Baptist

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

________________________________________

EZRA BAPTIST, JULIET PEARCE, MARGARET

LEWIS, JAMIE SANIN, CAROLYN LECHUSZA

AQUALLO, and CHELSEA VILLALBA, on their

own and on behalf of a class of similarly situated

individuals who suffered excessive force during their

unlawful arrests, and MICHELLE RIDDELL, on her

own and on behalf of a class of similarly situated

individuals unlawfully arrested,

Plaintiffs,

v. 1:24-cv-1478 (AMN/TWD)

DARRELL P. WHEELER in his individual capacity,

SHERIFF JUAN FIGUEROA, in his individual

capacity, OLIVIA BACHOR and THOMAS

BRUSCA, as representatives of a defendant class of

New York State Police Officers who violated

plaintiff’s rights as set forth herein and who are sued

in their individual capacities, DEPUTY SHERIFF

HARDER, as a representative of a defendant class of

members of the Ulster County Sheriff’s Office who

violated plaintiff’s rights as set forth herein and who

are sued in their individual capacities, PO J.

YUKOWEIC, Shield No. 16, as a representative of

the class of members of the New Paltz State

University Police who violated plaintiffs’ rights as

set forth herein and are sued in their individual

capacities,

Defendants.

_________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

SUSSMAN, WATKINS LAW FIRM MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, ESQ.

1 Railroad Avenue

P.O. Box 1005

Goshen, New York 10924

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SOKOLOFF STERN LLP KIMBERLY H. LEE, ESQ.

63 Washington Street

P.O. Box 509

Poughkeepsie, NY 12602

179 Westbury Avenue MARK A. RADI, ESQ.

Carle Place, NY 11514

Attorneys for Defendants Sheriff Juan Figueroa

and Sgt. James Harcher, s/h/a Deputy Sheriff

Harder

Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 5, 2024, Plaintiffs Ezra Baptist, Juliet Pearce, Margaret Lewis, Jamie Sanin,

Carolyn Lechusza Aquallo, Chelsea Villalba, and Michelle Riddell (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of a putative class of individuals.

Plaintiffs sue President Darrell P. Wheeler of the State University of New York at New Paltz

(“SUNY New Paltz”) and Ulster County Sheriff Juan P. Figueroa in their individual capacities, as

well as New York State Police Officers Olivia Bachor and Thomas Brusca, “Deputy Sheriff

Harder” of the Ulster County Sheriff’s Office, and New Paltz State University Police Officer Po

J. Yukoweic in their individual capacities and as representatives of putative defendant classes of

officers. In their amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”), Plaintiffs allege that the defendants

violated their constitutional rights through actions taken in response to a protest at SUNY New

Paltz on May 2, 2024. See generally Dkt. No. 9.

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by Defendants Sheriff Figueroa

and Sgt. James Harcher (collectively “Defendants”) for failure to state a claim on which relief can

be granted (the “Motion”).1 See Dkt. Nos. 29, 31, 33; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion in part and grants it in part.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Overview

Plaintiffs allege that on May 2, 2024, they were peacefully protesting “the atrocities

committed by the Israeli government with the active military support of the United States” at

SUNY New Paltz. Dkt. No. 9 at 1-2. Plaintiffs further allege that the defendants responded to the

demonstration by using hostile, violent, and aggressive tactics with the intent of suppressing

Plaintiffs’ speech, thereby violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Id.

B. The Parties

Plaintiffs are a group of SUNY New Paltz students and members of the local community.

Plaintiff Ezra Baptist is an undergraduate student at SUNY New Paltz. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff Juliet

Pearce is a recent graduate of SUNY New Paltz. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff Margaret Lewis is a resident

of the town of New Paltz. Id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff Jamie Sanin is a graduate of SUNY New Paltz and

a “community member.” Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff Carolyn Lechusza Aquallo is a musician and educator

and a resident of Kingston, New York. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff Chelsea Villalba is a community social

worker, a local human rights advocacy group member, and a resident of Kingston, New York. Id.

1 Defendants assert that “[t]here is no Deputy Harder employed by the Sheriff’s Office, but there

is an Officer Harder employed by the State Police who, upon information and belief, was present

during the subject events. Sgt. James Harcher is employed by the Sheriff’s Office.” Dkt. No. 29-

3 at 7, n.1. The Motion then seeks the dismissal of Harcher and Plaintiffs respond with respect to

Harcher, not Harder. Therefore, the Court for now assumes that Defendant “Deputy Sheriff

Harder” refers to Sgt. James Harcher.

at ¶ 6. Plaintiff Michelle Riddell is a special education teacher. Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiffs Baptist,

Pearce, Lewis, Sanin, Lechusza Aquallo, and Villalba bring this suit on behalf of a putative class

comprising “similarly situated individuals who suffered excessive force during their unlawful

arrests[.]” Plaintiff Riddell brings suit on behalf of a putative class comprising “similarly situated

individuals unlawfully arrested[.]” Id. at 1.

At all relevant times, Defendant Juan Figueroa was the Sheriff of Ulster County, id. at ¶ 9,

and Defendant James Harcher was a member of the Ulster County Sheriff’s Office, id. at ¶ 11.

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Harcher represents a class of “members of the Ulster County

Sheriff’s Office who violated [P]laintiffs’ rights” on May 2, 2024. Id. at ¶ 11.

C. Events of May 1-2, 2024

On May 1, 2024, SUNY New Paltz students and community members, including Plaintiffs

(collectively, the “demonstrators”), erected a tent encampment on Parker Quad, an outdoor lawn

on campus, “to protest the ongoing genocide in Gaza and demand SUNY New Paltz divest from

entities profiting from this violence.” Id. at ¶¶ 15, 18, 19. Plaintiffs allege that law enforcement

officers, campus officials, and the New Paltz Village Deputy Mayor advised encampment members

that tent camping was not permitted on SUNY New Paltz property, admonished students to remove

their tents, and warned of “potential police action.” Id. at ¶¶ 21, 23, 27, 30, 34-36.

Plaintiffs allege that on May 2, 2024, encampment members had removed all tents by about

6:30 pm. Id. at ¶¶ 20-37. Plaintiffs further allege that “[a]t about 7:15 pm,” University officials

“returned, acknowledged that the students had removed their tents, and, without providing

justification, instructed them to disperse by 9:00 pm.” Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiffs then contend that the

demonstrators did not leave but “engaged in peaceful protest” by interlocking their arms and legs

on the ground in a circle in the middle of Parker Quad, “chanting protest songs and reviewing

safety steps in case of police violence.” Id. at ¶¶ 47, 43-44.

The Amended Complaint then states that around 9:30 pm, “more than 15 police vehicles

from the New York State Police and Ulster County Sheriff’s Office, accompanied by at least 30

officers on foot, advanced toward Parker Quad.” Id. at ¶¶ 52-53. Plaintiffs allege that law

enforcement directed this response from “a joint command center involving SUNY New Paltz

University Police, New York State Police, Ulster County Sheriff’s Office deputies and members

of the New Paltz Police Department[]”. Id. Around 10:03 pm, an unidentified officer issued a

dispersal order via loudspeaker from one of the patrol vehicles, declared the demonstrators’

gathering unlawful, and gave demonstrators ten minutes to vacate Parker Quad. Id. at ¶ 54.

Plaintiffs allege that the order was “barely audible” because demonstrators were chanting and

“surveillance drones and helicopters” were “circling overhead[.]” Id. Plaintiffs also allege that

law enforcement issued two additional dispersal warnings at 10:18 and 10:28 pm. Id. at ¶ 55.

Plaintiffs allege that around 10:20 pm, law enforcement officers, including Ulster County

Sheriff’s Office members, “lined up outside Gage Hall” wearing riot gear and accompanied by K-

9 units. Id. at ¶ 59. Subsequently, at about 10:30 pm, the officers “stormed the former encampment

area, tearing down and trampling the demonstrators’ banners, which contained constitutionally

protected speech.” Id. at ¶ 60. The officers “moved in a tight, coordinated formation” and

“surrounded seated demonstrators, shined flashlights in their faces, and systematically removed

them while they continued chanting.” Id. at ¶¶ 62-63. Working with other law enforcement

officers and “directed by a commanding officer,” Ulster County Sheriff’s Office members “would

create openings in their line, through which teams of two to five [officers] would rush forward”

and “grab demonstrators by their arms, legs, or clothing,” “drag them several feet behind the police

line[,]” close the gap in the line and re-form ranks. Id. at ¶¶ 64-65.

Plaintiffs also allege specific instances in which officers removed or arrested

demonstrators. Unidentified officers threw Plaintiff Baptist headfirst into a pallet, causing “a deep

gash in his scalp that bled heavily[,]” and then dragged him across the ground by his arms and

handcuffed him. Id. at ¶ 66a. Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that unidentified officers

dragged Plaintiffs Baptist, Villalba, and Pearce by their limbs, inappropriately touched Plaintiffs

Villalba and Lechusza Aquallo’s breasts, forced Plaintiffs Villalba, Lechusza Aquallo, and Lewis

onto their stomachs, and tightly handcuffed Plaintiffs Sanin and Lechusza Aquallo’s wrists with

zip-ties, causing them pain. Id. at ¶¶ 66a-f, 75-76. Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Baptist did not

receive medical attention for more than an hour; after he was processed at the Highland Barracks,

he received several staples to close his head wound. Id. at ¶¶ 66a, 87-88. Plaintiff Lewis, who

was in her 80s and had been separated from her cane by unidentified officers, “collapsed and was

transported by ambulance for emergency medical care.” Id. at ¶¶ 66f, 84. In sum, Plaintiffs allege

that 170 law enforcement members “arrested over 130 demonstrators . . . for trespassing and/or

engaging in ‘disorderly conduct’ while they peacefully assembled to express their views on public

property.” Id. at ¶¶ 94, 102.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Figueroa “personally ordered . . . Ulster County Sheriff

deputies to unlawfully disperse and arrest” Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiffs also allege that

Defendant Wheeler acted “in opposition to the ‘anti-genocide’ message that plaintiffs promoted,”

and that Defendant Figueroa “supported” Wheeler’s use of law enforcement to “stifle plaintiffs’

exercise of their rights of assembly and free speech.” Id. at ¶¶ 46, 57.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a party’s claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2007).

In considering legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint

and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund,

Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). This presumption, however, does not extend to legal

conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the

claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to

relief,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (alteration in original) (quotation

omitted). Under this standard, a pleading’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are

“plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, “when

the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line

from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed,” id. at 570.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert four causes of action against Defendants: First Amendment retaliation,

Fourth Amendment excessive force, Fourth Amendment false arrest, and Fourth Amendment

unlawful seizure. Id. at ¶¶ 112-115. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not adequately pled

that Defendant Figueroa or Defendant Harcher were personally involved in any of the alleged

constitutional violations. Dkt. No. 29-3 at 11.

“[I]t is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit

brought under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Morabito v. New York, 803 Fed. App’x

463, 466 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013)).

“Pursuant to this requirement, a Section 1983 plaintiff must allege a tangible connection between

the acts of the defendant and the injuries suffered.” Keyes v. Venettozzi, No. 9:18-CV-0372

(GTS/DJS), 2022 WL 991402, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (quotation and internal quotation

marks omitted). In other words, “the actions or omissions attributable to each defendant must be

the proximate cause of the injuries and consequent damages that the plaintiff sustained.” Durr v.

Slator, 558 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (N.D.N.Y 2021) (citations omitted).

While supervisory liability is not permitted under Section 1983, a defendant “need not

actually ‘pull the trigger,’ or use force themselves, to be liable . . . as a direct participant.” Figuereo

v. City of Saratoga Springs, No. 1:23-cv-00922 (AMN/PJE), 2025 WL 460784, at *9 (N.D.N.Y

Feb. 11, 2025). “A defendant who plans or directs an unreasonable use of force is liable for the

resulting constitutional violation as a ‘direct participant.’” Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 234

(2d Cir. 2014). “In this Circuit, a ‘direct participant’ includes a person who authorizes, orders, or

helps others to do the unlawful acts, even if he or she does not commit the acts personally.” Id.;

see also Campbell v. City of Yonkers, 19 CV 2117 (VB), 2023 WL 4867459, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July

31, 2023).

The Court considers Defendants’ contentions as to their lack of personal involvement with

respect to each of Plaintiffs’ claims.

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

“To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has a right

protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated or substantially

caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions caused him some injury.”

Dorsett v. Cnty. of Nassau, 732 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2013). As to the second element, because a

defendant’s motive and intent are difficult to plead with specificity, courts in this Circuit have

found it “sufficient to allege facts from which a retaliatory intent . . . reasonably may be inferred.”

Gagliard v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Case v. City of New York,

233 F. Supp. 3d 372, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). “With respect to the third element, the plaintiff[]

[generally] must show that [his] First Amendment rights were ‘actually chilled.’” Searle v. Red

Creek Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 22-2049-cv, 2023 WL 3398137, at *2 (2d Cir. May 12, 2023)

(summary order) (quoting Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001)). But a

plaintiff may instead show some other concrete, non-speech related harm. Dorsett, 732 F.3d at

160. Finally, when the alleged retaliation takes the form of an arrest, a plaintiff must also plead

the absence of probable cause. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019).

1. Defendant Figueroa

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory, and that Plaintiffs fail to

adequately allege that Defendant Figuroa personally violated any Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Dkt. No. 29-3 at 11. Specifically, Defendants assert: “Plaintiffs do not allege that Sheriff Figueroa

personally participated in any arrest or took any retaliatory action against any Plaintiff or purported

class member. Nor do Plaintiffs allege facts plausibly suggesting Sheriff Figueroa’s actions were

motivated by Plaintiffs’ exercise of any First Amendment rights, or that Sheriff Figueroa caused

injury to any plaintiff.” Id.

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations plausible. To sufficiently plead that Defendant

Figueroa was personally involved in First Amendment retaliation, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege

that his actions were “motivated or substantially caused” by Plaintiffs’ exercise of their first

Amendment rights and that his actions caused Plaintiffs some injury. Dorsett, 732 F.3d at 160.

Here, Plaintiffs have done so by alleging that Defendant Figueroa personally ordered officers to

disperse and arrest lawful demonstrators and did so to “stifle” their rights to free speech and

assembly, resulting in the end of the demonstration as well as physical injuries to some

demonstrators. See Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 9, 46, 57, 66a, 90, 108; see also Torreso, 764 F.3d at 234.

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim

against Defendant Figueroa.

2. Defendant Harcher

Plaintiffs’ specific allegations against Defendant Harcher concern one arrest at the

demonstration. After alleging that Defendant Harcher participated in the removal of demonstrators

from the Quad, see Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 11, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Harcher was personally

involved in the arrest of Plaintiff Riddell, id. at ¶ 66g. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant

Harcher was part of a group of officers who approached Plaintiff Riddell to arrest her. Id. at ¶

66(g). After Plaintiff Riddell pled with them not to handcuff her behind the back because she had

a broken arm, the officers, including Defendant Harcher, handcuffed her in the front and led her

away. Id. “[T]hereafter defendant Harder [sic] was identified as the arresting officer.” Id.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege a First Amendment claim against Defendant

Harcher because they “do not allege Sgt. Harcher interacted with any other individual, and they

failed to allege Riddell was actually engaged in any First Amendment-protected activity, an

absence of probable cause to arrest for trespassing (the complaint does not allege she was a student

or employee entitled to be on campus after 10:00 p.m.), or that Sgt. Harcher’s actions were

motivated by Plaintiffs’ exercise of any First Amendment right.” Dkt. No. 29-3 at 11.

The Court finds Defendants’ arguments unavailing. Viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Plaintiff Riddell gathered with a group of peaceful

and lawful demonstrators, see Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 39, and her presence among that group is an activity

protected by the First Amendment.2 Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that Defendant Harcher

arrested her without cause, and it is reasonable to infer that this arrest was motivated or

substantially caused in part by the exercise of her First Amendment rights, i.e., her connection to

and presence among the group of demonstrators. See id. at ¶¶ 7, 54, 66g. At this stage, these

allegations are sufficient for Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed.3

Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim

against Defendant Harcher.

2 Defendants point out that the Amended Complaint specifically alleges that Plaintiffs Baptist and

Pearce were “engaging in peaceful protest,” but as to the other Plaintiffs it merely alleges that they

were lawfully present. Dkt. No. 29-3 at 7; see Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 1-7. Reading the Complaint in the

light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court infers that Plaintiffs allege that those Plaintiffs not

specifically described as engaging in protest, including Plaintiff Riddell, were at the very least part

of the same First Amendment assembly as Plaintiffs Baptist and Pearce. See, e.g., Marom v. City

of New York, 15-cv-2017 (PKC), 2016 WL 916424, at *10 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 7, 2016) (holding that

“[i]t is plausible to conclude that an individual [who] chooses to physically associate with [a rally

intended to convey a particularized message of political support] was engaging in expressive

conduct protected by the First Amendment” even when that individual only alleged that she was

present).

3 As discussed further in Section C.2, Plaintiffs need not plead more to show a plausible lack of

probable cause.

B. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claims

When assessing whether force is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a court

should pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.’” Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). In doing so, a court takes the perspective of “a reasonable officer on the

scene” rather than that of hindsight. Brown v. City of New York, 798 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015)

(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).

The Supreme Court’s “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right

to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of

physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “The police are not

required to utilize the least amount of force possible to place someone into custody.” Brennan v.

City of Middletown, No. 18 Civ. 6148, 2020 WL 3820195, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2020).

“Moreover, to support an excessive force claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used

more than de minimis force.” Durr, 558 F. Supp. 3d at 16 (citing Feliciano v. Thomann, 747 Fed.

App’x 885, 887 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Even conduct that caused some physical pain and resulted in

side effects need not be compensated if a jury finds that such injuries were de minimis.” Id. (citing

Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 123 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, regardless of the amount

of force, “a show of force by an officer that is overly disproportionate to the risk of harm may

support a claim for excessive force.” Id. (citing Gersbacher v. City of New York, No. 1:14-cv-

7600, 2017 WL 4402538, *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2017)).

In the arrest context, “unnecessary handcuff tightening . . . can constitute excessive force.”

Ketcham v. City of Mount Vernon, 992 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2021). This standard includes

handcuffs that are “overly tight.” Burdick v. Oswego Cnty., 2014 WL 12781320, at *9 (N.D.N.Y.

Mar. 31, 2014). A plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim, however, need not mechanically

plead a certain level of handcuff tightness. See Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604, 613 (2d

Cir. 2019). Rather, a court asks “more broadly whether an officer reasonably should have known

during handcuffing that his use of force was excessive. A plaintiff satisfies this requirement if

either the unreasonableness of the force used was apparent under the circumstances, or the plaintiff

signaled her distress, verbally or otherwise, such that a reasonable officer would have been aware

of her pain, or both.” Id.

Excessive force claims are intensely fact specific and often not amenable to early

resolution. Jimenez v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 23-CV-9476 (AMD) (RLM), 2025 WL 948348, at *15

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025). Indeed, “in the arrest context, the reasonableness of the force used is

often a jury question.” Oakley v. Dolan, 980 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2020).

1. Defendant Figueroa

Plaintiffs plausibly allege instances in which multiple officers used excessive force. For

example, Plaintiffs allege that “two unidentified male officers” threw Plaintiff Baptist “headfirst

into a pallet stacked with water bottles and food supplies,” “resulting in a deep gash in his scalp

that bled heavily.” Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 66a. Plaintiffs also allege at least four specific instances in

which unidentified officers handcuffed demonstrators too tightly, resulting in pain. Id. at ¶¶ 66c,

66d, 68b, 87. With respect to Defendant Figueroa, Plaintiffs allege that he personally ordered

officers to disperse the protest and arrest lawful demonstrators. Id. at ¶ 9. As such, the Court finds

that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that Defendant Figueroa was personally involved in the

deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights through the use of excessive force.

2. Defendant Harcher

As the Court has noted, Plaintiff Riddell’s arrest is the only specific incident in which

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Harcher was involved. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’

allegations concerning Plaintiff Riddell’s arrest fail to state a claim for excessive force. Dkt. No.

29-3 at 13. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint describes Riddell’s arrest in detail,

but in contrast with other arrest allegations, Plaintiffs make no mention of officers using more than

de minimis force, nor do they allege that officers handcuffed Riddell in a manner that was overly

tight. AC at ¶ 66g. At no point do Plaintiffs allege that Riddell complained of pain while in

handcuffs nor do they describe instances in which Defendant Harcher used any force, let alone

excessive force. Id. In fact, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Harcher and the other officers

accommodated Plaintiff Riddell’s request to be handcuffed in front because of her previously

broken arm. Id. Indeed, Plaintiff Riddell, unlike the other Plaintiffs, does not bring an excessive

force claim. See Dkt. No. 9 at 1 (caption).

Plaintiffs fail to respond directly to Defendants’ argument, seeking instead to restyle their

claim against Defendant Harcher as a Fourth Amendment violation for failure to intervene in a use

of excessive force. Dkt. No. 31 at 25. The Amended Complaint does not list failure to intervene

as one of Plaintiffs’ four causes of action, and the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ one allegation that

all moving and non-moving defendants failed to intervene is conclusory; it lacks sufficient factual

detail concerning a failure to intervene in any particular use of excessive force or any individual’s

personal involvement. See Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 109, 111-15.

Because Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege Defendant Harcher’s use of excessive

force, the Court dismisses this claim against Defendant Harcher. See Acevedo v. Ross, No. 18-

CV-06140 (JMA) (AKT), 2019 WL 343246, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019) (“Plaintiff’s bare

allegation that he was handcuffed is insufficient to constitute excessive force that is prohibited by

the Fourth Amendment.”).4

C. Fourth Amendment False Arrest Claims

To state a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) a defendant

intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff

did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Adams

v. City of New York, No. 21-CV03956, 2023 WL 2734611, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023) (citations

omitted). A confinement is “privileged” if it is based on “probable cause.” See, e.g., Simpson v.

City of New York., 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2015). “A police officer has probable cause to arrest

when he has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has

committed or is committing a crime.” Hulett v. City of Syracuse, 253 F. Supp. 3d 462, 494

(N.D.N.Y. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “However, when an arrest is made

without a judicial warrant, the existence of probable cause is an affirmative defense, for which

defendants bear the burden of proof.” White v. Cnty. of Dutchess, No. 15 CV 8744 (VB), 2016

4 The Court notes that to the extent that Plaintiffs intended for Defendant Harcher to serve as a

named representative for the defendant class of Ulster County Sheriff’s Office members who

allegedly engaged in excessive force, the dismissal of the claim of excessive force against him

prevents him from serving in such a capacity. See, e.g., Mental Disability L. Clinic v. Hogan, No.

CV-06-6320 (CPS)(JO), 2008 WL 4104460, at *21 n. 32 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2008) (declining,

after dismissing defendant, to certify a defendant class because defendant could no longer serve as

adequate class representative).

WL 4449720, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016) (citing Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 751

(2d Cir. 2010)).

1. Defendant Figueroa

Plaintiffs allege numerous instances that satisfy the first three elements of a false arrest

claim. See Dkt No. 9 at ¶¶ 66a-g, 68b, 72. As to the fourth element, Plaintiffs allege that they

were assembled lawfully and were not committing any crimes when officers arrested them and

other members of the putative class. See id. at ¶¶ 45, 94, 115. Plaintiffs also argue that there were

no laws or regulations that prohibited their activities at the time of the arrests, and that all arrests

were made without probable cause. Id. at ¶ 115; Dkt. No. 31 at 20 n. 2.

The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that Defendant Figueroa was

personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights via false arrest. As

above, Plaintiffs allege that he personally ordered officers to disperse the protest and arrest lawful

demonstrators. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 9.

Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest

against Defendant Figueroa.

2. Defendant Harcher

Defendants raise two separate grounds on which the allegation of false arrest against

Defendant Harcher should be dismissed. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ false arrest

allegations against Defendant Harcher rely on impermissible group pleading. Second, Defendants

raise the affirmative defense of probable cause.

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ account of Plaintiff Riddell’s arrest engages in

impermissible group pleading and therefore does not specifically allege that Defendant Harcher

was personally involved in any act constituting false arrest. Dkt. No. 29-3 at 15. However,

Defendants misapply the prohibition on group pleading. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs

frequently attribute alleged violations to both individual officers and groups of unidentified

officers, but such attributions are not impermissible group pleading. In cases involving alleged

police misconduct, courts give particular attention to the factual context to determine whether the

pleadings have met the requirements for adequate notice. See Bryant v. Monroe Cnty., No. 19-CV-

6474, 2022 WL 119184, at *11-12 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2022) (collecting and applying cases). “In

situations involving an alleged assault by a group of police officers or corrections officers, courts

do not insist that the complaint set forth in detail the actions of each officer where it would be

unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to be able to do so.” Id. at *10.

This case is one such situation. Plaintiffs allege that about 170 officers from multiple

jurisdictions were present at the protest. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 52, 102; Dkt. No. 31 at 11. When law

enforcement dispersed the protest, Plaintiffs allege various incidents in which mostly unidentified

officers “shined flashlights in their faces,” “moved in a tight, coordinated formation,” “jabbed” at

demonstrators with batons, and chased and grabbed demonstrators from behind, among other

actions. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 62, 63, 68, 71. Given these allegations of a chaotic scene, “[i]t would be

asking too much for an arrestee to remember and plead the role each of several police officers

played” in this alleged instance of false arrest. Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F. Supp. 116 (E.D.N.Y.

1994).

The Court finds that even though Plaintiffs identify Defendant Harcher as one of a group

of arresting officers, they sufficiently allege that he was “involved in the alleged constitutional

deprivations, and how [he was] involved.” Little v. Soulia, 9:19-CV-0263 (TJM/TWD), 2019 WL

13378467, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2019). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Harcher

violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights because he (1) participated in the dispersal of

lawful demonstrators; and (2) arrested Plaintiff Riddell without cause. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 11, 66g;

see also Dkt. No. 31 at 18. Defendant Harcher has thus received fair notice of Plaintiffs’ claims

and the grounds on which they rest. See Atahuene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d. Cir.

2001).

Second, as to probable cause, Defendants argue that “[t]he complaint fails to allege . . . that

there was no probable cause to arrest [Riddell] for trespassing.” Dkt. No. 29 at 15. However, at

this stage, Plaintiffs do not need to preemptively refute all possible assertions of probable cause

through their pleadings but need only plead facts sufficient to show a plausible lack of probable

cause.5 In this Circuit, that standard is satisfied where a plaintiff, as here, alleges a warrantless

arrest. Vincent, 2018 WL 1441370, at *9 (“Because of the presumption that a warrantless arrest is

unlawful, plaintiffs are not required to allege a lack of probable cause when stating a false arrest

claim based on such an arrest.” (citing Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458 (1975))); White,

2016 WL4449720, at *7 (“Because probable cause is an affirmative defense when a plaintiff is

arrested without a warrant, here, plaintiff’s warrantless arrest is sufficient to meet the fourth

element at the motion to dismiss stage.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendant Harcher

was personally involved in the false arrest of Plaintiff Riddell. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant

Harcher, along with other officers, intended to confine Plaintiff Riddell and that Plaintiff Riddell

was conscious of the confinement. Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 66g. Viewing the allegations in the light most

5 At this stage, to successfully raise a probable cause defense, Defendants would need to show that

the Amended Complaint alleges facts giving rise to probable cause or arguable probable cause as

a matter of law. Here, Defendants merely argue that Plaintiffs inadequately refute the possibility

of probable cause. See, e.g., Vincent v. Winski, No. 14-CV-7744 (VSB), 2018 WL 1441370, at *9

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018) (holding that defendant’s argument that probable cause existed to

effectuate plaintiff’s arrests failed on motion to dismiss because plaintiff’s complaint did not allege

facts demonstrating probable cause).

favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court infers that Plaintiff Riddell, despite negotiating to be handcuffed

in front rather than behind her back, did not consent to the confinement. See id. Finally, Plaintiffs

allege that all arrests described in the Amended Complaint were warrantless and made without

probable cause—assumed true, Riddell’s confinement was not privileged. See Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 115.

The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest

against Defendant Harcher.

D. Fourth Amendment Seizure of Persons

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest and seizure of their persons under

the Fourth Amendment are duplicative. Dkt. No. 29-3 at 16; see Dkt. No. 9 at ¶¶ 113, 115.

Plaintiffs do not respond, and the Court agrees with Defendants. Thus, the Court dismisses

Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants for the seizure of their persons as duplicative of their claims

for false arrest because Plaintiffs premise both sets of claims on the same alleged facts. See, e.g.,

Parkinson v. Town of Niskayuna, 2023 WL 8574309, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.) (“To the extent Plaintiff

premises his Fourth Amendment claim on the seizure of his person, such a claim is dismissed

because it is tantamount to a claim for false arrest.”) (citing Dixon v. City of Syracuse, 493 F. Supp.

3d 30, 42 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (dismissing a claim for unlawful seizure as duplicative of a claim for

false arrest where no facts differentiate the claims)). For the same reason, the Court also sua sponte

dismisses the seizure of persons claims as against all non-moving defendants. See, e.g.,

Jacquemyns v. Spartan Mullen Et Cie, S.A., No. 10 Civ. 1586 (CM)(FM), 2011 WL 348452, at *8

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for relief against all defendants after

dismissing it as against moving defendants, in part because it was duplicative).

E. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct “‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit

when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the

law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).

“[I]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [whether the conduct is constitutional],

immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

A court applies “a two-step analysis to determine whether qualified immunity bars a

plaintiff’s claim against government officials for civil damages related to actions taken in the

course of their official duties.” Sabir v. Williams, 52 F.4th 810, 817 (2d Cir. 2022), cert. dismissed,

143 S. Ct. 2694 (2023) (citing Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 139 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Pursuant to

that analysis, qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless

the plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,

and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). In assessing whether the right was clearly established, courts “do not

require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The

determining question is “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established,”

id. (emphasis added), and the analysis “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition[,]” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per

curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense; therefore, Defendants bear the burden of

proving that qualified immunity applies. See Coolick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2012).

The defense of qualified immunity may properly be raised at the motion to dismiss stage because

“[q]ualified immunity provides government officials ‘immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability.’” Looney v. Black, 702 F.3d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson, 555

U.S. at 231). At the motion to dismiss stage, the qualified immunity defense “‘faces a formidable

hurdle ... and is usually not successful’” because it is the defendant who must plead and prove the

defense. Estate of Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2006)). Defendants “must

therefore show not only that the facts supporting the defense appear on the face of the complaint,

but also that it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim that would entitle him to relief.” Horn v. Stephenson, 11 F.4th 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2021).

Defendants Figueroa and Harcher argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity

because “Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege their personal involvement in the violation of any

clearly established constitutional right.” Dkt. No. 29-3 at 17. The Court incorporates its previous

determinations and finds it inappropriate to grant qualified immunity at this stage. On the face of

the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendants Figueroa and Harcher either

ordered or participated in the dispersal of a lawful assembly, resulting in arrests without cause and

the use of excessive force. Thus, Defendants have not met their burden—Plaintiffs may ultimately

prove some set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief.

F. Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations “fail to meet the high threshold necessary to

obtain an award of punitive damages against Sheriff Figueroa and Sgt. Harcher.” Dkt. No. 29-3

at 16 n. 2; see Dkt. No. 9 at 20 (prayer for relief). Plaintiffs failed to dispute Defendants’ argument

to strike punitive damages, and Defendants now request that the Court deem that request

abandoned. Dkt. No. 33 at 8. In its discretion, the Court finds that it is premature to preclude

Plaintiffs from pursuing punitive damages against Defendants Figueroa and Harcher. See, e.g.,

Lipton v. Cnty. of Orange, N.Y., 315 F. Supp. 2d 434, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding, in a case

where plaintiff was counseled, that a court “may . . . deem a claim abandoned when a plaintiff fails

to respond to a defendant’s arguments that the claim should be dismissed[,]” and that “[a]pplication

of this proposition is . . . tempered by this Court’s discretion”); see also Keitt v. New York City,

882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (declining to dismiss punitive damages at the pleading

stage because plaintiffs alleged conscious wrongdoing or callous indifference as to at least some

of the individual defendants and had not yet had the benefit of any discovery) (citing Frank Sloup

Crabs Unlimited, LLC v. Loeffler, 745 F. Supp. 2d 115, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation marks

omitted).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Retaliation

claim, Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim, and Fourth Amendment False Arrest claim

against Defendant Juan P. Figueroa is DENIED; and the Court further

ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Retaliation

claim and Fourth Amendment False Arrest claim against Defendant James Harcher is DENIED;

and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim against Defendant

James Harcher is DISMISSED without prejudice; and

ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Seizure claims against all defendants are

DISMISSED with prejudice; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the

parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2025 Oued y . Jay WARE

Albany, NY Anne M. Nardacci

U.S. District Judge

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