Jones

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

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WAYNE CARROL JONES, CASE NO. 3:24-cv-05322-DGE

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Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART

12 v. AND DENYING IN PART

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

13 WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF (DKT. NO. 34)

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al.,

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Defendant.

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This case comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

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(Dkt. No. 34). For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in part and

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DENIED in part.

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1 I BACKGROUND

2 This case arises out of Plaintiff’s termination from the Washington Department of

3 Employment Security (“Department”).1 Plaintiff worked for the Department from May 2020

4 until his termination on July 21, 2023. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2–3.) Plaintiff worked for the

5 Department in a variety of roles including as an Unemployment Specialist 2 through 4 and a Paid

6 Leave Specialist 1 and 2. (Id.)

7 Plaintiff’s troubles with the Department began when he first asked for accommodations

8 on August 3, 2022 to address a “visual impairment” that “substantially limits [Plaintiff’s] ability

9 to read handwritten and poorly scanned documents.” (Id. at 2.) The Department failed to inform

10 Plaintiff of the “full range of available accommodations for visually impaired employees.” (Id.)

11 The Department also failed to “consult an accommodation specialist or conduct an individualized

12 assessment of Plaintiff’s specific needs.” (Id.) Instead, the Department gave Plaintiff “an

13 ‘Amazon list’ of equipment without explaining whether these tools were effective for Plaintiff’s

14 job duties.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff selected ZoomText software from the Department’s list. (Id.)

15 The Department failed to provide Plaintiff with any ZoomText training. (Id.) Plaintiff was not

16 able to use ZoomText to assist him with an “essential” part of his job: “reading handwritten or

17 poorly scanned documents.” (Id.) The Department denied requests from Plaintiff to receive

18 “additional accommodations and training” as well as a request to “transfer to a different team

19 where he would receive better support.” (Id.)

20 Plaintiff’s troubles escalated after the death of his father on January 9, 2023. (Id.)

21 Plaintiff requested FMLA leave from January 10, 2023 until April 2023 to “handle funeral

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1 All facts will be taken from Plaintiff’s complaint and assumed to be true for purposes of

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considering Defendant’s motion. The Court will not take judicial notice of any facts at this time.

(See Dkt. No. 35 at 3.)

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1 arrangements and personal recovery.” (Id.) The Department required Plaintiff “complete work-

2 related tasks, such as submitting timecard updates” during this period. (Id.) On May 12, 2023,

3 Plaintiff returned to work. (Id.) Upon his return, Plaintiff was subjected to “immediate

4 retaliation” in the form of being “denied training for new job duties,” “assigned to unfamiliar

5 work tasks without guidance,” having his “previously approved flexible work schedule” revoked,

6 and ultimately being terminated. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts misconduct has continued after his

7 termination, with his appeal being “obstructed” due to “[i]ncorrect contact names provided in his

8 separation letter” and “[a] deliberate delay in processing his appeal.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges

9 continued “discriminatory hiring practices against individuals with disabilities” by the

10 Department. (Id.)

11 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of (1) Plaintiff’s reinstatement “to his former

12 position or a comparable role” with the Department,” (2) mandatory “ADA, FMLA, and fair

13 hiring training for all supervisors and HR personnel” with the Department, and (3) court

14 monitoring of the Department’s “compliance with ADA and FMLA requirements for a

15 reasonable period of time.” (Id. at 4.) The Department has moved for judgment on the pleadings

16 alleging Plaintiff failed to show sufficient facts asserting “his separation from [the Department]

17 was related to his use of leave” or “he was not reasonably accommodated or discriminated

18 against on the basis of his disability.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 1.) Defendant’s motion is fully briefed.

19 (See Dkt. Nos. 35, 41.)2

20 II DISCUSSION

21 A. Legal Framework

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2 Plaintiff moved to strike certain portions of the Department’s reply. (Dkt. No. 42.) Plaintiff’s

motion is discussed in Part II.B, infra.

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1 “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move

2 for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is properly

3 granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to

4 judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Analysis

5 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), like analysis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

6 12(b), requires “a court [to] determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true,

7 entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.

8 2012) (quoting Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 10-04341 CRB, 2011 WL 6140912, at *3

9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

10 B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike

11 On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff moved to strike several portions of the Department’s reply,

12 including their challenge to his claim of disability under the ADA, their reference to the

13 children’s book If You Give a Mouse a Cookie, and their reference to AI hallucinations. (Dkt.

