Opinion

Niter v. Brown

Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Nov 14, 2025
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
Prisoner w/ Counsel
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.9%

“We will not raise and discuss legal issues that [Plaintiff] has failed to assert.”

How later courts described this case

  • “We will not raise and discuss legal issues that [Plaintiff] has failed to assert.”
  • holding the plaintiff failed to state a claim where he alleged that the defendant had a policy of allowing officers to use excessive force, but offered no facts in support of this allegation beyond the circumstances of his own case

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 24-10961 Document: 67-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/14/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

November 14, 2025

No. 24-10961

Lyle W. Cayce

Summary Calendar

Clerk

____________

Myisha Niter, on behalf of minor children, C.W., C.W., and C.W.,

the children of Christopher Darnell Williams (Decedent);

George Williams, Individually as Father of Christopher

Darnell Williams (Decedent),

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Marian Brown, in her official capacity as Sheriff of Dallas County;

Does, in their Individual and official capacity as agents/employees of Dallas

County Sheriff’s Office; Dallas County; Texas Department of

Public Safety,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:23-CV-1621

______________________________

Before Davis, Jones, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

Case: 24-10961 Document: 67-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/14/2025

No. 24-10961

Christopher Darnell Williams died by suicide while detained in Dallas

County Jail. His family sued the Texas Department of Public Safety,

(“TDPS”), Dallas County, Sheriff Marian Brown, and unknown jail

employees. Plaintiff-Appellants brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging Defendant-Appellees failed to monitor Williams and removed him

from a mental health unit without proper evaluation. The district court

dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims. We AFFIRM.

Plaintiffs do not brief, and have therefore abandoned, any challenge to

two aspects of the dismissal. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims

against TDPS without prejudice based on sovereign immunity. And, it

dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against the unknown jail employees based on

limitations and failure to serve. Because Plaintiffs have not briefed these

rulings, they are AFFIRMED. 1

As to Plaintiffs’ claims against Dallas County and Sheriff Brown in her

official capacity, the district court found that Plaintiffs failed to plead

sufficient facts to allege a plausible Monell claim. We agree. To state a Monell

claim which meets federal pleading standards, 2 a plaintiff must allege a

municipal policymaker promulgated a “policy or custom” that was the

_____________________

1

See Brinkmann v. Dal. Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.

1987) (“We will not raise and discuss legal issues that [Plaintiff] has failed to assert.”).

2

Although Plaintiffs cite Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), for the assertion that mere notice pleading is

sufficient for a municipal liability claim, this is incorrect. See Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948

F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e note that the ordinary Twombly pleading standard

applies. It is, of course, true that Leatherman, a pre-Twombly case, held that courts must not

apply a ‘heightened’ pleading standard to Monell claims. However, Leatherman did not

require courts to accept ‘generic or boilerplate’ pleadings in this case or in any other

context. Indeed, our precedents make clear that the Twombly standard applies to municipal

liability claims.”).

2

Case: 24-10961 Document: 67-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/14/2025

No. 24-10961

“moving force” of an alleged constitutional violation. 3 “To proceed beyond

the pleading stage, a complaint’s description of a policy or custom and its

relationship to the underlying constitutional violation cannot be conclusory;

it must contain specific facts.” 4

Here, Plaintiffs did not plead facts plausibly alleging Defendants had

a “policy” that led to Williams’ death. True, Plaintiffs allege Defendants

failed to regularly monitor inmates as required by state law. But beyond the

circumstances of their own case, Plaintiffs allege no facts showing a broader

policy. We have repeatedly held in similar cases that a conclusory allegation

of the existence of a policy, coupled with the facts of a plaintiff’s own case, is

insufficient to adequately plead the “policy” element of a Monell claim. 5

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed.

Finally, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim against Sheriff

Brown in her individual capacity based on qualified immunity. “Qualified

immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly

established constitutional right.” 6 “[P]retrial detainees have a Fourteenth

Amendment right to be protected from a known risk of suicide.” 7 Thus, jail

officials violate a detainee’s constitutional rights if they “gained actual

_____________________

3

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

4

Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018).

5

See id. (holding the plaintiff failed to state a Monell claim where she alleged the

city had a policy of tasing juvenile non-suspects because “the only specific fact in the

complaint is the single incident in which [plaintiff] was involved” and “a plaintiff must do

more than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion); Ratliff, 948 F.3d at 285 (holding the plaintiff failed to state a claim where he

alleged that the defendant had a policy of allowing officers to use excessive force, but

offered no facts in support of this allegation beyond the circumstances of his own case).

6

Converse v. City of Kemah, 961 F.3d 771, 774 (5th Cir. 2020).

7

Id.

3

Case: 24-10961 Document: 67-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/14/2025

No. 24-10961

knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide and responded with deliberate

indifference.” 8 But here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Brown knew Williams

was at risk of suicide. In fact, as the district court observes, “Plaintiffs do not

allege that Brown was at the jail when Decedent was there or that she was

personally involved in decisions regarding his confinement.” Because

Plaintiffs have not alleged that Brown acted with deliberate indifference to

Williams’s constitutional rights, dismissal of their § 1983 claim against

Brown was proper.

AFFIRMED.

_____________________

8

Id. (emphasis added).

4

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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