Bey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

RASHAD JAMIYL BEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: MJM-24-3266

MAGISTRATE PAMELA ALBAN,

MAGISTRATE STACY W. MCCORMACK,

MAGISTRATE ROBERT THOMPSON,

CAROLINE SPIES, and

SCOTT POYER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Self-represented plaintiff Rashad Jamiyl Bey filed the above-captioned civil rights

Complaint together with a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. ECF Nos. 1, 2. Because Plaintiff

appears to be indigent, his request to proceed without pre-payment of the filing fee is granted.

However, the Complaint must be dismissed for the reasons stated below.

Plaintiff brings this Complaint against Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Associate

Judges Pamela Alban, Stacy W. McCormack, and Robert Thompson; Caroline Spies, Assistant

Public Defender; and Scott Poyer, Clerk of Court.1 ECF No. 1. Plaintiff lists a series of events

that occurred in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court regarding a criminal matter in which

Plaintiff is the defendant, including that “Defendants collectively conspired to trick Respondent

into it’s [sic] ‘colorful jurisdiction,’ via forced cou[n]sel.” Id. at 7–8. As relief, Plaintiff seeks a

“Writ of Mandamus compelling the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County, to honor the default

1 Plaintiff names Judges Alban, McCormack, and Thompson as “Magistrates,” however they are

associate judges. See https://www.circuitcourt.org/about-us/judges (last visited Nov. 12, 2025).

judgment dismissing all claims, suits, petitions, and fillings with with [sic] the ‘State of

Maryland.’” Id. at 9. Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint numerous documents indicating that he

subscribes to Moorish-American sovereign citizen ideology.2 ECF No. 1-1.

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to

dismiss a complaint if the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Self-represented pleadings are liberally construed. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, for the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s

claims against each of the named Defendants may not proceed.

Plaintiff’s claim as to Judges Alban, McCormack, and Thompson is barred by the doctrine

of judicial immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988) (“If judges were

personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous

but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to

provoke such suits.”) The doctrine of judicial immunity shields them from monetary claims in

both their official and individual capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam).

Judicial immunity is an absolute immunity; it does not merely protect a defendant from assessment

2 To the extent that Plaintiff intends to pursue any argument that the Maryland state courts lack

jurisdiction to prosecute him as a Moorish-American, such argument has been repeatedly rejected. See El

v. Mayor New York, No. 13–CV–4079 (SLT) (CLP), 2014 WL 4954476, at *5 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014)

(citation omitted); Bond v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:14–cv–379–FDW, 2014 WL 5509057, at *1 (W.D.

N.C. Oct. 31, 2014) (explaining that “courts have repeatedly rejected arguments . . . by individuals who

claim that they are not subject to the laws of the . . . individual States by virtue of their ‘Moorish American’

citizenship”). “Regardless of an individual’s claimed status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a

‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood human being,’ that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of

the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.” United States v.

Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. White, 480 F. App’x. 193, 194 (4th

Cir. 2012) (“Neither the citizenship nor the heritage of a defendant constitutes a key ingredient to a ... court's

jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions....”).

of damages but also protects a judge from damages suits entirely. Id. at 11. An act is still judicial,

and immunity applies, even if the judge commits “‘grave procedural errors.’” Id. (quoting Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)).

Moreover, “judges . . . are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such

acts are in excess of their jurisdiction” and “are alleged to have been done maliciously or

corruptly.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56; see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1976)

(stating that a judge may not be attacked for exercising judicial authority even if done improperly).

In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari

to consider whether a judge was liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unconstitutional

conviction. In explaining its rationale for judicial immunity, the Court stated:

Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of

judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial

jurisdiction . . . . This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting

maliciously and corruptly, and it “is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious

or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges

should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear

of consequences”. . . It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction

that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most

intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he

should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation

charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute

not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.

Id. at 553–54.

The bar of absolute judicial immunity may be overcome in two limited sets of

circumstances: (1) “for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity”;

and (2) “for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12 (citing Forrester at 227–29). A judge acts in a judicial capacity when

the function is one “normally performed by a judge” and when the parties “dealt with the judge in

his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. The “relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’

of the act, not the ‘act itself.’” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). Courts

thus look to an “act’s relation to a general function normally performed by a judge” to determine

whether the act was judicial. Id. at 13.

Neither exception applies here. Plaintiff’s claims against each judge stem from actions

taken by that judge during Plaintiff’s criminal and post-conviction proceedings. Rulings on

pending cases over which they had jurisdiction are precisely the type of judicial action covered by

judicial immunity. Plaintiff has offered no grounds to defeat the judicial immunity that applies to

the judges’ determinations made in his criminal case. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against

Judges Alban, McCormack, and Thompson are dismissed.

Likewise, defendant Scott Poyer is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in his capacity as

the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Absolute quasi-judicial immunity

“extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that

these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Bush v. Rauch, 38

F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). This doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been further

adopted and extended to court support personnel because of “‘the danger that disappointed

litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent

their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.’” Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594,

601 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1989)). To

determine if quasi-judicial immunity applies, this Court must consider: “(1) whether the official’s

functions are similar to those of a judge; (2) whether a strong need exists for the official to perform

essential functions for the public good without fear of harassment and intimidation; and (3)

whether adequate procedural safeguards exist to protect against constitutional deprivations.”

Howard v. Food Lion, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (citing Ostrzenski v. Seigel,

177 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1999)). “[I]mmunity is vitiated only when the judicial officer acts in

the clear absence of jurisdiction.” Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)). The extent of the allegations stated against Clerk of

Court Poyer appear to be that he accepted filings in Plaintiff’s criminal case. ECF No. 1 at 7.

Accepting filings is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Clerk of Court, and the Clerk of Court

must be able to accept filings in order for cases to be properly processed. Even if he were not

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that accepting the filings

violated his constitutional rights in any way.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that defendant Caroline Spies of the Anne Arundel County Public

Defender’s Office filed “several frivolous motions” that were “unsolicited.” ECF No. 1 at 7.

Assistant Public Defender Caroline Spies is not a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §

1983.3 Essential to sustaining an action under § 1983 are the presence of two elements.

Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he suffered a deprivation of “rights, privileges

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States; and (2) the act or

omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law. West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Private attorneys do not act under color of state law even if they

are appointed by the court. See Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800, 800 (4th Cir. 1976); Hall v. Quillen,

631 F.2d 1154, 1155–56 (4th Cir. 1980). In addition, public defenders do not act under color of

state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 453–54 (1981). Because Plaintiff’s allegations

3 Plaintiff cites the following as a basis for federal jurisdiction: “Amdt 14. S1.5.1, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S

Ct. 1401 (1958), Ct.SF, 140 Cal. 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct 1683, 1687 (1974), 350 US 179, ARTICLE 6 OF

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.” ECF No. 1 at 5. But the Complaint is best construed as a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

concern Spies’ function as counsel, she was not acting under color of state law, and, therefore, the

Complaint must be dismissed against her.

A separate Order follows.

_11/12/25__ ___________/S/__________________

Date Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge