Diaz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JOSE ENRIQUE CERON DIAZ, on his own and on

behalf of others similarly situated, MEMORANDUM &

ORDER

Plaintiffs,

25-CV-1575

-against- (Merchant, J.)

(Marutollo, M.J.)

WANRONG TRADING CORP., et al.,

Defendants.

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JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Jose Enrique Ceron Diaz, on his own and on behalf of others similarly situated,

commenced this action on January 14, 2025 against Defendants Wanrong Trading Corp.

(“Wanrong”); Tai He Trading Corp. (“Tai He”); Wan Chang Inc f/d/b/a C.M.J. Xing Inc; Yiang

Shao a/k/a Yi Ang Shao; Xuming Ren a/k/a Xu Ming Ren; Xumao Ren a/k/a Xu Mao Ren; Taotao

Ren a/k/a Tao Tao Ren, (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging violations of the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) §§ 190-

199A, 650-665. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1-1 and 5. Defendants removed this action to federal

court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 on March 21, 2025. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1.1

Currently pending before this Court is Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration pursuant

to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (“FAA”), and stay the action pending

arbitration.2 See Dkt. No. 21.

1 Page citations are to ECF-stamped pages unless otherwise noted.

2 A motion to compel arbitration is non-dispositive, and reviewable on appeal to the District Court for clear

error. Chung v. Royal Care, Inc., No. 23-CV-7962 (OEM) (LKE), 2025 WL 809900, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.

14, 2025). Indeed, “[d]istrict courts in this Circuit regularly have concluded that a motion to compel

arbitration and stay litigation pending arbitration is non-dispositive and therefore within a Magistrate

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to compel is granted and the matter is stayed.3

I. Background

“A court deciding a motion to compel arbitration ‘considers all relevant, admissible

evidence submitted by the parties and contained in pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, and draws all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.’” Daitz v. ATR New York LH, Inc., No. 25-CV-01591

(JMA) (LGD), 2025 WL 2733346, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025) (quoting Meyer v. Uber Techs.,

Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up)); see Rahman v. Papa John’s International, Inc.,

22-CV-5644 (AMD) (TAM), 2024 WL 1308589, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. March 26, 2024);

Castellanos v. Raymours Furniture Company, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 294, 296 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2018);

Faggiano v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 33, 34 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Guida v. Home

Savings of America, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 611, 612 n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing BS Sun Shipping

Monrovia v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 06-CV-839 (HB), 2006 WL 2265041, at *3 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.

Aug. 8, 2006) (“While it is generally improper to consider documents not appended to the initial

pleading or incorporated in that pleading by reference in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss, it is proper (and in fact necessary) to consider such extrinsic evidence when faced with a

motion to compel arbitration.”) (internal citation omitted)).

Judge’s purview to decide without issuing a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).” Mera v. SA Hosp. Grp., LLC, 675 F. Supp. 3d 442, 445 (S.D.N.Y.

2023); Puig v. City of New York, 733 F. Supp. 3d 218, 219 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2024); Davis v. Crothall

Healthcare, Inc., No. 22-CV-07196 (PGG) (SDA), 2023 WL 6519603, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2023);

GateGuard, Inc. v. Goldenberg, 585 F. Supp. 3d 391, 394 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Anderjaska v. Bank of

America, N.A., 523 F. Supp. 3d 456, 459 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Ahmad v. Day, 556 F. Supp. 3d 214, 215 n.2

(S.D.N.Y. 2021).

3 Alexa M. Marsh, a judicial intern who is a third-year law student at The George Washington University

Law School, is gratefully acknowledged for her assistance in the research of this Memorandum & Order.

A. Facts

i. Allegations in the Complaint

According to the Complaint, Defendants employed Plaintiff from on or about November

30, 2021 through the present day. See Dkt. No. 5 ¶ 13. Plaintiff’s primary duties included

preparing and delivering “orders of meat (beef, pork, chicken, and duck) in Defendants’ Order

Preparation and Delivery Department.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he regularly worked more than forty hours per week, generally

between fifty and sixty hours per week and was paid “at or around” New York minimum wage at

rates ranging from $15 per hour to $16.50 per hour. Id. ¶¶ 75-79. From the commencement of his

employment until March 2025, Plaintiff claims that he was paid in cash every week. Id. ¶ 80.

Beginning March 2025, however, Defendants purportedly began to pay Plaintiff by check. Id.

¶ 81. Plaintiff alleges that throughout his employment with Defendants, he had an “automatic

deduction of half an hour a day for lunch that was not taken for six days a week, or three hours

each workweek.” Id. ¶ 82. Plaintiff and his coworkers allegedly never received their full thirty-

minute lunch break but were forced to sign off as having taken the full thirty-minute break. Id. ¶¶

83-84.

Plaintiff filed an action in New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, on behalf of

himself and his coworkers alleging race, national origin, sex, and gender discrimination against

Wan Chang Inc. on November 19, 2023. See Dkt. No. 5 ¶ 85 (citing Brinez v. Wan Chang Inc.,

Index No. 724543/2023 (Queens County Supreme) (“Brinez”).4 Upon commencement of the

Brinez case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “doubled down” on their refusal of Plaintiff’s lunch

time. Id. ¶ 86.

4 Plaintiff here is one of the named plaintiffs in Brinez. Dkt. No. 20-1.

Plaintiff brings the instant action individually and as a representative on behalf of all other

current and former workers, including but not limited to employees preparing and delivering meat,

who have been or were employed by Defendants for up to the last three years and were not

compensated at least the hourly minimum wage and/or overtime compensation for all hours

worked in excess of forty hours per week. Id. ¶ 91.

ii. Plaintiff’s Employment Agreement

Defendants prepared an “Agreement Regarding the Fact-Finding and Issue Resolution

(FAIR) Program and Arbitration” (the “FAIR Agreement”) in 2018 to resolve any future issues

that may arise with their employees. Dkt. No. 21-3 at 2. Defendants had the FAIR Agreement

translated into both Spanish and Chinese versions to accommodate their employees who did not

speak English. Id. All new employees “were required to review and execute a FAIR Agreement

at or around the time of their hire.” Id. at 3. Signed FAIR Agreements were then filed into each

employee’s personnel file, maintained by Defendants. Id. The FAIR Agreement states, in

pertinent parts, that:

By signing this agreement, You agree that all “Claims” (as defined in paragraph 3)

between “You” and the “Company” (as defined below in Paragraph 3 [Wanrong

Trading Corp. and its affiliate, Tai He Trading Corp]) shall be resolved exclusively

by the internal dispute resolution procedures and the binding arbitration procedures

described in this document.

Dkt. No. 12-2 at ¶ 2; see also Dkt. No. 21-3 at 6; Dkt. No. 21-2 at 6 (in Spanish). The FAIR

Agreement at paragraph 3 provides that:

“Claim” includes any claim, dispute, allegation, controversy, or action between

You and the Company that in any way arises from, or relates to, Your employment

with the Company or the termination of Your employment with the Company. A

Claim encompasses, for example, any employment, labor, wage-and-hour,

overtime, and compensation claims, including, without limitation, any Claim that

may arise under the following laws [which include] the Fair Labor Standards Act

of 1938 or any state wage and hour laws, such as the New York Labor Law[.]

Dkt. No. 12-2 at ¶ 3; see also Dkt. No. 21-3 at 7; Dkt. No. 21-2 at 7 (in Spanish). The FAIR

Agreement further states that it is “governed by the [FAA]” and that the employee and Wanrong

“acknowledge and agree that the FAIR Program evidences a transaction involving interstate

commerce.” Dkt. No. 12-2 at 6 (quotations in original). The FAIR Agreement further states that:

Can A Claim Be Resolved in Court? No. Under the FAIR Program, You and the

Company each waive Your respective rights to have a Claim decided in court, by a

judge, jury and, where permitted by law, an administrative agency. Instead, You

and the Company hereby agree that the internal dispute resolution and

arbitration procedures set forth below are the sole and exclusive methods for

resolving any and all Claims.

See Dkt. No. 12-2 at ¶ 5 (emphasis in original); see also Dkt. No. 21-3 at 8; Dkt. No. 21-2 at 8 (in

Spanish). Finally, in bold, the FAIR Agreement notes that: “By signing below, You confirm that

You have read and understand the terms and conditions of the FAIR Program, which

require You to submit all Claims to binding arbitration on an individual basis.” Id. at 7

(emphasis in original).

Defendants represent that one of the documents in Plaintiff’s personnel file is Plaintiff’s

signed agreement entitled, “Acuerdo En Respecto Al Encuentro De Hechos Y Resolutión De

Problemas (‘FAIR’) Programa Y Arbitraje,” which is the FAIR Agreement translated into Spanish.

Dkt. No. 21-2 at 3-12 (featuring the signature on page 12). Defendants provide the Court with a

forensic document examiner report concluding that the signature on the signature on the FAIR

Agreement is consistent with other signatures by the Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 21-4.

Plaintiff contests the legitimacy of the signed FAIR Agreement and claims that he has

never been presented with an arbitration agreement and that his signature was forged. Dkt. No.

22-6 at 6.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff,5 then-proceeding pro se, filed this action on January 14, 2025 alleging violations

of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206 and NYLL. See generally Dkt. No. 5. The Summons with Notice

was served on Defendants on March 1, 2025. Dkt. 1 at 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446,

Defendants filed a timely Notice of Removal on March 21, 2025. Id. On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff

filed his Complaint, supplemental exhibits, and a demand for a jury trial with this Court. See Dkt.

Nos. 5 and 6.

On May 8, 2025, Defendants requested a pre-motion conference because they intended to

file a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) to stay the action and compel arbitration. See Dkt.

No. 12. Within this request, Defendants stated that on November 30, 2021, Plaintiff executed a

mandatory arbitration agreement, the FAIR Agreement, upon commencing his employment with

Tai He, an affiliate of Wanrong. Id. at 1. Under the FAIR Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to submit

all claims arising from his employment to binding arbitration on an individual basis. Id. at 1; see

generally Dkt. Nos. 12-1 and 12-2. Defendants further claim that they made Plaintiff’s counsel

aware of this binding arbitration agreement via email on April 29, 2025, but Plaintiff’s counsel

had not answered as of May 8, 2025, when Defendant’s counsel drafted this letter to the Court.

Dkt. No. 12 at 2. In addition to Defendants’ request for a pre-motion conference, Defendants

included the FAIR Agreement translated into Spanish and signed by Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 12-1. On

May 9, 2025, Defendants’ request for a pre-motion conference and any resulting motion to compel

were referred to the undersigned. See Text Order dated May 9, 2025.

5 The docket erroneously lists Plaintiff Jose Enrique Ceron Diaz twice: first proceeding pro se and

represented by counsel, John Troy; and second represented by counsels Aaron Schweitzer, Tiffany Troy,

and John Troy. Plaintiff is, in fact, no longer proceeding pro se and is represented by counsels John Troy,

Aaron Schweitzer, and Tiffany Troy of Troy Law, PLLC. The Clerk is directed to update the docket

accordingly.

On May 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ request for a pre-

motion conference. See Dkt. No. 14. Plaintiff denied executing the FAIR Agreement stating he

did not sign the FAIR Agreement and that his signature was forged. Dkt. No. 14 at 2. Additionally,

Plaintiff claims he and four other coworkers never signed the FAIR Agreement, were never

presented with the FAIR Agreement, and their signatures were forged, as evidence by some of

their names being misspelled. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also alleges that, while Defendants claim they

retained a forensic document examiner, they never disclosed the identity of the document

examiner. Id. at 2.

On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff’s current counsel filed their notices of appearance. See Dkt.

Nos. 16 and 17. Upon review of the submissions, this Court adjourned the pre-motion conference

request sine die, and Defendants and Plaintiff were instructed to file their motion to compel

arbitration and opposition to the motion, respectively. See Text Order dated May 16, 2025.

