Benjamin

CVCVY\UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ADRIAN BENJAMIN,

Plaintiff,

-v- 3:25-CV-204

CAYUGA ADDICTION RECOVERY

SERVICES, et al.

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

ADRIAN BENJAMIN

Plaintiff, pro se

99 Turkey Hill Road

Berkshire, NY 13736

THE LONG LAW FIRM, PLLC JAMES A. LONG, ESQ.

Attorneys for Defendant Town of

Triangle Court

120 E. Washington St., Suite 928

Syracuse, NY 13202

DAVID N. HURD

United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 10, 2024, plaintiff Adrian Benjamin (“Benjamin” or

“plaintiff”), acting pro se, filed a complaint in New York Supreme Court,

Tompkins County alleging violations of his HIPAA rights, defamation, and

unlawful arrest against defendants Cayuga Addiction Recovery Services

(“CARS”), City of Ithaca, Town of Ithaca, City of Ithaca, Ithaca Police

Department (“Ithaca Police”), New York State Troopers (“NYSP”), the Town

of Triangle Court (the “Town”), and New York State (collectively the

“defendants.” Compl., Dkt. No. 2.

On February 11, 2025, the Town removed this action to the Northern

District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§§ 1331, 1441, and 1446 on the

basis that plaintiff’s complaint raises a federal question. On March 18, 2025,

the Town moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). In support of their motion, the Town argues

that: (1) they are entitled to judicial immunity; (2) plaintiff’s state law claims

do not comply with New York’s General Municipal Law; (3) plaintiff has

failed to plead a defamation claim; (4) plaintiff’s allegation of failure to

respect federal law fails to state a claim; (5) plaintiff’s claim that defendant

violated his right to privacy fails to state a claim; (6) plaintiff’s claim of a

HIPAA violation fails as to the Town because they are not a health care

provider; and (7) plaintiff failed to properly serve the Town. Def’s. Mem.,

Dkt. No. 10-1 at 3–9. Plaintiff did not oppose the Town’s motion to dismiss,

and the time to do so has passed. Dkt. Nos. 10, 13.

The motion has been fully briefed and will be considered on the basis of

the submissions without oral argument. Dkt. Nos. 2, 10-1.

II. BACKGROUND

In 2024, Benjamin attended counseling sessions provided by CARS, a

substance abuse center, where he with spoke non-defendant counselor and

CARS employee Kelsey Ingraham (“Ingraham”). Compl. ¶ 3. On January 9,

2024, during one such counseling session, plaintiff alleges telling Ingraham

he loved her. Compl. ¶ 4. On February 2, 2024, during another session,

plaintiff alleges smoking marijuana with Ingraham inside the CARS facility.

Id. ¶ 4. The following day, plaintiff claims Ingraham called him from her

work phone to thank him for the marijuana he gave her, telling him that she

and her boyfriend, Dylan Bartlett (“Bartlett”), enjoyed using it. Id. ¶ 5.

On February 5, 2024, Ingraham asked plaintiff if Bartlett could purchase

more marijuana from him, but plaintiff declined. Id. ¶ 6. However, on

February 13, 2024, plaintiff ordered a flower for delivery to Ingraham, along

with a note. Id. ¶ 9. On May 20, 2024, plaintiff alleges that Bartlett stalked

him. Id. ¶ 11. Benjamin contends he contacted “the police” the following day

before deciding to dismiss Bartlett’s conduct as a lapse in judgment. Id. ¶¶ 5.

12, 13. From that day until August 9, 2024, but continued to communicate

with Ingraham. Id. ¶ 13. But at some point, plaintiff alleges CARS violated

his First Amendment rights by denying his ability to “talk with an

individual.”1 Id. As a result, on September 3, 2024, plaintiff sent a notice of

intent to sue and settlement demand to CARS. Id. ¶ 14.

On September 26, 2024, Ingraham filed an accusatory instrument before

the Town, presumably bringing claims against plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 15.

Plaintiff contends this instrument contained his confidential health

information and constituted a retaliatory act at the suggestion of defendant

CARS. Id. On October 30, 2024, plaintiff alleges he filed his lawsuit in state

court against CARS for violating his First Amendment rights. Id. ¶ 16. On

November 20, 2024, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Ingraham in New York

Supreme Court, Tompkins County for breach of contract alleging she

disclosed his confidential health information and requesting the Court issue

an injunction “blocking the arraignment of the case #24100038[.]” Id. ¶¶ 18,

19. The next day, plaintiff contends he was granted an adjournment as to

this arraignment. Id. ¶ 19.

On December 9, 2024, plaintiff contacted the Town seeking further

adjournment of his arraignment but was denied. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff replied:

“If you take my liberty, I will make sure to take my life first.” Id. ¶ 24. Later

this same day, plaintiff encountered issues making payment at a parking

garage machine in Ithaca, New York and contacted law enforcement. Id. ¶

1 But plaintiff does not specify if this was Ingraham or another individual.

25. When the Ithaca Police Department arrived, plaintiff told them he would

be suing the City of Ithaca for the machine’s failure to accept his form of

payment. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff contends these police officers then harassed him

and held him against his will for approximately one hour, at which time the

New York State Police arrived on the scene to question plaintiff. Id. ¶ 28.

When plaintiff asked to leave and declined to consent to the interaction with

the NYSP, he alleges that a state trooper told him that he was being detained

pursuant to the New York Mental Hygiene Law. Id. ¶ 30.

Plaintiff asserts this interaction was an act of retaliation in response to

his threat to sue the City of Ithaca over the parking machine. Compl. ¶ 30.

Benjamin also alleges that the NYSP arrived after being “contacted by Owego

state police” to put out a bulletin identifying plaintiff as a suspect.2 Id. ¶ 28.

During this encounter, plaintiff alleges he: (1) clarified to NYSP that he never

wanted to harm himself or others; (2) made multiple outside calls to police

from inside his vehicle because he was alarmed by the circumstances; (3) was

never read his Miranda rights; (4) ultimately surrendered to NYSP under his

own accord; and (5) was “taken to CMC” for a mental health evaluation.

Plaintiff was released two hours later. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34, 37, 39.

2 As best as this Court can tell from plaintiff’s complaint, which is quite vague, a bulletin was

put out as a result of his call to Town of Triangle where his adjournment request was denied. It

appears this generated concern as to plaintiff’s well-being.

Plaintiff brings claims against the following defendants: (1) CARS for

defamation, violation of “CFR42 part 2” and HIPAA, violation of his civil

rights including his Fourth Amendment right to privacy; (2) both the City

and Town of Ithaca for “failure to obey, respect, and uphold” the U.S.

Constitution, defamation of character, and, solely as to the City of Ithaca,

claims for failure to accept legal tender and unlawful detention without

cause; (3) the New York State Police for “promoting a suicide attempt,”

harassment, false arrest, and civil rights violations; (4) Town of Triangle for

defamation of character, failure to respect federal law, violation of his civil

right to privacy, and violation of federal confidentiality law and HIPAA; and

(5) New York State for failure to uphold the U.S. Constitution, for enforcing

state laws in violation of plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,

and for violating his HIPAA privacy rights. Compl. at 7–8.3

The Town now moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)

12(b)(6), to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Defendant argues that: (1) they are entitled to

judicial immunity; (2) plaintiff failed to serve a notice of claim as to his state

law claims; (3) plaintiff has failed to identify a custom or policy which

violated his privacy rights; (4) HIPAA does not give plaintiff a private right of

3 Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF headers.

action; and (5) plaintiff’s complaint was not properly served. Dkt. No. 10-1 at

3–10.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual

allegations must be enough to elevate the plaintiff’s right to relief above the

speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). So

while legal conclusions can provide a framework for the complaint, they must

be supported with meaningful allegations of fact. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 679 (2009). In short, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

To assess this plausibility requirement, the court must accept as true all of

the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in

the pleading, any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it

by reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v.

Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Concord Assocs., L.P.

v. Ent. Props. Tr., 817 F.3d 46, 51 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. § 1441 Removal

As a threshold matter, and in light of plaintiff’s failure to bring any

opposition to removal or to the instant motion to dismiss, the Court will

determine whether removal was proper in this matter. Defendant filed a

notice of removal, Dkt. No. 1, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This statute

states, in part:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of

Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of

which the district courts of the United States have

original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant

or the defendants, to the district court of the United

States for the district and division embracing the place

where such action is pending.

28 U.S.C. 1441(a). Defendant contends that the Court has subject matter

jurisdiction because plaintiff’s complaint presents a federal question arising

under the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States, as is required to

find original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dkt. No. 1 at 2.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint asserts violations of, inter alia,

federal confidentiality laws, HIPPA, his Fourth Amendment right to privacy,

and his Fifth Amendment due process rights, along with claims of unlawful

detainment, abuse of power, and defamation. Defendant asserts they have

complied with all procedures for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1446.

“In determining whether a petition establishes the existence of a federal

question, removal based on federal question jurisdiction is improper unless a

federal claim appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.” Town of

Salina, N.Y. v. CWP Syracuse I LLC, 2025 WL 2050974, at *13 (N.D.N.Y.

July 22, 2025) (quoting Four Keys Leasing & Maint. Corp. v. Simithis, 849

F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1988)). But “federal jurisdiction exists if a

court must apply federal law to the plaintiff's claim in order to decide the

case.” Tantaros v. Fox News Network

Upon review, Court agrees that removal is proper in this matter.

Plaintiff’s complaint clearly centers around alleged violations of his

constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to the substantive

arguments raised by the Town in their papers.

B. Judicial Immunity

Defendant Town of Triangle argues they are entitled to judicial immunity

and request dismissal from this matter. As best as this Court can discern,

plaintiff broadly alleges violated his rights when it accepted the filing of an

accusatory instrument filed against him, invading his confidential private

health information and defaming him. While plaintiff has not provided any

specifics as to why he names the Court directly, a review of the complaint

suggest his claims are directed at either, or both, a judicial officer or another

member of the Town’s court staff.

“It is well settled that judges generally have absolute judicial immunity

from suits for money damages for their judicial actions.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579

F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). The immunity doctrine applies

“even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly,” Imbler

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.12 (1976), or where “the act he took was in

error . . . or was in excess of his authority.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–13

(1991 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978)).

Even further, judicial immunity may extend to persons aside from a judge

“who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.”

McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 434

F. App'x 32 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200,

106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985)). Indeed, absolute judicial immunity

protects court clerks in the performance of tasks “which are judicial in nature

and an integral part of the judicial process.” McKnight, 699 F. Supp.2d at

525 (quoting Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir.1997)).

Though plaintiff’s claims as to the Town are quite vague, plaintiff’s claims

center around the Town’s acceptance of an accusatory instrument containing

confidential private health information related to plaintiff. Further, the

Town denied plaintiff’s request for an adjournment of his arraignment on

December 9, 2024. However, both of the alleged actions taken by the Town

are acts which are clearly judicial in nature. The granting and denial of

adjournments and the acceptance of court filings are integral parts of the

judicial process. Even if plaintiff were to have alleged malicious or corrupt

conduct by the Town, which he has not, his claims would still fail on

immunity grounds. Therefore, the Court finds the Town to be properly

immune from plaintiff’s claims, and they will be dismissed with prejudice.

Given plaintiff’s claims against the Town must fail on immunity grounds

and, aside from addressing issues of service as to plaintiff’s complaint

discussed infra, the Court declines to address the remainder of the Town’s

arguments. But the Town has indeed raised relevant issues regarding the

service of process in this matter that the Court will tend to now.

B. Insufficient Service of Process

The Town, in their motion papers, separately argues that plaintiff failed to

properly serve his complaint in New York Supreme Court, Tompkins County.

Though this issue is moot as to the Town given their immunity from suit, the

Court is nonetheless unaware at this point whether surviving defendants

have ever been served with anything in this matter, in either state or federal

court, prior to the Town’s notice of removal. What is clear is the remaining

defendant have not appeared before the Court in the eight months that have

followed.

Accordingly, plaintiff has ten (10) days from being served with this

Decision & Order to file a status report with this Court indicating the

following as to the complaint initially filed in state court: 1) whether each

remaining defendant was served with a copy of the complaint; 2) when and

how plaintiff served each remaining defendant with the complaint, including

proofs of service; and 3) whether plaintiff filed affidavits of service in state

court. If plaintiff indicates that he did not serve fefendant, In the event that

plaintiff fails to timely file this requested status report, his complaint will be

dismissed without prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that

1. The Town’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 10) is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice as to the Town;

3. The Clerk is directed to enter partial judgment as to the Town;

4. Within ten (10) days of being served with this Decision & Order,

plaintiff shall file a status report with the Court indicating: 1) whether each

surviving defendant was served with a copy of the complaint; 2) when and

how plaintiff served each surviving defendant with a copy, including proof of

service; and 3) whether plaintiff filed affidavits of service in state court;

5. If plaintiff’s status report indicates that he has not served the

remaining defendants, he will have thirty (30) days from his receipt of this

Decision & Order to serve remaining defendants; and

6. In the event that plaintiff fails to timely file this status report or

otherwise comply with this Decision & Order, plaintiff's complaint will be

DISMISSED, and the Clerk is directed to close the file at that time without

further order of the Court.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a partial judgment dismissing

the Town, terminate the pending motion, and set deadlines accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

David N Hurd

U.S. Disfrict Judge

Dated: November 12, 2025

Utica, New York.

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