The opinion
J-S28029-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
VEGAS GIBSON :
:
Appellant : No. 13 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 21, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0001851-2004
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 14, 2025
Appellant, Vegas Gibson, appeals pro se from the order entered on
November 21, 2024, denying his sixth petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
Appellant was charged with various criminal offenses following a fatal
shooting in February 2002. We previously stated:
[O]n May 16, 2005, a jury found Appellant guilty of one count
each of criminal homicide, former convict not to own a firearm, []
recklessly endangering another person, and two counts of
aggravated assault. On July 26, 2005, the trial court imposed a
sentence of life in prison without [the] possibility of parole.
Appellant's initial PCRA petition was withdrawn in favor of a direct
appeal. This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on
November 22, 2006. Our Supreme Court denied his petition for
allowance of appeal on April 25, 2007.
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 249 A.3d 1136, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(non-precedential decision). Appellant subsequently filed five prior PCRA
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petitions in 2008, 2012, 2016 (two petitions filed), and 2019; all were
dismissed by the PCRA court and each subsequent appeal to this Court was
unsuccessful. Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his sixth PCRA
petition, on August 4, 2023. On September 23, 2024, Appellant filed a
supplemental pro se PCRA petition. On September 26, 2024, the PCRA court
notified Appellant of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant responded on October 27, 2024. The PCRA court
dismissed Appellant’s most recent PCRA petition on November 21, 2024. This
timely pro se appeal resulted.1
On appeal pro se, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the Commonwealth suppressed material exculpatory
and impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
372 U.S. 83 (1963) and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,
269-271 (1959), thereby depriving [] Appellant of due process
rights guaranteed by our Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution[?]
B. Whether [] Appellant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment
constitutional right to counsel when Appellant was forced to
represent himself at the critical arraignment without a colloquy
to ascertain his understanding of the proceedings or the
charges against him, thereby voiding Appellant’s convictions
and sentences[?2]
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1 Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on December 19, 2024,
pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 700
A.2d 423 (Pa. 1997). The PCRA court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) on February 20, 2025.
2 Upon review of the certified record, Appellant did not raise this issue in his
most current PCRA petition. As such, we are constrained to find this claim
waived for failing to raise the issue below and raising it for the first time on
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant’s Pro Se Brief, at 3 (compete capitalization omitted).
In his first issue presented, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth
withheld “five pieces of exculpatory and impeachment evidence” regarding
“key witness, Jason Brown” showing Brown received a deal to testify against
Appellant in exchange for the dismissal of “serious violent charges” pending
against Brown who was wanted in another criminal matter at the time of
Appellant’s trial.3 Id. at 6-8. In his pro se PCRA petition, Appellant claimed
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appeal. Appellant's claim is waived, due to his failure to include it in his PCRA
petition. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004)
(“We have stressed that a claim not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. We have reasoned that permitting a PCRA
petitioner to append new claims to the appeal already on review would
wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the PCRA.
The proper vehicle for raising this claim is thus not the instant appeal, but
rather is a subsequent PCRA petition.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues
not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.”).
3 More specifically, in his pro se memorandum of law in support of his PCRA
petition, Appellant alleged that in 2004, the Commonwealth charged Brown
with attempted homicide, criminal conspiracy, and related criminal offenses,
in an unrelated matter, but that those charges were ultimately dismissed for
lack of prima facie evidence as presented at the preliminary hearing.
Appellant alleged that Brown’s criminal case was sealed thereafter. Pro Se
PCRA Memorandum of Law, 8/4/2024, at *2. As such, Appellant maintained
that the government failed to disclose information regarding a potential deal
between the Commonwealth and Brown. Appellant therefore asserts that he
was entitled to a new trial since the undisclosed information was exculpatory,
material to trial, and could have been used to impeach Brown. Id. Appellant
attached an exhibit to his most recent PCRA petition, a copy of an article from
the Harrisburg Patriot-News dated June 11, 2004, detailing Brown’s arrest and
pending charges as the result of an unrelated criminal incident on November
30, 2002. See id. at Exhibit C. The article states that Brown was a key
witness in Appellant’s case and that Brown was present with the victim and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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that the governmental interference exception to the PCRA’s timing
requirements was applicable. On appeal, Appellant alleges that he learned of
the potential discovery violation in December 2022 and diligently petitioned
the PCRA court for relief within one year as required. Id. at 6.
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is
whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free
of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa.
2003). The issue of timeliness is dispositive in this appeal. “The timeliness
requirement for PCRA petitions ‘is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.’”
Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
banc), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). “The
question of whether a petition is timely raises a question of law, and where a
petition[ ] raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our
scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Pew, 189 A.3d 486, 488 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the
judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A]
judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
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the victim’s brother on February 28, 2002, when the victim was shot and
killed, and the victim’s brother was injured, outside the Steelton bar. Id. The
article further notes that Brown requested to “be placed in protective custody
at the prison because [Appellant] also [was] being held there.” Id.
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the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
Here, as we previously determined:
In this case, our Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for
allowance of appeal on April 25, 2007. He did not seek a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, his
judgment of sentence became final 90 days later, on July 24,
2007, at the expiration of the time for seeking a writ of certiorari.
See U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13. In accordance with 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545, he had until July 24, 2008 to file a timely PCRA petition.
Gibson, 249 A.3d 1136, at *2. Therefore, Appellant’s most recent PCRA
petition filed on August 4, 2023 is patently untimely.
“[I]f a PCRA [p]etition is untimely, a trial court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition.” Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50, 53 (Pa.
Super. 2000) (citations omitted). However, an untimely PCRA petition may
be considered if one of the following three exceptions applies:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). If an exception applies, a PCRA petition may be
considered if it is filed “within one year of the date the claim could have been
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presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “In the proper circumstances, Brady
violations can implicate both the governmental and newly-discovered facts
exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Nauss, 329 A.3d 602 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(non-precedential decision).
This Court previously explained:
The newly-discovered fact exception has two components, which
must be alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must establish
that: 1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated were
unknown and 2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence. If the petitioner alleges and proves these two
components, then the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the claim
under this subsection.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 500 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
In addition, our Supreme Court previously stated that
a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference
exception, [if the petitioner pleads and proves] the failure to
previously raise the claim was the result of interference by
government officials, and the information could not have been
obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008).
Here, the PCRA court determined:
Appellant maintains that information regarding the criminal
history of Jason Brown, a witness who testified at trial, was
withheld by the prosecution. Appellant maintains that the
information that was ultimately uncovered regarding Mr. Brown
was sealed in 2004. For this reason, Appellant claims that he only
became aware of such information in or around November or
December 2023 and, therefore, [he filed the instant petition within
one year of] learning [about] the information. However, he offers
no explanation as to why, within the past 18 years, this
information could not have been uncovered sooner with the
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exercise of due diligence. Appellant has attached the docket sheet
pertaining to Mr. Brown’s case, but offers no support for his
contention that the record was sealed in 2004. Further, Appellant
also attaches a news article dated June 11, 2004, which discusses
the arrest of Mr. Brown. Appellant’s reliance on this article is
misplaced for his purposes, as it shows that information regarding
Mr. Brown was readily available in 2004.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/20/2025, at 5.
Upon review, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in
dismissing Appellant’s most recent PCRA petition as untimely. There is no
dispute that Appellant’s petition is patently untimely. Moreover, Appellant’s
PCRA petition did not allege facts which, if resolved in his favor, would have
demonstrated that Brown’s unrelated arrest and criminal charges were
concealed or unknown to him. The record belies Appellant’s suggestion that
the evidence could not have been discovered earlier despite due diligence in
the almost 18 years that have passed since Appellant’s convictions. The
information was published in the local newspaper in 2004, as made clear by
exhibits Appellant attached to his latest PCRA petition. As such, the PCRA
court properly determined that Appellant’s petition was not subject to a
timeliness exception. We agree. In view of the 2004 article in the local
newspaper, Appellant has not shown that the facts could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, nor has he demonstrated that
the failure to raise this claim previously was the result of interference by
government officials. Without jurisdiction, neither the PCRA court nor this
Court may reach the merits of Appellant’s claims. Accordingly, the PCRA court
did not err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/14/2025
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