Saucedo v. County of Humboldt CA1/4

Filed 11/7/25 Saucedo v. County of Humboldt CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JESUS SAUCEDO, A172746

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Humboldt County

COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT. Super. Ct. No. CV2400105)

Defendant and Respondent.

This dispute arises from the termination of Jesus Saucedo’s

employment as an office assistant for the County of Humboldt (the County).

The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to Saucedo’s third amended

complaint (complaint) without leave to amend. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

The County hired Saucedo to work as an Office Assistant I in its

Department of Health and Human Services in July 2015. An August 1990

description of the position, which she attached as an exhibit to the complaint,

listed a number of “[i]llustrative” duties of Office Assistants I and II,

including acting as a receptionist, receiving and screening visitors and

telephone calls, taking messages, providing information regarding County

activities, typing correspondence, preparing reports and meeting materials,

proofreading materials, entering data, maintaining records, processing forms,

and taking notes for meetings, among others. The description further stated

that specific duties of the Office Assistant II position, including “contact with

the public,” would “vary with the organizational unit to which assigned.” A

July 2003 description, also attached as an exhibit to the complaint, similarly

set forth a long list of examples of typical duties an office assistant “may”

have to perform, such as assisting the public in person or by phone,

answering inquiries related to department services, scheduling

appointments, researching information, processing mail, and maintaining

records and files.

Shortly after Saucedo was hired, the County asked her to attend and

take minutes at meetings on a couple of occasions. Saucedo did not feel

adequately trained for this task and experienced anxiety and panic attack

symptoms as a result. Saucedo saw her doctor, who issued a note stating

that Saucedo was experiencing symptoms of anxiety that were triggered by

taking meeting minutes. Saucedo’s medical provider requested that Saucedo

be excused from taking meeting minutes, and the County accommodated this

request.

Saucedo worked from 2015 to 2019 with this accommodation and, in

July 2016, was promoted from Office Assistant I to Office Assistant II.

However, her anxiety symptoms were triggered once again in 2019 when the

County transferred her to another physical location and required her to make

scripted telephone calls to clients. In response, the County allowed Saucedo

to work with clients by mail only from May to August 2019.

During this time, Saucedo’s supervisor told her that her situation had

been discussed with the department’s Program Manager but the Program

Manager believed Saucedo was “ ‘faking her symptoms.’ ” Saucedo’s

supervisor suggested that Saucedo obtain a note from her medical provider.

Around June 2019, Saucedo’s doctor sent a letter asking that Saucedo’s work

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duties be modified to not include interaction with the public by phone or in

person until further notice.

At some point thereafter, Saucedo’s Program Manager told Saucedo

that the County was shifting to a new business model that required office

assistants to have contact with the public. Around August 2019, a County

employee services representative and a human resources representative

informed Saucedo that it might be possible to transfer her to a location where

she would not have to make phone calls. The County initiated the interactive

process to discuss reasonable accommodations that could enable Saucedo to

safely perform the essential functions of her position, sending a supplemental

medical questionnaire to Saucedo’s medical provider in November 2019 to

obtain information regarding proposed work restrictions, among other things.

In response, Saucedo’s medical provider indicated that Saucedo would need to

limit her in person and phone interactions with the public, and these

restrictions were permanent.

In December 2019, the County informed Saucedo that she could not

continue to work unless she did so without an accommodation. The County

subsequently placed Saucedo on forced medical leave. Saucedo’s employment

was later terminated on December 10, 2021.

Saucedo filed a discrimination complaint with the California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing (FEHA), and received a notice

of right to sue. Saucedo then filed the present action. After two rounds of

demurrers, Saucedo filed the operative complaint, which alleges a single

cause of action for wrongful termination based on disability discrimination

under FEHA. The County demurred again, arguing that Saucedo failed to

state a claim because she did not plead that she was able to perform the

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essential functions of her position even with reasonable accommodation or

that the County had a discriminatory intent.

The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The

court did not explain the basis for its decision beyond stating that it had

considered the parties’ papers and their oral arguments.

DISCUSSION

On a demurrer, the court’s function is limited to testing the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General

Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.) A demurrer is not the appropriate

vehicle for determining the truth of disputed facts. (Id. at pp. 113–114.) We

review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, assuming well-pleaded

factual allegations to be true and examining the complaint to determine if it

alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action on any legal theory. (Sanchez

v. Swissport, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1336.) “We may also look to

exhibits attached to the complaint for operative facts.” (Nealy v. County of

Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594, 596–597.)

To allege a claim for disability discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff

must plead that (1) he or she suffers from a disability, (2) was otherwise

qualified to do the job, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the

employer harbored discriminatory intent. (Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc.

(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1246.) An employee is otherwise qualified to do

his or her job if he or she is able to perform the essential functions of the job,

with or without reasonable accommodation. (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica

(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 378; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a)(1)1 [FEHA

does not prohibit discharging an employee based on a disability if that

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

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employee is unable to safely perform his or her essential duties even with

reasonable accommodation].)

Saucedo argues that her complaint adequately alleged each element.

As it did in its demurrer, the County maintains that Saucedo’s allegations do

not satisfy the second and fourth elements—i.e., that she was able to perform

the essential functions of her job, and that the County harbored

discriminatory intent. We consider these elements in turn.

I.

FEHA states that essential functions are “fundamental job duties” and

not “marginal functions” of a position. (§ 12926, subd. (f).) FEHA further

provides that “[e]vidence of whether a particular function is essential”

includes an employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, written

job descriptions, the amount of time spent on a particular function, the

consequences of an employee not performing that function, the work

experiences of past incumbents in the position, and the current work

experience of incumbents in similar jobs, among others. (Id. at subd. (f)(2).)

The “identification of essential job functions is a ‘highly fact-specific

inquiry.’ ” (Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th

962, 971; see also Hastings v. Dep’t of Corr. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 963, 967,

fn. 6 (Hastings) [essential functions of a job are a question of fact].) Thus, it

is usually an issue of fact for a factfinder or jury to decide. (See Price v.

Victor Valley Union High School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 231, 242.)

The complaint alleges that Saucedo was unable to interact with the

public in person or by telephone. The disputed issue is whether the

complaint’s allegations establish that such interaction was an essential

function of her position. The County relies on the two office assistant job

descriptions attached to the complaint, which list duties such as receiving

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and screening phone calls or assisting the public in person or by phone, as

well as the complaint’s allegation that Saucedo’s Program Manager informed

her in 2019 that contact with the public was an essential duty.

But the complaint does not allege that the Program Manager’s

statement was true, and as Saucedo points out, the job descriptions state that

all the duties listed are “Illustrative Only” or are examples of responsibilities

that an office assistant “may” have to perform. The job descriptions also

include a large number of other duties that do not involve contact with the

public. Further, Saucedo alleges she had been performing competently in her

role from 2015 to 2019 before she was required to interact with the public,

and was even promoted once during that timeframe. And her allegation that

she was told that she could possibly be transferred to a site where she would

not be required to make phone calls could support an inference that this duty

was not essential to the office assistant position.

We also note that, while job descriptions and an employer’s judgment

about which functions are essential are evidence that can be weighed in

determining if a duty is essential (§ 12926, subd. (f)(2)(A)–(B)), FEHA is clear

that numerous other factors can also be considered. (Id., subd. (f)(2).) As

applied here, these factors could include what amount of time office

assistants spend on phone or in person interactions with the public, what the

consequences would be if an office assistant did not perform that duty, and

what the past and present work experiences of office assistants has been in

this area. (See § 12926, subd. (f)(2)(C)–(G).)

Quoting Hastings, the County argues that “[a]bsent other evidence, [a

court] may properly rely on the employer’s judgment and the written job

description to determine the essential job functions.” (Hastings, supra,

110 Cal.App.4th at p. 967, fn. 6.) But Hastings was a summary judgment

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case, not a pleadings case, and in any event the job description there does not

appear to have contained any ambiguity about whether the relevant

functions were essential. (See id. at p. 967.) As discussed above, the job

descriptions here do not clearly establish that every “illustrative” task should

be considered essential for FEHA purposes. Accordingly, we disagree that

Saucedo pleaded herself out of her claim by attaching the job descriptions

and alleging her Program Manager’s statement that contact with the public

was an essential duty.

II.

With respect to discriminatory intent, the County argues, first, that the

complaint falls short because FEHA does not prohibit discharging an

employee who is unable to perform the job’s essential duties even with

reasonable accommodations. This argument fails because it depends on the

County’s previous argument, with which we have disagreed, that the

complaint alleges that interacting with the public was an essential function

of Saucedo’s position.

Second, the County contends that Saucedo’s allegation that the

Program Manager accused her of “ ‘faking her symptoms’ ” is insufficient to

plead discriminatory intent because Saucedo does not aver that the Program

Manager played any role in her termination. But in a disability

discrimination case where an employee sufficiently pleads the ability to

safely perform the essential duties of the job, an intent to discriminate can be

established by proving that “(1) the employer knew that plaintiff had a

physical condition that limited a major life activity, or perceived him to have

such a condition, and (2) the plaintiff’s actual or perceived physical condition

was a substantial motivating reason for the defendant’s decision to subject

the plaintiff to an adverse employment action.” (Wallace v. County of

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Stanislaus (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 109, 129.) Here, there is no dispute that

the County was aware of Saucedo’s disability, since it had engaged with her

at various points in her employment to determine if reasonable

accommodations could be provided. Additionally, Saucedo pleads that the

County relieved her of her work as an office assistant because of her inability

to interact with the public. Thus, regardless of whether the Program

Manager was involved in Saucedo’s termination, Saucedo sufficiently pleads

discriminatory intent. (See Wallace, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.)2

2 In light of our conclusion that the trial court erred in sustaining the

demurrer, we do not address Saucedo’s additional arguments on appeal that

the complaint could be construed implicitly to allege a claim for failure to

reasonably accommodate a disability, or that she was entitled to leave to

amend. We also decline to reach Saucedo’s contention that the County

waived its defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies because she

raised it for the first time in her reply brief. (See Reichardt v. Hoffman

(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) We also observe that the County did not

raise exhaustion in its demurrer or in its brief on appeal. Saucedo’s motion to

augment the record on appeal with a right-to-sue letter she received from the

California Civil Rights Department in 2023 is denied because the letter was

not before the trial court. (In re Marriage of Forrest & Eaddy (2006)

144 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.) There are also no exceptional circumstances

that warrant our consideration of the letter as new evidence under section

909 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The letter is not responsive to any

argument the County made in its brief and is not relevant to our resolution of

this appeal.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is reversed with directions to the superior

court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and

to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. Saucedo is awarded costs on

appeal.

GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.

MOORMAN, J. *

*Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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