Opinion

McGill

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Oct 14, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.9%

“[a] judge will not be deprived 8 of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . ..”

How later courts described this case

  • “[a] judge will not be deprived 8 of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . ..”
  • “[T]he right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.”
  • “An official does not act outside her jurisdiction simply because she makes an unconstitutional or unlawful decision.”
  • concluding that absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor’s decision to initiate and pursue prosecution

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

MICHAEL P. McGILL, PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 2:25-CV-02100-MEF

GOVERNOR SARAH HUCKABEE SANDERS,

Governor of Arkansas;

GEORGE McGILL,Mayor of Ft. Smith Arkansas;

CALEB WARD, Attorney at Law;

R. GUNNER DELAY, Circuit Court Judge Sebastian County;

ERIN ALLISON, Prosecutor Sebastian County;

DAN SHUE, Prosecutor Sebastian County;

SUSIE HASSKETT, Sebastian County Court Clerk;

TIM GRIFFEN, Attorney General for Arkansas;

CHRISTIAN SCHERRY, Public Defender; and

ERNIE WITT, Attorney at Law DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Michael P. McGill, a prisoner incarcerated at the Grimes Unit, Arkansas

Department of Correction, has initiated the above-captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 generally alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during his state court

criminal proceedings. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”).

(ECF No. 3). The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to

General Order 2024-02, but not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of a

magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Accordingly, for the purpose of preservice review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the case will automatically be reassigned to the Hon. Timothy

L. Brooks, Chief United States District Judge, and referred to the undersigned for a report and

recommendation pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § § 636(b)(1) and (3). Upon that review,

the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this matter be dismissed without prejudice for failure to

1

state a cognizable claim for relief.

BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s eight claims concern his state court criminal

proceedings in Sebastian County, Arkansas. First, Plaintiff alleges that on November 10, 2021,

he was not timely arraigned on his state criminal charges. He identifies Caleb Ward, Judge

Gunner Delay, Erin Allison, Dan Shue, and Susie Hassett as defendants to this claim. Second, he

says that his appearance at his arraignment was waived without his knowledge or consent. He

identifies Caleb Ward, Judge Gunner Delay, Erin Allison, and Dan Shue as defendants to claim

two. Third, Plaintiff claims that Caleb Ward provided him with constitutionally defective

assistance of trial counsel.

Fourth, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ernie Witt provided him ineffective assistance of

counsel because he failed to investigate the facts of his case, misrepresented the state’s evidence

against him, and used his daughter to convince him to plead guilty. Fifth, he says that after he

filed a habeas petition, Defendant Scherry lied to him, telling him that he had filed a motion to

withdraw his plea, and now any motion for postconviction relief would be untimely. Sixth,

Plaintiff claims that court staff would conspire with Judge Delay to decide what, if any, documents

were filed into his criminal case, violating his right to access to the courts. Plaintiff identifies

Defendants Hassett and Judge Delay as defendants to this claim. Seventh, Plaintiff says that

Defendant Judge Delay violated his constitutional rights during his state court criminal

proceedings, conspired with prosecutors, lawyers, and court clerks to hide violations of his

constitutional rights, and denied his motions without justification. Finally, identifying Governor

2

Huckabee Sanders and Attorney General Griffin as defendants,1 Plaintiff claims that the State of

Arkansas failed to correct any of the constitutional violations that occurred during his criminal

proceedings. Plaintiff identifies the defendants in their individual and official capacities. He

requests that his conviction be overturned, his criminal record be expunged, that he be awarded

$3,000 for each day he has been incarcerated, for his court costs, and for reimbursement for the

loss of potential income.

Publicly accessible state court records show that on November 1, 2021, Plaintiff was

charged by criminal Information with rape. See State of Arkansas v. Michael McGill, 66FCR-21-

904 (Ark. Cir. Ct.) (AOC Court Connect), available at

https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/66FCR-21-904 (last accessed Oct. 9, 2025).2 Plaintiff

pleaded guilty and was sentenced in April 2022 to 180 months imprisonment followed by a

suspended imposition of sentence of 300 months. See McGill v. State, Case No. CR-24-301, 2025

WL 1336611, at *1 (Ark. May 8, 2025). Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to correct his

sentence on the grounds that his sentence is illegal, the state court denied that motion as untimely.

Id. Plaintiff appealed, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 1915A of the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the court to review “a

complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer

or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

1 Plaintiff incorrectly spells Attorney General Griffin’s name in the case caption. The Court will

use the correct spelling in this report and recommendation.

2 The court may take judicial notice of public records. See Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757,

761 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005).

3

§ 1915A(b), the court must dismiss a complaint (or any portion of it) if it contains claims that fail

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). A pro se complaint, moreover, is to be given liberal construction, meaning “that

if the essence of an allegation is discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then

the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be

considered within the proper legal framework.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.

2004). However, “they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Id. at

914 (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a plausible § 1983

claim, a plaintiff must “allege a violation of a constitutional right committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” Andrews v. City of West Branch, Iowa, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir.

2006). Upon review, there are several problems with Plaintiff’s claims.

A. Heck-barred Claims (claims three, four, five, and eight)

As a threshold matter, at base, Plaintiff requests that his state criminal conviction and

sentence be reversed and that his criminal record be expunged. (ECF No. 1). He requests money

damages for every day he has—in his view—been unlawfully incarcerated. Id.

A “§ 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional

challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). Moreover, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

4

the Supreme Court held that “if a judgment favorable to a prisoner in a § 1983 action would

necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction or the length of the prisoner’s

sentence, then a § 1983 action for damages does not arise until the conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state

tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal writ.” See Sheldon v. Hundley, 83

F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Further,

under Heck, courts “disregard the form of relief sought and instead look to the essence of the

plaintiff’s claims.” Id.

Plaintiff challenges the lawfulness of his conviction, claiming, for example, that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel (claims three, four, and five), and that his state criminal

proceeding violated his constitutional rights (claims seven and eight). The Sixth Amendment

guarantees criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.”).

Further, criminal defendants have a liberty interest “in obtaining a fair criminal proceeding before

being denied [their] liberty in the most traditional sense.” Wilson v. Laurence Cty., 260 F.3d 946,

956 n.8 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).

If this Court agreed that Plaintiff’s trial counsel was ineffective and that his criminal

proceedings were riddled with constitutional errors, and thus granted Plaintiff his requested relief,

the Court would be declaring his conviction invalid. This is exactly the result that Heck prohibits.

Because Plaintiff has not provided any proof that his conviction or sentence has been declared

invalid, Heck bars this Court from granting Plaintiff’s request for relief. Claims three, four, five,

seven, and eight, should, therefore, be dismissed as barred by Heck.

5

B. Criminal Defense Attorney Defendants

Even if Heck did not bar Plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims (claims three,

four, and five), Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the defense attorney defendants (Caleb Ward,

Christian Scherry, and Ernie Witt) nevertheless fail.

“Only state actors can be held liable under Section 1983.” Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food

Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001). The defense attorney defendants—namely Caleb

Ward, Christian Scherry, and Ernie Witt—are not state actors for the purposes of § 1983. See,

e.g., Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (“[T]he Courts of Appeals are agreed that a

lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under

color of state law’ within the meaning of § 1983.”); see also Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 750

(8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (concluding that “[t]he attorneys who represented [the plaintiff],

whether appointed or retained, did not act under color of state law and, thus, are not subject to suit

under section 1983”) (citing Holbird v. Armstrong-Wright, 949 F.2d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 1991)

(per curiam) (same) (listing cases)).

This result does not change because Plaintiff identifies Defendant Scherry as a public

defender—i.e., a court-appointed criminal defense attorney. Indeed, a “public defender does not

act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a

defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Dodson, 454 U.S. at 325 (1981). In this case, Plaintiff

contends that Defendant Scherry incorrectly advised him that he had filed a motion to withdraw

his plea, making his motions for post-conviction relief untimely (claim five). See Comp. at 8

(ECF No. 1). But providing legal advice is a function normally performed by an attorney, even

if that advice turns out to be wrong or not entirely accurate.

6

To the extent that Plaintiff endeavors to satisfy the state actor requirement by claiming that

the criminal defense attorney defendants engaged in a “civil conspiracy” with state actors to

deprive him of his constitutional rights, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim does not cross the plausibility

threshold. “[W]hen a civil conspiracy claim involves both state and private actors, the private

party can be liable for conspiring with state officials if he was a willful participant in the

conspiracy.” Tirado v. City of Minneapolis, 521 F.Supp.3d 833, 845 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2021)

(citing White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 816 (8th Cir. 2008)). In such instances, “a plaintiff must

allege, at the very least, that there was a mutual understanding, or a meeting of the minds, between

the private party and the state actor, and the mutual understanding must be about the unlawful

objective of a conspiracy.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (cleaned up).

In this case, Plaintiff asserts the existence of a conspiracy, but he fails to offer any specific

facts giving rise to a plausible inference of a conspiracy. Plaintiff’s repeated references to a

“conspiracy” are simply conclusory. As such, they are not entitled to the presumption of truth.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Rather, to establish a

conspiracy claim, a complaint must include “specific facts tending to show a meeting of the minds

among the alleged conspirators.” Tirado, 521 F.Supp.3d at 845 (quoting Lawrence v. City of St.

Paul, 740 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1049 (D. Minn. 2010)). Plaintiff fails to supply any such facts in his

Complaint. Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against the criminal

defense attorney defendants (Caleb Ward, Ernie Witt, and Christina Scherry).

7

C. Governor Sanders and Attorney General Griffin

Similarly, even if Heck did not preclude Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Governor

Sanders and Attorney General Griffin (claim eight), Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible § 1983

claim against these defendants.

Vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. This means

that neither Governor Sanders nor Attorney General Griffin is liable under § 1983 simply because

they represent the State of Arkansas and Plaintiff believes that state actors violated his

constitutional rights during his criminal proceedings. Instead, to establish a § 1983 claim, “a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. Here, Plaintiff asserts no facts describing what,

specifically, these two Defendants did (or failed to do) in violation of his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to establish a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 against

Governor Sanders or Attorney General Griffin.

D. Judge Delay

Judicial officers, such as Judge Delay, are absolutely immune from civil suits seeking

damages for their judicial acts. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991). This immunity is

subject to two very narrow exceptions: it does not extend to non-judicial acts or to actions taken

in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 11–12. Neither exception applies here.

Plaintiff clearly disagrees with Judge Delay’s decisions, and he may even believe that those

decisions were wrongly decided, or that Judge Delay acted with malice or in a manner unbecoming

of a judicial officer in issuing them, but neither error nor malice deprives a judicial officer of

immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (“[a] judge will not be deprived

8

of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his

authority . . ..”). Further, he does not claim that any of those decisions (or Judge Delay’s conduct

throughout his criminal proceedings) was non-judicial. And he does not claim that Judge Delay

lacked jurisdiction over his criminal proceedings. See Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1131

(8th Cir. 2006) (“An official does not act outside her jurisdiction simply because she makes an

unconstitutional or unlawful decision.”).

To the extent, moreover, that Plaintiff requests injunctive or declarative relief against Judge

Delay, “[o]nly when a declaratory decree is violated or declaratory relief is unavailable would

plaintiffs have an end-run around judicial immunity.” Scheffler v. Trachy, 821 F. App’x 648, 653

(8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty., 931 F.3d 753, 763 (8th Cir.

2019)). Plaintiff does not claim that Judge Delay violated a declaratory decree, nor does he allege

that declaratory relief was unavailable to him in state court. Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Delay

are, therefore, barred by judicial immunity, including claim seven, even if claim seven were not

otherwise barred by Heck.

E. Claims One, Two, and Six

Pursuant to Heck, “if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if

successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff, the action should proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Heck, 512 U.S.

at 487. Arguably, therefore, Heck does not bar plaintiff’s claims alleging that his first appearance

was untimely (claim one), that his appearance was waived without his knowledge or consent (claim

two), and that the clerk’s office failed to file all his documents (claim six). See, e.g., Jackson v.

Muscatine Cty., No. 25-1712, No. 25-1714, No. 25-1716, 2025 WL 2826998, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct.

9

6, 2025) (per curiam) (concluding that a finding that plaintiff’s rights were violated by the denial

of a timely initial appearance would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the state court

convictions). These claims should nevertheless be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable

§ 1983 claim.

With respect to these claims, Plaintiff identifies Caleb Ward (criminal defense attorney),

Judge Gunner Delay, Erin Allison (prosecutor), Dan Shue (prosecutor), and Susie Hassert

(Sebastian County court clerk) as defendants. (ECF No. 1). As described in detail above, Judge

Delay is entitled to judicial immunity and Plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible § 1983 claim

against Defendant Ward, a private party. This leaves the prosecutors—Defendants Allison and

Shue—and Susie Hassert, a court clerk. These Defendants are also entitled to immunity.

F. Prosecutors Allison and Shue

Prosecutors “acting as advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution” are entitled to

absolute immunity. Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation

omitted). “Absolute immunity covers prosecutorial functions such as the initiation and pursuit of

a criminal prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case at trial, and other conduct that is

intimately associated with the judicial process.” Id. In determining whether absolute immunity

applies, courts consider “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who

performed it.” Id.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff asserts that the prosectors (Allison and Shue) conspired to

waive his appearance at an already untimely first appearance, but he asserts no facts describing

that conspiracy or what, specifically, Defendants Allison and Shue did (or failed to do) to suggest

that they participated in the decision to schedule his first appearance or to waive his appearance at

10

that hearing. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Allison and Shue fail for

that reason alone. See Mayorga, 442 F.3d at 1132 (“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal

link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909

F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)).

Defendants Allison and Shue, moreover, are immune from suit for “acts closely related [a

prosecutor’s] role as an advocate for the state.” Brodnicki, 75 F.3d at 1267. Such acts include

the decision to initiate criminal charges, requests for hearing dates be continued, the arguments

prosecutors raise at bail hearings, and how prosecutors present the state’s case. See Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (concluding that absolute immunity applies to a

prosecutor’s decision to initiate and pursue prosecution). Thus, even if Plaintiff asserted facts

suggesting that Defendants Allison and Shue agreed to continue his first appearance, or did not

object to the waiver of his appearance at his first appearance, because this conduct is closely

associated with the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the state, they would nevertheless be

immune from suit.

G. Court Clerk Susie Hassett

Sebastian County Court Clerk Susie Hassett is also immune from suit. It is well

established that “absolute immunity has been extended to acts that are discretionary, taken at the

direction of a judge, or taken according to court rules.” Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Missouri, 948

F.3d 921, 928 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that the court clerks would “conspire” with the judge to decide what,

if any, of his submissions would be filed. See Comp. at 9 (ECF No. 1). But Plaintiff asserts no

facts suggesting that Defendant Hassett herself was personally responsible for failing to docket

11

any of his submissions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. In any event, even if Defendant Hassett were

personally responsible for failing to docket his submissions as requested, Plaintiff concedes that

his filings were not docketed at the direction of the presiding judicial officer, Defendant Judge

Delay. See Comp. at 9 (ECF No. 1). Thus, because the court clerks operated at the direction of

Judge Delay in deciding whether to docket Plaintiff’s filings, the court clerks, Defendant Hassett

included, should be immune from suit. The claims against Defendant Hassett, therefore, should

be dismissed on that basis. There being no other defendants identified with any of the claims

asserted in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s Complaint should therefore be dismissed without prejudice

for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

CONCLUSION

In sum, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, it is

RECOMMENDED that: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and (2) Plaintiff is warned

that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial

consideration.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

3 Notably, while Plaintiff identifies George McGill, Mayor of Ft. Smith, Arkansas, as a defendant

to this action, see Comp. (ECF No. 1), he asserts no claims against him. Put differently, aside

from naming him as a defendant to this action, Plaintiff fails to assert any facts describing what

Defendant McGill purportedly did (or failed to do) in violation of his constitutional rights.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has also failed to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 against

Defendant Mayor McGill, as well. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

12

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

REFERRAL: No longer referred.

DATED this 14th day of October 2025.

/s/

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

McGill | Frix