Waldman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ADAM KEITH WALDMAN, )

#242914, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-cv-366-RAH

)

LEIGH GWATHNEY, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Adam Keith Waldman, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed this § 1983 lawsuit

over alleged constitutional violations committed by the Defendants during

Waldman’s September 28, 2022, parole hearing. The Defendants have moved to

dismiss, and Waldman has filed a response. Upon consideration of the parties’

filings, and for the reasons below, the motions to dismiss will be granted and this

case dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Waldman is serving two life sentences with the possibility for parole for 2015

first-degree kidnapping and first-degree robbery convictions. The convictions

stemmed from a series of events in which Waldman kidnapped a 5-year-old boy, led

police on a highspeed chase with the child in the vehicle, shot at police, and rammed

police cars.

Waldman first became eligible for parole in 2018. His parole was denied due

to the seriousness of the offenses and because release would lessen the seriousness

of the offenses and promote disrespect for the law.

Waldman came up for parole again on September 28, 2022. Waldman was

represented by counsel who called two witnesses in his favor. The mother of the

child victim spoke against parole as did representatives from the Victims of Crime

and Leniency, and Defendants Nayla Contreras (a representative from the Alabama

Attorney General’s Office) and Jordan Self (a representative from the Baldwin

County District Attorney’s Office). Waldman did not attend. Parole was again

denied on the basis of the severity of the offenses and the position of the

stakeholders. Waldman’s next parole hearing is set for September 2027.

On October 14, 2022, Waldman filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus with

the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. In his petition, Waldman sought

a writ directing the Defendants to hold a new – and fair – parole hearing. The

Defendants moved to dismiss which was granted by the state court on January 26,

2025. Waldman did not appeal.

Waldman filed the instant § 1983 Complaint in this Court on May 13, 2025,

against the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, Leigh Gwathney, Darryl

Littleton and Dwayne Spurlock (collectively, the Parole Board) and Nayla Contreras

and Jordan Self (collectively, the Law Enforcement Defendants).

DISCUSSION

Waldman claims the Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the

Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in connection with his September 28,

2022, parole hearing. In particular, Waldman claims the Defendants violated the

grand juries clause of the Fifth Amendment because he is being punished with life

without the possibility of parole for a noncapital crime and because Contraras and

Self allowed the victim’s mother to make false statements about him at his parole

hearing without correcting the record, thereby making him answer for crimes for

which he was never indicted. Waldman also argues that the double jeopardy clause

of the Fifth Amendment has been violated because the Parole Board used the same

reasons for denying him parole as it did previously. He further claims there has been

a violation of substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

because there are no procedural due process protections to ensure a fair parole

hearing and in not allowing inmates like Waldman an opportunity to be heard in

person or virtually or to present witnesses and evidence. Waldman also claims a

violation of the Eighth Amendment because, although his sentence is with the

possibility of parole, it is cruel and unusual punishment for the Parole Board not to

grant him parole. Finally, Waldman claims a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

because the Parole Board used a checklist for its parole decision instead of the

guidelines sheet. Waldman seeks declaratory relief, an order requiring the Parole

Board to immediately bring him back up for parole in a fair hearing process, and

monetary damages.

The Parole Board asserts Waldman’s claims are time-barred because he filed

this lawsuit 32 months after the September 28, 2022, parole hearing. The Law

Enforcement Defendants did not move to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds,

but argue their entitlement to various types of immunities.

In response, Waldman asserts the statute of limitations should be tolled

because he was required to exhaust his remedies before filing suit, he filed a

mandamus proceeding against the Parole Board in state court, and it took the state

court over two years to rule.

This is a § 1983 action. “All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are

tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in

the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168,

1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The governing limitations period in

Alabama is two years. Id. (citing Ala. Code § 6-2-38; Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin,

876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, to have his claims heard,

Waldman must have brought them within two years from the date the limitations

period began to run, which is generally the date “the facts which would support a

cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably

prudent regard for his rights.” Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d

1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 56–62 (11th Cir.

1996)).

The Complaint alleges the constitutional violations occurred during his parole

hearing on September 28, 2022. Thus, as of that date or within days when he learned

of the Parole Board’s decision, the facts supporting Waldman’s constitutional

violations were or should have been apparent to Waldman. However, Waldman did

not file this action until May 13, 2025, more than two years after the limitations

period began to run. As such, it is clear from the face of the pleadings that

Waldman’s § 1983 claims are time-barred. See Smith v. Shorstein, 217 F. App’x 877,

880 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The expiration of the statute of limitations warrants

dismissing a complaint as frivolous.”) (citing Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons &

Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 641 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990)).

Waldman argues the statute of limitations was tolled during the period of time

that his state court mandamus proceeding was pending. That proceeding was filed

on November 21, 2022, and was dismissed on January 26, 2025. The Supreme Court

has held that a federal court applying a state statute of limitations to an inmate’s

federal civil rights action should also apply any state statute tolling the limitations

period for prisoners. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989). But Waldman does not

show or provide any legal support for why a state court mandamus proceeding tolls

the statute of limitations in a § 1983 action or a personal injury case. While that

proceeding may toll the statute of limitations under a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas

proceeding subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,

this is not such a proceeding.1

Finally, while the Law Enforcement Defendants did not assert the statute of

limitations in their motion to dismiss, the defense nevertheless requires dismissal of

Waldman’s claims against them at the motion to dismiss stage. The expiration of

Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations is an affirmative defense the existence of

which warrants a dismissal of a complaint as frivolous. Clark, 915 F.2d at 641 n.2.

When the defense is apparent from the face of the complaint or the court’s records,

however, the court need not wait to see if the defense will be asserted in a defensive

pleading, and under such circumstances, a sua sponte dismissal will not constitute

an abuse of the Court’s discretion. See, e.g., Miller v. Woodham, 2006 WL 955748,

at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 2006); Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990). As

such, the claims against the Law Enforcement Defendants also will be dismissed as

time barred.

1 To the extent Waldman claims that he was wrongly denied parole in September 2022 and that he

is entitled to release on parole, he failed to state a claim under § 1983, as a challenge to the Parole

Board’s decision, in essence, would be a challenge to the length of his sentence. A state prisoner

does not have a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render

his sentence or conviction invalid until his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been questioned

by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Furthermore, the claim is not cognizable and must be

dismissed whether Waldman seeks to obtain monetary damages or to attack the validity of his

confinement. Id.; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488–90 (1973) (habeas corpus proceeding,

not § 1983, is the appropriate remedy for a state prisoner to attack the validity of the fact or length

of his sentence). He may not seek habeas relief and § 1983 relief in the same action. Thus, his

claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and must dismissed without prejudice to

Waldman’s right to seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Plaintiff Adam Keith Waldman’s Complaint is due to

be dismissed as time-barred.

Accordingly, itis ORDERED as follows:

(1) The Motion to Dismiss (doc. 8) filed by Defendants Jordan Self and Nayla

Contreras is GRANTED, for the reasons previously stated;

(2) The Motion to Dismiss (doc. 20) filed by Defendants Alabama Board of

Pardons and Paroles, Leigh Gwathney, Darryl Littleton and Dwayne Spurlock is

GRANTED;

(3) | The Motion to Dismiss (doc. 24) filed by Plaintiff is DISMISSED as moot;

(1) This action is DISMISSED; and,

(2) No costs are taxed.

DONE, on this the 13th day of November 202

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE