The opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 Vinayak NAYYER, Case No.: 25-cv-3111-AGS-DDL
4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE
5 v.
6 Christopher J. LAROSE, et al.,
7 Respondents.
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9 Petitioner Vinayak Nayyer seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
10 challenging his immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is
11 sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
12 the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly
13 appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
14 relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting use of those Rules to any “habeas corpus petition”). In
15 this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly
16 not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
17 But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to
18 justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
19 Nayyer alleges that he’s been in immigration custody since “May 26, 2025.” (ECF
20 1, at 2.) Respondents “purport to hold [him] under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),” and because of
21 a Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion in “Matter of Yajure Hurtado,” this “subject[s]”
22 him “to mandatory detention.” (ECF 1, at 14, 17.) He claims that he is instead “subject to
23 [§] 1226(a),” which entitles him to “an individualized bail hearing before a neutral
24 adjudicator.” (ECF 1, at 14–15.) The statutory misclassification, he argues, renders his
25 detention “unlawful[].” (Id. at 1.)
26 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally
27 identical cases across the country have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the
28 merits” or have resulted in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-
1 || cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (“[T]he Court
2 || concludes that petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section
3 || 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No.
4 ||2:25-cv-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same);
5 also Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1
6 || (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Every district court to address this question has concluded
7 the government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory
8 |/interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”); Quispe vy.
9 || Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1471-AJT-LRV, 2025 WL 2783799, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29,
10 2025) (“Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary framework, not
11 |} § 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedures, as at least thirty federal district courts around
12 || the country, including two in this Circuit, have concluded when faced with habeas petitions
13 || from comparably situated petitioners.”).
14 By November 21, 2025, respondent must answer the petition. Any reply by
15 || petitioner must be filed by December 3, 2025. The Court will hold oral arguments on the
16 || petition on December 12, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.
17 || Dated: November 12, 2025
19 Hon. rew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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