Ezell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHAEL EZELL CIVIL ACTION

versus

23-1514-SDD-EWD

LT. RANDY SEAL, ET AL.

RULING

Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. The first is a Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment1 filed by Plaintiff Michael Ezell (“Plaintiff”). The State of

Louisiana, through the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (the

“DPSC”) and Lieutenant Randy Seals (“Lt. Seals”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) oppose

the motion,2 and Plaintiff has filed a reply.3 The second is a Motion for Summary

Judgment4 filed by Defendants. Plaintiff opposes the motion,5 and Defendants have filed

a reply.6 For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment7 is

granted, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are dismissed. Consequently, Plaintiff’s

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment8 is denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 11, 2020, Captain Brian Guillot (“Captain Guillot”) and Lt. Seals

searched Plaintiff’s prison cell on Louisiana State Penitentiary’s TU Lower B Tier.9 During

1 Rec. Doc. 47.

2 Rec. Doc. 50.

3 Rec. Doc. 53.

4 Rec. Doc. 56.

5 Rec. Doc. 59.

6 Rec. Doc. 60.

7 Rec. Doc. 56.

8 Rec. Doc. 47.

9 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶¶ 2–4.

the search, Plaintiff was outside his cell and handcuffed behind his back.10 Cadet Ty

Bowman (“Cadet Bowman”) was on the TU Lower B Tier during the search as well.11

Lt. Seals found a contraband cellphone in Plaintiff’s cell and asked Plaintiff for the

phone’s PIN.12 He then told Plaintiff to step back to the wall with Cadet Bowman so that

the search could resume.13 Plaintiff “refused to move, pulled away from

Cadet . . . Bowman’s attempt to grab [him], and shouted ‘don’t put your [f’ing] hands on

me.’”14 A physical altercation ensued, in which Plaintiff bit Cadet Bowman.15

The parties dispute other details related to the physical altercation. Defendants

contend that “[i]n order to end Plaintiff’s resistance and regain control of the situation,

Plaintiff was brought to the ground and physically restrained through the combined effort

of Defendant Seals, Cadet Bowman, and Captain Guillot.”16 Plaintiff denies this assertion

but provides no support for his denial other than the following: “Denied. (Ex.1 Michael

Ezell ARP, Ex.2 Chris Johnson witness statement, Ex.4 Eddie Christoff witness

statement, Ex.3 Curtis Lilly witness statement.)”17 Likewise, Defendants assert that

“[w]hen Plaintiff was brought back to his feet, he lunged at Defendant Seals multiple times

while attempting to break free from the physical restraint of the other corrections

officers.”18 Plaintiff denies this assertion as follows: “Denied. (Ex.1 Michael Ezell ARP).”19

10 Id. at ¶ 5.

11 Id. at ¶ 8.

12 Id. at ¶¶ 6–7.

13 Id. at ¶ 8.

14 Id. at ¶ 9.

15 Id. at ¶ 11.

16 Rec. Doc. 56-1, ¶ 5 (citing Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶¶ 9–10; Rec. Doc. 53-1, p. 4).

17 Rec. Doc. 59-5, ¶ 5.

18 Rec. Doc. 56-1, ¶ 7 (citing Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶¶ 12–15; Rec. Doc. 53-1, pp. 4–5).

19 Rec. Doc. 59-5, ¶ 7.

Plaintiff brought suit in state court claiming: (1) Lt. Seals is liable in his individual

capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by using

excessive force;20 (2) Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees, costs, and punitive damages

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988; (3) Lt. Seals is liable for injuring Plaintiff through

intentional and/or negligent acts and/or omissions under Louisiana state law; and (4)

DPSC is vicariously liable for Lt. Seal’s tortious acts under Louisiana’s theory of

respondeat superior.21 Defendants removed suit to this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1343, and 1442.22

On November 9, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

pursuant to Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).23 The Court denied that motion on June

24, 2024.24 Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 2, 2025,

moving to strike 13 of Defendants’ affirmative defenses.25 Defendants filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment on June 13, 2025, seeking to dismiss the claims asserted against

them.26

20 Plaintiff has represented throughout this suit that he only asserted a respondeat superior claim against

the DPSC. See Rec. Doc. 47-2, p. 7 (“The State of Louisiana was sued in its capacity as the employer of

the correctional officer Defendants for vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior on the

State law claims asserted in this case.”); Rec. Doc. 11, p. 6 (“[A]s to the State of Louisiana, there was no

official capacity (Monell) claim pled. . . . The State of Louisiana was sued under respondeat superior as

vicarious liability on the state law claim of battery plead against Lt. Randy Seal.”) The Court notes, however,

that Plaintiff’ state court Petition asserts a § 1983 claim against “Defendants.” DPSC is not a “person” who

can be sued under § 1983. See Washington v. Louisiana, 425 F. App'x 330, 333 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)

(citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63–71 (1989)). To the extent Plaintiff has pled a

§ 1983 claim against the DPSC, that claim is dismissed.

21 Rec. Doc. 1-1, pp. 4–5.

22 Rec. Doc. 1.

23 Rec. Doc. 10.

24 Rec. Doc. 27.

25 Rec. Doc. 47.

26 Rec. Doc. 56.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”27 “The movant bears the initial burden and must identify ‘those portions of the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.’”28

However, “the movant ‘need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case.’”29

That is, “[a] movant for summary judgment need not set forth evidence when the

nonmovant bears the burden of persuasion at trial.”30 “The moving party may meet its

burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out

that the record contains no support for the non-moving party's claim.”31

If the movant carries the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact,

“its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”32 The non-movant's burden is not satisfied

27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

28 Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

29 Id. (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc))).

30 Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 987, 997 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323 (“we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with

affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim.”) (emphasis in original)).

31 Id. (citing Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002)).

32 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (internal citations

omitted).

by “conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of

evidence.”33

Ultimately, “where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”34 Additionally,

In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate the

credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes;

so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury drawing

all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in

that party's favor, the court must deny the motion.35

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Discovery Dispute

Defendants assert that the unsworn declarations of Christopher Johnson

(“Johnson”), Curtis Lilly (“Lilly”), and Eddie Christoff (“Christoff”) submitted by Plaintiff are

procedurally improper and thus cannot be considered on summary judgment.36 They

argue that unsworn declarations must strictly comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, which

requires that they be true and correct, made under penalty of perjury, signed, and dated.37

Johnson, Lilly, and Christoff’s unsworn declarations are signed and denote that they are

“true and correct” and made “under penalty of perjury.”38 Though undated, “the timing of

the testimony can easily be gleaned from the declaration itself.”39 Thus, similar to a

division of this Court’s decision in Adams v. United Association of Journeymen,40 strict

33 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

34 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (cleaned up).

35 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted).

36 Rec. Doc. 60, pp. 1–2.

37 Id.

38 See Rec. Docs. 59-2 (Johnson); 59-3 (Lilly); Rec. Doc. 59-4 (Christoff).

39 Adams v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the United

States & Canada, AFL-CIO, Loc. 198, 469 F. Supp. 3d 615, 643 (M.D. La. 2020) (citing Ion v. Chevron

USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 382 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2)); Nissho–Iwai Am. Corp. v.

Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th Cir. 1988)).

40 Id.

compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 is inappropriate. Rather, “[a]n unsworn declaration is

not competent summary judgment evidence unless it contains statements that it was

made ‘under penalty of perjury’ and is verified as ‘true and correct.’”41 As such, the Court

will consider these declarations on summary judgment.

Defendants further argue that the Court cannot consider Lilly’s declaration

because it was not based on his personal knowledge.42 Lilly’s declaration states as

follows: “I only witness [sic] injuries after effects. Missing tooth – Lassirations [sic] to wrist

and ankles from restraints, - as stated by Mr. Ezell.”43 The Court disagrees with

Defendants’ contention that “Lilly’s declaration is based upon what was told to him by

Plaintiff[] and not his own personal knowledge . . . .”44 Lilly’s declaration states that he

observed Plaintiff’s injuries after the physical altercation. He then describes those injuries

and explains that his observations align with Plaintiff’s claimed injuries. Thus, the Court

will consider Lilly’s declaration on summary judgment.

B. Section 1983 in General

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a private right of action for

redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law.45 It

provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . .46

41 Id.

42 Rec. Doc. 60, p. 2.

43 Rec. Doc. 59-3.

44 Rec. Doc. 60, p. 2.

45 See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage

Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).

46 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method

for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”47

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the

color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.48 A § 1983 complainant must support his claim with specific facts demonstrating

a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations.49

C. Excessive Force

Plaintiff sues Lt. Seals in his individual capacity, alleging Lt. Seals used excessive

force against Plaintiff in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.50 “In evaluating

excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment, the ‘core judicial inquiry’ is ‘whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.’”51 Although “‘[t]he focus of this standard is on the detention

facility official’s subjective intent to punish,’ intent is determined by reference to the well-

known Hudson factors—‘the extent of injury suffered, the need for application of force,

the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably

perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a

forceful response.’”52 “The amount of force used must be more than de minimis, ‘provided

47 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979));

accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,

816 (1985); Jackson v. City of Atlanta, Tex., 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996); Young v. City of Killeen, 775

F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985).

48 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986);

Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir. 1984).

49 See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir.

1990); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986); Angel v. City of Fairfield, Tex., 793 F.2d

737, 739 (5th Cir. 1986).

50 See Rec. Doc. 1-1, pp. 1, 4–5.

51 Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hudson v. Mcmillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).

52 Id. at 452–53 (quoting Kitchen v. Dall. Cnty., 759 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2014)).

that the use of force is not of a sort “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”’”53

“[C]ourts . . . frequently [find] constitutional violations in cases where a restrained or

subdued person is subjected to the use of force.”54 However, “[i]njury alone does not

equate to excessive force.”55

D. Qualified Immunity

Lt. Seals asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The doctrine of

qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”56 In

striking this balance, qualified immunity shields “government officials performing

discretionary functions” from civil liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.”57

An “official can raise qualified immunity at any stage in the litigation—from Rule

12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, to Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings, to Rule

56 motions for summary judgment, to Rule 50(b) post-verdict motions for judgment as a

matter of law—and continue to raise it at each successive stage.”58 On this basis, when

a public official asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of

53 Id. at 453 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 2).

54 Id. at 454 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kitchen, 759 F.3d at 479).

55 Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 255 (5th Cir. 2018).

56 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

57 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)

(“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments

about open legal questions.”).

58 Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2020) (footnotes omitted).

establishing a constitutional violation and overcoming the defense.59 To meet this burden,

a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2)

that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”60 The court

has discretion to decide these prongs in any order.61

An official’s conduct is not objectively unreasonable “unless all reasonable officials

in the [official’s] circumstances would have then known that the [official’s] conduct violated

the plaintiff’s rights.”62 When denying qualified immunity, a court must point to “controlling

authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the contours of

the right in question with a high degree of particularity.”63

The Court addressed Lt. Seals’s qualified immunity defense at the motion to

dismiss stage of this case. It its Ruling, the Court held the following:

At this stage, Plaintiff need only allege facts that plausibly indicate that Lt.

Seal[s] acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Lt. Seal[s]

“slamming” Plaintiff on his face and then into the bars of the prison cell was

not conducive to gaining Plaintiff’s compliance with his order to provide the

phone’s PIN number. Moreover, Plaintiff was handcuffed, and therefore did

not present a safety or security risk. Thus, from the current allegations the

inference could be drawn that any perceived threat experienced by Lt.

Seal[s] was unreasonable based on Plaintiff’s use of inflammatory language

and Plaintiff’s lack of compliance. Plaintiff claims he suffered injuries to his

right shoulder, right arm, right hand, and lost a gold tooth. If proven, the

injuries alleged could demonstrate that the amount of force used was more

than de minimis. The Court finds it plausible that Lt. Seal[s]’s use of force

was applied maliciously and satisfied a desire to punish Plaintiff for his

actions rather than to restore discipline. The Court rejects Defendants’

arguments that Plaintiff’s allegations are “general and conclusory” and finds

Plaintiff has adequately pled a constitutional violation.64

59 Jackson v. City of Hearne, Tex., 959 F.3d 194, 201 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing McClendon v. City of Columbia,

305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).

60 Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing Aschcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 735 (2011)).

61 Jackson, 959 F.3d at 200.

62 Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 169 (5th Cir. 2015).

63 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 2013).

64 Rec. Doc. 27, p. 9 (footnotes omitted).

The evidence now before the Court, however, paints a different story. The facts presented

on summary judgment are largely undisputed, but the parties do dispute the details of the

physical altercation between Plaintiff, Lt. Seals, Captain Guillot, and Cadet Bowman.

Considering the evidence presented on summary judgment, the Court finds the following.

Plaintiff was handcuffed behind his back and standing against a wall outside his

cell during Lt. Seals and Captain Guillot’s search.65 Cadet Bowman was also outside

Plaintiff’s cell.66 When Lt. Seals obtained the contraband cell phone, he ordered that

Plaintiff step off the wall and come towards the bars of his cell.67 At that point, Lt. Seals

asked Plaintiff about the contraband cell phone, including what the phone’s PIN was.68

Plaintiff was then asked to step away from the bars of his cell and back to the wall.69

Lt. Seals called Plaintiff back to his cell.70 He again asked Plaintiff for the phone’s

PIN71 and told Plaintiff to step back to the wall with Cadet Bowman.72 Plaintiff refused to

move.73 Lt. Seals started walking towards Plaintiff.74 Cadet Bowman attempted to grab

Plaintiff.75 Plaintiff shouted, “don’t put your [f’ing] hands on me.”76 Lt. Seals grabbed

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff shrugged his shoulders in an attempt to defend himself.77 Plaintiff

was then brought to the ground and physically restrained by Lt. Seals, Captain Guillot,

and Cadet Bowman.78

65 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶¶ 2–5; Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

66 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶ 8.

67 Id. at ¶ 7; Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

68 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶ 7; Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

69 Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

70 Id.

71 Id.

72 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶ 8.

73 Id. at ¶ 9

74 Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

75 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶ 9.

76 Id.

77 Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

78 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶ 10.

While on the ground, Plaintiff bit Cadet Bowman.79 Plaintiff also attempted to pull

up his boxers, and in response, Lt. Seals grabbed Plaintiff’s arm and twisted it.80 Plaintiff

responded, “go ahead and break it [b*tch].”81 Once Plaintiff reduced resistance, he was

brought back to his feet.82 While on his feet, Plaintiff lunged at Lt. Seals.83 Someone then

slammed Plaintiff’s face into cell #3’s bars.84 After that, Plaintiff lunged at Lt. Seals a

second time.85 Captain Guillot order Lt. Seals to back away from Plaintiff, and Lt. Seals

did so.86 Captain Guillot and Cadet Bowman then removed Plaintiff from the TU Lower B

Tier.87

Medical staff assessed Plaintiff that day and found that he had lacerations with

minimal bleeding.88 They also found that there was “no obvious sign of injury.”89 Plaintiff’s

treatment plan included cleaning his wounds and applying steri strips.90 A facial x-ray was

also ordered.91 Plaintiff attests in his ARP that his vision in his right eye was very blurred,

his eyes “bust open,” his back never stopped hurting, his right hand was swollen, he lost

his gold tooth, and that he had pain shooting to his shoulder blades.92 Lilly observed

Plaintiff’s injuries after the incident and attests that such injuries included a missing tooth

and lacerations to Plaintiff’s wrists and ankles.93 Defendants cite Plaintiff’s medical

79 Id. at ¶ 11. See also Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 6.

80 Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

81 Id.

82 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶ 12.

83 Id.; Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

84 Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 4.

85 Id. at pp. 4–5.

86 Rec. Doc. 56-4, ¶ 13.

87 Id. at ¶ 14; Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 5.

88 Rec. Doc. 56-3, p. 2.

89 Id.

90 Id.

91 Id.

92 Rec. Doc. 59-1, p. 5.

93 Rec. Doc. 59-3.

records and contend that “[t]here is no indication that Plaintiff lost any teeth at that time,

and a facial x-ray performed that day does not indicate any loss of teeth.”94 The Court

cannot ascertain these alleged facts from Plaintiff’s medical records.

Plaintiff argues that qualified immunity is a nonissue because the Court denied

qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.95 Thus, according to Plaintiff,

Defendants “were required to offer evidence showing that an issue of fact remains for trial

as to Lt. . . . Seal[s]’s use of force.”96 However, “official[s] can raise qualified immunity at

any stage in the litigation[,]” including on summary judgment.97 When they do, it is the

plaintiff’s burden to establish a constitutional violation and overcome the defense.98

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. The only evidence of force attributable to Lt.

Seals is that he:

• grabbed Plaintiff after Plaintiff 1) refused to step away from his cell, 2) resisted

Cadet Bowman’s attempt to grab him; and 3) told Cadet Bowman “don’t put your

[f’ing] hands on me”;

• brought Plaintiff to the ground and physically restrained him after Plaintiff shrugged

his shoulders to resist Lt. Seals grabbing him; and

• twisted Plaintiff’s arm while Plaintiff was restrained on the ground in response to

Plaintiff’s attempt to pull up his pants.

94 Rec. Doc. 56-2, p. 4.

95 Rec. Doc. 59, pp. 2–3; Rec. Doc. 47-2, pp. 3–5.

96 Rec. Doc. 59, p. 3.

97 Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330–31 (footnotes omitted).

98 Jackson, 959 F.3d at 201 (citing McClendon, 305 F.3d at 323).

Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Seals “slammed him on his face and then slammed him into the

bars of Cell 3[,]”99 but Plaintiff has provided no evidence as to who slammed his face into

cell 3’s bars—whether that be Lt. Seals, Captain Guillot, or Cadet Bowman.

Considering the Hudson factors,100 Lt. Seals’s use of force “was applied in a good-

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” and not an attempt to “maliciously and

sadistically . . . cause harm.”101 Similar to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Waddleton v.

Rodriguez,102 only the first Hudson factor of extent of the injury suffered weighs in

Plaintiff’s favor. “[T]he other four factors indicate that the use of force was applied in a

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.”103 Though Plaintiff was handcuffed

behind his back, he 1) was physical and verbally resistant after an order to step away

from his cell; 2) made sudden movements with intentions unknown to Lt. Seal; 3) bit Cadet

Bowman; and 4) lunged at Lt. Seals multiple times.

Based on the foregoing, there was a need for Lt. Seals’s application of force. The

amount of force Lt. Seals used was appropriate in relation to that need, and the threat

perceived was reasonable. “Prison disturbances ‘may require prison officials to act quickly

and decisively[,]’”104 as Lt. Seals did in this case. Lt. Seals also made an effort to temper

the severity of his forceful response by 1) getting Plaintiff back on his feet; and 2)

removing himself from the physical altercation. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet his

burden of proving an Eighth Amendment violation to overcome Lt. Seals’s qualified

immunity defense.

99 Rec. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 13.

100 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 2

101 Id. at 7.

102 750 F. App’x at 254–55.

103 Id. at 254 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

104 Id. at 255 (quoting Hudson, 503, U.S. at 6).

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment105 is granted as to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and his claim for attorney’s fees, costs,

and punitive damages under §§ 1983 and 1988 are therefore dismissed. With no claim

remaining to which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.106 This action is therefore

dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to reassert his state law claims in a court of

competent jurisdiction. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment107

is denied as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment108 is

GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff’s right to

reassert his state law claims in a court of competent jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment109 is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on this _6_t_h_ day of __N_ov_e_m_b_e_r_, 2025.

S

________________________________

SHELLY D. DICK

CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

105 Rec. Doc. 56.

106 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

107 Rec. Doc 47.

108 Rec. Doc. 56.

109 Rec. Doc 47.