Lewis

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DOUGLAS HENRY LEWIS, JR., §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:25-cv-01809-D (BT)

§

GM FINANCIAL, §

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff Douglas Henry Lewis, Jr. has purportedly filed this civil

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl. 3 (ECF No. 3). The Court granted Lewis

leave to proceed in forma pauperis but withheld service of process pending

completion of judicial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Having screened

Lewis’s complaint, the precise nature of his claims—as well as how they relate to

the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas—is unclear.1 Regardless, it

1 The Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas is not the correct venue for

this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Nothing that Plaintiff complains about

happened here, and no defendant resides within this Division. Nevertheless,

because of the patent frivolity of Plaintiff’s claims, rather than transferring the case

under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the better course is to dismiss it as frivolous under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Salaverria v. California, 2024 WL 3296440, at *1 n.2

(N.D. Tex. June 17, 2024) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted sub nom. Salaverria v.

California State, 2024 WL 3297522 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2024), appeal dismissed

sub nom. Salaverria v. California, No. 24-10674, 2024 WL 5347227 (5th Cir. Nov.

4, 2024) (dismissing case filed in the incorrect district as frivolous instead of

transferring the case under § 1404).

does not appear that Lewis can state a viable § 1983 claim. Accordingly, the Court

should DISMISS this action as frivolous.

Background

Lewis purports to bring this action under § 1983 against GM Financial (GM)

—a global auto finance provider—for alleged deprivations of his due process rights

under the United States Constitution. Lewis claims that he is a GM client, and that

GM allowed a third party to “obtain/retrieve [his] personal information without

[Lewis] signing an opted-out notice to allow such practice.” Compl. at 4. Lewis

similarly states that Wells Fargo disclosed his personal information without his

consent. Id.

These disclosures supposedly caused Lewis financial distress and “mental

injury,” as well as “physical injury” resulting from Lewis working longer hours to

make up for GM and Wells Fargo’s alleged misconduct. Id. at 5. Lewis requests

“Per Person Declaratory Damages of $5,000,000.00; “Per Person of Monetary

Damages $5,000,000.00; Per Person Compensatory Damages of $5,000,000.00;

Per Person of Punitive Damages $5,000,000.00.” Id.

Legal Standard

Lewis’s pleadings are subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court may summarily dismiss

a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes that the action is: (1) frivolous

or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks

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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with

enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. at 555.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a

complaint as frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or

when the factual contentions are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.

25, 32 (1992). The latter category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful,

fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the

wholly incredible.” Id. at 33

Analysis

I. Lewis Fails to Allege that GM or Wells Fargo Acted Under Color

of State Law.

Lewis has named GM—and potentially Wells Fargo—as defendants in this

action to recover damages for alleged constitutional violations under § 1983. To

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted

“under color” of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only “state actors” may be sued for

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federal civil rights violations. Private parties become “state actors” only when their

conduct is “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.

922, 937 (1982); see also Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (“Anyone

whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the State’ can be sued as

a state actor under § 1983.”) (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). The phrase “fairly

attributable to the State” means (1) “the deprivation must be caused by the exercise

of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by

the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible”; and (2) “the party

charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be

a state actor.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.

Lewis does not allege that GM or Wells Fargo engaged in any conduct that

could be fairly attributable to the State. Therefore, they are not state actors, and

Lewis’s claims should be dismissed. See Meitzler v. Reyes, 2024 WL 5058530, at

*3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2024), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 5063672 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 10,

2024) (citing Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996)) (“Private

citizens and businesses are not state actors within the meaning of § 1983.”);

Goolsbee v. Peirce, 2015 WL 1607994, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2015) (“Wells Fargo

Bank [is] not [a] state actor[] . . . for § 1983 purposes. . . .”).

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II. To the Extent Lewis Raises a Claim for Breach of Contract, Such a

Claim also Fails Under § 1915(e).

Lewis also suggests that GM and Wells Fargo breached a contract with him

by disclosing his personal information. See Compl. at 3, 7. To the extent that Lewis

seeks to raise a breach of contract claim in this action, he is unable to do so.

To assert breach of contract under Texas law, the plaintiff must establish

“(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by

the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages

sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.

Richardson, 2019 WL 1115059, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2019) (citations omitted).

Lewis fails to plausibly allege those elements. He states that he is a GM

client, but he does not plausibly allege that (i) a contract existed between him and

either GM or Wells Fargo; or (ii) if such a contract did exist, that he performed

under the contract while GM or Wells Fargo breached it. All that he alleges is that

GM and Wells Fargo disclosed his personal information to third parties.

Accordingly, if Lewis seeks to raise a breach of contract claim, he is unable

to do so. See Hicks v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 2024 WL 1312500, at *4 (N.D.

Tex. Mar. 19, 2024), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 1317808 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2024)

(dismissing breach of contract claims as meritless under § 1915(e)(2)).

Leave to Amend

Generally, a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his

complaint before it is dismissed. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.

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1998). But leave to amend is not required if the plaintiff has already pleaded his

“best case.” Id. Nor is leave to amend required if it would be futile because the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction or because the plaintiff's theory of relief is simply

not cognizable. See, e.g., Isom_v. United States, 2022 WL 2865864, at *3 (E.D.

Tex. June 23, 2022) (“Here, the facts as alleged by Plaintiff clearly demonstrate a

lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court, and her claims lack a rational basis.

Thus, granting leave to amend would be futile and cause needless delay.”), rec.

accepted 2022 WL 2865841 (E.D. Tex. July 20, 2022); Kindricks v. Garland,

Police Dep't., 2014 WL 5472446, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2014) (“Here, Plaintiff's

claims are fatally infirm. Thus, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend

would be futile and cause needless delay.”).

In this case, Lewis’s claims are fatally infirm. Therefore, leave to amend is

unwarranted.

Recommendation

For the reasons explained above, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's case as

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

SO RECOMMENDED.

October 9, 2025.

REBECCA trom

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,

an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination

is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the

briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written

objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district

court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.

Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

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