Million

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

MARY MILLION, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 24-CV-3357

)

HOSPITAL SISTERS HEALTH )

SYSTEM, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Discovery

(d/e 29, 43), Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (d/e 37) and

Motion to Dismiss (d/e 49), and the respective responses and replies

thereto. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel are

GRANTED, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, and

Defendants’ Motion to Stay is MOOT.

BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2024, Plaintiff Mary Million, individually and

on behalf of those similarly situated, filed a one-count Class Action

Complaint in this Court, asserting that she was required to undergo

a preemployment medical screening and answer questions

regarding family history of illnesses, in a manner that violated the

Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act (GIPA), 410 Ill. Comp. Stat.

513/1, et seq. See d/e 1, ¶¶ 28-35.

GIPA does not allow an employer, directly or indirectly, to

“solicit, request, require or purchase genetic testing or genetic

information of a person or a family member of the person, or

administer a genetic test to a person or a family member of the

person as a condition of employment, preemployment application,

labor organization membership, or licensure[.]” 410 Ill. Comp. Stat.

513/25(c)(1).

On February 28, 2025, Defendants Hospital Sisters Health

System (“HSHS”) and St. Francis Hospital, of the Hospital Sisters of

the Third Order of St. Francis (“St. Francis Hospital”), moved to

dismiss the sole count of Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to

plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See d/e 14, 15.

On May 15, 2025, this Court entered an Opinion and Order

denying that motion to dismiss. See d/e 27. Specifically, the Court

held that the Complaint sufficiently alleged that Defendants’

questions as to Plaintiff’s family medical history during a

preemployment medical screening constituted the soliciting of

genetic information as a condition of employment and that Plaintiff

had sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ conduct was intentional or

reckless. In that same Order, this Court also held that it has

subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) because

the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest

and costs, and is a class action in which some members of the class

are citizens of different states than the Defendants.

Meanwhile, on March 7, 2025, Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long

adopted the deadlines agreed upon in the Parties’ Joint Proposed

Discovery Schedule. See d/e 15, 17. Pursuant to the parties’

proposal, all fact discovery was to be completed by November 30,

2025; expert disclosures, reports, and depositions were due during

January through March 2026; and the deadline to file a motion for

class certification and any dispositive motions was May 15, 2026.

Further, by agreement of the parties, on April 30, 2025,

Magistrate Judge Long entered an Agreed Confidentiality Order,

Qualified Protective Order, and Electronically Stored Information

and Hard Copy Records Order (d/e 26).

On August 6-7, 2025, new counsel entered appearances on

Defendants’ behalf and prior counsel withdrew. See d/e 34, 35, 39.

MOTION TO DISMISS

The Court first considers the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Rule 11 Sanctions (d/e 49) and

accompanying Memorandum of Law (d/e 50) filed by Defendants on

August 28, 2025 because, if granted, the earlier-filed discovery

motions would become moot. Plaintiff filed her Response (d/e 53)

on September 11, 2025, to which Defendants filed a Reply (d/e 54)

on September 18, 2025.

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject

Jurisdiction is Denied.

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard

The standard that the Court applies to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion

to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the

purpose of the motion. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443–44 (7th Cir. 2009); United Phosphorus, Ltd.

v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc),

overruled on other grounds by Minn–Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683

F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). If a defendant challenges the sufficiency

of the allegations regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court

accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and will draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Apex Digital, 572

F.3d at 443–44; United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946. If, however,

the defendant denies or controverts the truth of the jurisdictional

allegations, the Court may look beyond the pleadings and view any

evidence submitted to determine if subject-matter jurisdiction

exists. See Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443–44; United

Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946.

When jurisdiction is in question, “the proponent of jurisdiction

has the burden of proof, but the burden applies only to contested

jurisdictional facts, which must be proven by a preponderance of

the evidence.” Irish v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2009 WL 276519, at *2 (W.D.

Wis. Feb. 4, 2009), citing Meridian v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 542

(7th Cir. 2006); see also Craig v. Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 876

(7th Cir. 2008). “[O]nce the proponent of jurisdiction has made a

good faith claim…, supported by uncontested factual allegations or

contested factual allegations that have been established in an

evidentiary hearing by admissible evidence, federal jurisdiction

follows unless the judge concludes that it is legally impossible for

the recovery to exceed the jurisdictional minimum.” Irish, 2009 WL

276519, at *2 (“Meridian Security Ins. concerned the amount in

dispute, but the holding of the case applies equally to the prediction

of class size, an element not present in the mine run diversity case

but critical to [jurisdiction] under the Class Action Fairness Act.”).

B. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants have raised the second type of jurisdictional

challenge. That is, Defendants ask that the Court not accept the

jurisdictional factual allegations in the Complaint as true and

instead require Plaintiff to present “summary judgment type

evidence” to support her allegation that jurisdiction exists under the

Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Licea v. Kontoor Brands, Inc.,

2023 WL 6162683, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2023) (“Plaintiff must

submit evidence—i.e., declarations, affidavits, or other summary-

judgment type evidence” to show that CAFA’s jurisdictional

threshold has been met).

CAFA “creat[es] federal subject matter jurisdiction if (1) a class

has 100 or more class members; (2) at least one class member is

diverse from at least one defendant (‘minimal diversity’); and (3)

there is more than $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs, in

controversy in the aggregate.” Sabrina Roppo v. Travelers Comm.

Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 568, 578 (7th Cir. 2017) (emphasis removed),

citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of

showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that jurisdiction

exists under CAFA. Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

assertion as to the number of class members and the existence of

diversity is based only a speculative belief. See Halim v. Charlotte

Tilbury Beauty Inc., 2023 WL 3388898, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 11,

2023) (holding that “speculation is not enough” to satisfy the

existence of subject-matter jurisdiction).

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s assertion that at least

100 class members exist is not actually supported by any

document(s) demonstrating that anyone other than Plaintiff was

subject to inquiry about their family members’ genetic information

when they applied for employment with Defendants.

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have any

evidence to identify that at least one class member is a citizen of a

state that is diverse from Defendants’ citizenship. See Dancel v.

Groupon, Inc., 940 F.3d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 2019).

C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-

Matter Jurisdiction is Denied because Plaintiff has

Presented Sufficient Evidence at this Stage that there

are 100 or More Class Members and that at Least One

Class Member is a Citizen of a State that is Diverse

from Defendants’ Citizenship.

In response to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff has met her

burden of producing evidence that 100 or more class members

exist.

Pursuant to the Complaint, the proposed class is defined as:

All individuals in Illinois who, within the applicable

limitations period [5 years]:

(i) applied for employment with Hospital Sisters Health

System or St. Francis Hospital, of the Hospital

Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, or were

employed by them; and

(ii) from whom Hospital Sisters Health System and St.

Francis Hospital, of the Hospital Sisters of the Third

Order of St. Francis, or its employees, agents,

assigns, contractors, or other third parties acting on

their behalf, requested, solicited, required, and/or

obtained genetic information, including family

medical history.

(d/e 1, ¶ 38).

Again, Defendants maintain that there are no documents or

other “summary judgment type evidence” that would support

Plaintiff’s allegation that any other individuals—much less at least

100 others—were asked about their genetic information, including

family medical history, when applying for employment with

Defendants.

Defendants are wrong. At this stage, prior to the close of

discovery, the following evidence supports Plaintiff’s allegations that

100 or more other employees or applicants for employment were

asked about their family medical history by Defendants:

• Defendant HSHS’s website clearly specifies they employ “more

than 11,000 colleagues” at their health centers and clinics;

• According to published industry research, hospital employee

turnover rates during the relevant time period ranged from 18

to 26 percent nationwide;

• A YouTube video from HSHS Medical Group1 included the

statement that “probably one of the first things we ask when a

patient comes to see us is there a family history of any of these

things…”;

• Discovery produced by Defendants to date included a policy

indicating that all candidates for employment with Defendant

1 In response to written discovery, Defendants identified HSHS

Medical Group as an entity to whom HSHS referred employees or

applicants for employment in Illinois for medical examinations.

(d/e 43-2, ¶¶ 3-4).

HSHS were required to be cleared with a pre-employment

health assessment including a pre-employment physical;

• Defendant HSHS’s website included a Code of Conduct

indicating that they collect information about family history,

as well as a commonly-used “Adult History & Physical

Examination Form” that included a section on family history;

• Defendants filed as an exhibit (d/e 36-3, p. 20) a document

not yet produced in discovery entitled “Screening Checklist for

Contraindications to Vaccines for Adults” and described by

Defendants as “the form sent to HSHS on each exam” of an

applicant for employment, which includes the following

question: “Do you have a parent, brother, or sister with an

immune system problem?”

