Rumsey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JASON RUMSEY, #M44081, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00869-MAB

)

IDOC, LATOYA HUGHES, )

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )

JEFF WEHKING, CHRISTINE VINYARD, )

DANIEL MONTI, ARVINDER ARORA, )

PERCY MYERS, JANA REUTER, )

and HEATHER GALLION, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Jason Rumsey, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center, brings this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights (Doc. 1). He

asserts claims including deliberate indifference to his painful medical condition,

retaliation, and negligence (Doc. 1, p. 6).

The Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out non-

meritorious claims.1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a Complaint that is legally

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint based on Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a

magistrate judge, and the limited consent by the Illinois Department of Corrections /Wexford Health

Sources, Inc., to the exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of

Understanding between this Court and the IDOC/Wexford.

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an

immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

THE COMPLAINT

A review of the Complaint reveals the following allegations: In late May 2024,

Plaintiff developed an ingrown toenail on the big toe of his right foot, which became

inflamed and started to hurt (Doc. 1, p. 7). He submitted a nurse sick call (“NSC”) request.

On June 9, 2024, he was seen at NSC; his toe was swollen, painful, and infected. The nurse

gave him no treatment and told him he must go through NSC again before he would be

referred to a doctor. Plaintiff believes it is a practice of Defendant Wexford Health

Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) to require inmates to attend NSC twice before they may see a

doctor. This delay caused Plaintiff to endure unnecessary pain and suffering while his

toe condition became worse.

Plaintiff made more NSC requests including complaints that his condition

impaired his ability to walk. On July 10, 2024, a nurse practitioner (“N.P.”) prescribed

ibuprofen and Bactrim D.S. to treat the toe infection. The Bactrim caused an adverse

reaction, so on July 15, 2024, the N.P. switched Plaintiff’s medication to Keflex (Doc. 1, p.

8).

On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff saw Defendant Dr. Arora, who was assisted by

Defendant Nurse Reuter (Doc. 1, p. 8). They ordered Plaintiff to be given nightly soaks in

hot water for the swollen/infected toe, in the Healthcare Unit. Plaintiff alleges the

treatment was inappropriate because it required him to walk a long distance on the

painful toe. Arora and Reuter did not address his pain.

On July 31, 2024, Dr. Arora re-ordered Keflex for another serious toe infection. Dr.

Arora ordered triple antibiotic ointment for the toe on August 8, 2024. Prior to this,

Plaintiff was admitted to the infirmary for a different medical issue (broken wrist).

On September 10, 2024, Plaintiff saw Defendant Dr. Myers for the toe, which was

swollen, inflamed, infected, and very painful and sensitive (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff asked

to be scheduled to have the ingrown toenail removed, but Dr. Myers refused to do the

procedure or refer Plaintiff to an outside provider. Dr. Arora was also present. Neither

doctor did anything to address Plaintiff’s pain (Doc. 1, pp. 8-9). The next day (September

11, 2024), Plaintiff again saw Dr. Arora. She told him that Dr. Meyers would have to be

the one to either remove the toenail or make the referral for Plaintiff to see an outside

provider for its removal. Plaintiff states that at this point, the infection had persisted

since at least June 9, 2024 (Doc. 1, p. 9).

According to Plaintiff, he learned from Dr. Arora that Dr. Meyers would not

remove the toenail and declined to refer Plaintiff to an outside prover for removal of the

nail (Doc. 1., p. 9). Then, on September 15, 2024, Plaintiff contends that his toe again

became infected and nurses on two shifts attempted to clean and treat the toe and

ultimately referred him to a doctor. The next day, the toe was oozing with a bloody

discharge. Defendant Reuter responded to clean the wound. Plaintiff requested a

different nurse because he had past issues with Reuter. However, Reuter told him if he

did not accept treatment from her, it would be considered as “refusing treatment.”

Defendant Reuter then made plaintiff take the “unnecessary step” of changing into his

prison blues even though he was in the infirmary, where sweatpants were allowed,

before she would treat him (Doc. 1, p. 10). Plaintiff changed, which caused him pain,

frustration, and duress. Reuter cleaned the wound and intentionally squeezed the

infected toe to inflict pain. During Plaintiff’s stay in the infirmary, many nurses gave him

the “cold shoulder” and negative attitudes, which he contends is retaliation for his official

complaints.

On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff requested Defendant Nurse Gallion, who was

passing out his antibiotics, to give him the medication with a meal because taking them

caused burning in his stomach (Doc. 1, p. 11). Medications are distributed in the infirmary

at 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. Gallion responded with hostility, telling Plaintiff if he did not

take his medication, she would write it down as a “refusal.” Plaintiff sought help from

Defendant Vinyard (Healthcare Unit Administrator), who reiterated the infirmary rule

that medications would be given only at 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. and suggested he eat his

commissary when he took his medications (Doc. 1, pp. 11-12). Vinyard did nothing about

the “burning pain” in Plaintiff’s stomach, referring Plaintiff to Gallion (the infirmary

nurse).

