Parham

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

MARION PARHAM, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-01209-SEM

)

RODNEY ALFORD et al., )

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint (Doc. 13) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by Plaintiff Marion

Parham, an inmate at Western Illinois Correctional Center (“WICC”).

The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion and concludes that

Plaintiff’s pleading states an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim for relief.

I. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. ALLEGED FACTS

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges constitutional violations at Pontiac

Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) against Defendants Rodney Alford,

Pontiac’s Warden, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford).

Plaintiff asserts that he has a spinal disease and a bulging

disk that causes pain for which he has received physical therapy

but requires surgery. Plaintiff states that Defendant Alford was

“fully advised” of his medical need but denied referring him to a

hospital.

III. ANALYSIS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need

only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This

requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in

sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that

the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v.

Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016); see

also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769,

772 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Instead, a plausible claim must include

‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Despite including the Pontiac warden, whom Plaintiff does not

identify, as a Defendant, he does not include any facts that permit

the Court to infer a constitutional violation. Thus, Plaintiff fails to

state a plausible claim against the Pontiac warden.

Defendant Wexford can be held liable under § 1983 if an

unconstitutional act is caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and

promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom

that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well

settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas

v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see

also Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-

28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for municipal liability

in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978),

applies to corporations as well). “The ‘official policy’ requirement

was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of

employees of the municipality, and thereby [clarify] that municipal

liability is limited to action for which the municipality is …

responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479

(1986) (emphases in original).

Plaintiff does not assert a plausible claim against Defendant

Wexford, as he does not allege any facts that establish or permit the

inference that Wexford is liable under any of the three bases

mentioned. See Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir.

2016) (“To hold defendants liable under § 1983 and Monell, [a

plaintiff] must demonstrate that the defendants’ ‘official policy,

widespread custom, or action by an official with policy-making

authority was the “moving force” behind his constitutional injury.’”)

(quoting Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir.

2016)).

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription

against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct

demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on

a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a

plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an objective and

subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir.

1996). Under the objective element, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that his medical condition is sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective component, the

prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by

showing that a defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the

inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645,

653 (7th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state a plausible deliberate

indifference to medical need claim under the Eighth Amendment

against Defendant Alford.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court’s merit review of Plaintiff’s

complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to proceed with an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs claim against Defendant Alford. Any additional

claims shall not be included in the case, except at the

Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause

shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) The Court directs the Clerk of the Court (“Clerk”) to

dismiss Wexford Health Sources, Inc. as a party.

3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff

need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time

unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing

Defendant a waiver of service. Defendant has sixty days

from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not filed

Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days

of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been

served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

5) If Defendant no longer works at the address provided by

Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while

at that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s

current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s

forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding

addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not

be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the

Clerk.

6) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the

date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is

not an answer. The answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this order. In general, an answer sets forth

Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files

a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is

necessary or will be considered.

7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after

Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel

copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has

filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or

responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless

they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s

counsel has filed an appearance, and the Court has

entered a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

8) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose

Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel

shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal

of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

10) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to

the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and

will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

11) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified

protective order under the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

12) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendant under the standard procedures.

ENTERED November 12, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

_______________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE