Sam

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KEVIN SAM

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 23-1485-JWD-EWD

STAFFORD BYRD, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc.

33) (“Defs. MSJ”) filed by Defendants Stafford Byrd (“Byrd”) and the State of Louisiana through

the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (the “State” or “DOC”) (collectively,

“Defendants”). Plaintiff Kevin Sam (“Plaintiff” or “Sam”) opposes the motion, (Doc. 36), and

Defendants have filed a reply, (Doc. 39). Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully

considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and

is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Defs. MSJ is denied.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was a DOC offender housed at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”) at Angola on

December 5, 2021. (Answer ¶ 4, Doc. 13.) Sam was housed at LSP at Cell Block A. (Amended

Petition for Damages/Use of Force (“Amended Petition”) ¶ 5, Doc. 1-8; Sam Dep. 44, Doc. 36-1

(verifying Amended Petition).)

On the same day, Byrd was employed by DOC at LSP. (Id. ¶ 5.) Byrd was working the cell

blocks of Cell Block C. (Am. Pet. ¶ 5, Doc. 1-8.)

According to Sam, he was “walking off” the Recreation Yard of Cell Block C when Byrd

called to him and said, “Bitch-ass N&*%$, I don’t like the way you have been talking to these

other officers!” (Id. ¶ 6 (cleaned up).) Sam testified that, on the day in question, Byrd did not want

to take him to the recreational yard because Byrd was tired and did not feel like moving from his

chair. (Sam Dep. 20, Doc. 36-1.)

Byrd called A block (where Sam was housed), so Sam approached, was patted down by

Byrd, and was told by Byrd that he was good. (Id. at 22.) Sam left, but Byrd called him back. (Id.)

Byrd ordered Sam to get up against the wall of Cell Block C to be shook down. (Am. Pet. ¶ 8, Doc.

1-8.)

According to Sam, “[a]nd then [Byrd] just went right with a blow to [Sam’s] face and

saying, I got you now.” (Sam Dep. 22, Doc. 36-1.) Byrd’s right hand hit Sam to the left side of his

face with his keys. (Id. at 23–24.) Sam fell back, but Byrd continued hitting him. (Id.) Sam fell

over the ice chest and hit his head, but Byrd came back down on him and started punching him in

the face while Sam was on the ground. (Id. at 24–25.) Byrd punched him three times. (Id. at 26;

see also Am. Pet. ¶ 9, Doc. 1-8.) Sam was not resisting, was not being disobedient, and was not

being an aggressor. (Am. Pet. ¶ 10, Doc. 1-8.)

Lt. Anderson saved Sam in that Anderson grabbed Byrd off of him. (Sam Dep. 26, Doc.

36-1.) Sam had blood on his face, and his teeth were knocked out. (Id. at 30.) He also had to have

surgery for his eye which necessitated an artificial lens and medication. (Id. at 14, 38.)

On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit in state court, (Doc. 1-3), and later filed his

Amended Petition (Doc. 1-8). The action was removed to this Court. (Doc. 1.)

In his Amended Petition, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive force by

Defendant Byrd on December 5, 2021. (Defs.’ Statement of Uncontested Material Fact (“SUMF”)

¶ 1, Doc. 33-1; Pl.’s Response to [SUMF] ¶ 1, Doc. 36-5 (admitted).)1 Further, in the Amended

Petition, Plaintiff asserts that the alleged excessive force by Byrd also constituted

1 Hereafter, when the SUMF is cited alone, then that fact is either admitted or denied in such a way as to be deemed

admitted. See M.D. La. Civ. R. 56(c), (f).

“battery/negligence” and that the State is vicariously liable for the alleged “tortious acts” of Byrd

pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. (SUMF ¶ 2, Doc. 33-1.)

On April 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) (“Pl.

MSJ”) in which he affirmatively stated that the only claim against the State is for vicarious liability

relative to the state law battery claim, and that the allegations within his lawsuit were only for

intentional misconduct. (Id. ¶ 4.) However, Plaintiff also seeks partial summary judgment on the

defense of comparative fault, arguing that (1) comparative fault does not apply to federal

constitutional claims, and (2) more importantly, “defendants have no evidence to support any

allegation of third party or comparative fault.” (Doc. 31-2 at 10–11.) Pl. MSJ will be taken up in

due course.

On April 25, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion seeking partial summary judgment

on some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 33.) Some of Defendants’ arguments are difficult to decipher,

as the section headings of Defendant’s brief have been scrambled, either by Defendants before or

during filing or on the Court’s end by Court staff on CM/ECF. (See Doc. 33-2 at 2–5.) In any

event, Defendants appear to argue: (1) Plaintiff has no claim for vicarious liability against the State

for any constitutional violation, (id. at 3); (2) Plaintiff has made a judicial admission that he seeks

to recover only for a battery, so his negligence claim should be dismissed, (id. at 3–4); and (3) the

State is not vicariously liable for the intentional torts of Byrd, so Plaintiff’s respondent superior

claim against the State must be dismissed, (id. at 4–5).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which states that a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must

support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” or by “showing that

the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse

party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

Thus, “[a] movant for summary judgment need not set forth evidence when the nonmovant

bears the burden of persuasion at trial.” Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 987,

997 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“we find no express

or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other

similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.”)). “The moving party may meet its burden to

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the record contains

no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” Id. (citing Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283

F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002)).

If the mover bears his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, “its opponent

must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . .

The nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (cleaned

up). The non-mover’s “burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up).

Additionally, “[w]hen evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant

fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not

properly before the district court.” Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing

Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins,

Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1992). “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to

sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.”

Id. (citing, inter alia, Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458). See also Nissho–Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d

1300, 1307 (5th Cir. 1988) (it is not necessary “that the entire record in the case . . . be searched

and found bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment may be properly

entered”); cf. United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs,

hunting for truffles buried in briefs”).

Ultimately, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate the

credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual

disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a

reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party could arrive at a verdict in that party’s favor, the court must

deny the motion. Indeed, even if the moving party comes forward

with an abundance of evidence supporting its theory of the case, the

nonmoving party may nevertheless defeat the motion by countering

with evidence of its own, which, if credited by the fact-finder, would

entitle the nonmoving party to a verdict in its favor. Or, the non-

moving party can defeat the motion by demonstrating that the

evidence tendered by the moving party is itself laced with

contradictions of [material] fact.

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263–64 (5th Cir. 1991) (cleaned up).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claim as to Constitutional Violations

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s judicial admissions mean that he has no claim for

vicarious liability for constitutional violations. (Doc. 33-2 at 3.) Plaintiff responds, “As set forth

in the Plaintiff’s summary judgment [RD31], there is no respondeat superior pled on the federal

constitutional claims.” (Doc. 36 at 2.) Defendants reply that, given Plaintiff’s concessions, any

claim that the State is vicariously liable for the constitutional violations must be dismissed. (Doc.

39 at 2.)

The Court will deny the motion on this issue. While the Amended Petition is not a model

of clarity on this point, (see Am. Pet. ¶ 43, Doc. 1-8), Plaintiff unequivocally states in his Pl. MSJ

that he “asserted a claim for respondeat superior on the state law claims against the State.” (Doc.

31 ¶ 1.) Further, Plaintiff also acknowledges in his opposition to the instant motion that “there is

no respondeat superior pled on the federal constitutional claims.” (Doc. 36 at 2.) And this is, of

course, not controversial. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ard, 519 F. Supp. 3d 301, 312 (M.D. La. 2021)

(deGravelles, J.) (“Section 1983 offers no respondeat superior liability.” (quoting Pineda v. City

of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)). Thus, because Defendants seek to dismiss a claim

that is in fact not made, Defs. MSJ will be denied as moot on this issue.

B. Negligence Claim

Defendants next contend that Plaintiff made a judicial admission in Pl. MSJ that his sole

claim against the State for vicarious liability is for Byrd’s alleged battery. (Doc. 33-2.) Thus, say

Defendants, Plaintiff has waived his claim for negligence, and this claim should be dismissed.

(Doc. 33-2 at 4.) However, Defendants cite no law to support this argument.

Plaintiff’s opposition is confusing at best in that the only real reference to his negligence

claims is in the following statement, “The respondeat superior claim immediate follows the

negligence claims” in the Amended Petition. (Doc. 36 at 2.) Elsewhere, Plaintiff says that “the

DOC/LSP are answerable for the battery and assault by . . . Byrd under a theory of vicarious

liability.” (Id. at 5.)

In reply, Defendants assert: “Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum does not address his

apparent abandonment of his negligence claims, as raised by Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff has

only doubled-down that he has pled a battery by Defendant Byrd, not negligence – despite its

invocation in his [Amended Petition].” (Doc. 39 at 1.) Thus, Defendants argue, the negligence

claim should be dismissed. (Id.)

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court will deny Defs. MSJ on this issue. In

short, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is not barred because of waiver or judicial admission.

First, this Court has recognized that “when a party does not address an issue in his brief to

the district court, that failure constitutes a waiver on appeal” and that “[b]y analogy, failure to brief

an argument in the district court waives that argument in that court.” Payton v. Town of

Maringouin, No. CV 18-563, 2021 WL 2544416, at *26 (M.D. La. June 21, 2021) (deGravelles,

J.), aff’d, No. 21-30440, 2022 WL 3097846 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (citing JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of

Commerce & Indus., 336 F. Supp. 3d 620, 634 (M.D. La. 2018) (deGravelles, J.)). In addition,

“[t]o avoid waiver, a party must identify relevant legal standards and ‘any relevant Fifth Circuit

cases,’” id. (quoting JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., L.L.C. v. United States, 831 F.3d 597, 601 (5th

Cir. 2016)), and “[i]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at

developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible

argument in [a] skeletal way, leaving the court to put flesh on its bones[,]” id. (quoting El–Moussa

v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 2009)).

Thus, while Plaintiff’s opposition on this point is weak, Defendants waived the issue by

providing no legal authority for why or how Plaintiff made a judicial admission and by giving the

matter only a barebones treatment. Without more, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff waived his

negligence claim.

Likewise, even if this Court analyzed the merits of Defendants’ argument, the Court would

reject it. As the Eastern District of Louisiana has explained:

A judicial admission is a formal concession in the pleadings or

stipulations by a party or counsel that is binding on the party making

them.” Martinez v. Bally’s La., Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir.

2001). “A judicial admission ‘has the effect of withdrawing a fact

from contention.’” Blankenship v. Buenger, 653 F. App’x 330, 335

(5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Martinez, 244 F.3d at 476) (emphasis in

original). Accordingly, judicial admissions generally concern issues

of fact and are inapplicable to questions of law. See Blankenship,

653 F. App’x at 335 & n.15. “To qualify as a judicial admission, the

statement must be (1) made in a judicial proceeding; (2) contrary to

a fact essential to the theory of recovery; (3) deliberate, clear, and

unequivocal; (4) such that giving it conclusive effect meets with

public policy; and (5) about a fact on which a judgment for the

opposing party can be based.” Jonibach Mgmt. Tr. v. Wartburg

Enters., Inc., 750 F.3d 486, 491 n.2 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Heritage Bank v. Redcom Labs., Inc., 250 F.3d 319, 329 (5th Cir.

2001)). Courts retain discretion to treat statements in briefs as

judicial admissions, City Nat’l Bank v. United States, 907 F.2d 536,

544 (5th Cir. 1990), as well as to relieve a party of the binding

consequences of its judicial admission where justice requires. See,

e.g., Kiln Underwriting, Ltd. v. Jesuit High Sch. of New Orleans,

2008 WL 4724390, at *12 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2008) (even if

statements were construed as judicial admissions, binding effect

waived for counsel’s “honest mistake” and lack of prejudice to

opposing party). . . . See Buenger, 653 F. App’x at 335 n.15 (“The

scope of judicial admissions is restricted to matters of fact which

otherwise would require evidentiary proof, and does not include

counsel’s statement of his conception of the legal theory of a case.”)

(quoting Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir.

1972)).

In re TK Boat Rentals, LLC, 411 F. Supp. 3d 351, 368 (E.D. La. 2019)

Applying this standard, Defendants’ argument fails for a number of reasons. First, Plaintiff

seeks a judicial admission about a legal theory, not a fact. On that ground alone, the Court could

deny Defs. MSJ.

Second, Plaintiff made no “deliberate, clear, and unequivocal statement” that he was

abandoning his negligence claim; to the contrary, in his Pl. MSJ (where the alleged admission was

made), Plaintiff also sought partial summary judgment on the defense of comparative fault, in part

on the ground that “defendants have no evidence to support any allegation of third party or

comparative fault.” (Doc. 31-2 at 10–11.) The only reasonable inference from Plaintiff’s position

is that he intended to maintain his negligence claim. At the very least, Plaintiff made no “deliberate,

clear, and unequivocal statement.”

And third, even if Plaintiff had made a judicial admission, “[c]ourts retain discretion . . . to

relieve a party of the binding consequences of its judicial admission where justice requires,” Boat

Rentals, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 368, and the Court would do so here. Any alleged waiver of Plaintiff’s

negligence claim appears to be an honest mistake, and Defendants have shown no prejudice in

allowing this issue to proceed to trial.

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not waived his negligence claim.

Defs. MSJ is denied on this issue.

C. Claim as to Battery

Defendants’ final argument is that the State is not vicariously liable for Byrd’s battery.

(Doc. 33-2 at 4–5.) While the incident occurred during work hours and at Byrd’s place of

employment, Byrd’s conduct was motivated by purely personal reasons. (Id.) Defendant

analogizes the case to Dickerson v. Piccadilly Restaurants, Inc., 1999-2633 (La. App. 1 Cir.

12/22/00), 785 So. 2d 842, 845, where the appellate court purportedly affirmed a summary

judgment in an employer’s favor when one co-worker stabbed another co-worker for purely

personal reasons. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff responds that Byrd was, at all relevant times, an employee of the State acting in

the course and scope of his employment, and thus is vicariously liable for the battery. (Doc. 36 at

5.) Plaintiff highlights the standard for a battery claim against a police officer under Louisiana law

and cites numerous cases in which law enforcement officers of some kind were found vicariously

liable for batteries by an officer, including sexual abuse. (Id. at 6–8 (citing, inter alia, Ross v.

Sheriff of Lafourche Par., 479 So. 2d 506, 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Latullas v. State, 94-2049

(La. App. 1 Cir. 6/23/95), 658 So. 2d 800, 803–04; Thompson v. France, No. CV 20-1842, 2020

WL 5761188, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2020) (Barbier, J.)).) Plaintiff also distinguishes Dickerson

on the grounds that it “did not involve a special relationship that exists between a correctional

officer and an inmate or a police officer and a private citizen, where one has authority over the

other described as ‘control and supervision.’” (Id. at 8–9.)

In reply, Defendants assert that the motivation of the employee is determinative. (Doc. 39

at 1–2.) Here, say Defendants, Byrd committed the battery because of a “personal grievance,” and

his deposition confirms that. (Id. at 2.) Since the tort is not employment-related, there is no

vicarious liability. (Id.)

“Under La. Civ. Code art. 2320, an employer may be held vicariously liable for the

intentional torts committed by its employees when those acts occur within the course and scope of

his employment.” Thompson, 2020 WL 5761188, at *3 (citing Lamkin v. Brooks, 498 So.2d 1068

(La. 1986)). “The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that employers are liable for the conduct of

their employees when the conduct was so closely connected to the ‘time, place, and causation [of]

his employment-duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s

business.’” Id. (quoting LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1974)).

LeBrane identified four factors to determine if an employer should be liable for its

employee’s tortious acts: “(1) whether the tortious act was primarily employment-rooted; (2)

whether the violence was reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee’s duties; (3)

whether the act occurred on the employer’s premises; and (4) whether it occurred during the hours

of employment.” Latullas, 658 So. 2d at 804 (citing LeBrane, 292 So. 2d 216). All factors need

not be met for vicarious liability to be found, and “each case must be looked at on its own merits.”

Id. (citing, inter alia, Miller v. Keating, 349 So. 2d 265, 268–69 (La. 1977)).

“It is well settled, however, that an employer is not vicariously liable merely because his

employee commits an intentional tort on the business premises during working hours.” Id.

(collecting cases) (quotations omitted). “Vicarious liability will attach only if the employee is

acting within the ambit of his assigned duties and also in furtherance of his employer’s objectives.”

Id. (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, “[a]s the [Louisiana] supreme court stated . . . :”

The fact that the predominant motive of the servant is to benefit

himself or a third person does not prevent the act from being within

the scope of employment. If the purpose of serving the master’s

business actuates the servant to any appreciable extent, the master is

subject to liability if the act is otherwise within the service. So also,

the act may be found to be in the service if not only the manner of

acting but the act itself is done largely for the servant’s purposes.

Id. at 805 (quoting Ermert v. Hartford Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 467, 477 (La. 1990) (citations omitted)).

See also Thompson, 2020 WL 5761188, at *3 (“if the employee’s position ‘actuates’ the employee

to ‘any appreciable extent,’ the employer will be liable for that act.” (quoting Ermert, 559 So. 2d

at 477).

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court will deny Defs. MSJ on this issue. In

sum, a reasonable juror could conclude that Byrd was in the course and scope of employment and

that the State is thus liable for his alleged intentional misconduct.

Specifically, a reasonable jury could conclude that a majority of the LeBrane factors weigh

in Plaintiff’s favor, when construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing

reasonable inferences in his favor. Plaintiff presents evidence that Byrd’s personal grievance was

“reasonably incidental to the performance of [Byrd’s] duties.” See Lattulas, 658 So. 2d at 804.

Bryd acted in part because he did not “like the way [Sam] [had] been talking to these other

officers![ ].” (Am. Pet. ¶ 6, Doc. 1-8; Sam Dep. 44, Doc. 36-1 (verifying Am. Pet.).) Moreover,

Byrd also appears to have been motivated in part by the fact that he did not want to take Plaintiff

to the recreational yard because Byrd was tired and did not feel like moving from his chair. (Sam

Dep. 20, Doc. 36-1.) That is, a reasonable inference is that Byrd did not feel like performing his

assigned job duties, and he took that out on Plaintiff. Additionally, before the alleged beating took

place, Byrd called Sam back and ordered Sam to get up against the wall of Cell Block C to be

“shook down.” (Am. Pet. ¶ 8, Doc. 1-8.) Thus, a jury could also conclude that “the violence was

reasonably incidental to the performance of [Byrd’s] duties,” as the battery closely followed an

order with which Plaintiff had to comply. See Lattulas, 658 So. 2d at 804. And, of course, Byrd’s

alleged misconduct happened on the State’s premises and during the hours of employment. Id.

Thus, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that, under the

LeBrane factors, Byrd’s tort “was so closely connected to the ‘time, place, and causation [of] his

employment-duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business.”

Thompson, 2020 WL 5761188, at *3 (quoting LeBrane, 292 So. 2d at 218).

Equally important, vicarious liability is appropriate “if the employee’s position ‘actuates’

the employee to ‘any appreciable extent.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ermert, 559 So. 2d at

477). A reasonable jury could conclude from the above facts that this standard is met.

Numerous cases support this conclusion. For example, in Thompson, the plaintiff was an

inmate at a sheriff jail, and he was purportedly abused sexually by the defendant, a road crew

supervisor with a sheriff’s office, “while under his supervision pursuant to his employment.

[Defendant] was allegedly able to coerce Plaintiff into ‘allowing’ the sexual abuse by threatening

Plaintiff with his apparent authority.” Thompson, 2020 WL 5761188, at *1, *3. Thus, the guard

“was actuated by Tangipahoa Parish through his control and supervision of Plaintiff, and [the

defendant’s] opportunity to commit the sexual abuse was derived directly from his apparent

authority over Plaintiff.” Id. at *3.

Thompson relied on Latallus, where the Louisiana First Circuit reversed the trial court’s

finding that the State was not vicariously liable for a guard’s rape of a female inmate. 658 So. 3d

at 804–07. The appellate court reasoned that, because of his authority, the guard “was able to

separate [the plaintiff] from her fellow inmates, and commit the act of rape.” Id. at 804.

Even though the rape itself was totally unauthorized by Lt. Brown’s

employer, and motivated by Lt. Brown’s personal desires, the rape

nevertheless occurred while he was at least partly actuated by his

purpose of acting for his employer in the control and supervision of

inmates, and it was through these duties that this opportunity arose.

Id. at 804–805. Thus, the State was vicariously liable for the guard’s misconduct. Id. at 805.

The same reasoning applies here. The alleged battery took place while Byrd was “acting

for his employer in the control and supervision of inmates, and it was through these duties that this

opportunity arose.” Id. at 804–805; see also Thompson, 2020 WL 5761188, at *3; see also Dew v.

Tallulah Water Co., No. 3:19-CV-01489, 2021 WL 2152548, at *3 (W.D. La. Apr. 23, 2021),

appeal denied, judgment aff’d, No. 3:19-CV-01489, 2021 WL 2153226 (W.D. La. May 14, 2021)

(recognizing that, under Louisiana state law, if the employe’s acts are within the course and scope

of employment, “a municipality may be held vicariously liable for the excessive use of force by a

police officer effecting an arrest.” (collecting case, including LeBraine, Thompson, and Latullus)).

Because Plaintiff has established a question of fact on this issue, Def. MSJ will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) filed by

Defendants Stafford Byrd and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and

Corrections is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on November 10, 2025.

S

JUDG E JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA