Holloway

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT November 12, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

DIEDRE HOLLOWAY, §

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Plaintiff, §

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VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-2014

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FORT BEND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL §

DISTRICT, §

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Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the court is Defendant Fort Bend Independent School District’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 33). Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Third

Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 28), Defendant’s Motion (Dkt. No. 33), Plaintiff’s Response (Dkt.

No. 42), and Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 43), and in light of the relevant law, the court is of the

opinion that Defendant’s Motion should be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Factual and Procedural Background1

Plaintiff Deirdre Holloway (“Holloway”) is an African American woman who was

employed by Defendant Fort Bend Independent School District (“FBISD”) for fifteen years before

her retirement in 2022. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶¶ 4, 7). In her fifteen years with FBISD, Holloway served

in several roles, including elementary school principal, middle school principal, and director of

state and federal programs. (Id. at ¶ 7). When the conduct complained of in this lawsuit began,

Holloway was serving as FBISD’s director of Title I programs. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 40). While Holloway

1 As this Order concerns a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), the facts presented

herein are as alleged by Plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

served in this role, Dr. Deena Hill (“Hill”) was FBISD’s director of student support services, and

she acted as Holloway’s supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 9). Hill had the authority to determine Holloway’s

work schedule and assignments, approve Holloway’s time off, carry out disciplinary actions

against Holloway, and complete Holloway’s annual performance reports. (Id. at ¶ 10). Thus,

Holloway asserts that at all points relevant to this lawsuit, Hill acted as an agent and employee of

FBISD. (Id. at ¶ 11).

Holloway alleges that Hill demonstrated racial animus and discrimination toward

Holloway on several occasions. At a diversity training on September 24, 2019, Hill joked that

someone planning to attend a family funeral for an African American staff member needed “to be

prepared to stay a long time with all that singing and dancing and stuff.” (Id. at ¶ 14). In the summer

of 2020, a district member’s stepson was killed. (Id. at ¶ 16). He was African American, and Hill

asked Holloway if she knew what happened and if he was a drug dealer. (Id.).

On February 17, 2021, Holloway’s home flooded due to a major winter storm. (Id. at ¶ 18).

Holloway requested the ability to work remotely while her house was being repaired and she was

living in a hotel. (Id.). At that time, Holloway was also taking care of her elderly mother. (Id.).

Hill ultimately approved Holloway’s remote-work request, but she also suggested that Holloway

should take time off under the Family and Medical Leave Act instead. (Id.). Holloway began

working remotely and taking days off to care for her mother. (Id. at ¶¶ 19–23). During that time,

Hill began calling Holloway on her days off to ask if she was coming to work, even though Hill

knew Holloway was caring for her mother. (Id. at ¶ 20). Hill would ask Holloway how long she

would be in the hotel and why there were no other family members to assist her. (Id. at ¶ 22). Hill

also criticized Holloway for missing an early morning meeting and told her she needed to appear

in the office from time to time. (Id.). Holloway alleges that Hill consistently treated her less

favorably than her similarly situated co-worker, the director of special education programs, who

was a white male. (Id. at ¶ 23). At the same time that Hill denied Holloway’s request to work from

home on certain days, this male co-worker was allowed to work from home for several months

without issue. (Id.).

Holloway alleges other instances of animus during that time, which include Hill repeatedly

instructing Holloway to redo a presentation that had already been prepared correctly and

threatening to report Holloway for failure to speak with principals about equity plans, even though

Hill had specifically instructed Holloway not to meet with school principals about that issue. (Id.

at ¶¶ 24–25).

On May 5, 2021, Holloway filed a grievance against Hill, and a hearing officer conducted

an investigation. (Id. at ¶ 26). The officer said she would instruct Hill to stop making inquiries

about Holloway’s home, and she directed FBISD to engage Hill in racial and cultural bias training.

(Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28). The officer also recommended reassignment for Holloway. (Id. at ¶ 29).

Despite the grievance and the hearing officer’s recommendations, FBISD still permitted

Hill to conduct Holloway’s performance evaluation in June of 2021. (Id. at ¶ 30). During the

performance evaluation, Hill said that Holloway was getting a lower-than-average rating in one

category because of the grievance Holloway filed. (Id. at ¶ 30). The FBISD human resources

representative in the meeting did not intervene after Hill’s statement or report the statement up the

chain of command. (Id.). Holloway complained to FBISD’s human resources director, who noted

that Holloway’s score was eventually raised, so there was “no harm, no foul.” (Id. at ¶ 31).

A few months later, FBISD reassigned Holloway, naming her the director of student

affairs. (Id. at ¶ 32). This new position had no actual supervisory responsibilities; even though

there were two assistant directors, they did not report to Holloway. (Id. at ¶ 33). When Holloway

arrived at her new workspace, no office had been prepared for her, and she was made to work in

the hallway for two days. (Id. at ¶ 34). FBISD filled Holloway’s previous position, director of Title

I programs, with a white female. (Id. at ¶ 35). Holloway retired from FBISD in 2022. (Id. at ¶ 37).

Holloway filed a charge of discrimination against FBISD with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on January 6, 2022. (Dkt. No. 33-1). The EEOC issued

Holloway a right to sue letter on March 1, 2024, instructing Holloway that she had ninety days to

file her lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 1-1). Holloway filed her original complaint on May 28, 2024, eighty-

eight days after receiving notice of her right to sue. (Dkt. No. 1). In response to motions to dismiss

filed by FBISD, Holloway filed a first amended complaint on July 22, 2024, a second amended

complaint on August 22, 2024, and a third amended complaint on May 12, 2025. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 18,

28).

In her third amended complaint, Holloway alleges racial discrimination, retaliation, and

hostile work environment claims under Title VII and a Section 1983 claim for violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶¶ 38–68). FBISD moved

to dismiss all claims under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No.

33 at 9, 12). The court will address each claim accordingly.

Standards of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

A court properly dismisses a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule

12(b)(1) “when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home

Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)); see FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(b)(1). A party challenging jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may do so through a “facial

attack” on the complaint, or through a “factual attack” relying on evidence outside the pleadings.

Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953

a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the

purposes of the motion.” Id. If the movant pursues the latter, “no presumptive truthfulness

attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations.” Montez v. Dep’t of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 2004).

Instead, the court looks to whether the plaintiff has proven the existence of subject-matter

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, and can decide disputed issues of material fact in

making this determination. Superior MRI Servs., Inc. v. All. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 502,

504 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1096 (5th Cir. 1989), aff’d

sub nom., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990)); Montez, 392 F.3d at 149. In

sum, the court may determine lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of: (1) the complaint

alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts. Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A party may move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) is read

in conjunction with the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-68 (2009). This standard does not require detailed factual

allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

However, a party’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]’ to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the complaint and any other matters properly considered2 must contain “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual

content allows the court, drawing upon its “judicial experience and common sense,” to reasonably

infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556), 679. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader

is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

a. Statute of Limitations

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1), “[a] plaintiff may bring a claim for discrimination under

Title VII only if she has filed a claim with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful act,

or within 300 days if the plaintiff first filed a complaint with a state or local agency.” Ikossi-

Anastasiou v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 579 F.3d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 2009).

Holloway first filed her charge of discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission, and the

parties therefore do not dispute that the applicable time limit here is 300 days. (Dkts. No. 33 at

¶ 15 and No. 42 at ¶ 15).

Under Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, “discrete discriminatory acts are not

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” 536

U.S. 101, 113 (2002). In Morgan, the Supreme Court determined that discreet acts might include

notice.’” Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dorsey v.

Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)); see also Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.

Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (court’s review on 12(b)(6) motion “is limited to

the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to

dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint”).

“termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” Id. at 114. According to the

Court, “[e]ach incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision

constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Id. Therefore, for discreet acts

of discrimination or retaliation in Texas, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300

days after the discriminatory act occurred. Id. at 113.

However, the existence of past acts does not bar employees from timely filing charges

about related, independently discriminatory acts. Id. “Nor does the statute bar an employee from

using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Id. Relatedly, when it

comes to hostile work environment claims, “[i]t does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that

some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period.”

Id. at 117. So long as “an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire

time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of

determining liability.” Id.

Here, Holloway’s complaint asserts three claims under Title VII—(1) hostile work

environment, (2) retaliation, and (3) racial discrimination. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶¶ 38–52, 63–68). In its

motion to dismiss, FBISD argues that any incidents alleged in Holloway’s complaint occurring

before March 12, 2021, should be barred by the 300-day statute of limitations period set by the

Civil Rights Act and Texas Labor Code. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶¶ 15–16). This constitutes a facial attack

under 12(b)(1), so the court considers just the allegations in Holloway’s complaint. See Menchaca,

613 F.2d at 511. The court will analyze each of Holloway’s Title VII claims in turn.

First, in her response to FBISD’s motion to dismiss, Holloway cites Morgan, arguing that

incidents occurring before March 12, 2021, are properly raised as part of a single hostile work

environment claim, and “not as timely discreet acts.” (Dkt. No. 42 at ¶ 17). In reply, FBISD

concedes that Morgan allows “untimely” asserted facts to support a claim for hostile work

environment under Title VII. (Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ 1). Holloway alleges that part of her hostile work

environment claim involves being reassigned to a non-supervisory role and forced to work from

the hallway. (Dkt. No 28 at ¶ 49). Her reassignment happened in fall 2021—within the 300-day

statute of limitations window—meaning that Holloway’s hostile work environment claim was

timely filed with the EEOC. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. Thus, Rule 12(b)(1) and the statute of

limitations are not a basis for dismissal of that claim, and any incidents occurring before the 300-

day window may be properly considered for determining FBISD’s liability under the hostile work

environment claim.

Second, FBISD argues that under Morgan, any incidents alleged by Holloway that

occurred outside of the 300-day window cannot support her discrimination and retaliation claims.

(Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ 2). FBISD is correct that any discreet claim of retaliation brought by Holloway

that occurred before March, 12, 2021, would be barred as untimely. However, Holloway’s

retaliation claim is based on events that occurred after she filed a grievance against Hill in May of

2021. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶¶ 63–66). Therefore, Holloway timely filed her retaliation claim with the

EEOC, and Rule 12(b)(1) and the 300-day statute of limitations period are not a basis for dismissal

of that claim.

Lastly, Holloway alleges two discreet adverse actions under her racial discrimination

claim—(1) punishment for Holloway’s work from home request and (2) demotion to a non-

supervisory position. (Id. at ¶¶ 41, 44). Hill’s allegedly discriminatory response to Holloway’s

work-from-home request in February of 2021 was not timely filed by Holloway because those

events happened before March 12, 2021. Therefore, under Morgan, the claim arising from

Holloway’s work-from-home request is no longer actionable, and it should be dismissed under

Rule 12(b)(1). See 536 U.S. at 115. Holloway’s reassignment, however, happened “in late August

or early September of 2021,” meaning that it did fall within the 300-day statute of limitations

window. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 32). Therefore, Rule 12(b)(1) and the 300-day statute of limitations

period are not a basis for dismissal of Holloway’s claim for discrimination through her

reassignment.

Accordingly, the court finds that Holloway’s claims under Title VII for hostile work

environment, retaliation, and discrimination by reassignment to a non-supervisory position were

all timely filed with the EEOC. However, Holloway’s claim for discrimination after her request to

work remotely is time-barred. FBISD’s motion to dismiss that claim is GRANTED, and it is

hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under Rule 12(b)(1).

b. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies3

Before seeking relief in federal court, “Title VII plaintiffs are required to exhaust their

administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission.” Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 893 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2018), aff'd, 587

U.S. 541, 139 S.Ct. 1843, 204 L.Ed.2d 116 (2019). When determining whether a Title VII claim

has been exhausted, courts “construe the EEOC charge in its broadest reasonable sense,” asking if

“the claim can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Davenport v.

Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 891 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “Although verbal precision and finesse in the charge are not required, a Title VII

lawsuit can include only those allegations that are like or related to those allegations contained in

3 The court considers the administrative exhaustion issue under the header of Rule 12(b)(1) because FBISD’s

motion to dismiss raises it under 12(b)(1). However, it should be noted that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is

not jurisdictional. See Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551 (2019). Instead, it is considered a mandatory

“processing rule” and “not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts.” Id. at 551.

the EEOC charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the

Commission.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, FBISD argues that Holloway failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her

allegations that (1) she was denied the ability to work from home, (2) she was made to work from

a hallway after being reassigned to her new position, and (3) that Hill made offensive statements

related to the death of their colleague’s stepson. (Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ 4). FBISD claims that these

factual allegations cannot be considered by the court because Holloway failed to include them in

her charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Id.).

The court will resolve this issue using Holloway’s complaint, supplemented by the EEOC

charge, which FBISD attached to its motion to dismiss. See Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161; Stewart v.

Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 16 F. Supp. 3d 783, 797 n.45 (S.D. Tex. 2014)

(“Even though the EEOC charge is a matter outside the pleading, judicial notice of it may be taken

as a matter of public record . . . .”). Because Holloway’s claim for discrimination based on her

work from home request is time-barred, the court need not resolve whether Holloway also

exhausted her administrative remedies for that claim. Remaining in dispute are Holloway’s

allegations that (1) she was made to work from a hallway after being reassigned to her new position

and (2) Hill made offensive statements to her about the death of their colleague’s stepson. (Dkt.

No. 43 at ¶ 4).

On her EEOC charge, Holloway checked the boxes for discrimination based on race, color,

and retaliation. (Dkt. No. 33-1 at 1). In the narrative portion of the charge, Holloway describes the

events following the 2021 winter storm and her work from home request. (Id.). She also describes

Hill’s statement about the African American funeral, FBISD’s investigation of and response to her

grievance, Hill’s statement that Holloway’s performance score was lowered because she submitted

the grievance, and Holloway’s ultimate reassignment to a non-supervisory role. (Id. at 2).

Construing the EEOC charge “in its broadest reasonable sense,” the court concludes that the scope

of Holloway’s charge could be read to include claims for discrimination based on race, hostile

work environment, and retaliation. Although Holloway did not mention being forced to work from

a hallway or Hill’s statements about their colleague’s stepson in her EEOC charge, both allegations

relate to and support Holloway’s hostile work environment claim. The allegation about being

forced to work from the hallway also relates to Holloway’s discrimination and retaliation claims.

Therefore, the court finds that these two allegations do not give rise to new claims under Title VII,

and they are sufficiently “like or related to” the allegations in Holloway’s EEOC charge to pass

the administrative exhaustion requirement.

Accordingly, FBISD’s motion to dismiss Holloway’s claims for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is DENIED.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

a. Title VII Discrimination

“Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse

to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Hamilton v. Dall. Cnty., 79 F.4th 494,

502 (5th Cir. 2023). At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff “need not submit evidence to

establish the prima facie case for discrimination, [but] she must plead sufficient facts on all of the

ultimate elements of the claim to make her case plausible.” Davis v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs.

Comm’n, 761 F. App’x 451, 454 (5th Cir. 2019).

To state a claim for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must plead that she “(1) is a

member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or

suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone

outside [her] protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees

outside the protected group.” Offord v. City of Fulshear, 861 F. App’x 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2021)

(quoting McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007)).

Here, FBISD argues that Holloway’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for

discrimination under Title VII. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 25). FBISD argues, “Plaintiff seeks to rely upon

facts that this Court cannot entertain as such facts have not been timely raised nor properly

exhausted.” (Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ 6). As discussed above, the discrimination claim arising from

Holloway’s remote work request was not timely filed with the EEOC. That claim is dismissed

under Rule 12(b)(1), so the court will not analyze it here. However, Holloway’s claim for

discrimination based on her reassignment was timely, and the court will now consider if Holloway

has pled sufficient facts to make a plausible claim for discrimination based on that event.

FBISD maintains that Holloway’s complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show the third

and fourth elements of a Title VII discrimination claim. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 38). In her complaint,

Holloway alleges that FBISD “took a further adverse employment action against Plaintiff by

demoting her to a nonsupervisory position and assigning her to work in a hallway.” (Dkt. No. 28

at ¶ 44). FBISD argues that Holloway’s reassignment “was not an adverse employment action as

the reassignment was a remedy granted by the grievance hearing officer pursuant to Plaintiff’s

grievance.” (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 31).

A plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action when there is “a significant change in

employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly

different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Butler v. Ysleta

Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir.1998). The Fifth Circuit has determined that a transfer

can qualify as an adverse employment action when it is the “equivalent of a demotion.” Alvarado

v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 2007). And “[t]o be equivalent to a demotion, a

transfer need not result in a decrease in pay, title, or grade; it can be a demotion if the new position

proves objectively worse—such as being less prestigious or less interesting or providing less room

for advancement.” Id. at 613. Holloway’s allegation that FBISD reassigned her to a non-

supervisory position indicates that her new job had significantly different responsibilities from and

was a demotion from her former role. Therefore, taking Holloway’s allegations as true, the court

concludes that she has stated facts sufficient to show that she suffered an adverse employment

action.

FBISD also argues that because Holloway’s reassignment was not an adverse employment

action, the individual who replaced Holloway in her “previous position is not relevant.” (Dkt. No.

33 at ¶ 36). FBISD makes no further argument about Holloway’s failure to sufficiently allege the

fourth element. Because Holloway alleges that she was replaced with a white female, the court

finds that Holloway has also sufficiently pleaded the fourth element of her Title VII discrimination

claim. Therefore, FBISD’s motion to dismiss Holloway’s claim for discrimination based on her

reassignment in the fall of 2021 is DENIED.

b. Title VII Retaliation

To successfully allege a claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must plead facts

showing that (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) an adverse employment action

occurred; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action. Cuellar v. Southwest General Emergency Physicians, P.L.L.C., 656 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th

Cir. 2016) (citing Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2004)). “Protected

activity under Title VII is either opposing any practice made unlawful by [Title VII], or making a

charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under this subchapter.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)) (cleaned up). To state a

retaliation claim based on opposition to discriminatory practices, “a plaintiff must show she

reasonably believed the employment practice she opposed was unlawful under Title VII.” Id. And

“a viable Title VII retaliation claim does not necessarily depend on a viable harassment or

discrimination claim.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Here, FBISD argues that Holloway’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for

retaliation against the district under Title VII for the following reasons: (1) Holloway filing a

grievance does not mean she engaged in protected activity, (2) Holloway did not suffer an adverse

employment action, and (3) Holloway did not plead any facts showing a causal connection between

the filing of her grievance and the alleged adverse employment action. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶¶ 39–43).

First, FBISD argues that Holloway has not alleged facts showing that filing a grievance

against Hill qualified as protected activity under Title VII. For an internal complaint or grievance

to qualify as protected activity, “an employee cannot simply complain that she received unfair or

undesirable treatment . . . . A vague complaint that does not reference a discriminatory employment

practice does not constitute a protected activity.” Carter v. Target Corp., 541 F. App’x 413, 418

(5th Cir. 2013). Holloway’s complaint does not go into detail about the content of her grievance.

But Holloway does show that the grievance was filed, at least in part, in response to Hill’s

statement about Black church funerals. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 27–28). And she alleges that the grievance

hearing officer directed FBISD to engage Hill in racial and cultural bias training. (Id.). Noting that

a viable retaliation claim is not necessarily contingent on a viable discrimination or harassment

claim, the court concludes that Holloway has shown reasonable belief that the employment

practices she opposed in her grievance violated Title VII. See Cuellar, 656 F. App’x at 709 (“To

state a retaliation claim based on opposition clause protected activity, a plaintiff must show she

reasonably believed the employment practice she opposed was unlawful under Title VII.”)

(quoting EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Second, as explained above, Holloway has pled sufficient facts to plausibly show that her

reassignment qualified as an adverse employment action. Holloway also alleges that she was

subject to a retaliatory adverse employment action when Hill gave her a lowered performance

evaluation score because of the grievance. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 65). FBISD argues that a lowered

score on a performance evaluation does not qualify as an adverse employment action, and FBISD

cites caselaw discussing the issue in the context of substantive discrimination claims. (Dkt. No. 43

at ¶ 9 n.1).

However, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is wider in scope than Title VII’s

substantive provision. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). To show

an adverse employment action in the retaliation context, a plaintiff only needs to “show that a

reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this

context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination.” Id. Holloway alleges that during her performance evaluation, “Hill

stated outright that she was giving Plaintiff a lower-than-average rating in one of the rated areas

due to the bringing of the grievance.” (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 30). The court finds that this statement

qualifies as an action which would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting

a charge of discrimination. Therefore, Holloway has alleged facts sufficient to show two adverse

employment actions in the context of her retaliation claim.

Third, FBISD argues that Holloway “has also failed to plead any fact that satisfies the final

element showing a causal connection between any such protected activity and alleged adverse

action.” (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 43). To plausibly allege the causation element of a retaliation claim, a

plaintiff must “plead facts permitting a reasonable inference” that the adverse employment action

occurred because of her protected activity. Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433 (5th

Cir. 2021). When a protected activity and an adverse employment action happen close together,

there may be a reasonable inference of causation. See id. (finding that an employee’s suspension

one day after submitting an internal complaint and termination one month later permitted a

reasonable inference of causation); Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir.

2016) (holding that “the close timing between . . . protected activity and the denial of a raise—

about two months—is sufficient to show causal connection for purposes of a prima facie case).

However, the proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action must be “very close”

to establish causation, and the Fifth Circuit has determined “that two and one-half months between

the protected activity and the adverse employment decision, standing alone, is not within the ‘very

close’ proximity that is necessary to establish causation.” Besser v. Texas Gen. Land Off., 834 F.

App’x 876, 885 (5th Cir. 2020).

Here, Holloway alleges that there is a “causal connection between the statutorily-protected

expression and the adverse employment actions by reason of their temporal closeness.” (Dkt. No.

28 at ¶ 66). Because Holloway states that Hill told her the performance evaluation score was due

to her grievance, Holloway has clearly shown a causal connection between the performance

evaluation and her protected activity. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 30). However, Holloway has failed to allege

sufficient temporal closeness between the grievance and her reassignment. Holloway’s complaint

alleges that her demotion did not occur until late August of 2021, approximately three months after

she filed the grievance against Hill. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 66). Therefore, under Besser, Holloway has

not alleged sufficient temporal closeness to show causation between the filing of her grievance in

May and her reassignment to a non-supervisory role in August. See 834 F. App’x at 885.

Accordingly, FBISD’s motion to dismiss Holloway’s retaliation claim is DENIED as to

Holloway’s lowered performance evaluation score and GRANTED as to Holloway’s

reassignment to a non-supervisory role.

c. Title VII Hostile Work Environment

“To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII,” a plaintiff generally must

show that she:

(1) belongs to a protected group; (2) was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the

harassment complained of was based on [her] membership in the protected group; (4) the

harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5)

the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take

prompt remedial action.”

Eng. v. Perdue, 777 F. App’x 94, 98 (5th Cir. 2019). However, “[i]f the claim is that the supervisor

harassed the employee, the plaintiff need not satisfy the fifth element.” Caldwell v. Lozano, 689

F. App’x 315, 322 (5th Cir. 2017). To affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment,

harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. “In determining whether harassment

is sufficiently pervasive or severe, [courts] consider ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;

its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Thompson v. Microsoft

Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 471 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Patton v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d 437,

445 (5th Cir. 2017)).

Here, FBISD argues that Holloway has not alleged facts showing (1) harassment that

affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment or (2) that FBISD knew or should have

known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 47). Holloway does

not need to show that FBISD knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to act

because she has alleged sufficient facts to show that Hill was her supervisor. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶¶ 9–

10). However, Holloway does need to plead enough facts to show that she faced harassment that

was severe or pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. See

Caldwell, 689 F. App’x at 322.

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Fifth Circuit has found conduct sufficiently severe to

support a hostile work environment claim when the complaint alleges harassment through speech

that is especially egregious or violent. See Woods v. Cantrell, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022)

(finding a single incident sufficiently severe to state an actionable hostile work environment claim

when a worker’s supervisor directly called him a “Lazy Monkey A__ N___” in front of his fellow

employees); see also Hudson v. Cleco Corp., 539 F. App’x 615, 620 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing a

hanging noose displayed in the workplace and noting that “such an incident might constitute an

‘extremely serious’ isolated event causing a discriminatory change in the terms and conditions of

one’s employment.”) However, if individual instances of harassment are not severe, conduct may

still be pervasive enough to support a hostile work environment claim when many incidents occur

in a short time period. See Blanchard v. Tulane Univ., 636 F. Supp. 3d 642, 657 (E.D. La. 2022)

(finding harassment pervasive when a complaint alleged eleven separate instances of

discriminatory conduct over the course of two years); Lauderdale v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice,

Institutional Div., 512 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding pervasiveness when a plaintiff

received unwanted phone calls “ten to fifteen times a night for almost four months”).

On the other hand, “Title VII does not impose a general civility code on employers,” and

the Fifth Circuit has determined that harassment is not severe or pervasive when a plaintiff alleges

infrequent conduct that falls within “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.” West v. City of

Houston, 960 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,

788 (1998)) (finding conduct was not severe or pervasive when plaintiff complained that “her

coworkers passed gas at the dinner table; infrequently slept in their underwear at the station; made

the occasional racially insensitive joke; and brought adult magazines to the station.”). See also

Stone v. Louisiana Dep’t of Revenue, 590 F. App’x 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that

harassment was not severe or pervasive even when a supervisor accused the employee of losing

documents, reduced her telecommuting privileges, assigned her more “desk audits” than Caucasian

employees, improperly delayed approval of her hours, and searched her desk without permission);

Mosley v. Marion Cnty., 111 F. App’x 726, 728 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding no hostile work

environment despite three incidents involving a racial slur).

Here, Holloway has not alleged facts sufficient to show that Hill’s conduct was severe or

pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Holloway states that

she “was subjected to harassment and hostility on the basis of race” based on the following events:

(1) Hill’s joke about black church funerals in 2019; (2) Hill’s question about whether their co-

worker’s black stepson was a drug dealer in 2020; (3) Hill’s scrutiny of Holloway when she was

working from home in February 2021, even though her white co-worker was allowed to work from

home with no issue; and (4) FBISD’s reassignment of Holloway to a non-supervisory position

where she was forced to work from a hallway for two days. (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 49). Even taking all

of Holloway’s allegations as true, these four events do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive

conduct that creates an actionable claim for hostile work environment under Title VII. See Stone,

590 F. App’x at 340.

Accordingly, FBISD’s motion to dismiss Holloway’s hostile work environment claim for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.

d. Section 1983

Finally, Holloway alleges that FBISD “violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th

Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that [Hill’s] conduct was motivated by

[Holloway’s] membership in a protected class as an African American/Black female, and

Defendant’s knowledge of that fact.” (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 59).

Section 1983 “provides that every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage of any State subjects, or causes to be subjected, any person to the

deprivation of any federally protected rights, privileges, or immunities shall be civilly liable to the

injured party.” Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 658

(2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that

local governmental units, such as school districts, are considered persons to which § 1983 applies.

Id. at 689. The scope of a local government’s liability under § 1983 is limited to instances where

the deprivation of rights results from a custom, policy, or practice. Id.

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York and its progeny, a

claim of “municipal liability under Section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a

policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving

force” is the policy or custom. The “official policy” requirement was intended to

distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby

make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually

responsible . . . So to prevail against a public school district, a plaintiff must show that the

district’s final policymaker acted with deliberate indifference in maintaining an

unconstitutional policy that caused the plaintiff's injury.

Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351, 365–66 (5th Cir. 2020).

Holloway does not allege any facts showing that FBISD’s final policy maker acted with

deliberate indifference in maintaining an unconstitutional policy that caused Holloway’s injury.

She alleges (1) that she was qualified for her position as director of Title I programs, (2) that Hill

scrutinized and punished Holloway for requesting to work from home, (3) that her similarly-

situated white male co-worker was allowed to work from home with no issue, and (4) that she was

demoted to a non-supervisory position and forced to work from a hallway. Ud. at [| 55-58).

Because Holloway does not allege any facts showing an unconstitutional policy, FBISD’s motion

to dismiss Holloway’s Fourteenth Amendment claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby ORDERS that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

(Dkt. No. 33) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

The following claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE:

(1) Plaintiff's claim for discrimination based on her work from home request in February

2021.

The following claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE:

(1) Plaintiff's claim for retaliation based on her reassignment in the fall of 2021;

(2) Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim; and

(3) Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

The following claims remain:

(1) Plaintiff's claim for discrimination based on her reassignment in the fall of 2021; and

(2) Plaintiff's claim for retaliation based on her performance evaluation in June of 2021.

SO ORDERED November 12, 2025, at McAllen, Texas.

Rane, Cres

Randy Crane

Chief United States District Judge

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