The opinion
2025 IL App (1st) 241536-U
FOURTH DIVISION
Order filed: November 6, 2025
No. 1-24-1536
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 12 CR 15690
)
JERMALLE BROWN, ) Honorable
) Sophia Atcherson,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE QUISH delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Navarro and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s order denying defendant’s third motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition is affirmed. The defendant failed to establish
prejudice necessary to obtain leave to file a successive petition because the
prospective application of section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections
does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States or Illinois
Constitutions.
¶2 Defendant Jermalle Brown appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook County
denying his third motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition under the Post
Conviction Hearing Act (Act). 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2024). He argues that section 5-4.5-115
No. 1-24-1536
of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2024)) violates the equal
protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions as applied to him because it grants
parole review only to young offenders sentenced after June 1, 2019, and not those like defendant
who were sentenced before that date. Defendant also contends that he established both cause and
prejudice for filing a successive postconviction petition. For the following reasons, we reject his
arguments and affirm.
¶3 Defendant was charged with first degree murder under a felony murder theory with the
underlying felony of home invasion. Defendant was 19 years old at the time of his arrest. The
evidence adduced at defendant’s jury trial established that he and several accomplices entered
Dondra Sharkey’s apartment on East 73rd Street in Chicago on July 25, 2012. One of the
accomplices, Douglas Bufford, entered the apartment armed with a revolver. Another accomplice,
Dominique Harris, was armed with a shotgun. Harris ordered Sharkey to get up and stand by the
refrigerator. As Sharkey walked to the kitchen, the shotgun Harris was holding discharged, striking
Bufford. Bufford died as a result of the wound.
¶4 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and home invasion. On April 13,
2015, the trial court sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment on the murder conviction. Defendant
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to view a video of him making
gang sign hand gestures while in police custody. This court affirmed defendant’s conviction and
sentence. People v. Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 151377-U.
¶5 On December 14, 2018, defendant filed a petition seeking relief under the Act, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. That petition was summarily dismissed by the trial court, and
this court affirmed the dismissal. People v. Brown, 2021 IL App (1st) 190705-U.
-2-
No. 1-24-1536
¶6 On December 1, 2021, defendant filed a document titled “Notice of Recapitulation under
a Successive Post Conviction Petition.” The circuit court construed it as a motion for leave to file
a successive postconviction petition. In the motion, defendant asked for a reduced sentence
because he was not the person who committed the act that caused Bufford’s death and because he
was young at the time of the crime and his brain was not fully developed. The circuit court denied
defendant’s motion, and this court affirmed. People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 221825.
¶7 On February 9, 2023, defendant filed his second motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, arguing that the use of his juvenile history as aggravation in sentencing
was improper. On March 19, 2024, defendant filed his third motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. The proposed third successive petition argued that Public Act 100-1182,
which amended section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)
(West 2024)), violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions
because it limited early parole eligibility to only young adult offenders sentenced after its June 1,
2019, effective date. He argued that there was no rational basis to exclude offenders like him who
were sentenced before the effective date.
¶8 The circuit court denied defendant’s second and third motions for leave to file successive
petitions. Regarding the third motion, the circuit court found that defendant could not establish the
prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test because this court rejected this same argument in
People v. Wells, 2023 IL App (3d) 210292, ¶¶ 39-44, and held that Public Act 100-1182 did not
violate the equal protection clause of either the Illinois or United States Constitution. This appeal
follows.
-3-
No. 1-24-1536
¶9 Defendant appeals only the dismissal of his third motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. He contends that section 5-4.5-115(b) violates the equal protection clauses
of the United States and Illinois Constitutions by excluding offenders who were sentenced before
its effective date. On appeal, his challenge to section 5-4.5-115(b) is framed as an as-applied
challenge, as he argues that the rationale for applying the parole provision prospectively only does
not apply to his individual circumstances and limiting retroactive application of section 5-4.5-
115(b) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The State responds that defendant waived an as-
applied challenge because his proposed petition challenges section 5-4.5-115(b) only in universal
terms and not as applied to him specifically.
¶ 10 Defendant’s third motion for leave to file a successive petition refers to the statute
generally, but also raises arguments based on his personal situation as an individual charged with
felony murder. “By definition, an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular
circumstances and facts of the individual defendant or petitioner.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL
118151, ¶ 37. Here, defendant’s claim relies, in part, upon evidence from his trial regarding his
circumstances and his level of participation in the offense. Therefore, we find that defendant
adequately preserved this argument.
¶ 11 The Act allows a defendant to collaterally attack a conviction by asserting that it resulted
from a “substantial denial” of his or her constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2024).
The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition without leave of court. 725
ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2024). “[T]here are two exceptions where fundamental fairness requires
that the bar against successive petitions be lifted.” People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 23. The
first is the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception which requires a defendant to make a
-4-
No. 1-24-1536
persuasive showing of actual innocence. Id. The second is the “cause and prejudice” exception,
which requires a defendant to demonstrate “cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or
her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure.” 725 ILCS 5/122-
1(f) (West 2024). A defendant must establish both cause and prejudice to obtain leave of court to
file a successive petition. People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15. We review the circuit court’s
order denying leave to file a successive petition de novo. People v. Profit, 2023 IL App (1st)
210881, ¶ 18.
¶ 12 As explained below, we find that defendant failed to establish prejudice and thus, we need
not address whether he established cause. See Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 25 (“We need not address
the State’s arguments regarding cause, because, for the following reasons, it is clear that Wilson
has not established prejudice.”).
¶ 13 Prejudice is shown “by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial
post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated
due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2024). “[L]eave of court to file a successive
postconviction petition should be denied when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition
and the documentation submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as
a matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to
justify further proceedings.” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35.
¶ 14 Defendant argues that he has established prejudice because section 5-4.5-115(b), as applied
to him, violates his equal protection rights.
¶ 15 Public Act 100-1182 amended section 5-4.5-115(b), which pertains to parole review.
Relevant to this appeal, the amended section 5-4.5-115(b) states:
-5-
No. 1-24-1536
“A person under 21 years of age at the time of the commission of first degree
murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act
100-1182) shall be eligible for parole review by the Prisoner Review Board after
serving 20 years or more of his or her sentence or sentences. . . ”
Pub. Act 100-1182 (eff. Jun. 1, 2019) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115). Here, defendant argues
that the provision of the amendment limiting the availability of early parole to those sentenced
after the effective date violates his equal protection rights, as it treats young adults sentenced before
the effective date differently than those sentenced after the effective date.
¶ 16 The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 596
(2006). “Statutes are presumed constitutional, and we must construe the statute so as to uphold its
constitutionality and validity.” People v. Carter, 377 Ill. App. 3d 91, 99 (2007). The party
challenging a statute has the burden of clearly showing a constitutional violation. Id. For an as-
applied challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that a constitutional violation results from the
application of the statute to a specific set of facts and circumstances. People v. Harris, 2018 IL
121932, ¶ 38.
¶ 17 Illinois courts apply the same equal protection standards and analysis under the United
States and Illinois Constitutions. In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 116. “The constitutional
right to equal protection guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be treated in a similar
manner, unless the government can demonstrate an appropriate reason to treat them differently.”
People v. Richardson, 2015 IL 118255, ¶ 9. “The equal protection clause does not forbid the
legislature from drawing proper distinctions in legislation among different categories of people,
but it does prohibit the government from doing so on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
legislation’s purpose.” Id. When the legislative classification does not implicate a fundamental
right or discriminate against a suspect class, as is the case here, we apply a rational basis scrutiny
-6-
No. 1-24-1536
and determine whether the legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose. Id. The rational basis test does not require the legislature to expressly state the purpose
or rationale supporting its classification. Wells, 2023 IL App (3d) 210292, ¶ 23.
¶ 18 Here, we consider whether the legislature’s decision to limit the parole provisions of
section 5-4.5-115(b) to apply only prospectively to individuals sentenced after June 1, 2019, bears
a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. We find that it does.
¶ 19 In Richardson, our supreme court addressed whether a classification caused by a statute’s
effective date violated the equal protection clause. The statute at issue was the savings clause in
an amendment to the Juvenile Court Act, which changed the exclusive jurisdiction provision to
apply to minors under the age of 18, when previously it only applied to minors under 17.
Richardson, 2015 IL 118225, ¶ 3; see 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West Supp. 2013). The savings clause
provided that the change only applied to violations that occurred on or after its effective date. 705
ILCS 405/5-120. In Richardson, the defendant was 17 years old when he was charged as an adult
with criminal sexual assault. The amendment to the Juvenile Court Act passed while the
defendant’s case was pending. Richardson, 2015 IL 118255, ¶ 3. On appeal, the defendant argued
that the savings clause violated the equal protection clause because excluding 17-year-olds who
allegedly committed offenses before the effective date of the amendment was not rationally related
to the amendment’s purpose. Id. ¶ 7.
¶ 20 Our supreme court rejected that argument and held that the savings clause was rationally
related to the legislature’s goal as it achieved its intended purpose of including 17-year-olds within
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act “in such a manner that avoids confusion and delay and
also preserves judicial resources.” Id. ¶ 10. The Richardson court held that the savings clause put
-7-
No. 1-24-1536
stakeholders on notice of the amendment’s application based on the date of the alleged violation
and ensured that cases in progress would not have to restart in the juvenile division of the court.
Id. Our supreme court observed that, in People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551, 562 (1978), the court
previously rejected an equal protection challenge to an amended sentencing provision that applied
only prospectively, holding that applying the amendment to those already sentenced would require
a remand for additional sentencing hearings. Richardson, 2015 IL 118255, ¶ 11.
¶ 21 In Profit, this court addressed a similar argument to that raised by defendant here and
rejected it, based on Richardson and Grant. Profit, 2023 IL App (1st) 210881, ¶ 14. The Profit
court held that section 5-4.5-115(b) explicitly stated that it was not retroactive and only applied
prospectively and found that this provision bore a rational relationship to a valid governmental
interest of the finality to convictions and the preservation of judicial resources. Id. ¶ 37. The Profit
court concluded that the prospective application of the parole provision did not violate equal
protection and thus, the defendant could not establish prejudice to warrant granting leave to file a
successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 41.
¶ 22 Similarly in Wells, this court acknowledged the general principle that there “‘is no
requirement that two persons convicted of the same offense receive identical sentences.’” Wells,
2023 IL App (3d) 210292, ¶ 28 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970)).
“‘Prospective application of a new doctrine or rule of law does not violate the equal protection of
laws under either the Federal or Illinois constitution.’” Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Coney v. J.L.G. Industries,
Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 125 (1983)). We examined Grant and Richardson, as well as cases from other
jurisdictions, and concluded that ameliorative sentencing provisions and changes to parole
-8-
No. 1-24-1536
eligibility that only applied prospectively have been repeatedly upheld as consistent with equal
protection. Id. ¶¶ 29-37.
¶ 23 Turning to section 5-4.5-115(b), we held in Wells that there were “many rational bases
supporting the legislature’s enactment of section 5-4.5-115” and its prospective application,
including the legitimate government purpose of improving sentencing laws for young adults, the
State’s “weighty interest” in the finality of sentences that were valid when imposed, the
legislature’s goal of implementing sentencing reform “one step at a time,” and the State’s interest
in applying new laws prospectively and not retroactively. Id. ¶¶ 40-44 (quoting People v.
Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 31 (1992)). The court concluded that a statute “passes constitutional
muster as long as ‘any plausible reasons for the legislature’s action can be discerned.’” Id. ¶ 44
(quoting Miller v. Department of Public Aid, 94 Ill. App. 3d 11, 20 (1981)). Because there were
“many rational bases supporting the legislature’s enactment of section 5-4.5-115 and its
prospective application,” the court held that the statute “passes constitutional muster” and rejected
the defendant’s equal protection challenge. Id. ¶ 44.
¶ 24 In addition to Profit and Wells, this court has rejected similar equal protection challenges
to the prospective application of the parole provision in section 5-4.5-115(b). See People v.
Munson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221193-U, ¶ 40; People v. Barry, 2023 IL App (2d) 220324, ¶¶ 17-24;
People v. Lowder, 2023 IL App (4th) 220315-U, ¶¶ 44-46. We find, consistent with Richardson,
Profit, and Wells, that the prospective application of section 5-4.5-115(b) is rationally related to
the legitimate governmental interest of the finality of convictions, the preservation of judicial
resources, and the legislature’s interest in implementing sentencing reform on an incremental basis
and does not violate the equal protection clause.
-9-
No. 1-24-1536
¶ 25 In an attempt to distinguish Wells, defendant relies on comments made by individual
legislators during the debate surrounding the passage of Public Act 100-1182 which, he argues,
suggest that they relied on promises made by prosecutors to victims and their families regarding
the sentences for individuals convicted prior to the effective date of the amendment. He contends
that this is not a rational basis to limit the amendment to apply only prospectively.
¶ 26 However, defendant’s argument seeks to impose a higher burden on the legislature to
explain its rationale than rational basis review requires. “Under the rational basis test, the court
may hypothesize reasons for the legislation, even if the reasoning advanced did not motivate the
legislative action.” People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998). Our review is
to determine whether the legislation at issue can be supported by “any plausible reason[].” Miller,
94 Ill. App. 3d at 20; see Wells, 2023 IL App (3d) 210292, ¶ 23 (rational basis test is not limited
to articulated explanation given by legislature, and legislature is not required to state the rationale
behind its decision-making). Rational basis does not require this court to examine the statements
of individual legislators and determine whether each proffered reason for the legislation is
legitimate, and we decline defendant’s invitation to do so.
¶ 27 Defendant next argues that People v. Nicks, 62 Ill. 2d 350 (1976) and People ex rel. Carroll
v. Frye, 35 Ill. 2d 604 (1966), support his position that the prospective application of section 5-
4.5-115(b) violates equal protection. We disagree. In Nicks, our supreme court considered the
constitutionality of a sentencing provision that applied prospectively only to those serving
consecutive sentences, while other provisions applied to all persons in custody on the effective
date. Nicks, 62 Ill. 2d at 354-55. The court found no rational basis to treat those serving consecutive
sentences differently from those not serving consecutive sentences. Id. at 355. Unlike Nicks,
- 10 -
No. 1-24-1536
however, the prospective application of section 5-4.5-115(b) at issue in this case is uniform for all
individuals sentenced after its effective date, and thus, Nicks is distinguishable. See Lowder, 2023
IL App (4th) 220315-U, ¶ 51.
¶ 28 In Frye, our supreme court held that the prospective application of a statute granting pretrial
detention credits to inmates violated equal protection as applied to mandatory minimum sentences
because it would cause indigent defendants who were unable to pay bail to serve longer sentences
than those who could afford bail. Frye, 35 Ill. 2d at 609-10. Unlike this case, the statute at issue in
Frye created a distinction that arbitrarily discriminated against individuals to whom the statute did
not apply. See Lowder, 2023 IL App (4th) 220315-U, ¶ 51. Thus, we reject defendant’s reliance of
Nicks and Frye here.
¶ 29 Since we found that the prospective application of section 5-4.5-115(b) is rationally related
to a legitimate governmental purpose, we may end our analysis here. See Barry, 2023 IL App (2d)
220324, ¶¶ 17-24 (in the context of an as-applied challenge to section 5-4.5-115(b), determining
that the legislature had a rational basis for applying the change prospectively without consideration
of defendant’s individual circumstances). However, even if we consider defendant’s arguments
regarding his individual circumstances in an as-applied challenge, we would reject them.
¶ 30 Defendant’s arguments that section 5-4.5-115(b) is unconstitutional as applied to him are
based on his position that the family of the victim, Bufford, did not want defendant to be charged.
Therefore, he argues, there is no concern about the finality of his sentence from the perspective of
the victim and the legislature’s other stated rationales for limiting retroactive application of section
5-4.5-115(b) do not apply to him. However, contrary to defendant’s argument, there is no evidence
in the record to support his position. While defense counsel made a comment about what he was
- 11 -
No. 1-24-1536
told related to Bufford’s family’s wishes during the sentencing hearing, the court sustained the
State’s objection to that comment. Additionally, defendant’s argument ignores the extent to which
Sharkey, who testified at defendant’s trial and whose home was invaded by defendant and his
accomplices, had an interest in defendant being charged and convicted. Accordingly, we reject
defendant’s arguments.
¶ 31 Defendant also argues that some of the stated rationales for the prospective application of
section 5-4.5-115(b), such as judicial efficiency, the use of judicial resources, and incremental
change in sentencing, are not implicated when it is only applied to his individual request that the
statute apply retroactively to him. This is not a compelling argument that section 5-4.5-115(b) is
unconstitutional as applied to this defendant, as any defendant could argue that large-scale
concerns when enacting a piece of legislation are not implicated when the defendant asks only for
individual relief. Further, this argument is divorced from any consideration of defendant’s
individual characteristics or circumstances, which is a necessary component of an as-applied
constitutional challenge, and we reject it. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37.
¶ 32 Defendant’s as-applied arguments amount to assertions that there is no harm in allowing
him the opportunity for early parole provided for in section 5-4.5-115(b). He has not demonstrated
what makes his individual circumstances different from other defendants such that the prospective
application of section 5-4.5-115(b) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Defendant failed to show
that excluding him from the early parole provisions in section 5-4.5-115(b) amounts to an equal
protection violation. Therefore, we hold that he has failed to establish prejudice necessary to obtain
leave to file a third successive postconviction petition.
- 12 -
No. 1-24-1536
¶ 33 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the circuit court denying defendant’s
third motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 34 Affirmed.
- 13 -