Kyle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

DEVON M. KYLE, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 3:25-cv-542

)

v. ) Judge Atchley

)

MATTHEW WINN, ALISON ANGEL, ) Magistrate Judge Poplin

MICHAEL PODERY, BRETT COBBLE, )

and FRANK STRADA, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Devon M. Kyle, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of

Correction (“TDOC”) currently housed at the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex (“BCCX”),

filed a (1) pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2] and (2) motion for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis [Doc. 1]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s

motion, permit Plaintiff’s retaliation claim to PROCEED against Defendant Matthew Winn in his

individual capacity and DISMISS all remaining claims and Defendants.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner bringing a civil action may

apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A

review of Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 1] demonstrates that he lacks sufficient financial resources to

pay the filing fee in a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion [Id.] will

be GRANTED.

Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s

inmate trust account will be DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market

Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee, 37902 twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding

monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding month), but only

when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred

fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Clerk will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial deputy

and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s current facility to ensure compliance with

payment of the filing fee.

II. COMPLAINT SCREENING

A. Screening Standard

Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss

any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).

The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure to state a

claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language

tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630

F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive an initial review under the

PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them

to a less stringent standard than “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even so, allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might

2

later establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible

claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the

elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible

claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

While incarcerated, Plaintiff, who had been addicted to K-2, cocaine, and Hennessy,

voluntarily entered the Second Chance Protective Custody Therapeutic Community Drug and

Alcohol Program [Doc. 2 p. 10]. As part of this program, Plaintiff received individual and group

therapy, cognitive-behavioral interventions, and drug/alcohol relapse prevention [Id.]. He did well

in the program, and he was able to restore relationships that were damaged during his addiction

[Id.]. After this healing, Plaintiff had “no desire to do drugs and alcohol ever again. Plaintiff felt

life was worth living” [Id. at 10–11].

At BCCX, Plaintiff shared a cell with Maleake Tatham [Id. at 11]. On May 28, 2025, their

cell was searched by Corrections Officer (“CO”) Richard Farley, and a white powder substance

was found inside [Id.]. CO Farley called Sgt. Wiliam Byrd to come to the cell to retrieve the

substance [Id.].

On June 3, 2025, Sgt. Byrd delivered a “write up” to both Plaintiff and Tatham [Id.]. Sgt.

Byrd was identified as the reporting official in this write up, and he told Plaintiff to call him as a

witness at his disciplinary hearing [Id. at 12].

On June 4, 2025, Sgt. Matthew Winn came to Plaintiff’s unit and asked whether he had

any witnesses [Id.]. Plaintiff replied affirmatively and requested Sgt. Byrd [Id.]. Plaintiff was

provided a witness form, which Sgt. Winn filled out with Plaintiff’s name and potential testimony

[Id.]. Later, Sgt. Winn came back to the unit and served Plaintiff and Tatham with an amended

3

write up [Id. at 13]. Sgt. Winn informed Plaintiff, without explanation, that no witnesses would

be called for testimony [Id.].

The next day, June 5, 2025, Sgt. Winn informed Plaintiff that Tatham had pleaded guilty

[Id.]. Sgt. Winn stated, “If you don[’]t plea out and take my offer, you will wish you had. If you

waste my time and everyone else’s by taking this to a hearing or file an appeal, I will personally

see to it that you [will] be found guilty. Your parole [will be] denied in November, [you will be]

kicked out of the program, [you will lose] 4 months . . . of good time credits, you will stay in prison

a[]lot longer[,] and on top of what I impose for your disciplinary punishment!! 30 days punitive

segregation in the hole, 3 months visits restriction[,] and you’ll do [an] extra 6 months in the

hole!!” [Id. at 13–14]. In response, Plaintiff told Sgt. Winn that he had a right to both a hearing

and an appeal, and that Sgt. Winn was violating TDOC policy by retaliating against him for

exercising his rights [Id. at 14]. Plaintiff also informed Sgt. Winn that the charges against him

should be dismissed since Tatham pleaded guilty [Id.]. But Sgt. Winn told Plaintiff he had no

rights at BCCX, that Plaintiff was also guilty of the disciplinary infraction, and that he would see

him at the hearing the following day [Id. at 15].

On June 6, 2025, Plaintiff was called before the Class A Disciplinary Board [Id.]. The

Board consisted of the Chairperson, Sgt. Winn; the Warden’s secretary, Alison Angel; and Michael

Podery [Id. at 5–6, 15]. Sgt. Winn asked Plaintiff if there was anything he wished to say in his

defense, and Plaintiff explained that he had requested Sgt. Byrd as a witness [Id. at 15–16]. He

also informed the Board that they were violating TDOC policy and his due process rights [Id.].

Sgt. Winn asked Plaintiff to step out of the office [Id. at 16].

The Board found Plaintiff guilty and imposed a disciplinary punishment of 30 days of

punitive segregation, a 3-month restriction on visitation privileges, 4 months of Prisoner Sentence

4

Reduction Credits (“PSRC”), and a $5.00 fine1 [Doc. 2-1 p. 12]. In addition, because of Sgt.

Winn’s “retaliatory motives,” Plaintiff spent an additional 5 months in segregation, was denied

parole, and removed from his federally funded drug and alcohol program [Id. at 20–21].

Internal Affairs (“IA”) Investigator Jason Dykes falsified the writeup by claiming he was

the reporting official, even though CO Farley found the contraband [Id. at 16].

On June 10, 2025, Plaintiff informed Warden Brett Cobble about the TDOC and due

process violations associated with his disciplinary hearing, Sgt. Winn’s retaliatory threats, and his

cellmate’s guilty plea [Id. at 17]. Warden Cobble told Plaintiff to file an appeal [Id.]. Warden

Cobble then spoke with Tatham [Id. at 17–18]. And on June 22, 2025, Warden Cobble denied

Plaintiff’s appeal [Id.].

TDOC Commissioner Frank Strada denied Plaintiff’s subsequent appeal [Id.].

Commissioner Strada has essentially implemented a rule that prisoners are presumed guilty until

proven innocent, which violates TDOC policy [Id.].

Aggrieved, Plaintiff filed this action against Matthew Winn, Alison Angel, Michael

Podery, Brett Cobble, and Frank Strada, alleging retaliation by Defendant Winn [Id. at 19–21, 23–

24]; due process violations by Defendants Winn, Angel, and Podery [Id. at 22]; and Eighth

Amendment violations by Defendants Cobble and Strada [Id. at 23]. Plaintiff seeks a variety of

declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief [Id. at 25–27].

C. Analysis

To state a claim against any Defendant for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must

establish that a “person” acting “under color of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges,

1 This finding is reflected in Plaintiff’s attached disciplinary records, which are considered part of his

complaint. Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[D]ocuments

attached to the pleadings become part of the pleadings[.]” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c))).

5

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here,

Plaintiff sues each Defendant in both their official and individual capacities [Doc. 2 p. 5–7].

1. Official-Capacity Claims

Defendants are all TDOC employees. Suit against TDOC employees in their official

capacities is the equivalent of suit against TDOC itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

166 (1985) (holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a

suit against the entity”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-

capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.”). And because the TDOC is an arm of the State of Tennessee, suit against

a TDOC employee in his official capacity is suit against the State. See Hix, 196 F. App’x at 355

(holding TDOC is equivalent of the “State”). However, Plaintiff cannot sustain a § 1983 action

against the State of Tennessee, because “a state is not a person within the meaning of §1983.” Will

v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).

Also, the Eleventh Amendment typically “bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory

or monetary relief, against the state and its departments.” Thiokol Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of

Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984)). Because there has not been congressional abrogation or waiver of

immunity, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are otherwise barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (finding § 1983

does not waive state sovereign immunity); Berndt v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th

Cir. 1986) (holding Tennessee has not waived immunity to suit under § 1983). Thus, Plaintiff’s

suit against Defendants in their official capacities is impermissible and will be dismissed.2

2 An exception to sovereign immunity, known as the Ex Parte Young exception, exists when a State official

is sued in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908);

6

2. Individual-Capacity Claims

To state a claim against a defendant in his personal capacity, a plaintiff must adequately

plead that the particular defendant, through his or her own actions, has violated the Constitution.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)

(providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the

alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). This

requirement exists because constitutional liability cannot attach to a defendant solely based on his

or her position of authority. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[O]ur precedents establish . . . that

Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates

under a theory of respondeat superior.”); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (finding that liability under §

1983 may not be imposed merely because a defendant “employs a tortfeasor”).

i) Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Warden Cobble and Commissioner Strada violated the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by improperly

implementing TDOC policies in a manner that presumes an inmate is guilty of a disciplinary

offense before the matter is heard [See Doc. 2 p. 23]. However, a prisoner has no right to the

presumption of innocence in a prison disciplinary hearing. See, e.g., Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F.

Supp. 521, 539 (M.D. Tenn. 1973) (“[T]he disciplinary hearing need not contain certain procedural

safeguards, such as presumption of innocence and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which

are applicable in normal criminal prosecutions.”). And disciplinary hearings are not otherwise “to

Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993). But where the

complaint is “based entirely on past acts and not continuing conduct that, if stopped, would provide a remedy to

[Plaintiff] . . . it . . . does not come under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.” Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 776 (6th

Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as a retroactive measure for past alleged harms, and therefore, his

claims do not come within the Ex Parte Young exception.

7

be measured by the requirements of a criminal prosecution, for the full panoply of procedural due

process rights do not apply to the administration of prison discipline.” Brooks v. Westbrooks, No.

3:17-CV-00686, 2017 WL 3868275, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2017) (quoting Crafton, 378 F.

Supp. at 526 (M.D. Tenn. 1973) (citations omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a

plausible Eighth Amendment claim, and this claim will be dismissed.

ii) Due Process

To state a due process violation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he was deprived of an

interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)

(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life,

liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish one of

these interests at stake.”). Plaintiff’s complaint, liberally construed, alleges that that Defendants

violated his due process rights by (1) failing to follow TDOC policies; (2) falsely finding him

guilty of a disciplinary offense; and (3) refusing to permit him witnesses at his disciplinary hearing

[See, generally, Doc. 2]. The Court considers each of these allegations in turn.

First, the Court finds that Defendants’ alleged failure to follow TDOC policies does not

give rise to a constitutional claim, as TDOC policy and procedures do not create constitutionally

protected interests. See McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94-23347, 1995 WL 236687, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr.

21, 1995) (holding failure to follow policy directive does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation because policy directive does not create a protectible liberty interest); see also Stanley v.

Vining, 602 F. 3d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (“It has long been established that violation of a state

statute or regulation is insufficient alone to make a claim cognizable under § 1983.”). Accordingly,

this allegation does not state a claim.

8

Next, Plaintiff complains that he should not have been convicted of a disciplinary offense,

because the contraband found in his cell belonged to his cellmate, who pleaded guilty. However,

inmates possess no right to be free from charges or convictions of prison disciplinary offenses.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564–71 (1974). This is so even if the charge turns out to be

unfounded. Cromer v. Dominguez, 103 F. App’x 570, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (“False accusations of

misconduct filed against an inmate do not constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights where

the charges are subsequently adjudicated in a fair hearing.”); Person v. Campbell, No. 98–5638,

1999 WL 454819, at *1 (6th Cir. June 21, 1999) (“[T]he filing of false disciplinary charges against

an inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation redressable under § 1983.”). Therefore,

this allegation does not state a due process claim.

Finally, the Court considers the lynchpin of Plaintiff’s due process argument, which is that

Defendants Winn, Angel, and Podery denied him “a fair and impartial disciplinary proceeding by

refusing to call” Plaintiff’s witness and the reporting official [Doc. 2 p. 22]. As the Court noted

above, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not a part of a criminal prosecution, and the full

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.

But the loss of good-times credit because of a disciplinary conviction (as occurred in this case)

will typically implicate a liberty interest and require certain due process protections. Id. at 558.

One of these requirements is that the inmate possesses the right to call witnesses when doing so

“would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566-67.

However, because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages as a result of his disciplinary

conviction, he must first prove that his disciplinary conviction has been reversed or otherwise

invalidated before he can maintain a § 1983 action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–

87 (1994) (holding plaintiff must demonstrate unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement prior

9

to pursuing § 1983 claim challenging criminal judgment); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648

(1997) (applying Heck to disciplinary proceedings that resulted in deprivation of good-time

credits). And, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to overturn his disciplinary conviction and restore his

good-time credits, he is challenging the duration of his confinement, which must be pursued

through a writ of habeas corpus. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (citing Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). Summarizing these principles, the Supreme Court has

explained:

[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter

the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's

suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success

in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its

duration.

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005). Here, success on Plaintiff’s § 1983 due process

claim would render his disciplinary conviction invalid. And Plaintiff has not demonstrated that

the disciplinary conviction resulting in the loss of good-time credits has been invalidated.

Accordingly, this allegation fails to state a cognizable due process claim.

In sum, all of Plaintiff’s due process claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under § 1983, and they will be dismissed.

iii) Retaliation

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Winn retaliated against him for exercising his right

to a disciplinary hearing and pursing the appeals process [Doc. 2 p. 19–21, 23–24]. A retaliation

claim requires a plaintiff to show three things: (1) he “engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse

action was taken against [him] that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to

engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two—that

10

is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s protected

conduct.” Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999).

Regarding the consequences Plaintiff faced as a result of his disciplinary conviction, the

Court finds that, just as with Plaintiff’s due process claim, success on a retaliation claim necessarily

implies the invalidity of the Board’s decision that Plaintiff was, in fact, guilty. And the Sixth

Circuit has held that prisoners cannot collaterally attack their disciplinary hearings or convictions

by alleging retaliation in a § 1983 action. See, e.g., McMillan v. Fielding, 136 F. App’x 818, 820

(6th Cir. 2005) (“A prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to

collaterally attack the hearing’s validity or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction.”);

Lewis v. Pendell, 90 F. App’x 882, 883 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a § 1983 claim was not

cognizable because a favorable ruling on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim would imply the invalidity

of his disciplinary conviction); Norwood v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 67 F. App’x 286, 288 (6th Cir.

2003) (“Norwood cannot evade Heck’s bar on § 1983 challenges . . . by labeling his cause of action

a retaliation claim.”).

However, Plaintiff also claims that due to “Defendant Winn’s retaliatory motives, the

Plaintiff was placed in segregation an additional 5 months, [his] parole [was] denied[,] and [he

was] removed” from the drug and alcohol program [Id. at 20–21]. As the Court understands

Plaintiffs’ complaint, these restrictions were not part of Plaintiff’s punishment for his disciplinary

conviction [See Doc. 2-1 p. 12]. Thus, the Court presumes at this stage of the litigation that Heck

would not bar Plaintiff’s challenge. And, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Winn threatened these

actions—and Plaintiff subsequently suffered these consequences—because Plaintiff exercised his

right to a disciplinary hearing rather than pleading guilty to the write up [Id. at 19]. The Court

presumes that (1) Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct by maintaining his innocence at his

11

disciplinary hearing, and (2) Plaintiff’s placement in segregation, denial of parole, and removal

from the drug and alcohol program were sufficiently adverse actions. See Muhammed v. Byron

Ponds, No. 3:20-CV-00602, 2020 WL 7231625, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2020) (finding prisoner

engaged in protected conduct by maintaining innocence at disciplinary hearing and suffered

adverse action through more restrictions in close custody). And Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a

connection between the two elements, as he alleges that Defendant Winn explicitly threatened

these consequences if Plaintiff continued to a disciplinary hearing. Accordingly, the Court will

permit a retaliation claim to proceed against Defendant Winn in his individual capacity.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;

3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the filing

fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the

custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and

the Court’s financial deputy;

5. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim will PROCEED against Defendant Matthew Winn in

his individual capacity;

6. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons and

USM 285 form) for Defendant Winn;

7. Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the service packet and return it to the Clerk’s

Office within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order;

8. At that time, the summons will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded

to the U.S. Marshal for service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4;

9. Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that if he fails to timely return the completed service

packet, this action will be dismissed;

12

10. Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within twenty-one

(21) days from the date of service. If Defendant fails to timely respond to the

complaint, it may result in entry of judgment by default against him;

11. All other claims and Defendants are DISMISSED; and

12. Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and Defendant or his

counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13,

it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to

the proceedings of any change in his address, to monitor the progress of the case,

and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to

provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen (14) days of any change in

address may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr.

CHARLES E. ATCHLEY, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13