On September 27, 2024, Wexford Regional Director Babich removed Plaintiff’s

ingrown toenail. Over the next week, Plaintiff saw Dr. Arora for follow up and

complained he still had shooting and burning pain in the toe daily. Dr. Arora did nothing

about this problem (Doc. 1, p. 12).

On October 15, 2024, Plaintiff saw an outside podiatrist who opined that the

shooting/burning pain could be caused by nerve damage due to the delayed treatment,

or by a piece of toenail remaining in the toe. The podiatrist ordered a two-week course of

Gabapentin for pain, before he would be willing to cut into Plaintiff’s toe to search for

pieces of toenail. Plaintiff returned to prison, where Dr. Arora signed off to approve this

plan (Doc. 1, pp. 12-13). But when Plaintiff saw Dr. Arora for follow up the next day, Dr.

Arora said the Gabapentin should not have been prescribed and cancelled that

medication. Plaintiff reported the cancellation to Vinyard, who “took unknown steps to

keep care in place for Plaintiff.” (Doc. 1, p. 14).

On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff was given antibiotics again for a toe infection. He

still has issues with burning and shooting pain in the toe.

Plaintiff asserts that under Wexford practice/policy, a refusal of treatment means

a prisoner must start the NSC process over again before obtaining medical attention.

Wexford and IDOC also refuse to enact safeguards for prisoners to avoid biased or

problematic providers (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 12).

Plaintiff believes Defendants Vinyard and former Warden Monti were aware of

Wexford’s failure to meet their contractual obligations to provide medical care but failed

to take action to correct Wexford’s delays in giving care. IDOC and Wexford’s

unreasonable delays in caring for Plaintiff’s toe condition prolonged his pain and

suffering and caused him mental and emotional trauma (Doc. 1, p. 14).

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief to reform IDOC’s and

Wexford’s policies/practices (Doc. 1, p. 16).

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations in the Complaint and Plaintiff’s identification of his

claims (Doc. 1, p. 6), the Court designates the following claims in this pro se action:

Count 1: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant

Reuter.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claim against Defendants Vinyard, Arora,

Myers, Reuter, and Gallion, for unreasonably delaying and

denying treatment of Plaintiff’s painful infected ingrown

toenail.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment (Monell) deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs claim against Defendants Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., and the Illinois Department of

Corrections for maintaining policies, practices and/or

procedures that caused unreasonable delays in treating

Plaintiff’s painful infected ingrown toenail.

Count 4: State law medical negligence claim against Defendants

Vinyard, Arora, Myers, Reuter, and Gallion for

unreasonably delaying and denying treatment of Plaintiff’s

painful infected ingrown toenail.

Count 5: State law negligence claim against Defendants Vinyard,

Arora, Myers, Reuter, and Gallion for unreasonably

delaying and denying treatment of Plaintiff’s painful

infected ingrown toenail.

Count 6: State law claim for intentional, negligent, reckless, and/or

outrageous infliction of emotional distress.

Count 7: Breach of contract claim as a third-party beneficiary, against

Wexford, IDOC, Vinyard, and former Warden Daniel

Monti.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered

dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.2

Preliminary Dismissals

Plaintiff includes Defendant Centralia Warden Jeffrey Wehking “for discovery

only at this juncture” and does not articulate any claim against him (Doc. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff

may obtain discovery from any other defendant for the claims that survive merits

screening, thus it is not necessary to include Wehking for this purpose. Wehking will be

dismissed as a defendant without prejudice.

Count 1

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for exercising their First

Amendment rights to file grievances, lawsuits, or otherwise complain about their

conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012);

Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002). “A complaint states a claim for

retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly

be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

The plaintiff must have experienced an adverse action that would likely deter him from

engaging in the First Amendment activity in the future. See McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731 F.

App’x 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2011));

Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009).

Here, Plaintiff alleges generally that he “had issues with” Defendant Reuter in the

past but does not explain those “issues” or identify any complaints he may have lodged

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

about her. He states Reuter acted in a “retaliatory manner” when she required him to

change clothes before she treated his toe wound; claims she pressed on his toe with the

intent to cause him pain, not to expel the infection; and told him to “stop being a baby”

when he complained (Doc. 1, p. 10). These allegations are insufficient to support a

retaliation claim against Reuter. Plaintiff does not identify his First Amendment activity

that triggered the alleged retaliation, and he did not suffer an adverse action likely to

deter future protected activity. Count 1 will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Count 2

Prison medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious

medical needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a

prisoner must plead facts and allegations suggesting that (1) he suffered from an

objectively serious medical condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to his medical needs. Id. Deliberate indifference is demonstrated where a

prison official acted or failed to act despite his/her knowledge of a serious risk of harm.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate

indifference if such delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s

pain.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012). The failure to treat pain may

amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).

Notably, medical negligence or even malpractice does not violate the Constitution. Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106; Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff’s allegations about a lengthy and painful infected ingrown toenail amount

to an objectively serious medical condition. The Court next turns to each defendant’s

individual interactions with Plaintiff. The hot water soaks ordered by Dr. Arora and

Reuter do not amount to deliberate indifference, despite Plaintiff’s objection that he was

required to walk too far for this treatment. The Eighth Amendment does not give

prisoners entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but only

requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar,

112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff claims Reuter did not give him anything for his pain on July 24, 2024,

when the water soaks were ordered. However, no deliberate indifference is apparent for

the September 16, 2024 interaction when Reuter gave necessary treatment to clean

Plaintiff’s infected toe wound. Accordingly, Count 2 may proceed against Reuter only for

the July 24, 2024 alleged failure to provide pain treatment.

Plaintiff’s infected toenail was not removed until September 27, 2024, two months

after he first saw Dr. Arora. Dr. Arora prescribed toe soaks and antibiotics during this

time but allegedly gave him nothing for the pain. The Complaint is unclear on whether

Dr. Arora had authority to make a referral or perform the toenail removal herself, but it

is plausible that she contributed to the delay in surgical treatment. Plaintiff claims Dr.

Arora also failed to treat his pain following the toenail removal and attempted to cancel

the Gabapentin prescribed by the podiatrist. Plaintiff indicates he nonetheless received

the Gabapentin when Vinyard kept that “care in place.” These allegations are sufficient

to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Arora for her alleged failure to treat

Plaintiff’s pain from July 24, 2024 through October 15, 2024 when he received the

Gabapentin, and for the delayed surgery from July 24, 2024 to September 27, 2024.

On September 10, 2024, Dr. Myers allegedly refused to remove Plaintiff’s infected

toenail or to refer him to another provider for this treatment. More than three weeks

passed before the toenail was removed, and Plaintiff claims Dr. Myers failed to give him

any pain treatment during that time. Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed with his

deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Myers for the pain and delayed surgery between

September 10, 2024 and September 27, 2024.

Plaintiff’s disagreement with Gallion’s and Vinyard’s schedule for distributing his

medications in the infirmary does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff

cannot dictate the medication or meal schedule, and he had the option of eating a

commissary snack to mitigate his stomach discomfort. Defendants Gallion and Vinyard

will be dismissed from Count 2.

In summary, Count 2 will proceed only against Defendants Arora, Myers, and

Reuter as described above.

Count 3

Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) is a corporation contracted

by the IDOC to provide medical staff and treatment at Centralia during the time

Plaintiff’s claims arose, but it cannot be held liable solely on that basis. A corporation can

be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that caused the

alleged violation of a constitutional right. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d

917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004) (corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference if it had

a policy or practice that caused the violation). See also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d

760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation is treated as though it were a municipal

entity in a § 1983 action). Plaintiff invokes Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), alleging the Wexford policy, custom, or practice of requiring

a prisoner to go through the NSC process twice before being allowed to see a doctor

unnecessarily delayed his treatment and prolonged his pain and suffering from the

infected toe. This is sufficient to proceed with the deliberate indifference claim against

Wexford in Count 3.

Plaintiff also takes issue with the Wexford practice/policy that a prisoner must

accept the proposed treatment (and provider) or have the encounter documented as a

“refusal” which would cause further delay. This alleged practice does not amount to

deliberate indifference. A plaintiff cannot claim a constitutional violation where he makes

the choice to decline treatment or refuses to be treated by a particular provider. Prisoners

do not have a constitutional right to specific medical treatment. See Walker v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff cannot proceed with a Monell policy/practice claim against the IDOC or

Director Latoya Hughes. A Monell claim may only be brought against a municipal entity,

not a state agency such as the IDOC. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Defendants IDOC and

Hughes will be dismissed from the action.

Count 3 will proceed against Wexford only on the claim for delay due to the Nurse

Sick Call procedure. The Court further notes that because Wexford is no longer the

contracted medical provider for the IDOC, any request for prospective injunctive relief

related to Wexford’s former policies or practices is now moot. See Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d

577, 580 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,

396 (1980)).

Counts 4 and 5

Plaintiff’s claims for medical negligence in Count 4 and negligence in Count 5

derive from the same facts as his federal constitutional claims in Count 2. Because Count

2 will proceed against Defendants Arora, Myers, and Reuter, the state law medical

negligence and negligence claims will also proceed against Arora, Myers, and Reuter for

the conduct described in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

To state a claim for negligence in Illinois, a complaint must allege facts to establish

that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, breached that duty, and that the

breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d

39, 45 (Ill. 2011) (citing Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (2007)). Plaintiff’s Complaint is

devoid of such allegations regarding Defendants Gallion and Vinyard, thus they will be

dismissed from Counts 4 and 5.

To ultimately pursue the state law claims against Arora, Myers, and Reuter, before

the completion of the summary judgment phase of the case, Plaintiff will need to procure

an affidavit stating that “there is a reasonable and meritorious cause” for litigation

against these Defendants and a physician’s report to support the assertions in the

affidavit, pursuant to 735 ILCS § 5/2-622. See Young v. United States, 942 F.3d 349 (7th Cir.

2019).

Count 6

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress

must demonstrate that the defendant(s) intentionally or recklessly engaged in “extreme

and outrageous conduct” that resulted in severe emotional distress. Somberger v. City of

Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1030 (7th Cir. 2006); see Lopez v. City of Chi., 464 F.3d 711, 720

(7th Cir. 2006). The tort has three components: (1) the conduct involved must be truly

extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe

emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will

cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional

distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988).

Plaintiff does not associate specific individual defendants with this claim (Doc. 1,

p.6). He claims Reuter intentionally inflicted “frustration and duress” on him in the

course of treating his wound on September 16, 2024 (Doc. 1, p. 10). This alleged conduct

does not rise to the level of truly “extreme and outrageous,” nor does Plaintiff describe

suffering emotional distress of a severity to support an emotional distress claim against

Reuter.

Plaintiff also states the delay in medical care caused by the IDOC and Wexford

caused him “mental and emotional traumatization…damaging his self image, self worth,

and mental and emotional state.” (Doc. 1, p. 14). This claim also fails. None of the

individual IDOC or Wexford medical providers who treated Plaintiff engaged in alleged

conduct meeting the “extreme and outrageous” standard. Nor does the Complaint satisfy

the other elements of the claim. Count 6 will therefore be dismissed without prejudice for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Count 7

Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary appears to rest

on an alleged breach by Wexford of its contract to provide medical services to IDOC

inmates. However, inmates are not intended to be third party beneficiaries to this

contract. See Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 24-cv-1140-MAB, 2025 WL 2418444,

at *3 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2025). “Under Illinois law, a person is considered a third party

beneficiary only when the benefit to him is intended.” Golden v. Barenborg, 53 F.3d 866,

870 (7th Cir. 1995). A third party has no right of recovery arising from the contract when

the benefit to him is merely incidental. Id. Illinois district courts have consistently held

that inmates cannot sue for breach of the Wexford-IDOC contract because they are not

intended to be third-party beneficiaries of that contract. See, e.g., Bakaturski v. Pittman, No.

21-cv-14-GCS, 2023 WL 3626431 at *6 (S.D. Ill. May 24, 2023); Johnson v. Shah, No. 15-cv-

344-SMY-RJD, 2018 WL 724427 at *8 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2018); Knuth v. Wexford Health Sources,

Inc., No. 15-C-2666, 2016 WL 11688081 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2016); Flournoy v. Ghosh, No.

07-C-5297, 2010 WL 1710807 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2010). Accordingly, Count 7 will be

dismissed from the action with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Defendant Monti will be dismissed from the action without prejudice.

OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS

Plaintiff raises claims against the individual defendants in their individual and

official capacities (Doc. 1, p. 3). However, claims for monetary damages may only be

pursued against state officials in their individual capacities. Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904,

918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the

official capacity claims against the individual defendants are dismissed without

prejudice.

PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiff’s Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 4) is

GRANTED. Service will be ordered below on those Defendants that remain in the action.

DISPOSITION

The Complaint states colorable claims in Count 2 against Defendants Arora,

Myers, and Reuter; in Count 3 against Wexford Health Sources, Inc.; and in Counts 4 and

5 against Arora, Myers, and Reuter. Counts 1 and 6 are DISMISSED from the action

without prejudice and Count 7 is DISMISSED from the action with prejudice.

Defendants Illinois Department of Corrections, Latoya Hughes, Jeff Wehking, Christine

Vinyard, Daniel Monti, and Heather Gallion are DISMISSED from the action without

prejudice.

The Clerk shall prepare for Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Arvinder Arora, Percy

Myers, and Jana Reuter: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of

a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED

to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each

Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign

and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from

the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service

on the Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court

file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244 and Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only

respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment

includes the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full

amount of the costs.

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this

action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 13, 2025

/s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve

them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendants will

enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60

days from the date of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely

possible that it will take 90 days or more. When Defendants have filed their Answers, the

Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines,

discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants notice and an opportunity

to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence

to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.