14 No. 42 at 1–2.) While the Court declines to strike any of Defendant’s reply as ‘redundant,

15 immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), the Court can understand some of

16 Plaintiff’s frustrations with the Department’s language. For example, if the Department’s

17 reference to a children’s book is meant to question the decision granting Plaintiff leave to amend

18 his complaint, the Court would remind the Department that complaints by pro se plaintiffs are to

19 be liberally construed and, if dismissed, leave to amend should be granted unless “absolutely

20 clear” amendment is futile. Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations

21 omitted).

22 While Plaintiff has certain misconceptions about the law as noted throughout this order

23 and will ultimately be held to the same legal standards as any other plaintiff, the Department is

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1 reminded of the importance of counsel—especially counsel representing the state and

2 specifically its Department of Employment Security—being mindful of tone when advocating

3 their client’s position.

4 C. Analysis

5 1. Plaintiff asserts a plausible claim under Title 1 of the ADA for failure to

6 accommodate.

7 Plaintiff’s complaint broadly speaking identifies two federal statutes—the Americans

8 with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)—he alleges the

9 Department violated. While Plaintiff does not identify specific provisions of the ADA

10 Defendants violated, his claim appears to allege a “failure to accommodate” claim under Title 1

11 of the ADA. In such claims a plaintiff is “required to establish (1) that [the plaintiff] was

12 disabled under the ADA; (2) that [the plaintiff] was a qualified individual with a disability; and

13 (3) that [the plaintiff] was discriminated against by [the plaintiff’s] employer because of that

14 disability.” Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prod., Inc., 878 F.3d 794, 798–799 (9th Cir. 2017).

15 Plaintiff states a plausible claim of disability under the ADA. An individual is disabled

16 under the ADA if one has a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more

17 of the major life activities of the individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Plaintiff identifies

18 himself as having a “visual impairment” that “substantially limits his ability to read handwritten

19 and poorly scanned documents.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 2.)3 While visual impairments are not per se

20 ADA disabilities, they can be the basis of an ADA claim. See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv.,

21 Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 802–803 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a monocular individual was not disabled

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23 3 Plaintiff provides additional information about his disability in his response. (Dkt. No. 35 at 2.)

However, only information contained in his complaint can be used for purposes of a judgment on

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1 under the ADA, but recognizing a disability could exist where an impairment “prevent[s] or

2 severely restrict[s] use of [] eyesight compared with how unimpaired individuals normally use

3 their eyesight in daily life”); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding

4 visually impaired individuals stated a successful ADA claim); Floyd v. Insight Global LLC, No.

5 23-cv-1680-BJR, 2024 WL 2133370, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2024) (citing a Sixth Circuit

6 case recognizing a “visually impaired” plaintiff alleged a plausible ADA violation); Atkinson v.

7 Aaron’s LLC, 733 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1070 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (same). Moreover, reading

8 constitutes a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d

9 1053, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff alleges substantial limitations in his ability to read

10 “handwritten or poorly scanned documents.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 2.)

11 Plaintiff also states a plausible claim of being a qualified individual. A qualified

12 individual is an individual who “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

13 essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Dunlap,

14 878 F.3d at 799 (quoting Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013)).

15 Plaintiff asserts he was promoted to the “Paid Leave Specialist 2” role after “completing an in-

16 training period.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 2.) Plaintiff’s success during this in-training period is sufficient

17 to show he could plausibly perform the job’s essential functions.

18 Finally, Plaintiff states a plausible claim he was discriminated against by the Department.

19 Discrimination under the ADA includes “an employer’s failure to make [a] reasonable

20 accommodation.” Dunlap, 878 F.3d at 799 (citing Mendoza v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop

21 of Los Angeles, 824 F.3d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016)). The duty to provide reasonable

22 accommodations is a continuing duty and employers must re-engage with the plaintiff if an

23 initial accommodation effort is unsuccessful. Humphrey v. Memorial Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d

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1 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff received one accommodation, ZoomText, which

2 “was ineffective.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 3.) Plaintiff asserts the Department then denied all other

3 requests for accommodations and trainings. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff states a facially

4 plausible claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA.

5 2. Plaintiff asserts a plausible claim for retaliation under the ADA.

6 A retaliation claim under the ADA requires the plaintiff to show “(1) involvement in a

7 protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the two.”

8 Coons v. Sec’y of United States Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

9 Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff cites his request for a

10 reasonable accommodation as involvement in a protected activity. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2.) Plaintiff

11 alleges three potential adverse employment actions: first, being denied a transfer; second, being

12 terminated; and third, having his appeal process obstructed. (Id. at 3.) Because the denied

13 transfer happened concurrently with Plaintiff’s dispute about reasonable accommodations, and

14 the termination and allegedly obstructed appeals process happened less than a year later,

15 proximity is sufficient for Plaintiff to survive judgment on the pleadings. See Pardi v. Kaiser

16 Found. Hosp., 389 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding retaliatory intent can be “inferred”

17 from temporal proximity); see also Kersey v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 210 Fed. App’x 561, 562

18 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing only cases with gaps over a year as lacking temporal proximity).

19 Accordingly, Plaintiff states a facially plausible claim for retaliation under the ADA.

20 3. Plaintiff asserts a plausible claim for retaliation under the FMLA.

21 A plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under the FMLA must “establish: (1) he engaged

22 in protected activity under the FMLA; (2) he suffered some adverse employment action by the

23 employer following the protected activity; and (3) the adverse employment action was causally

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1 linked to the protected activity.” Hazelett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 829 Fed. App’x 197, 202

2 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Browett v. City of Reno, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1046 (D. Nev. 2017)

3 (internal edits omitted). Proximity can be a factor for showing a causal link. See, e.g., Xin Liu v.

4 Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003); Mendel v. S. Mono Healthcare Dist., No.

5 2:19-cv-00216-TLN-JDP, 2022 WL 4237724, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2022); Schultz v. Wells

6 Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 970 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1054 (D. Or. Sept. 5, 2013). Because Plaintiff

7 alleges protected activity in the form of taking FMLA leave followed by his termination

8 approximately six months after his request and less than three months after his return to work,

9 Plaintiff states a plausible claim for retaliation under the FMLA.4

10 4. Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for interference under the

11 FMLA.

12 A FMLA interference claim requires the plaintiff show “(1) he was eligible for the

13 FMLA’s protections, (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave

14 under the FMLA, (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his

15 employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.” Crawford v. JP Morgan Chase,

16 983 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (quoting Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d

17 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2011)).

18 Plaintiff’s claim fails because the only interference he identified during his FMLA leave

19 was being required to “submit[] timecard updates.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 3.) Employers are allowed

20 to engage in de minimis contacts with employees on FMLA leave. See, e.g., Kelley v. Jewish

21 Voice Ministries Int’l, No. CV-23-00353-PHX-SPL, 2024 WL 4416978, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4,

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4 It is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff qualified for FMLA leave. Because he appears to have

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been granted FMLA leave, however, the Court will presume at this stage Plaintiff was eligible

for FMLA leave.

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1 2024): Graves v. DJO, LLC, No. 20-CV-1103 W (KSC), 2023 WL 3565077, at *14 (S.D. Cal.

2 Mar. 30, 2023); Michelucci v. Cnty. of Napa, No. 18-cv-05144-HSG, 2019 WL 1995332, at *6

3 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2019). Because Plaintiff asserts only the de minimis conduct of submitting

4 timesheets in his complaint, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for FMLA

5 interference is GRANTED.5 Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim is dismissed.

6 III ORDER

7 Accordingly, and having considered Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

8 (Dkt. No. 34), the briefing of the parties, and the remainder of the record, the Court finds and

9 ORDERS that Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and

10 DENIED in part. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted for Plaintiff’s

11 FMLA interference claim and denied for Plaintiff’s ADA failure to accommodate, ADA

12 retaliation, and FMLA retaliation claim. Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim is dismissed.6

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14 Dated this 12th day of November, 2025.

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17 5 Plaintiff argues Defendant’s framing of their requirements for him during his FMLA leave as

“de minimis” constitutes “extra-pleading characterizations.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 1.) However, the

18 Department’s characterization of timesheets and other similar tasks as being de minimis is

supported by case law and not outside the scope of a judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly,

19 no “conversion” or Rule 56(d) discovery is necessary. (See id. at 5–6.)

6 Plaintiff has expressed a desire to either add or substitute “the Commissioner in her official

20 capacity.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 1.) While Plaintiff may be able to sue the Commissioner in her

official capacity for injunctive relief, see Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir.

21 2003) (allowing Title II ADA suits against state officials in their official capacities), this change

would have no impact on the injunctive relief available to Plaintiff. Accordingly, a motion to

22 substitute the Commissioner as defendant will be denied.

Plaintiff also identifies an alternative request to add a Rehabilitation Act § 504 claim in the event

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the Court were to dismiss his ADA claim on immunity grounds. (See Dkt. No. 35 at 5–6.) As

this did not occur, the Court considers this request moot absent further request from Plaintiff.

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David G. Estudillo

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United States District Judge

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