Whitlock

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER WHITLOCK, ET AL. CIV. ACTION NO. 3:25-00280

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

DAVID MONTGOMERY, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, is a

combined Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted and a Rule 12(f) motion to strike filed by Defendants, Mastery Transportation L.L.C. and

Canal Insurance Company. [doc. # 9]. The motion is opposed. For reasons set forth below,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED. Furthermore, IT IS

ORDERED that the motion to strike is DENIED.

Background

On September 13, 2023, Christopher Whitlock (“Whitlock”) was driving a 2010 Toyota

Camry, owned by Sherri Barnhill (“Barnhill”), on I-20 eastbound in West Monroe, Louisiana,

when he struck the rear of a dangerously slow-moving 2018 Freightliner, owned by Mastery

Transportation, L.L.C. (“Mastery”) and operated by Mastery’s employee, David Montgomery

(“Montgomery”). (Petition, ¶¶ 1-6). As a result of the collision, Whitlock suffered

permanently debilitating injuries. Id., ¶ 11. Barnhill’s Camry was “totaled.” Id., ¶ 7.

One year later, on September 13, 2024, Whitlock filed the instant lawsuit, individually,

and on behalf of his minor child, A.K., against Mastery, Montgomery, and their liability carrier,

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Canal Insurance Company (“Canal”) to recover the personal injury and loss of consortium

damages that Whitlock and A.K., respectively, sustained as a result of the accident. (Petition).

Furthermore, Barnhill joined as an additional plaintiff to recover damages that she suffered from

the loss of her Camry. Id., ¶ 7.

On March 7, 2025, Defendants, Mastery and Canal, removed this matter to federal court

on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 (Notice of Removal).

On March 20, 2025, Mastery and Canal (collectively, “Defendants”) filed their

responsive pleading, which they combined with the instant motions to dismiss and strike under

Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f). Defendants contend that, following 2024 legislative action, tort

victims, such as Whitlock and Barnhill (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), no longer may assert a direct

action against the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, i.e., Canal, absent specific enumerated

circumstances, none of which are present here. See LA. R.S. § 22:1269(B). Furthermore,

because, under the amended statute, the insurer is not to be included in the caption of the suit,

nor its existence disclosed to the jury, Defendants seek to strike references to Canal from the

record. See LA. R.S. §§ 22:1269(B)(4)(a)-(b).

On April 11, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their opposition memorandum, arguing that

Louisiana’s Direct Action Statute provides tort victims with a substantive right and cause of

1 Plaintiffs are all domiciliaries and citizens of Louisiana. (Petition, Preamble). Defendant,

Montgomery, is a domiciliary and citizen of Florida. (Petition, ¶ 1). Defendant, Mastery, is a

citizen of Alabama, via its sole member, Carlos Hughes. (Notice of Removal, ¶ 4). Moreover,

Defendant, Canal, is a South Carolina corporation, with its principal place of business in said

State. (Div. Jur. Discl. Statement [doc. # 7]). Finally, the amount in controversy plainly

exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. (Notice of Removal, ¶ 6).

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action against a tortfeasor’s insurer such that the 2024 amendment cannot be applied

retroactively to disturb their vested rights. (Pls. Opp. Brief [doc. # 13]). Furthermore, to do so

would transgress their constitutional due process protections. Id.

On April 17, 2025, Defendants filed their reply brief, disputing Plaintiffs’ argument that

they had a vested right under the Direct Action Statute, and, instead, citing cases holding that the

Direct Action Statute conferred a procedural right of action that did not accrue until suit was

filed. (Defs. Reply Brief [doc. # 14]). Defendants further urged the Court to disregard

Plaintiffs’ due process argument because they failed to include it in a pleading and, even if they

had, they did not serve the attorney general, as required by Louisiana law. Id.

Accordingly, the matter is ripe.

Analysis

I. Governing Law

“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and

federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); see also

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Here, neither side contests that the substantive

issues raised by Defendants’ motion to dismiss are governed by Louisiana law. See In re Katrina

Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (deferring to the parties’ agreement

that Louisiana substantive law controlled); Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th

Cir. La. 1997) (applied Louisiana law where no party disputed that Louisiana law governed).1

1 In Jefferson, the Fifth Circuit’s decision incorporated the underlying district court opinion,

930 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. La. May 31, 1996) (Vance, J.)

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To determine Louisiana law, federal courts look to the final decisions of the Louisiana

Supreme Court. Moore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 556 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2009)

(citation omitted). In the absence of a decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court on a given issue,

federal courts are compelled to make an Erie guess. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495

F.3d at 206; Howe v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2000). In so doing, the Court

must use its best judgment to determine

how [the Louisiana Supreme C]ourt would resolve the issue if presented with the

same case. In making an Erie guess, we must employ Louisiana’s civilian

methodology, whereby we first examine primary sources of law: the constitution,

codes, and statutes. Jurisprudence, even when it rises to the level of jurisprudence

constante, is a secondary law source in Louisiana. Thus, although we will not

disregard the decisions of Louisiana’s intermediate courts unless we are convinced

that the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide otherwise, we are not strictly bound

by them.

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 206 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

II. Motion to Dismiss

a) Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails “to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim

for relief when, inter alia, it contains a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 667-668 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A

claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the

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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility

does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

556. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation

that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556. Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is

unlikely. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint,

the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading

comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only

‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Moreover, Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes courts to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive

issue of law, notwithstanding that it otherwise might be well-pleaded. See Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 326-327 (1989) (citations omitted); Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln

Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

When considering a motion to dismiss, courts generally are limited to the complaint and

its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted). However, courts may rely upon “documents incorporated into the complaint

by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Id.

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b) Discussion

Prior to August 1, 2024, Louisiana’s Direct Action Statute, Louisiana Revised Statute §

22:1269, stated that an “injured person . . . shall have a right of direct action against the insurer

within the terms and limits of the policy; and, such action may be brought against the insurer

alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido . . .” In 2024, however, the

Louisiana legislature passed Act 275, which amended § 22:1269(B) to read that an “injured

person . . . shall have no right of direct action against the insurer unless” at least one of seven

enumerated exceptions apply, none of which are applicable in this case. See LA. R.S. §

22:1269(B)(1). The amendment took effect on August 1, 2024. See Baker v. Amazon

Logistics, Inc., 751 F.Supp.3d 666, 668 (E.D. La. 2024).

Although not addressed by the parties, it is important to emphasize that Act 275 further

added that,

[i]n those instances where direct action is not otherwise authorized by law, at the

time that a judgment is to be entered, or a settlement is reached during the pendency

of litigation, a liability insurer may be joined on motion of any party as a party

defendant for the purposes of entering final judgment or enforcing the settlement.

LA. R. S. § 22:1269(D)(1)(a). In other words, while absent an enumerated exception tort victims

no longer may sue the insurer directly at the inception of a suit, tort victims nonetheless may join

the tortfeasor’s insurer for the purposes of entry of final judgment or enforcing a settlement.

As stated earlier, Plaintiffs contend that the 2024 amendment may not be applied

retroactively to deprive them of their right to sue Canal, which vested at the time of the accident.

The pertinent Louisiana Civil Code article provides that, “[i]n the absence of contrary legislative

expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply

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both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.”

LA. CIV. CODE ART. 6.2

In this case, Act 275 did not include an expression of the legislature’s intent concerning

its retroactive or prospective application. Baker, 751 F.Supp.3d at 671. Therefore, intent must

be discerned by classifying the laws as either substantive, procedural, or interpretive. LA. CIV.

CODE ART. 6; Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dardar, 145 So.3d 271, 279-280 (La. 2014). Before

embarking on this inquiry, however, the courts ordinarily must determine whether application of

the statute to the facts of this case qualifies as a retroactive application at all. Id. (citing, inter

alia, Walls v. American Optical Corp., 740 So.2d 1262, 1272–73 (La. 1999)). This is because

“a law may permissibly change the future consequences of an act and even the consequences of

acts committed prior to the law’s enactment without operating retroactively.” Walls, 740 So.2d

at 1266 (citing 1 M. PLANIOL, Treatise on the Civil Law, Sec. 243 (LA. ST. L. INST. TRANS.

1959)).

To determine whether a statute operates retroactively, the Louisiana Supreme Court

adopted the definition crafted by Planiol: “a law is retroactive when it goes back to the past

either [1] to evaluate the conditions of the legality of an act, or [2] to modify or suppress the

effects of a right already acquired. Outside of those conditions, there is no retroactivity.”

Church Mut. Ins. Co., 145 So.3d at 280 (citing PLANIOL, Treatise on the Civil Law § 243 at 174).

Here, there is no indication that Act 275 evaluates the conditions of the legality of an act.

Therefore, the Court proceeds to consider Planiol’s second situation, which he described as

2 Further, “[n]o Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated.”

LA. R.S. § 1:2.

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pertaining to the accrual of causes of action and vested rights. Walls, 740 So.2d at 1268-1269.

“If a party acquires a right to assert a cause of action prior to a change in the law, that right is a

vested property right, protected by the due process guarantees.” Church Mut. Ins. Co., 145

So.3d at 280-281 (quoting Walls, 740 So.2d at 1268). “Statutes enacted after the acquisition of

such a vested property right cannot be applied so as to divest a party of his or her vested right in

the cause of action because such a retroactive application would contravene due process

guarantees.” Id. (citations omitted). Once a cause of action accrues, it becomes a vested

property right that may not be divested constitutionally. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058,

1063–64 (La. 1992) (citations omitted).3

Upon consideration, it is apparent that the issue of Act 275’s retroactivity is commingled

with the issue of whether the Direct Action Statute is characterized as substantive or procedural,

which has varied over the years. For example, before 1950, federal courts construed the Direct

Action Statute as procedural. See Hudson v. Georgia Cas. Co., 57 F.2d 757, 759 (W.D. La.

1932); Wells v. Am. Employers’ Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1942); and Bouis v. Aetna

Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 F. Supp. 954, 959–60 (W.D. La. 1950). Beginning in 1950, however, the

Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that the Direct Action Statute “confer[s] substantive rights

on third parties to contracts of public liability insurance, which become vested at the moment of

the accident in which they are injured . . .” West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 191; 46 So.2d

122, 123 (La. 1950). In the decades that followed, the Fifth Circuit followed this lead. See

3 To be considered vested, a right “must be absolute, complete and unconditional, independent

of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of future benefit . . . does not constitute a vested right.”

Sawicki v. K/S Stavanger Prince, 802 So.2d 598, 604 (La. 2001) (citation omitted).

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McDermott v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 418 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 1969) (the Direct Action

Statute “gives the injured party an immediate right of direct action against the insurer of the party

responsible for the injuries.”); Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 891 F.2d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir.

1990) (third-party rights under the Direct Action Statute vest at the time of injury); McAvey v.

Lee, 260 F.3d 359, 369 (5th Cir. 2001).

More recently, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court has characterized the Direct

Action Statute as providing a procedural right of action against the insurer. Soileau v. Smith

True Value & Rental, 144 So.3d 771, 780 (La. 2013); Cacamo v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 764

So.2d 41, 43 (La. 2000) (the Direct Action Statute is designed to grant a procedural right of

action against an insurer); Descant v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 639 So.2d 246, 249

(La. 1994) (direct action statute does not create an independent cause of action against the

insurer); Dumas v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 241 La. 1096, 1117–18; 134 So.2d 45 (1961) (the

injured party’s procedural right of direct action against the insurer is purely remedial and

ancillary to their substantive cause of action against the tortfeasor).