In short, and contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff is

not relying on mere speculation. Based upon the foregoing

documentary evidence filed by Plaintiff in response to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff has established by a preponderance of

the evidence the following facts: Defendants employ over 11,000

employees, all candidates for employment have been required to

receive a pre-employment physical, Defendants referred employees

and applicants for employment in Illinois to HSHS Medical Group

for medical exams, HSHS Medical Group routinely asks patients

about family history, and at least one form sent to Defendant HSHS

on completion of an applicant’s exam includes a question regarding

whether the applicant’s immediate family members suffer from a

specific medical condition (an immune system problem).

These facts are sufficient, at this stage, to rebut Defendants’

arguments that Plaintiff has no evidence that 100 or more other

employees or applicants were asked for family medical history. See

Irish, 2009 WL 276519, at *4 (“At this point, the only question is

whether plaintiffs have shown that it is a legal certainty that this

jurisdictional requisite will not be met.”), citing Meridian Security

Ins., 441 F.3d at 541.

Likewise, at this stage Plaintiff has met her burden of proving

it is more likely true than not that at least one class member is

diverse from at least one defendant. Defendants are Illinois not-for-

profit corporations with the same registered address in Springfield,

Illinois.

Defendants point to Plaintiff’s written discovery response

indicating that she has not personally spoken to any person who is

a member of the proposed class. It follows, therefore, that Plaintiff

cannot at this stage identify a specific class member by name who

is a citizen of a state other than Illinois.

In response, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants are fully

aware that they employ Missouri citizens. In support thereof,

Plaintiff points to the following publicly-available evidence:

• LinkedIn pages for specific, named individuals who list their

home city as St. Louis, Missouri, and their employer as either

HSHS or St. Francis Hospital;

• A document from HSHS human resources indicating that

Defendants’ employees are within the “HSHS Select” health

plan network service area if their primary residence is within

one of 31 listed counties in Illinois or 5 counties in Missouri;

and

• An indeed.com search for jobs with “hshs” in St. Louis, MO,

returns multiple hospitals within commuting distance from

Missouri, including Defendant St. Francis Hospital and

HSHS’s St. Elizabeth Hospital.

Based on the foregoing evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff

has shown that it is more likely true than not that at least one

member of the proposed class is a Missouri citizen and therefore

diverse from Defendants. Plaintiff need not prove more at this

stage, prior to class certification or dispositive motions. That is,

Plaintiff need not establish that there is a specific Missouri (or other

diverse) citizen whose rights under GIPA were violated by

Defendants. See Boim v. American Muslims for Palestine, 9 F.4th

545, 557 (7th Cir. 2021) (“The Supreme Court has cautioned

against deciding merits questions when evaluating challenges to

jurisdiction.”), citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,

523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682

(holding that jurisdiction is not defeated by the possibility that the

Plaintiff may not actually recover on the cause of action alleged in

the complaint).

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is DENIED.

II. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions is Denied because

Plaintiff did not Violate Rule 11.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11(b) provides:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other

paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later

advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies

that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and

belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the

circumstances:

… (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support

after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or

discovery[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).

Defendants allege that Plaintiff, through Plaintiff’s counsel,

violated Rule 11(b)(3) because the factual allegations regarding

CAFA jurisdiction in Plaintiff’s Complaint do not have evidentiary

support and because Plaintiff’s counsel did not actually conduct a

reasonable inquiry prior to filing the Complaint. Defendants

therefore move for sanctions as provided under Rule 11(c).

Defendants’ Motion must be denied for two reasons. First, the

Motion does not comply with Rule 11(c)(2)’s requirement that “[a]

motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other

motion” because Defendants filed the request for Rule 11 sanctions

in the same filing as its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1).

Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint did not violate Rule 11(b)(3). As

with the request to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s belief that subject-matter exists

under CAFA is based upon mere speculation and is not based upon

facts supported by reasonable inquiry.

The Court has now rejected this argument when denying

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. As discussed above, Plaintiff has demonstrated that

her factual contentions regarding CAFA subject-matter jurisdiction

have evidentiary support. Moreover, much of the information that

Plaintiff has presented in support of jurisdiction was available upon

inquiry by her counsel prior to filing the Complaint via publicly-

available information on the internet and was not merely uncovered

during discovery in this case. Cf. Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., 388

F.3d 990, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The focus in Rule 11 sanctions is

on what counsel knew at the time the complaint was filed, not what

subsequently was revealed in discovery.”).

For these reasons, Defendants’ request for Rule 11 sanctions

must be DENIED.

DISCOVERY MOTIONS

I. Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery is Denied because

this Court has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.

The Court first considers the Motion to Stay (d/e 37), in which

Defendants requested a stay of discovery pending the resolution of

the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and accompanying request for Rule

11 sanctions filed by Defendants. The Court has now denied both

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and their request for Rule 11

sanctions. Therefore, the case will proceed with discovery, and the

Motion to Stay is MOOT.

II. Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel are Granted because

Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests are Proper Under the

Parties’ Joint Discovery Schedule and the Electronically

Stored Information and Hard Copy Records Order.

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants to

Participate in Class Discovery is Granted.

In Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants to Participate in

Class Discovery (d/e 29), Plaintiff asks that the Court compel

Defendants’ response to interrogatories number 10 and 11, request

for production 20, and other requests related to class certification.

Interrogatory 10 requests that Defendant HSHS “[i]dentify the

number of HSHS employees and applicants for employment with

HSHS in Illinois that submitted to a Medical Examination during

the Relevant period.” (d/e 29-1, p. 7 ¶ 10). Interrogatory 11

requests that Defendant HSHS “[i]dentify all individuals, including

HSHS employees and applicants for employment with HSHS, that

submitted to a Medical Examination in Illinois during Relevant

Period” and include each individual’s name, date of application

and/or employment, position held with HSHS, examining medical

provider, date of exam, reason for exam, and the specific health,

medical, or other genetic information requested. (d/e 29-1, p. 7-8 ¶

11).

Request for production 20 seeks “[a]ll documents and

communications relating to requests for health and/or medical

information (including family medical history) made to those

individuals other than Million identified in Interrogatory 10, above,

by any medical professional to whom such individual was referred

to by HSHS.” (d/e 29-1, p. 12 ¶ 20).

Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s interrogatories 10 and 11

and request for production 20 with the following identical objection:

“Defendants object to [Interrogatory/Request] as overbroad, and not

proportional to the needs of the case as the class has not been

certified.” (d/e 29-2, p. 9 ¶¶ 10-11, p. 15-16 ¶ 20).

Defendants’ objection—which is based upon the fact that the

class has not yet been certified—is not well-taken.

As indicated in the Background section, above, Magistrate

Judge Long entered an Order on March 7, 2025, adopting the

parties’ joint proposed deadlines. Those deadlines included one fact

discovery deadline on November 30, 2025, followed by expert

discovery deadlines throughout January, February, and March

2026, and a deadline to file a motion for class certification by May

15, 2026. That is, the parties agreed to one fact discovery deadline,

necessarily encompassing both merits-based and class-based

discovery. See, e.g., Hossfeld v. Allstate Co., 2021 WL 4819498, at

*3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2021) (“As an initial matter, [Defendant’s]

argument that [Plaintiff] should not be permitted to obtain

information relevant to his class claims at this time is without

merit. Merit and class fact discovery are not bifurcated in this case

and thus, there is only one fact stage of discovery….Given that the

Court has not bifurcated merits and class discovery, the fact that

the [document requested] is relevant to the class certification

inquiry or even to a later standing determination of which class

members have suffered a redressable injury does not make it

disproportional to the needs of the case or otherwise improper at

this time.”); See also Whiteamire Clinic, P.A. Inc. v. Quill Corp., 2013

WL 5348377, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2013).

Prior to class certification, “the scope of discovery must be

sufficiently broad to give the plaintiff a realistic opportunity to meet

the requirements of class certification” under Rule 23: numerosity,

common questions of law or fact, typicality, and adequacy of

representation. Gebka v. Allstate Corp., 2021 WL 825612, at *7

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2021) (collecting cases); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see

also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 354 n.20

(1978) (“We do not hold that class members’ names and addresses

never can be obtained under the discovery rules. There may be

instances where this information could be relevant to issues that

arise under Rule 23”—such as numerosity, common questions, and

adequacy of representation—“or where a party has reason to believe

that communication with some members of the class could yield

information bearing on these or other issues.”).

Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to responses by Defendants to

interrogatories number 10 and 11 and request for production 20 at

this stage of discovery, prior to class certification.

Further, to the extent that Defendants now object, in response

to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, that the requested discovery

“tramples on third-party privacy rights” (d/e 36, p. 2), those issues

were already addressed with entry of agreed-upon confidentiality

and qualified protective orders (d/e 26). If Defendants believe those

agreed orders entered by the Magistrate Judge are now insufficient,

Defendants may formally raise this issue with the Magistrate after

conferring with Plaintiff’s counsel in an attempt to agree upon a

proposed revised order.

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants to

Participate in Class Discovery is GRANTED.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants to Produce

ESI Information is Granted.

Finally, in Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants to Produce

ESI Information (d/e 43), Plaintiff asks that this Court order

Defendants to:

1. Provide Defendants’ proposed search terms and search term

hit reports;

2. Disclose the ESI Sources it has searched to date, including

Custodial and Non-Custodial Data Sources as those terms are

defined in the ESI Protocol (ECF No. 26);

3. Provide the date range of the search;

4. Provide any other method of limitation being used by

Defendants to cull responsive data;

5. Meet and confer with counsel for Plaintiff regarding this

information; and

6. Pay Plaintiff’s reasonable expenses and attorney fees

incurred in bringing this Motion.

(d/e 43-6, p. 1-2; see also d/e 43, p. 6-7).

As already summarized, the Magistrate Judge entered an

Electronically Stored Information and Hard Copy Records Order on

April 30, 2025, pursuant to the parties’ joint agreements regarding

discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”). (d/e 26, p. 30-

50). That Order governs the production of documents by the

parties during discovery in this matter and provides, in relevant

part:

To achieve proportional and cost-effective discovery, the

Parties agree that limitations on the scope of the search (e.g.,

time frames, Document types, keywords, etc.) may be

employed by the Parties to reasonably cull out non-responsive

information. If Search Terms are used, the Producing Party

will disclose those Search Terms to the Requesting Party. If the

Requesting Party in good faith believes additional Search

Terms are likely to yield additional unique, relevant

information, the Requesting Party may propose additional

Search Terms. In that event, the Parties agree to meet and

confer about the anticipated benefits and burdens of those

additional proposed Search Terms. If disputed terms still exist

at the end of the meet and confer process, the Parties will

submit those terms to the Court in the form of a joint

discovery letter with a discussion of the relevance and/or

burden associated with those Search Terms. If some other

method of limitation is used to cull responsive data, the

Producing Party will disclose the method to the Requesting

Party.

(d/e 26, p. 46 § 5 ¶ 1).

According to the Motion to Compel filed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff

received Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s requests for production

of documents on May 9, 2025. Plaintiff sent Defendants a letter on

June 9, 2025, indicating that Defendants’ produced documents had

included no emails or other internal or external electronic

communications. On its face, it appeared implausible to Plaintiff

that no responsive emails or other ESI could exist. Plaintiff then

proposed:

Regarding the [requested] Class Discovery and ESI Production,

we are willing to work with you to create a set of initial search

terms, list of custodians, and list of databases to search in

relation to our Requests for Production. This will allow us to

start the iterative process necessary to ensure proportional

discovery in this case. See Rayome v. ABT Elecs. Inc., 2024 WL

4296755, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2024) (“The quality control

measures that Parties may consider to address these

limitations include, among other things, sampling and testing

the search terms to determine whether they are actually

returning relevant documents….These iterative measures,

together with the sharing of responsive metrics corresponding

to the sampled and reviewed documents, can help Parties

identify responsive ESI in a more proportional manner.”). This

process follows what we agreed to in the ESI Protocol entered

in this litigation. See ECF #26. Specifically, Section V of the

ESI Protocol governs the custodians and search methodology

for ESI.

(d/e 43-3, p. 3).

On June 26, 2025, the parties engaged in a meet-and-confer

about discovery, including the lack of ESI in Defendants’ initial

production and discussed Defendants’ ongoing efforts to search

emails and texts, as well as other databases, using relevant search

terms. Defendants agreed to identify search terms and ESI sources

used in producing additional responsive documents. On July 25,

2025, the parties again met and conferred and Defendants agreed

to make their best effort to disclose search term reports and ESI

sources before the next scheduled meet-and-confer on August 1,

2025 (which was later moved to August 5, 2025, at Defendants’

request).

On August 5, 2025, Plaintiff was notified that Defendants’

counsel would be withdrawing and that Plaintiff’s counsel should

meet and confer with new counsel regarding the foregoing discovery

issues. However, prior to any opportunity for further meet-and-

confer, Defendants filed a Motion to Stay Discovery the following

day.

Defendants do not dispute the foregoing chronology in their

response to Plaintiff’s Motion. Instead, Defendants: (1) repeat their

argument that Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) argue that Plaintiff failed to properly

meet and confer before filing her Motion to Compel; and (3) assert

that the information that Plaintiff is requesting is not contemplated

by the ESI Order.

Defendants’ first two arguments are baseless. The Court has

already rejected Defendants’ argument as to subject-matter

jurisdiction. Further, the undisputed chronology indicates that

Plaintiff did comply with the required meet and confer obligations

before filing the instant Motion to Compel. The Court cannot

reasonably require Plaintiff to have attempted further meetings

when Defendants did not participate in the scheduled August 5,

2025, conference and instead filed a Motion to Stay Discovery

altogether.

Turning to Defendants’ final argument regarding the scope of

the ESI Order, Defendants argue that they were required to disclose

only: “(1) search terms if search terms were used; and (2) any

limited method used to cull responsive data if such a method was

used.” (d/e 51, p. 2 (emphasis added by Defendants)). As such,

Defendants assert that they were not required to conduct a search

for responsive documents in any particular manner, nor were they

required to disclose “information related to search term hit reports,

databases, custodians, or date ranges.” Id.

Defendants’ interpretation of the ESI Order is not a reasonable

understanding of the requirements under that Order.

With respect to Defendants’ argument that the ESI Order did

not require the search of ESI to be conducted in any particular

manner and only required Defendants to disclose search terms if

any were actually used, the ESI Order plainly directed that the

parties meet and confer if the party requesting production has a

“good faith belie[f] [that] additional Search Terms are likely to yield

additional unique, relevant information[.]” (d/e 26, p. 46).

Defendants may not simply assert that they did not use any search

terms2 when identifying and producing responsive documents and

2 Further, Defendants have already admitted that while their

“search for responsive documents…has been largely manual[,]”

“search terms [have] be[en] used in a limited fashion.” (d/e 51-6, p.

1). Therefore, search terms were used to produce responsive

documents and those search terms must be disclosed pursuant to

the plain language of the ESI Order.

then opt out of all future discussions of relevant search terms

proposed in good faith by Plaintiff.

As for Defendants’ position that they were not required to

provide information related to search term hit reports, databases,

custodians, or date ranges, that information falls within the “other

method[s] of limitation used to cull responsive data” that is required

to be disclosed under the ESI order. Applying a plain language

interpretation, a decision to search for ESI in only certain databases

or within the control of a particular custodian would constitute a

“method of limitation” in searching for responsive data, as would

applying a date range to the possible results.

In sum, Defendants have not complied with their discovery

obligations under the Court’s ESI Order. Defendants have not

disclosed the methods of limitation used to identify relevant ESI

(including databases, custodians, and date ranges) and have not

met and conferred in good faith with Plaintiff’s counsel to identify

additional search terms likely to produce responsive documents.

Under the plain language of the ESI Order, Defendants must do so.

Further, under Rule 37(a)(5)(A), the Court must order

Defendants to pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and other reasonable

expenses incurred in making this Motion because (i) Plaintiff did

attempt in good faith to obtain the discovery without Court action,

(ii) Defendants’ nondisclosure, response, or objection was not

substantially justified, and (iii) no other circumstances make an

award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants to Produce

ESI Information is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

Defendants to Participate in Class Discovery (d/e 29) is GRANTED;

Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (d/e 37) is DENIED as MOOT;

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants to Produce ESI Information

(d/e 43) is GRANTED; and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction and Rule 11 Sanctions (d/e 49) is DENIED.

Plaintiff is DIRECTED to submit an affidavit setting forth her

reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees within 7 days of this Order.

This case is referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further

management of discovery, including resetting the fact discovery

deadline currently set for November 30, 2025.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: November 7, 2025.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE