Calvin

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6 SAN JOSE DIVISION

7

8 HENRY RENE CALVIN, Case No. 25-cv-05921-VKD

9 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A;

10 v. GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

11 KELLY SANTORO, et al.,

Defendants.

12

13

14 Pro se plaintiff Henry Rene Calvin, a state prisoner at Corcoran State Prison, filed a

15 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Kelly Santoro of Salinas Valley State Prison

16 (“SVSP”) and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Dkt. No. 1

17 at 2. The Court separately granted Mr. Calvin’s in forma pauperis application. Dkt. No. 6.

18 I. BACKGROUND

19 The following facts are based on the allegations in Mr. Calvin’s complaint.

20 Mr. Calvin alleges that while housed at SVSP on December 10, 2024, he was placed on

21 suicide watch after a mental breakdown. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Rather than being housed in a “mental

22 health crisis bed,” Mr. Calvin was housed in “a holding cell with a mattress, blanket, and suicide

23 safety smock.” Id. Mr. Calvin asserts that the CDCR is required to provide inmates with safe and

24 adequate shelter, including beds and reasonably sanitary bedding. Id. at 3. He contends that

25 failing to provide a “crisis bed” and “[f]orcing [him] to sleep on a mattress on the floor” violates

26 his rights under the Eighth Amendment “or due process.” Id. at 2-3. Mr. Calvin seeks $250,000

27 in damages and asks to be “a part of reforming the prison’s grievance process so no one (prison

1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

2 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks

3 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

4 § 1915A(a). A court must dismiss a case filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it

5 determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief

6 may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

7 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). In conducting its review, the court must identify any

8 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon

9 which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

10 relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed,

11 particularly in civil rights cases. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

12 Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003).

13 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege two essential

14 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,

15 and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

16 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

17 III. DISCUSSION

18 The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit

19 inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner

20 receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the

21 Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Amendment imposes

22 duties on prison officials who must provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as

23 food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.

24 A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment where: (1) the deprivation alleged is,

25 objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

26 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison official acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the

27 prisoner’s health or safety, id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303). “A deprivation is sufficiently

1 measure of life’s necessities.” Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074

2 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference,

3 where he “kn[e]w [ ] of and disregard[ed]” the substantial risk of harm, but the officials need not

4 have intended any harm to befall the inmate. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “The

5 circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation of these necessities must be considered in

6 determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726,

7 731 (9th Cir. 2000). Substantial deprivations of shelter, food, drinking water or sanitation for four

8 days, for example, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth

9 Amendment claim. See id. at 732-733.

10 As currently pled, the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to state an Eighth

11 Amendment claim. First, to the extent Mr. Calvin alleges that during his mental breakdown he

12 was not provided a “crisis bed” but was instead provided “a mattress, blanket, and suicide safety

13 smock,” he fails to plead facts sufficient to plausibly support his claim that he was deprived of

14 “safe and adequate shelter” or “reasonably sanitary bedding” in violation of the Eighth

15 Amendment. Second, even if the Court construes the complaint as alleging that Mr. Calvin was

16 deprived of adequate protections for his personal safety because he was not afforded a “crisis bed”

17 while suffering from a mental breakdown, and that such a bed was a necessity in these

18 circumstances, the complaint contains no allegations indicating the duration of the alleged

19 deprivation, e.g., whether it was for one night or for several days.

20 Moreover, the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to state a claim against Warden

21 Santoro or against any specific state actor. With respect to the Warden, who is the sole individual

22 named as a defendant, there are no allegations regarding how the Warden was involved in the

23 alleged deprivation. A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for

24 denying a prisoner humane conditions of confinement unless the standard for criminal

25 recklessness is met, i.e., the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

26 safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Furthermore, a prison official may not be held vicariously

27 liable for the conduct of others under his supervision unless the supervising official was personally

1 supervising official’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation. Lemire, 726 F.3d at

2 1074–75; see also Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000). Mr. Calvin does

3 not allege that Warden Santoro was personally involved in the alleged deprivations or that he

4 engaged in any wrongful conduct that caused the alleged deprivation.

5 In addition, the allegations in the complaint do not state a viable § 1983 claim against the

6 CDCR. Mr. Calvin alleges the CDCR was “required to provide inmates with beds and reasonably

7 sanitary bedding.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3. However, the CDCR is not a “person” subject to suit

8 under § 1983. See Brown v. California Dep't. of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The

9 district court correctly held that the California Department of Corrections and the California Board

10 of Prison Terms were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Maldonado v. Harris, 370

11 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989))

12 (“State agencies . . . are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore not

13 amenable to suit under that statute”). Rather, Mr. Calvin must identify individual state actors who

14 are responsible for the violation of his constitutional rights. See Atkins, 487 U.S. at 48.

15 Lastly, the complaint refers generally to a violation of “due process,” supported by vague

16 and conclusory allegations that prison officials failed to give prisoners fair hearings after issuing

17 “a 115 (write up)” and engaged in other abuses of power. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. These allegations are

18 insufficient to support a plausible claim that Mr. Calvin suffered a violation of his Fourteenth

19 Amendment due process rights or the due process rights afforded to him under California’s Code

20 of Regulations governing prison grievances. “A section 1983 claim based upon procedural due

21 process . . . has three elements: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a

22 deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of process.” Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22

23 F.4th 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara,

24 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)). The complaint contains no factual allegations identifying a

25 specific liberty or property interest of which Mr. Calvin was deprived or describing a process or

26 procedure he should have been afforded but was not. If Mr. Calvin wishes to challenge a prison

27 disciplinary action, he must describe the charge and prison disciplinary proceedings to which he

1 disciplinary proceedings lacked necessary constitutional procedural protections, see Wolff v.

2 |} McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and resulted in the deprivation of a liberty interest of “real

3 substance,” see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995). See generally Melnik v.

4 || Dzurenda, 14 F.4th 981 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing application of Wolff to disciplinary

5 proceedings).

6 || IV. CONCLUSION

7 After screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that it

8 || presently fails to state any cognizable claim for relief. Mr. Calvin may file an amended complaint

9 || to attempt to correct the deficiencies identified in this order. An amended complaint must be filed

10 || no later than December 5, 2025. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case

11 number used in this order, Case No. 25-cv-05921-VKD, and the words “AMENDED

12 || COMPLAINT” on the first page. If using the court form complaint, Mr. Calvin must answer all

5 13 the questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. Mr. Calvin is advised that his

14 amended complaint will supersede the original complaint, the latter being treated thereafter as

3 15 non-existent. Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015).

a 16 || Consequently, claims not included in an amended complaint are no longer claims and defendants

3 17 not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

18 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992).

19 If Mr. Calvin fails to file an amended complaint in time, or if the amended complaint fails

20 || to cure all defects described above, the Court may issue an order reassigning the case to a district

21 || judge with a recommendation that the action be dismissed.

22 The Clerk of the Court shall include two copies of the Court’s form complaint with a copy

23 of this order provided to Mr. Calvin.

24 IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 Dated: November 7, 2025

26 .

28 Virginia K. DeMarchi

United States Magistrate Judge