Relying on this latest interpretation of the statute, most every court to have considered the

issue has held that the Direct Action Statute provides the injured third party with a procedural

right of action against the insurer that does not vest or accrue until the third party actually

invokes the remedy.4 In the wake of this nigh-unanimous weight of authority, the undersigned

4 See Hurel v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 414 So.3d 778, 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2025); Baker

v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 751 F.Supp.3d 666, 671–73 (E.D. La. 2024) (plaintiffs’ procedural

right of action did not become a vested property right until they sought to join the insurer to the

suit); Smith v. Fortenberry, Civ. Action No. 24-1647, 2024 WL 4462332, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Oct.

10, 2024) (plaintiff’s cause of action against the insured became a vested right at the time she

brought suit against the insurer); Taylor v. Elsesser, Civ. Action No. 24-2888, 2025 WL 471807,

at *4–5 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2025) (plaintiff’s right under the Direct Action Statute is vested only

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is compelled to find that Plaintiffs’ cause of action against Canal did not vest or accrue until they

commenced the instant suit. Therefore, Act 275 does not retroactively deprive Plaintiffs of a

vested right or a constitutionally protected property interest.5 Furthermore, as a procedural

statute, Act 275 may be applied retroactively. LA. CIV. CODE ART. 6.

In any event, even if, pursuant to West and its progeny, Plaintiffs’ cause of action against

Canal accrued and vested at the time of injury (rather than when suit was filed), that does not

change the outcome here. While under this interpretation of the Direct Action Statute, Act 275

potentially applies retroactively to modify the effects of a right already acquired, it represents a

permissible procedural change in the law.

As contemplated by Article 6 of the Civil Code, “[s]ubstantive laws establish new rules,

rights and duties or change existing ones.” Segura v. Frank, 630 So.2d 714, 723–24 (La. 1994)

(citations omitted). Procedural laws, however, “prescribe a method for enforcing a substantive

right and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of the laws.” Id.

It is manifest that the Direct Action Statute is multi-faceted legislation that establishes a

“substantive right, a remedial action, and a joinder procedure.” McAvey, 260 F.3d at 370–71.

when the plaintiff files suit); Tridico v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 24-0302,

2025 WL 1244855, at *5 (M.D. La. Apr. 22, 2025) (noting that Louisiana Supreme Court has

“consistently” interpreted the Direct Action Statute to be a procedural law); Landry v. Great Am.

Ins. Co., Civ. Action No. 24-0039, 2025 WL 2205155, at *4 (W.D. La. July 17, 2025), R&R

adopted, 2025 WL 2201381 (W.D. La. Aug. 1, 2025) (plaintiff’s claim against the tortfeasor’s

insurer was barred because she did not assert her procedural right against the insurer until after

the effective date of Act 275); Racca v. R U R Transp. Inc., Civ. Action No. 24-1513, 2025 WL

2538934, at *1–2 (W.D. La. Aug. 19, 2025), R&R adopted, 2025 WL 2534040 (W.D. La. Sept.

3, 2025) (applying Act 275 to pre-amendment accident where injured plaintiff did not file suit

until after effective date of amendment).

5 Therefore, the Court need not discuss Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs failed to include

their due process argument in a pleading and to serve it on the Attorney General.

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In other words, it contains both substantive and procedural elements.6 As relevant here, Act 275

modifies the circumstances when a third party may bring a direct action against the insurer.

Prior to the amendment, Plaintiffs could have sued Canal directly at the same time that they

initiated suit against the insured. After the effective date of Act 275, however, Plaintiffs could

not sue Canal directly unless and until it became necessary for the purpose of entering final

judgment or enforcing a settlement. See discussion, supra.

In short, Act 275 changes the method and timing of Plaintiffs’ direction action against

Canal. As applicable here, Act 275 represents a procedural change in the law that may be

applied retroactively without divesting Plaintiffs of their cause of action against Canal. See

Segura, 630 So.2d at 723–24 (application of the amendment did not disturb plaintiff’s vested

right in cause of action because it only altered the order of recovery without disturbing plaintiff’s

right to recover); Keith v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 694 So.2d 180, 183 (La. 1997) (amendment

requiring quantification of employer fault reflected a method for enforcing a substantive right,

which was procedural and subject to retroactive application).

Because Plaintiffs did not file suit until after the effective date of the amendment, Act

275 applies to bar assertion of their claim against Canal, at the present time. However, it may

be appropriate for Plaintiffs to join Canal later in the case; therefore, the recommended dismissal

6 “Clearly that part of the Act which gives a right of action direct against the insurer is

substantive. Just as clearly . . . that part which provides that the action may be brought against

either the insurer alone or against both the insured and the insurer jointly is procedural . . .”

Elbert v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 202 F.2d 744, 745–46 (5th Cir. 1953) (dissent).

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is without prejudice.7 See Racca, 2025 WL 2538934, at *2 (recommending insurer be

dismissed without prejudice).

III. Motion to Strike

a) Standard

Motions to strike are governed by Rule 12(f), which authorizes a court to “order stricken

from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently

granted.” U.S. v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 275 F. Supp.2d 763, 767 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (citing

Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction of Escambia County, Florida, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th

Cir. 1962)). As the Fifth Circuit has noted:

[p]artly because of the practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual record

it is well established that the action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used

by the courts. * * * It is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for

the purpose of justice. * * * The motion to strike should be granted only when the

pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.

Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868 (citing Brown v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. U.S., 201 F.2d 819, 822

(6th Cir. 1953)).

b) Discussion

Act 275 further amended the Direct Action Statute to provide that,

(a) An insurer shall not be included in the caption of any action brought against the

insurer pursuant to this Section. The action shall instead be captioned only against

the insured defendant or other noninsurance defendants.

(b) A court shall not disclose the existence of insurance coverage to the jury or

7 Albeit, because the recommended disposition of the instant motion resolves fewer than all

claims and parties it remains subject to revision at any time before conclusion of the case. FED.

R. CIV. P. 54(b). Consequently, even a dismissal “with prejudice” effectively will operate as a

dismissal “without prejudice.”

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mention such coverage in the jury’s presence unless required by Code of Evidence

Article 411.

LA. R. S. § 22:1269B(4)(a)-(b). Citing the foregoing provisions, Defendants seek an order

striking from the record “the claims against Canal, and Canal’s identification in the caption of

the lawsuit[.]” [doc. #9, p. 4].

First, in the most general sense, the Court’s record is public, and, under the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, the public record is not redacted in this way, even if it is later determined that

a party and claims against it are to be dismissed. Further, a motion to strike is not the proper

vehicle to prohibit dissemination of information to the jury. Rather, that issue may be raised

prior to trial via motion or as part of the discussion of foreseeable issues at the pre-trial

conference.

Accordingly, Defendants have not established that the drastic remedy of striking

allegations is necessary for the purpose of justice. Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.

Conclusion

For the above-assigned reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss [doc. # 9] be

GRANTED, and that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant, Canal Insurance Company, be

DISMISSED, without prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to strike [doc. # 9] is DENIED.8

8 As this motion is not one of the motions excepted in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), nor dispositive

of any claim on the merits within the meaning of Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, this ruling is issued under the authority thereof, and in accordance with the standing

order of this court. Any appeal/objection must be made to the district judge in accordance with

Rule 72(a).

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Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties

have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific,

written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A courtesy copy of any

objection or response or request for extension of time shall be furnished to the District Judge at

the time of filing. Timely objections will be considered by the District Judge before he makes a

final ruling.

A PARTY’S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS

REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS SERVICE

SHALL BAR AN AGGRIEVED PARTY, EXCEPT ON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR,

FROM ATTACKING ON APPEAL THE UNOBJECTED-TO PROPOSED FACTUAL

FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

In Chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, on this 9th day of October, 2025.

KAYLA DY LUSKY TO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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