LOPEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

KAIJA FELLMAN LOPEZ, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) 2:25-cv-00456-SDN

)

MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH )

AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., )

)

Defendants )

RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW

OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges the Maine Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and

two of its employees violated her constitutional rights and discriminated against her

regarding the custody of her children. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) With her complaint,

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees, (Application, ECF No.

3), which application the Court granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) In accordance with the statute

governing actions filed without the prepayment of fees, a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s

complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Following a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, I recommend the Court dismiss the

complaint.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are summarized as follows:

In October 2024, Plaintiff voluntarily entered a detoxification program. While

Plaintiff was sedated with prescription medication, two DHHS employees pressured

Plaintiff to enter a residential treatment facility designated by the detoxification program

staff, and to sign a temporary guardianship form transferring custody of her children to her

brother. Plaintiff entered the residential treatment program and partial hospitalization

program. During her time in residential treatment, Plaintiff attempted to contact

Defendants, but they did not respond. Plaintiff asserts that she complied with all clinical

recommendations, but Defendants maintained that she had failed to enter sober living.

Defendants relied on statements from Plaintiff’s sister-in-law rather than the opinions of

medical professionals.

Shortly before discharge from the program in December 2024, Plaintiff was told

that her case would be closed, but on the next day, Defendants rescinded that statement and

required further documentation. At a family meeting that Defendants convened,

Defendants accused Plaintiff of being untruthful and demanded that her therapist provide

parenting recommendations and confidential treatment notes. When the therapist refused

to release the treatment notes, Defendants advised that they had obtained records from

therapists in other cases.

In January 2025, Plaintiff’s children were returned to her care, but she did not

receive an official notice closing the case. Shortly thereafter, Defendants issued findings

of severe abuse and neglect that were not raised previously. The findings were in a letter

sent to an incorrect address, which delayed Plaintiff’s receipt of the notice until April 2025.

Defendants’ findings were later overturned on appeal. Plaintiff filed a Freedom of Access

Act request and a civil suit in state court. The records request was denied, and the civil

suit was dismissed on immunity grounds.

LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1915 is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts for

individuals unable to pay the cost of bringing an action. When a party is proceeding

without prepayment of fees, however, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under §

1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective

defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be

granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the

benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640

F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A self-represented

plaintiff is not exempt from this framework, but the court must construe his complaint

‘liberally’ and hold it ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Waterman v. White Interior Solutions, No. 2:19-cv-00032-JDL, 2019 WL

5764661, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).

“This is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to

state a claim.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980).

DISCUSSION

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 prohibits “the lower federal courts from exercising

jurisdiction over cases brought by” parties who lost in state court and who are “challenging

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Lance

v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quotation marks omitted), because “the proper forum

for challenging an unlawful state court ruling” is the state appellate system followed by a

petition for review by the United States Supreme Court. Davison v. Government of Puerto

Rico-Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps., 471 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

Because Plaintiff evidently seeks the same or similar relief that she sought in her

unsuccessful state court civil suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars her claims in federal

court.

Even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not entirely defeat federal jurisdiction,

issue preclusion and claim preclusion principles, which limit a plaintiff’s ability to obtain

relief in federal court after an unsuccessful result in state court, would appear to preclude

Plaintiff’s claim in this case. The general rule of issue preclusion “is that when an issue of

fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the

determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent

action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” B & B Hardware,

Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015) (quotation marks and

modifications omitted). Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, when a later suit “arise[s]

1 See generally, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

from the same transaction . . . or involves a common nucleus of operative facts” as an

earlier suit, “the earlier suit’s judgment prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses

to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were

asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel

Fashions Group, Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020) (cleaned up). Plaintiff acknowledges that

she filed a civil suit in state court based on her interactions with DHHS. Issue and claim

preclusion, therefore, bar Plaintiff from asserting here claims based on the same

circumstances.

Even if there were no obstacles to this Court’s consideration of Plaintiff’s claims,

the allegations are insufficient to state a plausible federal claim. In one claim, Plaintiff

asserts that Defendants violated her right to due process by coercing her to take certain

actions to regain custody of her children. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state

deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. This protection has both substantive and procedural components. Amsden v.

Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753–54 (1st Cir. 1990). In either context, “a plaintiff, as a condition

precedent to stating a valid claim, must exhibit a constitutionally protected interest in life,

liberty, or property.” Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1,

8 (1st Cir. 2005).

The procedural component of the due process guarantee “normally requires notice

and an opportunity for some kind of hearing” but “[w]hether the opportunity needs to be

furnished before the seizure or whether a post-seizure opportunity is sufficient depends on

the circumstances.” “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by

executive action when it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking,

in a constitutional sense.” Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (quotation

omitted); see also Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (conduct must be

“extreme and egregious,” “truly outrageous, uncivilized, and intolerable,” “stunning”).

Plaintiff’s assertion that her grant of temporary guardianship to her brother due to pressure

from Defendants would not support a substantive due process or procedural due process

claim.

“The substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive

action when it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a

constitutional sense.” Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (quotation

omitted); see also Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (conduct must be

“extreme and egregious,” “truly outrageous, uncivilized, and intolerable,” “stunning”).

Defendants’ alleged conduct cannot reasonably be viewed as “extreme and egregious,”

“truly outrageous, uncivilized, and intolerable.”

As to the procedural due process claim, Plaintiff’s allegations implicate the Supreme

Court’s reasoning in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517 (1984), and Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). The so-called Parratt-Hudson

doctrine provides:

So long as a state has not set up a scheme so open-ended it invites

unwarranted uses of summary process, see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138, and

so long as a state provides an adequate after-the-fact remedy for any wrongful

summary action, see Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543–44, allegations of the kind of

“random and unauthorized” mistakes in application that those who work in

government sometimes make are not enough to state a procedural due

process claim, Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

South Commons Condominium Association v. Charlie Arment Trucking, Inc., 775 F.3d 82,

89 (1st Cir. 2014) (alternate citations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged an actionable

procedural due process claim because (1) Plaintiff does not challenge the adequacy of the

procedures provided by a state or local policy or rule, and (2) Plaintiff does not allege the

absence of state remedies for the alleged violation, which remedies are evidently available.

Plaintiff also asserts that the individual defendants retaliated against her for the

inquiries of and complaints to their superiors. To state a First Amendment retaliation

claim, a plaintiff “must show that [the plaintiff] engaged in protected activity, that

defendants took an adverse action against [the plaintiff] that would deter a [person] of

ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct, and that there is a causal link

between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Turner v. Wall, No. 18-1869, 2020

WL 5543935, at *1 (1st Cir. May 5, 2020).

Plaintiff has arguably alleged facts that would support a finding that she engaged in

protected conduct and that she suffered an adverse consequence—a restriction on her

contact with her children. Plaintiff, however, has not alleged sufficient facts to support a

finding that she suffered the adverse consequence due to the complaints rather than for

other reasons. First, Plaintiff provides few details regarding the substance of her

complaints and thus an inference of retaliation is not apparent. Furthermore, Plaintiff

alleges she was deprived of contact with her children before she made the complaints.

Without more, “the Complaint does not ‘support a fact-based inference’ that the . . .

Defendants’ actions were anything other than routine actions undertaken by [government]

officials in the exercise of their responsibilities.” Powell v. City of Pittsfield, No. CV 18-

30146-MGM, 2020 WL 7700123, at *10 (D. Mass. June 29, 2020) (assuming adverse

consequences followed protected speech but there was insufficient support to infer

retaliatory motive) (quoting Campagna v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental

Protection, 334 F.3d 150, 155 (1st Cir. 2003 and citing Air Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d

27, 36 (1st Cir. 2011)).

Plaintiff also seeks relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act “provide, in nearly identical

language, that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,

be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Nunes

v. Mass. Department of Corrections, 766 F.3d 136, 144 (1st Cir. 2014) (quotation marks

omitted).2 “To state a claim for [disability discrimination], a plaintiff must allege: (1) that

[the plaintiff] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that [the plaintiff] was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services,

programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion,

denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of [the plaintiff’s] disability.” Toledo v.

2 Title II prohibits such conduct by public entities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title III prohibits discrimination in

places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits

discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2006). Assuming Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her

substance use were sufficient to establish that she suffers from a disability, the claim under

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act still fails because there are no facts from which a fact

finder could plausibly infer that Defendants acted out of discriminatory animus.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges a state tort claim for negligence. Because Plaintiff has not

stated a federal claim, the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

alleged state law claim. See Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st

Cir. 1995) (“As a general principle, the unfavorable disposition of a plaintiff’s federal

claims at the early stages of a suit, well before the commencement of trial, will trigger the

dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims”). Accordingly,

dismissal of the matter is warranted.

CONCLUSION

After a review of Plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, for the

reasons explained herein, I recommend the Court dismiss the complaint.

NOTICE

A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate

judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district

court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen

(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right

to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.

/s/ John C. Nivison

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated this 12th day of November, 2025.