Defendants requested and were granted an extension of time to serve their motion to compel

arbitration because the New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, issued a decision and

order in Brinez relating to Defendants’ pending motion to stay the action and compel arbitration

in the instant case. Dkt. Nos. 20 at 1; 20-1 at 3-5. In short, New York State Supreme Court Justice

Denise N. Johnson found that the FAIR Agreement, at issue in both this instant matter and Brinez,

is enforceable against Plaintiff. Id. Defendants argue the Brinez decision and order estops Plaintiff

from contesting the signature on the signed FAIR Agreement under the doctrine of collateral

estoppel. Id. Defendants filed their motion to Stay the Action and Compel Arbitration on July 31,

2025. Dkt. No. 21. In addition to their motion, Defendants filed declarations from two Wanrong

employees containing the FAIR Agreement in both English and in Spanish, signed by Plaintiff

(Dkt. Nos. 21-2 and 21-3), an Expert Report by Mr. Jeffrey H. Luber, the Forensic Document

Examiner (Dkt. No. 21-4), and their memorandum of law in support of their motion (Dkt. No. 21-

5).

On July 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration

and stay the action. Dkt. No. 22. Plaintiff filed affidavits by Plaintiffs Diaz (Dkt. No. 22-1),

Brinez (Dkt. No. 22-2), Basurto (Dkt. No. 22-3), Neira (Dkt. No. 22-4), and Galvez (Dkt. No. 22-

5) with side-by-side comparisons of their handwritten signatures (Dkt. Nos. 22-1 at 17; 22-2 at 17;

22-3 at 17; 22-4 at 17; 22-5 at 17) and all stating they never signed the FAIR Agreement (Dkt Nos.

22-1 at 1; 22-2 at 1; 22-3 at 1; 22-4 at 1; 22-5 at 1). Additionally, in Plaintiff’s memorandum of

law in opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel, Plaintiff claims that: (1) the FAIR Agreement

is void and unenforceable because the Plaintiff’s signature was forged; and (2) the FAIR

Agreement did not encompass of Plaintiff’s claims. Dkt. No. 22-6 at 6-9.

Defendant then filed a reply memorandum of law in response to Plaintiff’s opposition to

the motion to compel arbitration. See Dkt. No. 23. Defendants argue in their reply that collateral

estoppel precludes Plaintiff from challenging the authenticity of his signature and that all

Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the FAIR Agreement. Dkt. No. 23 at 6-12. In response,

Plaintiff filed a sur-reply—without seeking leave of the Court—asserting that collateral estoppel

does not apply where the issue being addressed by the court is currently being appealed. Dkt. No.

24 at 7. In an abundance of caution, all of these documents have been reviewed and considered.

II. Standard of Review

The FAA provides when a court shall compel arbitration and stay all proceedings before

it:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon

any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,

the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved

in such suit or proceeding is referrable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall

on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration

has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant

for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3. The FAA provides that “[a] written provision in . . . a

contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall

be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA thus reflects a “federal policy

favoring arbitration” and the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” AT&T

Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ross

v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the FAA reflects “a strong

federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

“In deciding whether to compel arbitration, a court must first decide whether the parties

agreed to arbitrate.” Daitz, 2025 WL 2733346, at *2 (quoting Zachman v. Hudson Valley Fed.

Credit Union, 49 F.4th 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2022)). “To determine whether to compel arbitration,

courts perform a two-step inquiry that looks at contract principles ‘governed by state rather than

federal law.’” Ross v. Finzer & Atallah, No. 25-CV-1179 (DEH) (VF), 2025 WL 2860070, at *2-

3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2025) (quoting Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d

360, 365 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). “At step one, the court considers whether the parties

enter[ed] into a contractually valid arbitration agreement.” Ross, 2025 WL 2860070, at *2-3

(citations omitted). “At step two, the court first asks, whether a court or an arbitrator should decide

if the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.” Id. “[I]f the agreement delegates

the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, a court may not decide the arbitrability issue.” Gordon v.

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, No. 22-CV-5212 (JPC) (JEW), 2023 WL

2138693, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2023) (quoting Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales,

Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 69 (2019)) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted). “If it does

not, then the court considers whether ‘the parties’ dispute fall[s] within the scope of the arbitration

agreement.’” Ross, 2025 WL 2860070, at *2-3 (quoting Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., LLC,

346 F.3d at 365).

“If a court concludes that the parties agreed to arbitrate, it must then determine ‘(1) the

scope of the agreement to arbitrate; (2) whether Congress intended any federal statutory claims

asserted to be non-arbitrable; and (3) if some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitrable,

whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.’” Daitz, 2025 WL 2733346,

at *2 (quoting Zachman, 49 F.4th at 101).

“Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether

the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.” Ross, 2025 WL

2860070, at *2-3 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649

(1986)). “To show ‘clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability

to an arbitrator,’ parties may point to provisions of an arbitration agreement ‘explicitly

incorporat[ing] procedural rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability.’”

Ross, 2025 WL 2860070, at *2-3 (quoting DDK Hotels, LLC v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 6 F.4th

308, 318 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

After the two-step inquiry, the Court examines whether ‘one party to the agreement has

failed, neglected or refused to arbitrate.’” Ross, 2025 WL 2860070, at *2-3 (quoting Beijing

Shougang Mining Inv. Co. v. Mongolia, 11 F.4th 144, 162 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted)).

Motions to compel arbitration are adjudicated under a framework similar to the summary

judgment standard. Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003); Hines v.

Overstock.com, Inc., 380 Fed. Appx. 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2010); Faggiano v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 283

F. Supp. 3d 33, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). “[T]he court considers all relevant, admissible evidence

submitted by the parties and contained in pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with affidavits, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-moving party.” Sanchez v. Clipper Realty, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 3d 357, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2022),

aff’d, 2023 WL 7272062 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2023) (citations omitted).

As noted above, the court must “consider all relevant admissible evidence” and “draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d

220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016); see Daitz, 2025 WL 2733346 at *3. “If there is an issue of fact as to the

making of the agreement for arbitration, then a trial is necessary.” Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175

(citing 9 U.S.C. § 4). If, however, the arbitrability of the dispute can be decided as a matter of law

based on the undisputed facts in the record, the court “may rule on the basis of that legal issue and

‘avoid the need for further court proceedings.’” Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. VCG Special

Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Bensadoun, 316 F.3d

at 175).

“The party seeking to compel arbitration bears an initial burden of demonstrating that an

agreement to arbitrate was made.” GPS Int’l Techs., Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 24-CV-

7758 (ALC), 2025 WL 2776095, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025) (quoting Zachman, 49 F.4th at

101-02). The burden then “shifts to the party seeking to avoid arbitration to ‘show[ ] the agreement

to be inapplicable or invalid.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., 602 F.3d 113, 124

(2d Cir. 2010)). The non-moving party may not satisfy this burden through “general denials of the

facts on which the right to arbitration depends.” Oppenheimer & Co. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352,

358 (2d Cir. 1995). Instead, the party opposing arbitration “must submit evidentiary facts showing

that there is a dispute of fact to be tried.” Id. “A party has refused to arbitrate if it commences

litigation or is ordered to arbitrate the dispute by the relevant arbitral authority and fails to do so.”

Smith v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 24-CV-4633 (JPC), 2025 WL 2782484, at *4 (quoting Beijing

Shougang Mining Inv. Co. v. Mongolia, 11 F.4th 144, 162 (2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up)).

“In accordance with the ‘strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means

of dispute resolution,’ [courts] resolve any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues ‘in

favor of arbitrability.’” Daly v. Citigroup Inc., 939 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing State of

N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 90 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1996)).

III. Discussion

A. Arbitration

Defendants contend that the FAA mandates arbitration of Plaintiff’s claim because: (i) the

parties executed a valid arbitration agreement; and (ii) Plaintiff’s claim against Wanrong and Tai

He falls within the scope of such arbitration agreement. Dkt. No. 23 at 6-12. As outlined below,

the Court agrees with Defendants on both issues.

i. The FAIR Agreement is a Valid Arbitration Agreement

First, the Court agrees that the parties formed a valid arbitration agreement. “The threshold

question facing any court considering a motion to compel arbitration is whether the parties have

indeed agreed to arbitrate.” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Alemayehu, 934 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2019)

(internal quotations and alterations omitted). The question is resolved with reference to state law.

Meyer, 868 F.3d at 73-74; Bell v. Cendant Corp., 293 F.3d 563, 566 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Because an

agreement to arbitrate is a creature of contract . . . the ultimate question of whether the parties

agreed to arbitrate is determined by state law.”).

“Under New York law, [Defendants] must establish there was a meeting of the minds on

all essential terms of the contract, demonstrating the parties’ mutual assent and mutual intent to be

bound.” Compass Prods. Int’l LLC v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 22-254, 2023 WL 2358479,

at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 2023) (citing Schurr v. Austin Galleries of Ill., Inc., 719 F.2d 571, 576 (2d

Cir. 1983)). A contract containing a forged signature is unenforceable because there can be no

meeting of the minds. See Opals on Ice Lingerie v. Bodylines Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 370 (2d Cir.

2003). “[I]f a party’s signature were forged on a contract, it would be absurd to require arbitration

if the party attacking the contract as void failed to allege that the arbitration clause itself was

fraudulently obtained.” Kyung In Lee v. Pac. Bullion (New York) Inc., 788 F. Supp. 155, 157

(E.D.N.Y. 1992).

“A party resisting arbitration on the ground that no agreement to arbitrate exists must

submit sufficient evidentiary facts in support of this claim in order to precipitate the trial

contemplated by 9 U.S.C. § 4.” Manning v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 833 F.2d 1096,

1103 (2d Cir. 1987). Conclusory statements or mere assertions are insufficient. See Dassero v.

Edwards, 190 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554-55 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that a party resisting arbitration

must submit evidentiary facts, such as expert testimony or other proof, to support the claim of

forgery); see also ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99; Roofers Local

No. 149 Pension Fund v. Amgen Inc., 751 F. Supp. 3d 330, 345.

Here, the Court finds that the parties entered into a contractually-valid arbitration

agreement. Defendants filed a copy of the FAIR Agreement bearing Plaintiff’s signature on the

docket in this action. See Dkt. No. 21-2 at 12. Defendants also provided a report from a forensic

document examiner who concluded that Plaintiff’s verified signatures matched the signature on

the signed FAIR Agreement. See Dkt. No. 21-4 at 18, 20-25. In the instant case, Defendants’

forensic scientist, Jeffrey H. Luber,6 based his forensic examination on visual and microscopic

examinations of the signature written on the FAIR Agreement and compared it to known samples

of Plaintiff’s signature, including Plaintiff’s New York State Form LS 54S, three weekly time

sheets, and two weekly lunch fees. Id. at 4-5; Dkt. No. 21-5 at 7. As part of Mr. Luber’s

handwriting comparisons, he examined “features of handwriting habit patterns, including but not

limited to: fluency of writing, letter construction, height relationships between letters, letter

proportions, connecting strokes, slant, speed of writing, beginning and ending strokes and baseline

orientation.” Dkt. No. 21-4 at 5. Based on his forensic examination, Mr. Luber determined that

Plaintiff signed his name on the FAIR Agreement document. See Id. at 6.

1. Plaintiff’s Forgery Claim

Following Defendants’ submission, Plaintiff disputes that he entered into a valid arbitration

agreement with Defendants; instead, he alleges that his signature was forged. Dkt. No. 22-6 at 6-

9. As stated above, Plaintiff filed affidavits by Plaintiffs Diaz (Dkt. No. 22-1), Brinez (Dkt. No.

22-2), Basurto (Dkt. No. 22-3), Neira (Dkt. No. 22-4), and Galvez (Dkt. No. 22-5) with side-by-

side comparisons of their handwritten signatures (Dkt. Nos. 22-1 at 17; 22-2 at 17; 22-3 at 17; 22-

4 at 17; 22-5 at 17) and all stating they never signed the FAIR Agreement (Dkt Nos. 22-1 at 1; 22-

2 at 1; 22-3 at 1; 22-4 at 1; 22-5 at 1).

While a party is not required to submit forensic document examiner reports,7 the party

claiming forgery has the burden of rebutting the presumption of authenticity of signatures. See

6 Mr. Luber is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners. Id. at 3. Mr. Luber

has been a forensic document examiner for over forty years and has consulted on both public and private

cases. Id.

7 Under Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification

as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter in question is what its proponent claims.” “[T]he standard for authentication. . . .is one of reasonable

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4540-a; U.C.C. § 3-308; see Duran v. Taco Bell of America, LLC, No. 24-CV-8193

(FB) (MMH), 2025 WL 2711521, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2025) (“If the opposing party

challenges the validity of the signature, the moving party must establish its authenticity by a

preponderance of the evidence.”) (internal citation omitted); In re Broadway Equity Holdings,

LLC, 617 B.R. 777, 789 n.41 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020) (“It is incumbent upon a party claiming

the non-genuineness of a signature [on a negotiable instrument] to produce firsthand proof of the

forgery.”) (internal citation omitted); Dye v. Kopiec, No. 16-CV-2952 (LGS), 2016 WL 7351810,

at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (“It is incumbent upon a party claiming the nongenuineness of a

signature to produce firsthand proof of the forgery.”) (internal citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff did not file any reports by handwriting examiners in support of his assertion

that his signature on the FAIR Agreement was forged. Plaintiff instead relies on the affidavits and

side-by-side comparisons which only compare the FAIR Agreement signatures to one sample

signature for each Plaintiff. See Dkt. Nos. 22-1 at 17; 22-2 at 17; 22-3 at 17; 22-4 at 17; 22-5 at

17. Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ motion relies on Opals on Ice Lingerie

v. Bodylines Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) to substantiate his claim that a forged arbitration

agreement is void ab initio. See Dkt. No. 22-6 at 13. In Opal, however, the party claiming forgery,

retained a handwriting examiner who rendered his expert opinion regarding the authenticity of the

signature; whereas, here, Defendants submitted a report from a forensic scientist who determined

that Plaintiff signed his name on the FAIR Agreement, and Plaintiff submitted no such report. See

id. at 366. Therefore, Plaintiff’s forgery claim must be rejected.

likelihood.” 457 Realty Corp. v. Chamois Properties, Inc., No. 18-CV-4996 (DRH) (SIL), 2019 WL

13236157, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2019).

2. Plaintiff’s Forgery Claim is Barred by Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel provides an independent reason to bar Plaintiff’s forgery claim.

Notably, Plaintiff advances the same forgery argument and the same affidavits in the instant case

as Brinez. Dkt. Nos. 22-6 at 7 (acknowledging that since “the arguments that Defendants raised

are substantively the same as the arguments they raised in [the State Court Action (Brinez)],

Plaintiff Ceron Diaz supports this Memorandum of Law with his previous affidavit together with

the affidavits of his coworkers Mauricio Alberto Brinez, Efren Vargas Basurto, Luis Manuel

Espinoza Neira, Natalio Crispin Galvez”) (capitalization altered); 23 at 6. As a result, the forgery

claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies

where:

(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the

issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding;

(3) the part[ies] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue;

and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid

and final judgment on the merits.

Geller v. Hochul, No. 21-CV-2514, 2023 WL 221725, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2023) (affirming

district court’s application of collateral estoppel). Here, the requirements of collateral estoppel are

satisfied.

First, Plaintiff advances the same claim that the signature of the FAIR agreement was

forged in both the Brinez action and the instant matter. Brinez Dkt. No. 118 at 8-12; Dkt. No. 22-

6 at 10-14. Second, the authenticity of Plaintiff’s signature was litigated in Brinez, as evidenced

by Justice Johnson’s opinion. Dkt. No. 23-2 at 4. Third, the parties had a full and fair opportunity

to litigate the issue before a New York State Court, as evidenced by Brinez. Lastly, the resolution

of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits because, in granting

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in the Brinez, the authenticity of Plaintiff’s signature

was necessarily determined.

In her opinion, Justice Johnson concluded that Plaintiff’s “bare, unsubstantiated assertions

of forgery in [his] respective affidavits are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact[.]” Dkt. No.

23-2 at 4; see also Oppenheimer, 56 F.3d at 358 (holding that the non-moving party may not satisfy

the burden of demonstrating that an agreement to arbitrate was made through “general denials of

the facts on which the right to arbitration depends”)

In sum, the Court finds that Defendants have satisfied their burden to show that Plaintiff

indeed agreed to be bound by the FAIR Agreement.

ii. Plaintiff’s Claims are within the Scope of the FAIR Agreement

Second, Plaintiff’s claim appears to fall squarely within the scope of the FAIR Agreement.

The FAIR Agreement specifically identifies claims under the FLSA and the NYLL in its non-

exhaustive list of covered statutory claims. See Dkt. Nos. 21-5 at 13; 21-3 at 7. Here, Plaintiff

alleges violations of both the FLSA and the NYLL. See Dkt. No. 5 ¶ 1. Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants willfully and intentionally failed to pay him his minimum wage and

overtime hours, and that Defendants did not record Plaintiff’s work hours. Id ¶¶ 2-3. Simply put,

the FAIR Agreement appears to cover the unpaid wage claims enshrined in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Consistent with Daitz, FLSA and NYLL claims are also ripe for arbitration because they are not

the type of federal statutory claims Congress intended to be non-arbitrable. Daitz, 2025 WL

2733346, at *2. “[I]t has been found that individual agreements to arbitrate FLSA claims are

enforceable.” See Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 527, 539 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). Here,

the FAIR Agreement states that all valid Claims, which includes FLSA and NYLL claims, must

be arbitrated individually subject to the arbitration agreement. See Dkt. No. 21-3 at 9. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claims are within the scope of the FAIR Agreement.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. See Forbes v.

A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 08-CV-552 (TPG) at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009) (“When a

district court determines that the issue before it is referrable to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration

agreement, the FAA ‘leaves no place for the exercise of discretion,’ but instead, mandates that the

court ‘direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has

been signed.’”) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).

B. Stay of the Action

Having concluded that the FAIR Agreement is enforceable and that Plaintiff’s claims fall

within its broad scope, the Court must decide whether stay the action.

When all claims have been referred to arbitration and a stay is requested, the Court must

grant the stay. See Katz v. Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that “the text,

structure, and underlying policy of the FAA mandate a stay of proceedings when all of the claims

in an action have been referred to arbitration and a stay requested.”) (emphasis added); see also

Daitz, 2025 WL 2733346, at *4 (quoting Katz, 794 F.3d at 343-346); Goldeneye Advisors, LLC v.

Hanaco Venture Capital, Ltd., No. 24-C-9918 (VSB) (VF), 2025 WL 2434643, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.

Aug. 25, 2025) (quoting Katz, 794 F.3d at 347); Diaz v. Avo Shopping Company, Inc., 22-CV-

2591 (ENV) (TAM), 2024 WL 5416155, at *4 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2024) (same); Shenzhen

Xingchen Xuanyuan Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Amazon.com Services LLC, 735 F. Supp. 3d 453, 464

(S.D.N.Y. 2024) (same).

The Court notes that, following Katz, courts in this Circuit “generally [] stay the

proceedings pending arbitration, rather than dismiss the case.” Osorio v. CVS Pharmacy, No. 22-

CV-6575L, 2023 WL 3093872, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2023) (citing Katz, 794 F.3d at 347);

see, e.g., TIG Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 18-CV-10183 (VSB), 2020 WL 605974,

at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2020) (same); Porcelli v. JetSmarter, Inc., No. 19-CV-2537 (PAE), 2019

WL 2371896, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2019); Crawley v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 15-

CV-2228 (KPF), 2017 WL 2297018, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017); see also Mancilla, WL

4432122, at *10. The Court therefore does not make any sua sponte report and recommendation

regarding dismissal at this time.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ request for a stay and stays this case pending

arbitration. See GPS Int’l Techs., Inc., 2025 WL 2776095, at *8.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is granted and the case is stayed

pending the outcome of arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (mandating that a court “shall on application

of one of the parties stay the [case] until such arbitration has been had” if the court is satisfied that

the issue involved in the suit is referrable to arbitration) (emphasis added). The Clerk of Court is

respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. No. 21 and to stay this case.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

November 7, 2025 SO ORDERED.

/s/ Joseph A. Marutollo

JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO

United States Magistrate Judge