, 439 U.S. 357,

363–64 (1979) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). While Duren dealt with a

criminal trial—and indeed, much of the case law on racial bias in jury selections focuses on

criminal trials—the Supreme Court has stated that “discrimination on the basis of race in selecting

a jury in a civil proceeding harms the excluded juror no less than discrimination in a criminal trial.”

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991). To make a prima facie showing

“that the jury venires were not selected from a fair cross-section of the community[,]” Plaintiff

must show “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2)

that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and

reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this

underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”

United States v. Sanders, 133 F.4th 341, 372 (5th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364).

Plaintiff argues only that “[i]n the panel for potential jurors, only four persons of color out

of twenty-eight persons appeared.” (Doc. 133-1 at 4.) As the Court informed the parties at the time,

it uses “a two-step process to select jurors.” (Doc. 139-1 at 1.) First, it creates a “master jury wheel

. . . every two years following general elections by selecting names at random from Louisiana voter

registration lists and licensed drivers/identification card holder lists who are U.S. Citizens and over

18 years of age from each parish in this district.” (Id.) “Then, names are randomly drawn

periodically from the master jury wheel to receive juror qualification questionnaires[,]” the

answers to which determine whether individuals “are legally qualified to serve.” (Id.) Those legally

qualified to serve “are put on a second wheel, a qualified jury wheel.” (Id.) When a panel is needed

for a trial or grand jury, “juror summonses are sent to persons randomly selected from the qualified

wheel.” (Id.) In addition, the Court uses “a properly programmed electronic data processing system

for pure randomized selection.” (Id.) Any number of factors, therefore, can contribute to the

makeup of a panel, including voter registration, whether a person has a driver’s license or an

identification card, legal qualifications to serve, and the randomness inherent in each wheel.

Furthermore, the Court has no control over which of the persons called for jury service actually

appear. Plaintiff’s evidence on this ground is merely the overall racial makeup of East Baton Rouge

Parish, which does not speak to the racial makeup of those registered to vote or in possession of

legal identification, or those legally qualified to serve as jurors. (See Doc. 133-1 at 4.)

Consequently, Plaintiff has not shown “underrepresentation [] due to systematic exclusion of the

group in the jury-selection process.” Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a new trial has ever been granted in federal court due to

a juror’s failing to disclose a prior bankruptcy. She points to McDonough Power Equip., Inc., v.

Greenwood, in which the Supreme Court stated: “To invalidate the result of a [three-week] trial

because of a juror’s mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on something closer

to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give.” McDonough, 464 U.S. 548, 555

(1984). The holding in McDonough is, in other words, precisely the opposite of what Plaintiff

asserts: The Supreme Court held that “[t]he Court of Appeals was mistaken in deciding as it did

that respondents were entitled to a new trial.” Id. at 556.

The Court’s standard voir dire asks: “Has anyone in the jury panel been a party to a lawsuit,

either as the plaintiff (the party bringing the claim) or the defendant (the party against whom the

claim has been made)?” (Standard Voir Dire Questions for Civil Jury Trials,

https://www.lamd.uscourts.gov/content/judge-john-w-degravelles (last visited Nov. 14, 2025).) It

does not inquire about bankruptcy proceedings. (See id.) Bankruptcy petitions typically do not use

the terms “lawsuit,” “plaintiff,” or “defendant” but instead use “bankruptcy” or “petition,”

“debtor,” and “creditor.” (See Doc. 133-2.) For a nonlawyer, the question of whether to include a

bankruptcy when asked about lawsuits would potentially be confusing given this different

terminology. At most, this is “a juror’s mistaken, though honest response to a question,” which

will not lead the Court to invalidate the result of this trial. See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555.

In any case, Plaintiff has not shown that she was prejudiced. Plaintiff argues that this

information was relevant because of “the juror’s failure to disclose money issues[.]” (Doc. 133-1

at 4.) But the Court’s standard voir dire does not include broad questions about “money issues,”

nor did Plaintiff seek voir dire on financial difficulties or bankruptcies. (See Doc. 87.) Plaintiff

sought voir dire on lawsuits related to insurance companies, “collection letter[s] or overdue

notice[s] for a medical bill that [one’s] insurance company was supposed to pay,” and finances

related to insurance companies. (Doc. 87 at 3–5.) The Court does not require jurors to volunteer

un-asked-for information, nor does it require jurors to read the minds of counsel. To do so would

be “to insist on something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give[]”—

or indeed, than any person can be expected to give. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555.

Next, the Court looks to Plaintiff’s argument that inadmissible evidence was introduced.

(Doc. 133-1 at 4.) Plaintiff asserts that evidence of her enrollment in Medicaid was introduced,

which she claims was subject to the collateral source rule. (Id.) Defendants note correctly that

Plaintiff did not object to this reference to Medicaid prior to trial, at trial, or at any point prior to

this filing. (Doc. 139 at 3.) Furthermore, the references to Medicaid had to do with an MRI in

2011, not Plaintiff’s medical treatment following this accident. (Id.)

The Louisiana Civil Code of Evidence states that “[i]n a civil case, evidence of furnishing

or offering or promising to pay expenses or losses occasioned by an injury to person or damage to

property is not admissible to prove liability for the injury or damage nor is it admissible to mitigate,

reduce, or avoid liability therefor.” La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 409. It adds, “This Article does not

require the exclusion of such evidence when it is offered solely for another purpose, such as to

enforce a contract for payment.” Id. “The collateral source rule precludes evidence of payments

received from an independent source from admission at trial against the tortfeasor to mitigate,

reduce, or avoid liability.” Thomassie v. Amedisys LA Acquisitions, LLC, 2020-01229 (La.

1/20/21), 308 So. 3d 1165, 1165 (citing Bozeman v. State, 2003-1016 (La. 7/2/04) 879 So. 2d 692,

698; La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 409). The Louisiana Supreme Court has “rejected a traditional

application of the collateral source rule in favor of a rule more narrowly tailored to better conform

with the compensatory goal of tort recovery.” Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 2007-1335 (La.

4/18/08), 980 So. 2d. 654, 669. It “reasoned that whether the collateral source rule applies depends

to a certain extent upon whether the victim has procured the collateral benefits for himself or has

in some manner sustained a diminution in his or her patrimony in order to secure the collateral

benefits such that he or she is not merely reaping a windfall or double recovery.” Id. Plaintiff has

made no arguments regarding this question—not prior to trial, at trial, or in this motion. (See Doc.

133-1 at 4.) She has not, therefore, shown that she is entitled to a new trial on this ground.

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are, largely, that she disagrees with the jury’s verdict. (Id.

at 7–10.) On a Rule 59(a) motion, it is not the role of the Court to “substitute[e] its judgment for

the jury’s considered verdict[.]” Gaddy, 446 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (cleaned up). After Plaintiff rested,

Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50. (Doc. 121.) The Court denied it.

(Id.) The Court has repeatedly found that there are questions in this matter best decided by a jury,

denying both this motion from Defendants and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in 2019.

(Doc. 15.) In a jury trial, the Court is not the finder of fact—the jury is. The jury here deliberated

for approximately two hours. (Doc. 121 at 2.) At the end of its deliberations, the jury decided that

Plaintiff was 45% at fault and Defendant Bradshaw was 55% at fault. (Doc. 124 at 2.) It did so

after hearing testimony from both Plaintiff and Defendant Bradshaw, as well as a number of

witnesses. (See Docs. 117, 118, 120, 121.)

As Plaintiff herself noted, the Court instructed the jury that “the law has established a

rebuttable presumption that a following motorist who strikes a preceding motorist from the rear

has breached the standard of conduct prescribed by Louisiana Revised Statute Sect. 32:81(A) and

is therefore liable for the accident.” (Doc. 131 at 2 (emphasis omitted).) The jury was free to decide

that Defendant had rebutted that presumption in whole or in part and apportion liability

accordingly. The jury found Defendant to have been negligent and 55% at fault. The jury chose to

apportion liability according to the testimony it believed. Plaintiff has not presented the Court with

any reason to rule that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; instead, she merely that

disagrees with the jury’s assessment of the evidence presented. (Doc. 133-1 at 2, 7–9.)

