Blount-Yeye

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-22023-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

ANGELICA BLOUNT-YEYE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF HIALEAH, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendants, City of Hialeah (the “City”), Orlando

Amador, Alain Pineiro, and Juan Diaz’s Partial Motion to Dismiss . . . [ECF No. 30], filed on

September 12, 2025. Plaintiff, Angelica Blount-Yeye filed a Response [ECF No. 31]; to which

Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 32]. The Court has considered the parties’ written submissions

and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This civil rights action stems from the aftermath of a fatal March 16, 2022 shooting of

Miami-based hip-hop artist Timothy Starks — professionally known as “Baby Cino.” (See Second

Am. Compl. (“SAC”) [ECF No. 29] ¶¶ 1, 5, 13).1 Plaintiff, Starks’s mother, alleges that

emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) employed by the City — Amador, Pineiro, and Diaz

(the “Individual Defendants”) — arrived at the scene and found Starks “deceased or in critical

condition in a prone position in the vehicle.” (Id. ¶¶ 9–10). According to Plaintiff, the Individual

Defendants took photographs of Starks’s corpse (see id. ¶ 11), and then either directly uploaded

1 Plaintiff’s SAC is incorrectly titled a Third Amended Complaint. The Court will refer to the operative

pleading as the SAC.

the images to social media or shared them with another person for the purpose of posting them

online (see id. ¶ 12). She further asserts that the images “were used as artwork for a diss track”

mocking Starks’s death. (Id. ¶ 13).

Plaintiff suffered “significant emotional distress and mental anguish” because of the

images’ publication, including pregnancy complications. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 18). Plaintiff asserts the City

bears responsibility because it failed to implement or train its employees on a policy “prohibiting

the photography [sic] and dissemination of images of deceased individuals.” (Id. ¶ 16).

Plaintiff brings eight claims for relief: three claims of intentional infliction of emotional

distress (“IIED”) against the Individual Defendants (“Counts I–III”) (see id. ¶¶ 20–34); three

claims of substantive due process violations under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the Individual

Defendants (“Counts IV–VI”) (see id. ¶¶ 35–91); and two negligence claims against the City

(“Counts VII–VIII”) (see id. ¶¶ 92–109). Defendants move to dismiss Counts IV through VIII,

asserting the section 1983 claims are barred by qualified immunity and the others fail to state

plausible claims for relief. (See generally Mot.; Reply).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)], a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration added; quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Although this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. (alteration added; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings must contain

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration added; citation omitted). “[O]nly a complaint

that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679

(alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To meet this “plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678 (alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The mere possibility the defendant

acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.,

578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678), abrogated on other grounds

by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). When considering a motion to dismiss, a

court construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts its factual

allegations as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369

(11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Counts IV, V, and VI: 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Claims

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims on the ground that the

Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (See Mot. 3–9).2 The Court first

addresses whether the Individual Defendants acted within the scope of their discretionary

authority, then whether Plaintiff plausibly alleges her constitutional rights were violated, and

finally whether those rights were clearly established when the alleged incident occurred.

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation

omitted). To be entitled to qualified immunity, a government official must first demonstrate “he

2 The Court uses the pagination generated by the electronic CM/ECF database, which appears in the headers

of all court filings.

was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.” Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). When a defendant acts within the scope of his or her discretionary authority,

the burden “shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee v.

Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff can show qualified immunity is not appropriate by establishing “(1) the defendants

violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation.” Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). These requirements may be addressed “in any order.” Alcocer v.

Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “Generally speaking, it is proper to

grant a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint fails to allege the

violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311

(11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

i. Discretionary Authority

The parties agree the Individual Defendants were acting within the scope of their

discretionary authority. (See Mot. 4; see also SAC ¶¶ 39–40, 44, 58–59, 63, 77–78, 82). The

burden thus shifts to Plaintiff “to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d

at 1194 (citation omitted); see also Johnston v. Carlson, No. 24-10862, 2025 WL 1927532, at *3

(11th Cir. July 14, 2025).

ii. Violation of a Constitutional Right

Again, in Counts IV, V, and VI, Plaintiff alleges the Individual Defendants, respectively,

violated her substantive due process rights by photographing her deceased son’s body and causing

those images to be circulated online. (See SAC ¶¶ 11–12, 36, 39–41, 55, 58–60, 74, 77–79). The

Court next considers whether — accepting these allegations as true — Plaintiff possessed a

substantive due process right, and the Individual Defendants plausibly violated it.

A “‘[s]ubstantive due process’ analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted

right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires [the Court] to exercise the utmost care

whenever [it is] asked to break new ground in this field.’” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302

(1993) (alterations added and adopted; quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125

(1992)); see also Windwalker v. Governor of Ala., 579 F. App’x 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[The

Court] analyze[s] a substantive due process claim by first crafting a careful description of the

asserted right.” (alterations added; citation and quotation marks omitted)). A careful description

“of the fundamental interest at issue” ensures that the Court “narrowly frame[s] the specific facts

before [it] so that [it] do[es] not stray into broader ‘constitutional vistas than are called for by the

facts of the case at hand.’” Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005) (alterations added;

quoting Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004)). Here, Plaintiff

asserts that she possessed “a clearly established constitutional right . . . in controlling the images

of her [deceased] child’s remains[,]” and Defendants do not contest that characterization. (SAC

¶¶ 45, 64, 83 (alterations added); see also generally Mot.). The Court thus adopts Plaintiff’s

framing of the asserted substantive due process right at issue.

The Court must next “determine whether the asserted right is “one of ‘those fundamental

rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they

were sacrificed.’” Moore, 410 F.3d at 1343 (quoting Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239). On this

question, National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004), is

instructive. In Favish, the Supreme Court considered whether the Freedom of Information Act’s

(the “FOIA[’s]”) privacy exemption — which bars disclosures that would constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy — extends to a decedent’s family seeking to withhold

his death images. See generally id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). The Court held that the

“FOIA recognizes surviving family members’ right to personal privacy with respect to their close

relative’s death-scene images.” Id. at 170.

The Court emphasized it “ha[d] little difficulty . . . in finding in our case law and traditions

the right of family members . . . to limit attempts to exploit pictures of [a] deceased family

member’s remains for public purposes.” Id. at 167 (alterations added). And the Court recognized

that the “well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a family’s control over the body and

death images of the deceased has long been recognized at common law.” Id. Other courts have

found that the long-standing tradition of respecting family members’ privacy in death images

recognized at common law is also protected by substantive due process. See, e.g., Marsh v. Cnty.

of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Brookings v. City of Philadelphia,

No. 24-cv-470, 2024 WL 1889242, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2024); cf. Donohue v. Hoey, 109 F.

App’x 340 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying qualified immunity on right to privacy grounds where police

officer showed intimate nude photographs of the plaintiff and his murdered spouse to individuals

not involved in the murder investigation).

In Marsh v. County of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Constitution

protects a parent’s right to control images of a deceased child from unwarranted public disclosure

by the government. See 680 F.3d at 1154. Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Favish,

the Ninth Circuit court concluded that this right flows from history and tradition, and from “the

well-established substantive due process right to family integrity.” Id. The court also emphasized

that “public display of death images are [sic] the kind of conduct that is likely to cause the family

profound grief and therefore ‘shocks the conscience’ and ‘offend[s]’ the community’s sense of fair

play and decency.” Id. at 1155 (alteration adopted; quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,

172–73 (1952)).

Defendants insist that Marsh is inapplicable because, unlike this case, the deceased child

there was a minor; therefore, they argue the court’s decision was “base[d] on the fundamental

interests of a parent in choosing how to care for a child in life.” (Mot. 6 (alteration added); see

also Reply 2); see generally Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154. The Court is not persuaded that Marsh

should be read so narrowly. Although the deceased in Marsh was a minor, the Ninth Circuit also

grounded its decision in a more general “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal

matters[.]” Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154 (alteration added; citation omitted). Marsh relied on multiple

cases extending beyond the parent-minor relationship that recognized a common-law right of

family members over a decedent’s death images. See id. at 1153–54 (citing Melton v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of Hamilton Cnty., 267 F. Supp. 2d 859, 865 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Catsouras v. Dep’t of

Cal. Highway Patrol, 181 Cal. App. 4th 856, 874 (2010)). There is little reason to believe that the

profound grief caused by the public dissemination of a son or daughter’s death images ceases to

exist merely because, as here, the deceased was not a minor.3

For the very reasons the Supreme Court set forth in Favish and the Ninth Circuit in Marsh,

the Court concludes that the right to control the public dissemination of a child’s death images is

protected by substantive due process. In sum, Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants

photographed her son’s corpse “[w]ithout authorization and in violation of privacy and decency”

3 Defendants also contend that Marsh failed to set forth a “careful description” of the asserted substantive

due process right in that case. (Mot. 5–6; see Reply 3); see also Reno, 507 U.S. at 302. The Court finds no

basis to conclude that Marsh’s framing of the asserted substantive due process right was overly broad or

not carefully described, particularly when, as stated, Defendants do not object to Plaintiff’s framing of the

substantive due process right asserted in this case (see supra 5).

and caused those photographs to be circulated on social media (SAC ¶¶ 11–12 (alteration added));

thereby violating her constitutional right to control the public dissemination of her son’s death

images (see id. ¶¶ 41, 60, 79). The dissemination of these images “caused her significant

emotional distress and mental anguish[,]” as well as pregnancy complications. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 18

(alteration added)). Accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff has adequately alleged the

violation of a constitutional right.

iii. Clearly Established Law

The Court next considers whether the right to control the public dissemination of a son or

daughter’s death images was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. “‘Clearly established law’ is law that is sufficiently established so as to

provide public officials with ‘fair notice’ that the conduct alleged is prohibited.” Randall v. Scott,

610 F.3d 701, 715 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). “To

determine whether a right is clearly established, [the Court] ask[s] whether it would be clear to a

reasonable [government] official that his or her conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted.”

De Veloz v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 756 F. App’x 869, 880 (11th Cir. 2018) (alterations added). “[T]he

clearly established law standard is a demanding one.” Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217,

1235 (11th Cir. 2020) (alteration added; citations omitted).

A plaintiff can demonstrate that a constitutional right was “clearly established” in various

ways. See Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1121 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). First,

the plaintiff may show that “a materially similar case has already been decided.” Terrell v. Smith,

668 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Vinyard v.

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1352 (11th Cir. 2002) (“When fact-specific precedents are said to have

established the law, a case that is fairly distinguishable from the circumstances facing a

government official cannot clearly establish the law for the circumstances facing that government

official[.]” (alteration added)). Second, the plaintiff may “point to a broader, clearly established

principle that should control the novel facts of the situation.” Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1255 (alterations

adopted; quotation marks and citations omitted). Third, the plaintiff may “show that [her] case fits

within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates the constitution that prior case law is

unnecessary.” Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted); see also Nute v. White, 152 F.4th 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2025) (noting that “clearly

established law” can be shown through “conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly

violated, even in the total absence of case law” (citation omitted)).

Plaintiff argues that the right at issue in this case was clearly established under the first and

third categories. (See Resp. 5–8). As to the first category, Plaintiff asserts that Favish established

an individual’s right to control the dissemination of her son’s death images. (See id. 5–7).

Although Favish supports Plaintiff’s assertion of a constitutional right to control the dissemination

of a son’s death images, it does not establish that the right was clearly established because the

decision rested on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional analysis. See Favish, 541 U.S.

at 160. The inquiry into whether a right is “clearly established” is a rigid one, and under the first

category, the undersigned may only consider cases from the Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, or

the highest court of the state where the case arose. See Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of

Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff cites no other applicable authority, so the

Court turns to the third category.

Cases finding clearly established law under the third category are “few and far between”

given that a plaintiff “must show that a defendant’s conduct ‘lies so obviously at the very core of

what the [relevant constitutional provision] prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was

readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of case law.’” Jarrard v. Sheriff of Polk

Cnty., 115 F.4th 1306, 1324 (11th Cir. 2024) (alteration adopted; quoting Loftus v. Clark-Moore,

690 F.3d 1200, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012)).

One such example is De Veloz v. Miami-Dade County, where prison medical officials were

accused of misgendering an inmate despite knowing that doing so would place her in an all-male

facility and jeopardize her safety. 756 F. App’x at 872–75. There, the Eleventh Circuit reversed

the undersigned’s grant of qualified immunity and dismissal of the plaintiffs Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claims. See id. at 881. Relying on the third “clearly established law”

category, the Eleventh Circuit held that, even without direct precedent, “every reasonable [prison

official] would have known that wrongfully misclassifying a biological female as a male inmate

and placing that female in the male population of a detention facility was unlawful.” Id. at 880.

Similarly, in Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit found it clearly

established, “even in the absence of case law[,]” that repeatedly tasering someone over a two-

minute span without attempting to arrest or detain him was “so unnecessary and disproportionate”

that no reasonable officer could have believed it was lawful. Id. at 907–08 (alteration added).

Having carefully reviewed the allegations here, the Court concludes Plaintiff satisfies the

third category’s stringent standard. It should have been readily apparent to every reasonable on-

duty EMT at the time of this incident that photographing a corpse and causing the images to

circulate on social media — especially without consulting the decedent’s parents — constitutes

egregious and unlawful conduct. (See SAC ¶¶ 11–12); see also Favish, 541 U.S. at 168 (“Family

members have a personal stake in . . . objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by

intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the

deceased person who was once their own.” (alteration added)). The Court thus finds that none of

the Individual Defendants is entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity.

B. Count VII: Vicarious Liability (Alternatively Pleaded Claim)

In addition to the section 1983 claims asserted against the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff

alternatively asserts a vicarious liability claim against the City if the Individual Defendants are not

found to have intentionally caused the dissemination of Starks’s death images. (See Count VII).

Defendants move to dismiss, arguing Count VII (1) fails to sufficiently allege the City owed

Plaintiff a duty of care or breached any such duty; (2) does not satisfy the physical impact rule;

and (3) improperly asserts a negligence claim predicated on allegedly intentional conduct. (See

Mot. 10–13).

As no determination has been made as to whether the Individual Defendants acted

intentionally, it is premature to address Defendants’ arguments concerning Plaintiff’s alternative

claim. See Dixie Elec. Co-op v. Citizens of State of Ala., 789 F.2d 852, 857–58 (11th Cir. 1986)

(“Federal courts may not render advisory opinions on abstract or hypothetical propositions of

law. . . . A federal court may not, consistent with the Constitution, entertain a proceeding such as

this one, that merely . . . allows for the adjudication of potential issues that have not actually

arisen.” (alterations added; citation omitted)).

C. Count VIII: Negligence (Failure to Train and Implement Policy)

Plaintiff also alleges that the City failed to train the Individual Defendants on the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, section 264, 110

statute 1936; and failed to implement a policy regarding the dissemination of death images. (See

SAC ¶¶ 101–09). The City argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity. (See

Mot. 13–15).

Under Florida law, governmental entities are immune from tort liability for actions

involving their “discretionary” functions, such as the “development and planning of governmental

goals and policies.” Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001); see

also Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1162 (“Although [Florida Statute section] 768.28(1) waives sovereign

immunity for acts which would create liability for a private person, such waiver extends only to

the government’s operational, not discretionary acts.” (alteration added; citation and quotation

marks omitted)). “A city’s decision regarding how to train its offic[ials] and what subject matter

to include in the training is clearly an exercise of governmental discretion regarding fundamental

questions of policy and planning.” Lewis, 260 F.3d at 1266 (alteration added).

Plaintiff does not allege the City was negligent in training the Individual Defendants under

its existing policies; rather, it alleges the policies themselves were inadequate. (See SAC ¶¶ 101–

09). Plaintiff’s claim therefore challenges discretionary governmental functions protected by

sovereign immunity. See Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092,

1119 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1162 (“Because [plaintiff] only challenges

the content of the [training] program, not the way in which the program was implemented, [the

City] is entitled to sovereign immunity[.]” (alterations added)). Plaintiff’s negligence claim based

on the City’s alleged failure to implement HIPAA training is thus dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants, City of Hialeah, Orlando Amador, Alain

Pineiro, and Juan Diaz’s Partial Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 30] is GRANTED in part.

Count VIII is DISMISSED without prejudice.

CASE NO. 25-22023-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 11th day of November, 2025.

lo als W. LZ

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

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