Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

STEVEN BUTLER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:25-cv-1-MMH-PRL

MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S

OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

O R D E R

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 12; Report), entered by the Honorable Philip R. Lammens, United States

Magistrate Judge, on April 17, 2025. In the Report, Judge Lammens

recommends that Plaintiff, Steven Butler’s, Motion for Leave to Proceed in

Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2; Motion), filed January 3, 2025, be denied and his

second amended complaint dismissed. See Report at 12; see also Second

Amended Complaint for Violations of Constitutional Rights and Tort Claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Challenge to Qualified Immunity (Doc. 11; Second

Amended Complaint), filed March 24, 2025; 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (the in forma

pauperis statute). On April 21, 2025, Butler, who proceeds pro se, filed

objections to the Report. See Plaintiff’s Objections to Report and

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Recommendation (Doc. 13; Objections). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for

review.

The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Under

Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), the Court “must determine

de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly

objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a

party waives the right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.1 As such, the Court reviews those

portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings to which no objection was filed for

plain error and only if necessary, in the interests of justice. See id.; see also

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress

intended to require district court review of a magistrate [judge’s] factual or

legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party

objects to those findings.”); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1304–05 (11th

Cir. 2013) (recommending the adoption of what would become 11th Circuit

Rule 3-1 so that district courts do not have “to spend significant amounts of

time and resources reviewing every issue—whether objected to or not”).

1 The Magistrate Judge properly informed Butler of the time period for objecting and

the consequences of failing to do so. See Report at 1 n.1.

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Upon independent review of the file, the Court will overrule the

Objections and accept and adopt the Report in part.2 Specifically, the Court

adopts the Report as to Section I, Section II, and Section III.A.3 The Court

writes briefly here to address Butler’s Objections. Because the Court assumes

that Butler is familiar with the record in this case, additional background

information is included here only as necessary to provide context for this

discussion.

I. Background

The Magistrate Judge summarized the alleged basis of Butler’s claims

against each Defendant as follows:

[Butler] contends that his constitutional rights were violated by

the police officers (Deputy Perry, Deputy Santana, and Sergeant

Dice) who arrested him on factually and legally baseless charges;

the prosecutors (William M. Gladson and Elizabeth White) who

knowingly pursued the charges under a statute that was not

applicable and offered a coercive plea deal under threat of

maximum sentence; and Judge Peter Matthew Brigham who failed

to dismiss the charges or intervene in the unlawful prosecution.

See Report at 4. As the Magistrate Judge noted, “[a]lthough not included in the

case style nor in the factual allegations section, [Butler] identifies in a bullet

2 The Court reads the reference to “Clark v. Ga. Pardons and Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d

636, 639 (11th Cir. 1984)” on page 2 of the Report as referring to “Clark v. Ga. Pardons and

Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1990).”

3 Butler did not object to Section I, in which the Magistrate Judge set forth the legal

standard, or Section II, in which the Magistrate Judge set forth the facts. In light of this, and

the Court independently observing no error, the Court adopts these sections of the Report

without comment.

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point list, five additional defendants—Judge John/Jane Doe; Court Records

Officer or Clerk of Court; Sheriff Billy Woods; Marion County[;] and the State

of Florida.” See id. at 4 n.2. The Magistrate Judge also identified Butler’s

claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stating that Butler “generally alleges

four counts for federal constitutional violations—(Count I) First Amendment;

(Count II) Fourth Amendment; (Count III) Fourteenth Amendment, due

process and equal protection; and [(Count IV)] Eighth Amendment, excessive

bail … .” See id. at 4; see also Second Amended Complaint at 4. In addition to

the federal claims the Magistrate Judge identified, in Counts V–VIII, Butler

asserts state law claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. See Second Amended

Complaint at 4. And in Count IX, he asserts a claim captioned “Challenge to

Qualified Immunity as Unconstitutional in Application.” Id. As relief, Butler

demands:

compensatory damages in the amount of $1,500,000 for mental

pain and suffering and emotional distress; reputational damages

in the amount [of] $1,500,000; punitive damages in the amount of

$2,500,000; injunctive relief expunging all related records;

declaratory relief that qualified immunity does not apply; referral

for federal investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 242; and a $250,000

donation to civil rights organizations.

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See Report at 4; see also Second Amended Complaint at 7.4

II. Discussion

A. Shotgun Pleading

In Section III.A. of the Report, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the

Second Amended Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading. See Report

at 5–6. In particular, the Magistrate Judge found that while Butler “includes

a ‘Factual Allegations’ section with allegations about actions taken by various

Defendants related to [Butler’s] arrest and prosecution,” when he recites his

causes of action, he “alleges the elements of his claim[s] in vague and

conclusory terms without identifying which allegations form the basis of his

claims against which Defendants.” See Report at 5–6. In his Objections, Butler

disagrees, arguing that his Second Amended Complaint is not a shotgun

pleading because “[e]ach claim identifies[] [t]he responsible defendants, [t]he

nature of the [alleged] constitutional violation, [t]he factual basis, and

[s]upporting case law.” See Objections at 2.

4 Butler also seeks a “[d]eclaratory judgment that Defendants violated [his]

constitutional rights.” See Second Amended Complaint at 7. But “a plaintiff has standing to

seek declaratory relief only when there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury

in the future.” Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Florida High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 115

F.4th 1266, 1281 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 104 (1983). As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “[a] declaration that [the

defendant’s] past conduct violated [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights … ‘would [be] nothing

more than a gratuitous comment without any force or effect.’” Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547,

1552 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (last alteration in original). Because Butler has

alleged no facts that suggest a likelihood of future injury, the Court concludes he lacks

standing to obtain declaratory relief.

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Upon independent review of the Second Amended Complaint, the Court

concludes that despite Butler’s contention to the contrary, he fails to identify

which Defendant or Defendants he seeks to hold accountable for what alleged

wrongdoing. Likewise, he does not adequately identify the factual basis of his

claims. For example, Butler captions Count I “First Amendment—Retaliation

for Protected Speech,” but the entire explanation of that claim consists of a

citation to Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) and the statement that he

“was retaliated against for objecting to the misapplication of law.” See Second

Amended Complaint at 4. But this conclusory statement does not help clarify

which Defendant or Defendants he seeks relief against, nor does it explain the

factual basis of his First Amendment claim. Similarly, Butler captions Count

III “Fourteenth Amendment—Due Process and Equal Protection,” but the

entire explanation of that claim consists of citations to Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963) and Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) and

the statement that “Defendants deprived [him] of due process and treated him

unequally under the law.” See Second Amended Complaint at 4. Yet, in his

factual allegations, Butler does not suggest that Defendants acted in concert

such that joint liability would be appropriate, nor does he state which acts

allegedly violated his due process or equal protection rights. See generally id.

Moreover, as to the five Defendants Butler identifies in his bullet point list of

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Defendants but omits from his factual allegations section and case caption, see

id. at 2 (listing as Defendants Judge John/Jane Doe, Court Records Officer or

Clerk of Court, Sheriff Billy Woods, Marion County, and the State of Florida),

the Court cannot identify any factual or legal basis for any claim. Although

Butler separates his claims into nine counts, he does not identify which factual

allegations support which claim or which of the eleven Defendants are alleged

to be liable for which claim. See id. at 2, 4. As the Magistrate Judge correctly

concluded, “[g]iven these limited allegations, the Court (and Defendants) are

left to guess which claims are brought against which Defendants, and which

allegations support the claims.” See Report at 6.

The Magistrate Judge gave Butler two opportunities to correct the

deficiencies in his pleadings. See Order (Doc. 6; First Order to Replead),

entered January 15, 2025, at 6 (“The amended complaint must clearly state

the legal theory or theories upon which [Butler] seeks relief and explain with

factual allegations how each defendant is responsible.”); Order (Doc. 10;

Second Order to Replead), entered March 14, 2025, at 5–6 (“[Butler] alleges

the elements of his claim[s] in vague and conclusory terms without identifying

which allegations form the basis of his claims against which Defendants.”); see

also Complaint for Violations of Constitutional Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Doc. 1; Complaint), filed January 3, 2025; Amended Complaint for Violations

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of Constitutional Rights and Tort Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 8; First

Amended Complaint), filed January 21, 2025. In the First Order to Replead,

the Magistrate Judge did not use the term “shotgun pleading” nor cite to any

authority relating to shotgun pleadings. See generally First Order to Replead.

Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge did direct Butler to “clearly state the legal

theory or theories upon which Plaintiff seeks relief and explain with factual

allegations how each defendant is responsible.” See First Order to Replead at

6. This directive was sufficiently clear to put Butler on notice that he must

draft a pleading that puts the defendants on notice of the claims he wishes to

pursue as required by the shotgun pleading caselaw. Despite this, when Butler

failed to do so, the Magistrate Judge gave him another opportunity to cure his

deficient pleading with a more detailed discussion of the applicable authority.

See generally Second Order to Replead. Indeed, in the Second Order to

Replead, the Magistrate Judge explained the law on shotgun pleadings to

Butler in some detail. See Second Order to Replead at 5–6. Even with this

additional guidance, in the Second Amended Complaint, which is Butler’s third

attempt to draft a proper complaint, he still fails to identify which facts

purportedly support each cause of action and which defendants he seeks to

hold responsible for which allegedly wrongful acts. Notably, Butler’s Second

Amended Complaint is not an improvement over his first two pleading

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attempts, and the Court concludes that granting leave for further amendment

would be futile.5 On this record, the Court is convinced that Butler is either

unable or unwilling to comply with the Court’s directives and the requirements

of the Rules and that nothing less than dismissal is appropriate. See Sarhan

v. Miami Dade Coll., 800 F. App’x 769, 772 (11th Cir. 2020).6 “Even pro se

5 In the First Order to Replead, in addition to directing Butler to explain the factual

basis of his claims and how each Defendant is responsible, the Magistrate Judge also directed

Butler to state whether a final judgment was entered in the state proceedings and

admonished Butler that Judge Brigham and Prosecutors Gladson and White were likely

immune from his claimed damages. See First Order to Replead at 4–5. In his First Amended

Complaint, Butler did clarify that the charges against him were dismissed, see First

Amended Complaint ¶ 29, but he continued to raise claims against Judge Brigham and

Prosecutors White and Gladson and did not allege any facts to undermine the conclusion that

those claims are barred by immunity. See generally id. For this reason, in the Second Order

to Replead, the Magistrate Judge stated, “[i]f [Butler] chooses to file a second amended

complaint, he should not include these same claims against the immune parties.” See Second

Order to Replead at 7. Yet in Butler’s Second Amended Complaint, not only does he include

the same claims with no materially new factual allegations, he also appears to include claims

against another party likely immune from damages, “Judge John/Jane Doe, the unidentified

first appearance judge who found probable cause on an incorrect statute and set bond … .”

See Second Amended Complaint at 2.

In both orders to replead, the Magistrate Judge also notified Butler that the Marion

County Sheriff’s Office is not a legal entity subject to suit. See First Order to Replead at 5–6;

Second Order to Replead at 8. Again, Butler made apparently no effort to address this issue

and continued to include the Marion County Sheriff’s Office as a party without providing any

basis for a suit against it. See generally First Amended Complaint; Second Amended

Complaint. Finally, in the Second Order to Replead, the Magistrate Judge notified Butler

that his Fourth Amendment claim based on an alleged license plate “search” would likely be

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Second Order to Replead at 8. Butler

ignored this warning too. See Second Amended Complaint at 3. Although the Court need not

discuss the merits of these various deficiencies, the Court describes them to demonstrate that

Butler almost completely failed to address any issue the Magistrate Judge identified in the

two orders to replead. This failure underscores the futility of permitting further leave to

amend.

6 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they

may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See

McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P.

32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they

may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

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plaintiffs must comply with pleading rules or face judgment day,” Tran v. City

of Holmes Beach, 817 F. App’x 911, 915 (11th Cir. 2020), and for Butler, that

day has come. Despite the Court’s guidance on the problems with his pleadings

and two opportunities to fix those deficiencies, the Second Amended Complaint

remains a shotgun pleading. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report as to

Section III.A. to the extent that Butler’s federal claims are due to be dismissed

with prejudice.7

B. Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims

Having determined that Butler’s federal claims are due to be dismissed,

the Court considers whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claims. See Second Amended Complaint at 4

(listing various state law claims for relief in Counts V–VIII).8 Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts have original

7 Because Butler purports to bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court is

satisfied that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 authorizes the Court to exercise jurisdiction over this action

and dismiss it based on the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order.

8 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore have an obligation to

inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction. See Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d

1277, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th

Cir. 1994). This obligation exists regardless of whether the parties have challenged the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405,

410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject

matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”). “In a given case, a federal

district court must have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1)

jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron

Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997). Because Butler and Defendants all

appear to be citizens of Florida, see Second Amended Complaint at 2, the exercise of diversity

jurisdiction over these claims would be improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

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jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy … .” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a). “The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pend[e]nt

state claims rests within the discretion of the district court.” Raney v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c), the Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a state claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims

over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling

reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Notably, “[a]ny one of the section 1367(c) factors is

sufficient to give the district court discretion to dismiss a case’s supplemental

state law claims.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743

(11th Cir. 2006). However, upon determining that it has the discretion under

§ 1367(c) to decline jurisdiction, “[a district court] should consider the

traditional rationales for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and

convenience, in deciding whether or not to exercise that jurisdiction.” Palmer

v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994). And, in

the context of dismissals on shotgun pleading grounds, the Eleventh Circuit

has stated that state law claims within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction

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should typically be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. See

Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2018). Upon

due consideration, the Court finds that judicial economy and convenience

would not be served by retaining jurisdiction over Butler’s state law claims.

Thus, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Butler’s

state law claims and will dismiss those claims without prejudice to refiling in

the appropriate state court.

III. Conclusion

The Court adopts the Report as to Section I, Section II, and Section III.A.,

finding that Butler’s federal claims are due to be dismissed with prejudice

because despite two opportunities to amend, Butler’s Second Amended

Complaint remains an impermissible shotgun pleading. The Court concludes

that permitting further amendments would be futile. The Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Butler’s state law claims and these

claims are due to be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in an appropriate

state court.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff, Steven Butler’s Objections to Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 13) are OVERRULED.

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2. The Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 12) as

to Section I, Section II, and Section III.A.

3. Butler’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is

DENIED.

4. The federal claims Butler brings in his Second Amended

Complaint (Doc. 11) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

5. The state claims in Butler's Second Amended Complaint are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT in

conformity with this Order and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers this 6th day of November, 2025.

United States District Judge

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Copies to:

Pro Se Party

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