“If the jury’s verdict is ‘clearly within the universe of possible awards which are supported

by the evidence,’ the district court should not grant a new trial.” Gaddy, 446 F. Supp. 3d at 149

(quoting Narcisse v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co., 620 F.2d 544, 547 (5th Cir. 1980)). “A district court

should not interfere with the factfinder’s award of damages unless it is in an amount that ‘shock[s]

the judicial conscience and . . . raise[s] an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption

or other improper cause invaded the trial.’” Id. (quoting Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 578 (5th Cir.

1991)). The jury’s verdict that Defendant was 55% at fault was clearly within universe of

possibilities. It awarded Plaintiff $236,017.93, which once reduced by the liability/fault

apportioned to Plaintiff, was $129,809.96. This was also clearly within the universe of possible

awards, given that Plaintiff herself agreed to a high/low agreement that contemplated the

possibility of a low award below $150,000.00. (Doc. 131-2 at 1.)

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that “[n]o future medical expenses were awarded[,]” which

she claims is an error. (Doc. 133-1 at 8.) She asserts—without citing to any record evidence—that

she is in need of “continuing treatment from her neck injury which is new” and “her lower back

which is exacerbated.” (Id.) But Defendants argue that “Plaintiff had an extensive pre-accident

history for both her neck and back and had been actively treating with a pain management doctor

in Mississippi (Dr. Joseph Jackson) for years prior to the accident for ongoing cervical and lumbar

complaints.” (Doc. 109 at 3.) Dr. Jackson’s deposition testimony was read at trial. (Doc. 121 at 1.)

Numerous other witnesses also testified as to Plaintiff’s medical treatment. (Docs. 118, 120.)

Again, the jury was free to believe whatever admissible testimony it found most credible. The jury

could have reasonably found that any future treatment for Plaintiff’s neck and lower back was not

due to the accident but to pre-existing injuries and therefore declined to award damages for future

medical expenses. Since this is within the universe of possible awards, the Court will not interfere

with the jury’s award of damages. See Gaddy, 446 F. Supp. 3d at 149.

Plaintiff has given the Court no reason to vacate the jury’s verdict and award of damages.

IV. SANCTIONS

Defendants seek sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel in both their opposition to her

Motion for Declaratory Judgment and their opposition to her Motion for New Trial. (Docs. 139,

140.) However, Defendants provide no legal basis for their request for sanctions. If this is a motion

for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then it “must be made

separately from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates

Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Accordingly, Defendants’ request for sanctions is denied.

V. MOTION TO INTERVENE (DOC. 156)

A. Parties’ Arguments

a. Bayou Medical Management’s Motion to Intervene (Doc. 156)

Bayou Medical Management argues that it has “a justifiable interest in the principal action

and, as such, names all parties therein as Defendants-in-Intervention, namely, Kimberlana Elkins,

Joe Edward Bradshaw, and GEICO Casualty Insurance Company.” (Doc. 156 at ¶ 2.) It asserts that

it “is a preferred provider organization that facilitates the provision of medical services to

individuals through a network of healthcare providers, hospitals, and facilities contracted by BMM

PPO.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) Bayou Medical Management claims that it entered into an agreement with

Plaintiff Elkins to pay her providers for their medical services related to this accident. (Id. at ¶¶ 4–

5.) As part of this agreement, it asserts, she assigned Bayou Medical Management her interest in

the proceeds from this suit. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Bayou Medical Management claims that “[t]he treatment

facilitated” following Plaintiff’s accident “through BMM PPO’s provider and facility totals

$140,764.15” as of March 3, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 16.) It “consequently makes a claim against the funds

which may be recovered by Plaintiff, Kimberlana Elkins, and/or deposited into the registry of the

Court in the full sum of $140,764.15.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) It asks the Court to grant its motion to intervene

and award it the $140,764.15, “plus legal interest from the date of deposit, for the medical bills of

Kimberlana Elkins[,]” as well as “any future medical costs incurred by Kimberlana Elkins, which

are related to the accident at issue in this matter and facilitated through BMM PPO, LLC[,]” and

“[f]or all just and equitable relief, and for all costs of this proceeding.” (Id. at ¶ 18.)

b. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion to Intervene (Doc. 150)

Defendant GEICO argues that the Court should not address the motion to intervene until it

has disposed of the motion for declaratory judgment and the motion for new trial. (Doc. 150 at 1.)

It contends that “this matter is ‘closed’ such that there appears to be a procedural impediment to

the instant Motion,” and it argues that if the Court were to deny those two motions—as it now

has—“there will be no matter into which to intervene[.]” (Id.)

B. Legal Standards

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court “must permit

anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the

subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair

or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent

that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. The Fifth Circuit has explained that a motion under this rule “is

proper when: ‘(1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the potential intervener (sic) asserts an

interest that is related to the property or transaction that forms the basis of the controversy in the

case into which she seeks to intervene; (3) the disposition of that case may impair or impede the

potential intervener’s ability to protect her interest; and (4) the existing parties do not adequately

represent the potential intervener’s interest.’” Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 753 (5th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Saldano v. Roach, 363 F.3d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 2004)). “A movant must show that she

satisfies each factor of the above test to be entitled to intervene.” Guenther v. BP Ret. Accumulation

Plan, 50 F.4th 536, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th

Cir. 2015)). “Intervention should generally be allowed where ‘no one would be hurt and greater

justice could be attained.’” Ross, 426 F.3d at 753 (quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205

(5th Cir. 1994)). However, “[t]he intervention rule is intended to prevent multiple lawsuits where

common questions of law or fact are involved but is not intended to allow the creation of whole

new lawsuits by the intervenors.” Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 525 (5th Cir. 1994).

C. Analysis

a. Timeliness

The Fifth Circuit “has identified four factors, sometimes referred to as the Stallworth

factors, to determine whether a motion to intervene is timely: the length of time the movant waited

to file, the prejudice to the existing parties from any delay, the prejudice to the movant if

intervention is denied, and any unusual circumstances.” Rostain v. Mendez, 986 F.3d 931, 937 (5th

Cir. 2021) (citing Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264–66 (5th Cir. 1977)). The Fifth

Circuit has found that “intervention could be allowed post-judgment provided that the rights of

existing parties were not prejudiced and intervention did not interfere with the orderly processes

of the court.” Ross, 426 F.3d at 754 (citing Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 266). It has stated that where a

party “sought to intervene for the limited purpose of protecting its subrogation interest in a fund

which had not yet been distributed, we cannot conclude that the motion to intervene was untimely

merely because it came a few hours after the entry of judgment.” McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co.,

430 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1970); see also McClenny Moseley & Assocs., P.L.L.C. v. Equal

Access Just. Fund. L.P., No. 23-30670, 2024 WL 2874371 (5th Cir. June 7, 2024) (finding that a

petition filed within thirteen days of a relevant district court order was timely).

This, however, was not a motion to intervene filed a few hours or days after the entry of

judgment. Bayou Medical Management did not file this motion to intervene until March 2023,

(Docs. 148, 156)—approximately sixteen months after the judgment in this case, (Doc. 129), and

over four years after the case was first filed, (Doc. 1). Plaintiff assigned her interests in the proceeds

from this claim or lawsuit to Bayou Medical Management in March 2018, at which time she also

informed Bayou Medical Management of the instant suit. (Doc. 170-2 at 3.) Given this timeline,

it is difficult for the Court to find this intervention timely. The Court will acknowledge that it is

unlikely that there is any prejudice to Defendants as a result of the delay, but because Bayou

Medical Management requests interest, the delay does prejudice Plaintiff.

As to prejudice to Bayou Medical Management: This assignment of rights is, in essence, a

contract between Bayou Medical Management and Plaintiff, and should Plaintiff fail to abide by

the terms of the contract, Bayou Medical Management can certainly pursue legal action against

Plaintiff. Its rights are not reliant on this intervention. On the other hand, allowing an intervention

that would force the Court to decide contractual disputes involving a new party seven years into a

motor vehicle personal injury case and four years after a jury verdict in that case would “interfere

with the orderly processes of the court.” Ross, 426 F.3d at 754 (citing Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 266).

The Court finds the intervention was not timely filed.

b. Interest in Property or Transaction

Next, in determining whether the potential intervenor “asserts an interest that is related to

the property or transaction that forms the basis of the controversy in the case into which she seeks

to intervene[,]” Ross, 426 F.3d at 753 (quoting Saldano, 363 F.3d at 551), the Court emphasizes

that a jury verdict and judgment were reached in this matter in October 2021, (Docs. 124, 129).

Bayou Medical Management asserts an interest in the funds awarded by the jury. (Doc. 156 at 4.)

Had this been a timely intervention, its interest would have been related to the property or

transaction at issue.

c. Ability to Protect Interests

The Court does not, however, find that “the disposition of [this] case may impair or impede

the potential intervener’s ability to protect her interest[,]” Ross, 426 F.3d at 753, because, again,

this case was disposed of four years ago, (Docs. 124, 129). Plaintiff’s attempts to revive her case

play no role in Bayou Medical Management’s motion. (See Doc. 156.) Even if they did, Bayou

Medical Management could protect its interests equally well with a suit to enforce any breach of

contract on the part of Plaintiff.

d. Adequate Existing Representation of Interests

Finally, with respect to the question of whether the existing parties adequately represent

Bayou Medical Management’s interest: Bayou Medical Management’s interest is in the “funds

recovered by or on behalf of Plaintiff, Kimberlana Elkins, in connection with her claim against the

defendants to this matter.” (Doc. 156 at ¶ 1.) When there were questions of liability and damages

pending between Plaintiff Elkins and Defendants, Plaintiff Elkins adequately represented Bayou

Medical Management’s interests; it was in the interest of both to pursue the largest feasible

damages award to Plaintiff. Now, Bayou Medical Management seeks to recover some portion of

those funds, raising new claims with new questions of law and fact, in which Plaintiff may not

adequately represent its interests.

Bayou Medical Management seeks, in essence, to graft a contractual claim against Plaintiff

Elkins onto this case, in which the jury reached a verdict nearly four years ago. Because Bayou

Medical Management’s Motion to Intervene is far from timely, because Plaintiff adequately

represented its interests in the initial suit, and because Bayou Medical Management is able to

protect its interests in this new controversy equally well with an independent suit against Plaintiff

Elkins for any breach of contract should the need arise, the Court denies Bayou Medical

Management’s Motion to Intervene.

VI. MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT (DOC. 168)

Finally, the Court turns to Defendant GEICO’s Motion to Enforce Settlement (Doc. 168).

A. Parties’ Arguments

a. Defendant GEICO’s Motion to Enforce Settlement (Doc. 168)

Defendant GEICO asks the Court to enforce the high/low settlement agreement, noting that

after the jury returned its verdict and the Court signed the judgment, “counsel for Defendants sent

the settlement proceeds for $150,000.00 and a satisfaction of judgment to counsel for the Plaintiff,

which was refused.” (Doc. 168-1 at 2.) Instead, Defendant GEICO argues, Plaintiff filed the

motions for declaratory judgment and for new trial (Docs. 131, 133), which GEICO opposed

(Docs. 139, 140). (Doc. 168-1 at 2.) GEICO asserts that it “has patiently waited for the Plaintiff to

evidence her willingness to accept the settlement proceeds; however, to date, she has not done so.”

(Id. at 3.) It argues that it filed this motion to enforce the settlement “in the interest of bringing

finality to this matter[.]” (Id.)

GEICO argues that the Court has jurisdiction over this matter due to Bayou Medical

Management’s motion to intervene, (id. at 4), and that Louisiana law should apply to the Court’s

analysis of the enforceability of the settlement, (id. at 5).

b. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Enforce Settlement (Doc. 171)

In her Opposition, Plaintiff reiterates many of her arguments from her earlier motions.

(Doc. 171.) She argues that there was no meeting of the minds, objects to Mr. Bradshaw’s absence,

and asserts that GEICO’s motion for a directed verdict—which the Court denied—voided the

Agreement. (Id. at 1.) While the first two of these were raised in Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory

judgment, the third is novel. Plaintiff asserts that GEICO’s motion for a directed verdict raised an

outcome unforeseen by the Agreement—a non-jury verdict—and therefore voided the Agreement

altogether. (Id. at 5–8.) Plaintiff argues that the request by defense counsel for a directed verdict

constituted fraud. (Id. at 8.) She also briefly argues that under the terms of the Agreement, GEICO

must pay the $236,017.93 awarded by the jury before the allocation of fault. (Id.)

c. Bayou Medical Management’s Opposition to Motion to Enforce Settlement

(Doc. 170)

Bayou Medical Management argues only that the Motion to Enforce “is premature” given

Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Motion for New Trial. (Doc. 170 at 3.) It argues

that its rights are not affected by the Agreement (which Plaintiff entered into over a year before

Bayou Medical Management’s Motion to Intervene, (see Doc. 131-2; Doc. 148)), and continues to

assert its rights to the funds in question, (Doc. 170 at 3–4). It also notes that “[s]hould the alleged

settlement amount of $150,000 not cover the amount owed to BMM PPO, BMM PPO’s rights

against Plaintiff to recover full payment shall remain.” (Id. at 5.)

d. Defendant GEICO’s Reply (Doc. 174)

Defendant GEICO argues that Bayou Medical Management’s opposition here is,

essentially, irrelevant since it “is not a party to the agreement.” (Doc. 174 at 2.) It maintains that

Plaintiff’s arguments are contrary to facts, law, and common sense. (Id. at 3.) As such, GEICO

requests that the Court grant the Motion to Enforce Settlement. (Id. at 5.)

B. Legal Standards

“A court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement when it has retained jurisdiction.”

Cavalier v. State of Louisiana: Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 21-656, 2023 WL 3594155, at *2 (M.D.

La. Feb. 24, 2023) (citing Richardson v. Famous Bourbon Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 857 F. App’x 182,

183–84 (5th Cir. 2021)).

“Louisiana jurisprudence has a ‘strong policy favoring compromise agreements and

finality of settlements.’” Thompson, 377 So. 3d at 920 (quoting Brown, 630 So. 2d at 757). The

law “does not sanction the solemn acts of contending parties settling their disagreements being

lightly brushed aside, unless there be present evidence of bad faith, error, fraud, etc.” Id. (quoting

Beck, 145 So. at 811).

C. Analysis

Here, the parties expressly did not waive the right to “post judgment relief . . . to enforce

this agreement[,]” showing that they contemplated the Court enforcing the Agreement. (Doc. 131-

2 at 2.) And indeed, courts have distinguished settlement agreements that result in the dismissal of

claims, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994), from the type of

high/low agreement that is not intended to fully terminate the case but instead still relies on the

actions of the jury or the court, see Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 357 (5th

Cir. 2007) (high/low agreement based on the outcome of appeals); Thrapp v. Armstrong World

Indus., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 822, 822–23 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (high/low agreement in state court based

on outcome of jury trial did not constitute final settlement against in-state defendants to allow

removal); Cameron v. Werner Enters., No. 13-243, 2016 WL 660940, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 18,

2016) (high/low agreement based on outcome of trial was not enforceable by a non-party, but court

did not reject jurisdiction); Admiral Ins. Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 471 B.R. 687, 695 (N.D.

Tex. 2012) (high/low agreement based on outcome of summary judgment motion); Boudreaux v.

Transocean Deepwater, Inc., 641 F. App’x 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2016) (high/low agreement based on

outcome of summary judgment motion and subsequent appeals). Courts have generally not

hesitated to enforce high/low agreements such as these. See Boudreaux, 641 F. App’x at 331, 335

(remanding but still finding the high/low agreement enforceable by the district court).

The Court finds that, unlike the type of settlement agreement that dismisses a case pursuant

to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), this high/low agreement did not contemplate a dismissal of all claims. (See

Doc. 131-2.) It instead required that Defendant GEICO pay Plaintiff a sum of $150,000.00 to

$1,400,000.00, depending on the jury’s verdict and award. (Id. at 1.) In exchange, both parties

would waive certain rights. (Id. at 1–2.) However, they would not waive “the right to enforce this

agreement.” (Id. at 2.) The Court finds that the parties contemplated and contracted for the

enforcement of the high/low agreement as the only non-waived post-judgment relief, in this Court

or on appeal. (See id.) As a result, the Court has jurisdiction to enforce the high/low agreement.

The Court has previously found Plaintiff’s first two arguments against enforcing the

Agreement to be without merit. Plaintiff has not raised any new meritorious arguments here. With

respect to her third argument—that Defendant’s motion for directed verdict voided the

Agreement—the Court looks to the terms of the Agreement: “The parties have agreed to a high/low

agreement regarding the verdict of the jury in the trial of this matter.” (Doc. 131-2 at 1.) They set

a high, “which will apply to any verdict above $1,400,000.00,” of $1,400,000.00. (Id.) They set a

low, “which will apply to any verdict under $150,000.00,” of $150,000.00. (Id.) They waived rights

to appeal, motions for new trial, JNOV, additur/remittitur, and post-judgment relief other than the

right to enforce the Agreement. (Id. at 2.) They did not waive the right to pursue motions for

directed verdicts. (See id. at 1–2.) Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[w]hen the words of a

contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may

be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La. Civ. Code art. 2046. This language is clear, explicit,

and unambiguous: The parties contracted away the uncertainty inherent in the range of awards that

could result from a jury verdict, and in exchange, they waived their rights to certain post-judgment

relief. (See Doc. 131-2 at 1–2.) Because this contract is clear, explicit, and leads to no absurd

consequences, it is not this Court’s role to attempt to peer into the parties’ minds for what their

intent may or may not have been when they formed this contract on October 22, 2021. Instead, it

is the Court’s role to enforce the Agreement as written.

In addition, Plaintiff’s claim that she is owed the full $236,017.93 ignores the jury’s actual

verdict, which apportioned 55% of the fault to Defendant Bradshaw and 45% to Plaintiff Elkins.

(Doc. 124 at 2.) Here, the jury did as instructed: They did “not make any actual monetary reduction

in the figure [they] reach[ed] based on the percentages of fault,” but rather allowed the Court to

“make the appropriate reduction” (i.e., 45%). (Id. at 3.) In the Judgment, the Court did the math,

resulting in the award of $129,809.96. (Doc. 129 at 2.) Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.

Finally, the Court notes that Bayou Medical Management’s contention that it maintains

claims against Plaintiff regardless of the Court’s determination on this matter simply supports the

Court’s denial of Bayou Medical Management’s Motion to Intervene. (Doc. 170 at 3–5.) Bayou

Medical Management’s interests do not rely upon the outcome of this matter. They are best pursued

independently of this action.

VII. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that 1) the Motion To For [sic] Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 131) filed

by Plaintiff Kimberlana Elkins is DENIED; 2) Plaintiff’s Alternative Motion for Relief from Jury

Verdict for New Trial Pursuant to FRCP 59(a) (Doc. 133) is likewise DENIED; 3) Bayou Medical

Management’s Motion to Intervene on Behalf of Bayou Medical Management, Preferred Provider

Organization, LLC (Doc. 148-2) is also DENIED; and 4) the Motion to Enforce Settlement (Doc.

168) filed by Defendant GEICO Casualty Company is GRANTED. However, Defendant

GEICO’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on November 14, 2025.

S

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA