Noem

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JORGE RAMIREZ MARTINEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

) No. 25-cv-12029

v. )

) Judge Andrea R. Wood

KRISTI NOEM, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Jorge Ramirez Martinez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without

inspection more than 24 years ago and has resided here ever since. On October 1, 2025, Ramirez

Martinez was arrested and taken into custody by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”). In line with a recent decision issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),

Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025), Ramirez Martinez has been detained

without the opportunity to seek release by means of an individualized bond hearing before an

Immigration Judge. For that reason, he has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 1), asking the Court to declare that Respondents’ actions violate the

applicable provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and his rights under the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and order Respondents to grant him a bond hearing

for his removal proceedings. For the reasons that follow, Ramirez Martinez’s petition is granted.

BACKGROUND

Ramirez Martinez is a native and citizen of Mexico, who entered the United States

without inspection in 2001 and has remained in the country since then. (Pet. ¶¶ 19, 21, Dkt. No.

1.) Prior to his arrest, Ramirez Martinez resided in Chicago, Illinois, with his wife and three U.S.

citizen children, and he served as his family’s primary source of financial support. (Id. ¶ 20.) He

has no criminal record. (Id. ¶ 3.) On October 1, 2025, Ramirez Martinez was arrested in Chicago

and taken into custody by ICE. (Id. ¶ 5.) Initially, he was detained at the Broadview Detention

Center in Broadview, Illinois. (See id. ¶ 7.) Two days later, he was issued a Notice to Appear for

removal proceedings on October 22, 2025, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Resp. to Pet. Ex. 1 at

1, Dkt. No. 10-1.) Since his initial detention, Ramirez Martinez has been relocated to the Clay

County Detention Center in Brazil, Indiana. (Status Report at 1, Dkt. No. 7.)

Until recently, the Government has had a longstanding practice of treating aliens taken

into custody while already present in the United States as subject to the detention pursuant to the

requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Section 1226(a) provides that detention is discretionary for

aliens detained under the provision, so long they do not fall within any of the enumerated

categories of “criminal aliens” listed in § 1226(c) for whom detention is mandatory. An alien

subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) may request a hearing to obtain release on

bond. Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98 (2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a),

1236.1(d)(1)). However, on September 5, 2025, the BIA issued its decision in Yajure Hurtado, in

which it held for the first time that all aliens who unlawfully enter the country are ineligible for

release on bond. Specifically, the BIA concluded that such aliens are not subject to discretionary

detention under § 1226(a) but instead are “applicants for admission” subject to mandatory

detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. at 228–29.

Based on Yajure Hurtado, Ramirez Martinez has been deemed ineligible for release

while he awaits removal proceedings, and therefore he has been denied a bond hearing before an

Immigration Judge. Contending that Yajure Hurtado incorrectly interprets the relevant

provisions of the INA and that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Ramirez Martinez now petitions this Court for a writ of

habeas corpus and, specifically, seeks a court order requiring Respondents Kristi Noem, in her

official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, and Russell Hott, in his official capacity as

Field Office Director of ICE’s Chicago Field Office, to provide him with a bond hearing. At the

time he filed his habeas petition, Ramirez Martinez was detained at the Broadview Detention

Center, which is located within the Northern District of Illinois.

DISCUSSION

A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that

“[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3). Here, Ramirez Martinez challenges his detention only insofar as he has been

deemed categorically ineligible for a bond hearing. In particular, he contends that he has been

improperly treated as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) when, in fact, his

detention is discretionary under § 1226(a). Ramirez Martinez further argues that Respondents’

refusal to provide him with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) violates his Fifth Amendment right

to due process. Before considering the merits of Ramirez Martinez’s habeas claims, however, the

Court first addresses Respondents’ arguments that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear those

claims, that the claims are not ripe for consideration, that Ramirez Martinez should be required

to exhaust his claims administratively before seeking a writ of habeas corpus, and that the

Secretary of Homeland Security is improperly named as a Respondent.

I. Jurisdiction

According to Respondents, three provisions of the INA independently preclude this Court

from exercising jurisdiction over Ramirez Martinez’s habeas petition. First, Respondents invoke

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or

claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to

commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this

chapter.” The Seventh Circuit has explained that § 1252(g) “does not sweep broadly; only

challenges to the three listed decisions or actions—to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,

or execute removal orders—are insulated from judicial review.” E.F.L. v. Prim, 986 F.3d 959,

964 (7th Cir. 2021). Here, Ramirez Martinez does not challenge any of those three specified

actions; instead, he challenges only the denial of a bond hearing. And “nothing in § 1252(g)

precludes review of the decision to confine” an alien. Carrera-Valdez v. Perryman, 211 F.3d

1046, 1047 (7th Cir. 2000). Indeed, numerous courts in this Circuit have considered similar

habeas claims and concluded that § 1252(g) did not divest their jurisdiction. E.g., Ochoa Ochoa

v. Noem, No. 25 CV 10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); Campos Leon v.

Forestal, No. 1:25-cv-01774-SEB-MJD, 2025 WL 2694763, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2025).

This Court concurs with that view and therefore rejects Respondents’ contention that § 1252(g)

deprives it of jurisdiction over Ramirez Martinez’s claims.

Next, Respondents assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

That provision states with respect “to review of an order of removal” as follows:

Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and

application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken

or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this

subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this

section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have

jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 . . . or by any other provision of

law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or

fact.

However, § 1252(b)(9) does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over questions about

whether “certain statutory provisions require detention without a bond hearing.” Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 292 (2018) (plurality opinion);1 see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.

1 While the Jennings decision’s jurisdictional analysis was joined only by a plurality of Justices (a

majority of Justices joined the rest of the opinion), the three Justices in dissent expressed the view that

jurisdiction was “unaffected by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which by its terms applies only ‘[w]ith respect to

Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (“As we have said before, § 1252(b)(9) does

not present a jurisdictional bar where those bringing suit are not asking for review of an order of

removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). And that is the crux of Ramirez Martinez’s challenge here.

Accordingly, § 1252(b)(9) presents no jurisdictional bar.

Finally, given that Ramirez Martinez argues that the decision to detain him pending a

decision on his removal is discretionary rather than mandatory, Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies. In particular, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that “no court shall have

jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the

discretion of the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security.” But that provision does

not preclude this Court’s jurisdiction because Ramirez Martinez “does not challenge a

discretionary bond denial by an [Immigration Judge] under § 1226(a). He has not been permitted

such a hearing because Respondents maintain that he is mandatorily detained under § 1225

instead.” Ochoa Ochoa, 2025 WL 2938779, at *4; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688

(2001) (“The aliens here . . . do not seek review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion;

rather, they challenge the extent of the Attorney General’s authority under the . . . detention

statute. And the extent of that authority is not a matter of discretion.”).

In short, the Court finds that none of the statutory provisions cited by Respondents

preclude it from exercising jurisdiction over the instant petition.

review of an order of removal under [§ 1252(a)(1)].’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)). Thus, a total of six Justices took the position that § 1252(b)(9) does not

preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over questions concerning detention without a bond hearing.

II. Ripeness

Having confirmed its jurisdiction over Ramirez Martinez’s habeas petition, the Court

turns to Respondents’ contention that his challenge is not yet ripe for consideration. In particular,

Respondents claim that Ramirez Martinez can only speculate that he will be detained without

being provided a bond hearing. The Court disagrees. As Respondents concede, Ramirez

Martinez assumes “with good reason . . . that he will not be afforded a bond hearing.” (Resp’ts’

Opp’n at 3, Dkt. No. 11.) More importantly, Respondents’ opposition brief makes clear their

position that Ramirez Martinez has no right to a bond hearing because he is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225 based on the BIA’s decision in Yajure Hurtado. By contrast, Ramirez

Martinez contends that detention is discretionary under § 1226(a) and he has a right to a bond

hearing. Whether Ramirez Martinez is properly considered as detained under § 1225 or

§ 1226(a) is a question that became ripe immediately upon his detention.

III. Administrative Exhaustion

Rather than reach the merits of Ramirez Martinez’s habeas claims now, Respondents

contend that this Court should require him first to request a bond hearing and then appeal any

denial of that request to the BIA. Where, as here, “Congress has not clearly required exhaustion,

sound judicial discretion governs.” Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004)

(quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). Nonetheless, the general rule calls

for “parties [to] exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal

courts.” Id. (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144–45). But one instance in which exhaustion will

be excused is where “appealing through the administrative process would be futile because the

agency is biased or has predetermined the issue.” Id. at 1016 (internal quotation marks omitted).

That is the situation here: the BIA made clear in Yajure Hurtado its view that aliens like Ramirez

Martinez are subject to mandatory detention and thus ineligible for release on bond, a

determination that is binding on all Immigration Judges. Since “the BIA has predetermined the

statutory issue” presented in Ramirez Martinez’s habeas petition and “there is nothing to indicate

the BIA would change its position,” the Court will not require him to exhaust his claims

administratively. Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. Proper Respondent

One final preliminary matter the Court resolves before turning to the merits is whether

Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, is properly named as a

Respondent. “The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to

a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542

U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that “the

default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being

held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” Id. at 435; see also

Kholyavskiy v. Achim, 443 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A century-old line of Supreme Court

precedent has defined a habeas petitioner’s custodian as the person who has the immediate

custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court

or judge.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). At the time of Ramirez Martinez’s initial

detention at the Broadview Detention Center, his immediate custodian was Russell Hott, then

ICE’s Chicago Field Office Director. Hott has since been succeeded in that role by Samuel

Olson, and the Court therefore substitutes Olson in Hott’s place as Respondent pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Further, because Ramirez Martinez has been relocated

and is currently detained at the Clay County Detention Center, the Court has added as a

Respondent that facility’s Jail Commander, Brandon Crowley. Since Noem is not Ramirez

Martinez’s immediate custodian, she is dismissed as a Respondent.

V. Detention Without Bond Hearing

The Court now turns to the merits of Ramirez Martinez’s habeas claims. He contends that

his mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is predicated on an incorrect interpretation of the

INA. Moreover, regardless of whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, Ramirez

Martinez contends that his detention without a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment right

to due process. The Court agrees on both fronts.

A. Statutory Basis for Detention

The provisions of the INA governing detention of noncitizens pending removal

proceedings are §§ 1225 and 1226. First, under § 1225(a)(1), any “alien present in the United

States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a

designated port of arrival . . .) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for

admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Relevant here, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that, “in the case of

an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that

an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien

shall be detained” for a removal proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Detention of aliens under § 1225(b)(2)(A) “is mandatory, and the noncitizen is not entitled to a

bond hearing.” Miguel v. Noem, No. 25 C 11137, 2025 WL 2976480, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21,

2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1226(a) sets forth what the Supreme Court has described as the “default rule” for

“the process of arresting and detaining [an alien present in the United States] pending their

removal.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. With respect to detaining an arrested alien, § 1226(a) states

in relevant part that, “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c) and pending” a decision on removal,

“the Attorney General . . . may continue to detain the arrested alien; and . . . may release the alien

on . . . bond” or “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).2 Aliens detained under § 1226(a), are

entitled to “receive [a] bond hearing[] at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306

(citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)).

As summarized by the Supreme Court, § 1225 “authorizes the Government to detain

certain aliens seeking admission into the county,” whereas § 1226 “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Id. at

289. Under that articulation, the question of whether § 1225 or § 1226 governs Ramirez

Martinez’s detention would seem straightforward—he has been residing in the United States for

over 24 years prior to the Government’s initiation of removal proceedings. Indeed, before Yajure

Hurtado, the Government’s longstanding practice was to “apply[] § 1226(a) to inadmissible

noncitizens already residing in the country.” Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR

(CDB), 2025 WL 2337099, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025). Yet the BIA abandoned that previous

understanding in Yajure Hurtado and held that aliens present in the United States without

admission remain applicants for admission subject to mandatory detention pending removal

under § 1225(b)(2)(A), even when they have resided in the country for years. 291 I&N Dec. at

220. To resolve the instant habeas petition, the Court must determine which interpretation of the

INA’s detention provisions is correct.

When interpreting a statue, the Court first looks to its text “to ascertain its plain

meaning.” United States v. Melvin, 948 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “If the statutory language’s plain meaning is unambiguous, [the Court’s] inquiry ends

there.” Id. In this case, there is no dispute that Ramirez Martinez does not fall within any of the

2 The exception in subsection (c) “carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released under

§ 1226(a),” namely, any alien “who falls into one of several enumerated categories involving criminal

offenses and terrorist activities.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)).

enumerated categories of criminal aliens for purposes of § 1226(c)’s exception. Ramirez

Martinez claims that necessarily means that § 1226(a)’s default rule for aliens present in the

United States applies to his detention. Yet Respondents, echoing Yajure Hurtado, contend that

Ramirez Martinez constitutes an “applicant for admission” within the meaning of § 1225(a)(1),

and therefore because he “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” he is subject

to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The Court agrees that Ramirez Martinez is an applicant for admission within the meaning

of § 1225(a)(1). As noted above, § 1225(a)(1) deems the designation applicant for admission to

include any alien present in the United States who has not been admitted. And being “admitted”

for purposes of that provision means “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

Nonetheless, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,” mandatory detention

under § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only where “the examining immigration officer determines that an

alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus, the critical question is whether an alien like Ramirez Martinez who has

long been present in the United States can nonetheless be considered “an alien seeking

admission.”

This Court joins the overwhelming majority of district courts in concluding that an alien

who has been residing in the United States for an extended period of time is not “seeking

admission” within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A). E.g., Miguel, 2025 WL 2976480, at *1 & n.1

(observing the numerous cases in which the district court held that “noncitizens already in the

country are properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A)”). “[M]ost

importantly, ‘seeking’ implies action and [noncitizens] who have been present in the country for

years are not actively ‘seeking admission.’” Ochoa Ochoa, 2025 WL 2938779, at *6; see also

Bait It v. McAleenan, 410 F. Supp. 3d 874, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“Congress’s ‘choice of verb

tense’ informs ‘a statute’s temporal reach.’” (quoting Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448

(2010))). Ramirez Martinez entered this country in 2001 without inspection and, since then, has

continuously resided and started a family here. It is wholly implausible to say that Ramirez

Martinez is presently seeking “admission”—i.e., “the lawful entry of the alien into the United

States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)

(emphasis added).

Moreover, § 1225(b)(2)(A) expressly refers to both an “applicant for admission” and “an

alien seeking admission.” Congress’s use of those two different phrases within the same

subsection strongly suggests that it meant to distinguish between an “applicant for admission”

and “an alien seeking admission.” E.g., Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79,

86 (2017) (“[W]e presume differences in language . . . convey differences in meaning.”). And

under Respondents’ interpretation, all “applicants for admission” who are “not clearly and

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” are subject to mandatory detention under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), rendering the “seeking admission” language mere surplusage. United States v.

Feeney, 100 F.4th 841, 846 (7th Cir. 2024) (“According to the rule against surplusage, we aim to

give independent meaning to the entire text so that no part is rendered meaningless.”).

Notably, even as Respondents argue that Ramirez Martinez is an applicant for admission

for whom detention is mandated under § 1225(b)(2)(A), they do not argue that anything in the

plain language of § 1226(a) excludes him from its scope. Yet § 1225(b)(2)(A) and § 1226(a) are

“mutually exclusive—a noncitizen cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and eligible for bond under § 1226(a).” Miguel, 2025 WL 2976480, at *4. That

Ramirez Martinez comfortably fits within the plain language of § 1226(a), while § 1225(b)(2)(A)

reaches him only under a strained interpretation of the statutory language, reinforces the

conclusion that Ramirez Martinez should be considered detained under the former provision

rather than the latter. See, e.g., Barrera v. Tindall, No. 3:25-cv-541-RGJ, 2025 WL 2690565, at

*5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (describing the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 as “novel”). The

Supreme Court evidently understood that to be the case, given its description of § 1226 as

“governing the process of arresting and detaining [a] group of aliens pending their removal,”

including “aliens who were inadmissible at the time of entry.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. And

until only very recently, the Government’s practice was to apply § 1226(a) to such noncitizens.

That “longstanding practice of the [G]overnment—like any other interpretative aid—can inform

a court’s determination of what the law is.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386

(2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For these reasons, the Court rejects Respondents’ contention that § 1225(b)(2)(A)

mandates detention for Ramirez Martinez simply because he is a noncitizen who entered the

United States without inspection. Instead, the Court adopts the previously uncontroversial (pre-

Yajure Hurtado) interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) and § 1226(a) in concluding that Ramirez

Martinez is detained subject to the requirements of § 1226(a). Accordingly, he is entitled to a

bond hearing.

B. Due Process

The Court further concludes that Ramirez Martinez has a Fifth Amendment due process

right to a bond hearing. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United

States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “Government detention in immigration proceedings may

violate that Clause except ‘in certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances where a

special justification outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding

physical restraint.’” Padilla v. Noem, No. 25 CV 12462, 2025 WL 2977742, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct.

22, 2025) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).

Courts in this District apply the three-part balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976), in determining whether a noncitizen’s detention without a bond hearing

violates procedural due process. E.g., Ochoa Ochoa, 2025 WL 2938779, at *7. Under that test,

the following factors are balanced: “first, the private interest at stake; second, the risk of

erroneous deprivation and the value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and third, the

government’s countervailing interests.” Miguel, 2025 WL 2976480, at *7 (quoting Simpson v.

Brown County, 860 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017)). Like other courts in this District that have

addressed the question with respect to similarly situated petitioners, this Court finds that all three

factors weigh in favor of Ramirez Martinez. Padilla, 2025 WL 2977742, at *3; Miguel, 2025

WL 2976480, at *7; Ochoa Ochoa, 2025 WL 2938779, at *7. First, Ramirez Martinez’s “liberty

is at stake.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (E.D.

Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Second, given that he has no criminal record and there is no indication

that he poses a danger to others, the risk of erroneous deprivation of his liberty is high. And

third, while “the Government has a legitimate interest in the prompt execution of removal orders

which detention may facilitate[,] simply holding a bond hearing does not impair that interest.”

Miguel, 2025 WL 2976480, at *7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently,

Ramirez Martinez’s detention without a bond hearing violates due process.

VI. Relief

In his habeas petition, Ramirez Martinez requests that the Court order Respondents to

schedule a bond hearing for his removal proceedings. The Court finds that such relief is proper.

At the bond hearing, Respondents will have the burden of showing by clear and convincing

evidence that Ramirez Martinez poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community such that his

detention is necessary. E.g., Ochoa Ochoa, 2025 WL 2938779, at *8 (“When granting

immigration detainees’ habeas petitions, an overwhelming consensus of courts have placed the

burden on the [G]overnment to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee poses a

danger or flight risk.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ramirez Martinez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Dkt.

No. 1) is granted. Within seven days of the entry of this memorandum opinion and order,

Respondents shall either (1) provide Ramirez Martinez with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a) or (2) release him from custody under reasonable conditions of supervision. The date

of November 13, 2025 for the parties to file a joint status report is stricken and reset for

November 21, 2025. The status report due November 21, 2025 shall address Ramirez Martinez’s

release status, including confirming that he received a bond hearing and stating the result of that

bond hearing. As this memorandum opinion and order grants all requested relief, the Clerk is

directed to enter Judgment in favor of Ramirez Martinez and administratively close the case on

this Court’s civil docket.

ENTERED:

Dated: November 11, 2025 duane.

Andrea R. Wood

United States District Judge

1A