The opinion
Filed 11/5/25 P. v. Cabral CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084652
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD301812)
ABRAHAM GONZALEZ CABRAL, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
Defendant and Appellant. NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 15, 2025, be
modified. On page 12, footnote 6 should be deleted in its entirety.
There is no change in the judgment.
IRION, Acting P. J.
Copies to: All Parties
Filed 10/15/25 P. v. Cabral CA4/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084652
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD301812)
ABRAHAM GONZALEZ CABRAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard J. Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and James M. Toohey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant Abraham Gonzalez Cabral guilty of one
misdemeanor count of resisting arrest (Pen. Code,1 § 148, subd. (a)(1)) and
the trial court placed him on summary probation.2 On appeal, Cabral
contends the trial court erred by denying his request for a pinpoint
instruction on the First Amendment as a defense to the charge of resisting
arrest. Because we find Cabral’s proposed pinpoint instruction unsupported
by substantial evidence, confusing, and argumentative, we affirm the
judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Prosecution Evidence
At about 6:20 a.m. on November 23, 2023 — Thanksgiving Day —
uniformed San Diego Police Department (SDPD) Officer Thomas Pool
observed a gold SUV run a stop sign at a downtown intersection. The officer
got in his marked patrol vehicle, followed the SUV, and activated his
emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop. The driver of the SUV, later
identified as Cabral, pulled over. The ensuing events were captured on
several SDPD officers’ body-worn cameras and the recordings were admitted
as exhibits at trial.
Before Officer Pool could exit his police car, Cabral had already stepped
out of the SUV. Officer Pool testified this behavior is unusual and concerning
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The jury found Cabral not guilty of felony possession of a billy club.
(§ 22210.) We discuss the facts pertaining to that charge only as they relate
to the issues arising from the resisting arrest charge.
2
to police officers because traffic stops are “usually the most dangerous thing
officers do.” Cabral’s hands were near his waistband and Officer Pool could
not see Cabral’s right hand. Against Officer Pool’s commands, Cabral turned
and faced the officer. Based on Cabral’s unusual behavior and the
uncertainty over whether there were weapons or other occupants in the SUV,
Officer Pool got out of his vehicle, drew his handgun, pointed it at Cabral,
and called for emergency backup. Officer Pool took cover behind his open
vehicle door with his handgun pointed at Cabral while waiting for more
officers to arrive to “deescalate the situation” and get Cabral “into custody
peacefully.” Numerous SDPD officers responded.
Officer Pool repeatedly ordered Cabral to get down on the ground but
Cabral did not comply. Instead, Cabral got back in the driver’s seat of his
SUV despite Officer Pool telling Cabral to remain outside of it. Officer Pool
then ordered Cabral to keep his hands outside the SUV but Cabral instead
brought his hands inside. Cabral began playing music from his phone over
the SUV’s stereo system and turned the volume up loud, making it difficult to
communicate. Cabral bounced one hand along to the music.
Cabral then got out of his SUV, closed the driver’s door (which muffled
the music), walked away from the officers, and loudly placed his hands on the
SUV’s hood. Officers had not instructed Cabral to do this and Officer Pool
considered it “threatening” because the officers could not see what Cabral
was doing with his hands. The officers repeatedly instructed Cabral to take
two steps to the left but Cabral did not comply. Another officer instructed
Cabral to “turn away,” but Cabral instead turned to face the officers. Officer
Pool testified that a suspect facing officers during an arrest poses a safety
threat.
3
Officers again ordered Cabral to turn around but he did not comply.
Officer Pool clarified, “Sir, face way. You’re facing towards us. Turn around.
Turn around.” Cabral shouted, “What do you want, man? I gotta f---ing ham
in the oven. [¶] It’s Thanksgiving man. I’ve got a f---ing ham in the oven.
[¶] What do you want?” Officer Pool responded, “You need to listen to us
right now.” Cabral shouted, “If you would have stopped me without f---ing
screaming at me and without f---ing pointing s--t at me . . . . I would be
compliant as hell.” Officer Pool told Cabral, “We’re not gonna argue about it.”
The officer directed Cabral to “turn away” and “get on the ground” on his
stomach. Cabral briefly faced away from the officers, but then turned to face
them, shouted his name, said he had identification, and made incoherent
statements. The officers repeated for Cabral to get on his stomach but he did
not comply. Officer Pool asked Cabral if anyone was in the SUV; Cabral
turned to face the officers, gesticulated with his arms, and said he was alone.
Cabral then faced away from the officers again.
Without being told to, Cabral dropped to the ground on his stomach.
Officers did not approach Cabral to detain him at this point because he was
next to his SUV and officers were uncertain whether it was occupied.
At the direction of a police officer, Cabral finally stood back up and
began walking backward toward the officers. But Cabral then pivoted to face
the officers and walked forward toward them, causing them to retreat for
safety. Officers instructed Cabral to face away and resume walking
backward toward them. Cabral initially complied, but then began walking
sideways away from the officers, raising concerns he might try to escape.
Officers repeatedly ordered Cabral to get on the ground but Cabral continued
not to comply. As officers approached Cabral to take him into custody,
Cabral physically resisted them.
4
The officers placed Cabral on the ground, where he continued to resist
them and defied their commands to put his hands behind his back. One
officer administered “open-palm strike[s]” to Cabral’s back, but Cabral still
did not comply. Officer Pool then delivered five blows to Cabral’s abdomen,
determined they were ineffective, and delivered five more. Another officer
pepper-sprayed Cabral’s face. While Cabral was struggling with the officers,
they had the following exchange:
CABRAL: (Unintelligible yelling.) So f--- you guys.
POOL: Put your hands behind your back, dude. You’re
gonna get tased.
CABRAL: I don’t give a f---. You think I give a f--- about a
f---ing — They’re hitting me. They’re hitting me.
POOL: Put your hands behind your back.
CABRAL: They’re f---ing, socking my ribs. They’re f---ing
pepper spraying me and f---ing hitting me. F---ing p---ies.
POOL: Put your f---ing hands behind your back.
CABRAL: Yeah, that’s right you f---ing p---ies. F---ing s---.
You f---ing idiots. Bet you guys like f---ing playing like
that, huh? [¶] . . . [¶] A f---ing stop sign. Over a f---ing stop
sign. Over a f---ing stop sign. [¶] . . . [¶] Over a f---ing stop
sign.
Officers eventually got Cabral’s hands behind his back and handcuffed
him. Officers found a knife in Cabral’s pocket and a miniature baseball bat
wedged between the driver’s seat and front console of Cabral’s SUV.
The prosecution introduced evidence regarding the SDPD’s use-of-force
matrix to show that the officers’ actions toward Cabral were authorized at
each stage of the escalating encounter.
5
2. Defense Evidence
Cabral testified in his own defense. He claimed he was unaware he
was being pulled over and just happened to have parked when Officer Pool
stopped. Cabral testified he requested that Officer Pool summon a supervisor
and that he (Cabral) decided to wait in his SUV until the supervisor arrived.
Cabral “pumped the music up” and was “dancing a little” because he “was
excited.” Cabral explained he tried to comply with the officers’ commands but
misunderstood or could not hear them, claiming it was loud downtown and he
is “a little hard of hearing.”
Cabral testified that when officers approached to detain him, he did not
attempt to hit them or to escape. He “had no problems speaking with the
officer” but “just didn’t want to be in handcuffs.” He testified he voluntarily
went to the ground and “completely stopped moving” when officers told him
to stop resisting. The defense presented photographs showing bruises Cabral
sustained during the arrest.
B. Procedural Background
The prosecution charged Cabral with one felony count of possession of a
billy club (§ 22210) and one misdemeanor count of resisting arrest (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1)). The jury found Cabral not guilty of the weapon-possession
charge and guilty of resisting arrest. The trial court placed Cabral on
summary probation.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Background
The People moved in limine to admit Cabral’s statements made during
his arrest, arguing they were “critical to understand his state of mind,
demeanor, intent, motive, and knowledge.”
6
Cabral moved in limine for a pinpoint instruction clarifying that,
because the First Amendment affords “the freedom of individuals to verbally
oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest,” the jury
could not convict Cabral of resisting arrest based on his verbal opposition to
the police. Cabral proposed the following instruction:
There is no violation of Penal Code section 148 when a
citizen verbally opposes or challenges police conduct
because the citizen has not “resisted, delayed or
obstructed” the police. Even fighting words, when uttered
to a policeman, are constitutionally protected because it is
not contemplated that a peace officer will react violently.
Although section 148 proscribes resisting, delaying, or
obstructing a police officer, “The First Amendment
protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and
challenge directed at police officers.” The freedom of
individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action
without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal
characteristics by which we distinguish a free state from a
police state. Even though the police may dislike being the
object of abusive language, they are not allowed to use the
awesome power which they possess to punish individuals
for conduct that is not only lawful, but which is protected
by the First Amendment. For this reason, section 148 must
be applied with great care to speech.
At a pretrial hearing on motions in limine, the trial court announced its
tentative ruling to deny Cabral’s request. Defense counsel argued the
instruction was necessary because the defense suspected — based on the
People’s motion in limine — that “the People will seek to use Mr. Cabral’s
freedom of speech . . . during that interaction with police to insist that he did
delay, obstruct, or resist the police.” The trial court denied Cabral’s request,
finding it premature and unnecessary in light of the applicable pattern
instruction’s “sufficien[cy] to cover the factual issues in this case.”
7
At the jury instruction conference during trial, the defense renewed its
request for the pinpoint instruction. The defense argued it was warranted
based on the video footage and officers’ testimony recounting Cabral’s verbal
opposition to the officers’ conduct, and the defense’s view that the officers
considered Cabral’s speech obstructive and warranting the use of additional
force. The prosecutor responded that the instruction was not appropriate
because he would “not be arguing or asking the jury to find Mr. Cabral guilty
because he was verbally combative by itself. It’s the refusing to comply with
commands before force is used.” The prosecutor further argued Cabral’s
“statements are probative of his state of mind.” The trial court denied the
defense’s request to give its pinpoint instruction, finding the pattern jury
instructions adequately cover the elements of, and defenses to, the resisting
arrest charge and that “there does not appear to be substantial evidence to
provide an additional pinpoint instruction.”
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2656 regarding
the elements of resisting arrest. The instruction required the People to prove
that (1) Officer Pool “was a peace officer lawfully performing . . . his duties”;
(2) Cabral “willfully resisted, or obstructed, or delayed [Officer] Pool in the
performance . . . of those duties”; and (3) when Cabral acted, he knew or
reasonably should have known that Officer Pool was a peace officer
performing his duties. This instruction also included the following unanimity
component: “The People allege that the defendant resisted, or obstructed, or
delayed [Officer] Pool by doing the following: ignoring lawful police
commands, refusing lawful orders to place his arms behind his back, and
pulling away from officers. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you
all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least
8
one of the alleged acts . . . and you all agree on which act he committed.” The
court also gave a separate unanimity instruction (CALCRIM No. 3500).
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2670 regarding
the requirement that Officer Pool must be lawfully performing his duties at
the time of the arrest. Among other things, this instruction advised that
(1) “[a] peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is
unlawfully arresting or detaining someone or using unreasonable or excessive
force when making or attempting to make an otherwise lawful arrest or
detention”; (2) “[s]pecial rules control the use of force”; (3) the jury “may not
find the defendant guilty of resisting arrest if the arrest was unlawful”; and
(4) “[i]f a peace officer uses unreasonable or excessive force while arresting or
attempting to arrest or detaining or attempting to detain a person, that
person may lawfully use reasonable force to defend himself or herself.”
During closing arguments, the prosecutor and defense counsel each
emphasized the importance of the jury agreeing unanimously that Cabral
engaged in one or more of the predicate acts specified in CALCRIM No. 2656.
Defense counsel also argued extensively that Cabral was not guilty because
the officers acted unlawfully, thus justifying Cabral’s reasonable resistance.
B. Relevant Legal Principles
“ ‘Under appropriate circumstances, “a trial court may be required to
give a requested jury instruction that pinpoints a defense theory of the
case.” ’ ” (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 220.) Pinpoint
instructions “ ‘relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or “pinpoint”
the crux of a defendant’s case.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th
789, 824.) “A defendant is entitled to a pinpoint instruction, upon request,
only when appropriate.” (Ibid.; People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th
442, 498 (Mora and Rangel) [“A proper pinpoint instruction must be given at
9
a defendant’s request.” (Italics added.)].) “[A] trial court may properly refuse
an instruction offered by the defendant if it incorrectly states the law, is
argumentative, duplicative, or potentially confusing [citation], or if it is not
supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 30.)
The de novo standard of review applies to a trial court’s refusal to give
a requested pinpoint instruction on the basis it was unsupported by
substantial evidence. (See People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581.)
The abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial court’s refusal to give a
requested pinpoint instruction on the basis it is duplicative, confusing, or
argumentative. (See Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 497; People v.
Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1063.)
C. Analysis
Based on our review of the entire record, we find no error in the trial
court’s refusal to give the requested pinpoint instruction.
To begin, the requested pinpoint instruction was not supported by
substantial evidence. Based on the officers’ testimony, their body-worn
camera footage, Cabral’s own testimony, and the jury instructions, no
reasonable juror would construe the resisting arrest charge as being based on
Cabral’s speech rather than on his actions. The evidence shows Cabral
repeatedly refused to comply with the officers’ clear verbal commands and
physically resisted when officers attempted to take him into custody. The
trial court specifically instructed the jury that the resisting arrest charge was
based on Cabral allegedly “doing” certain things: “ignoring lawful police
commands, refusing lawful orders to place his arms behind his back, and
pulling away from officers.” None of these predicates involve Cabral’s speech.
Cabral argues that certain of the prosecutor’s statements during
closing arguments suggested the charge was based on Cabral’s speech rather
10
than his actions. For example, Cabral asserts “[t]he prosecutor incorrectly
argued . . . that this statement alone made [Cabral] guilty: ‘[Mr. Cabral]
doesn’t remember saying “You f---ing p---ies” on the ground. Doesn’t
remember challenging them to fight. Why? Because those statements, that
evidence makes him guilty.’ ” The record shows, however, that the prosecutor
was not citing Cabral’s statements as instances of resisting arrest, but
rather, as bases for impeaching Cabral’s credibility.
More specifically, the prosecutor made the cited statement while
discussing CALCRIM No. 226, which sets forth factors the jury may consider
when evaluating witness credibility. While discussing one of those factors —
“Did other evidence prove or disprove any fact about which the witness
testified?” (ibid.) — the prosecutor cited several instances in which other
evidence disproved aspects of Cabral’s testimony.3 So framed, the reason
Cabral’s statements “ma[d]e him guilty” is because his dubious and self-
serving claim to not remember making the statements impeached his
credibility in all respects. The prosecutor also argued, more generally, that
Cabral’s statements were relevant to establishing the requirement that
Cabral “willfully resisted, or obstructed, or delayed” a police officer.4 (Italics
3 For example, the prosecutor pointed out that while Cabral claimed he
did not know the police had pulled him over, Cabral admitted at trial that he
said “ ‘over a f---ing stop sign’ ” — before police told him why Officer Pool had
stopped him.
4 The prosecutor argued: “Statements can tell you what people are
thinking. Right. It can reveal their intent. ‘If you would have stopped me
without f---ing screaming at me, without f---ing pointing s--- at me, I would be
compliant as hell.’ That’s an admission he’s not complying. He is telling the
officer [‘]had you just done your job differently, I would have acted exactly as
you’re asking me to.[’] [¶] Or how about this on direct: ‘I didn’t want to be in
handcuffs.’ He is telling you that he is taking these actions on purpose.
Purposeful. No one is forcing him to act this way.”
11
added.) The record, as a whole, shows that the prosecutor’s argument about
Cabral’s statements “mak[ing] him guilty” did not suggest the statements
could constitute a predicate for the resisting arrest charge.
Cabral also cites the prosecutor’s references in closing arguments to
Cabral “taunting” the officers, which he maintains suggested to jurors that
they could find him guilty of resisting arrest based on his speech. Cabral first
points to the following statement in the prosecutor’s initial closing argument:
“ ‘And the law tells you consider all the surrounding circumstances of this
case . . . . That the defendant was quick to anger, demanded officers do their
job a different way, yelling and cursing, challenging the officers, ignoring
police commands and dancing, taunting with law enforcement who have guns
drawn at them [sic], willing to physically resist police officers.’ ” But the
record shows the prosecutor made this statement in connection with the
weapon-possession charge (that is, whether Cabral possessed the miniature
baseball bat “as a weapon”).5 Cabral obscured this fact in his appellate
briefing by selectively quoting the passage above to omit the sentence that
immediately follows it: “It’s a weapon. Under these circumstances with this
object, with this defendant, it’s a weapon.”6 In context, then, it is clear that
the prosecutor’s initial reference to “taunting” was unrelated to the resisting
arrest charge.
5 The trial court instructed the jury on the weapon-possession charge
with CALCRIM No. 2500, which states in part: “To prove that the defendant
is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he defendant
possessed the object as a weapon. [¶] . . . [¶] When deciding whether the
defendant possessed the object as a weapon, consider all the surrounding
circumstances relating to that question . . . .”
6 We remind Cabral’s appellate counsel of his duty of candor to this
court. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d); Rules Prof. Cond.,
rule 3.3(a).)
12
Cabral next points to the prosecutor’s use of the word “taunting” twice
in his rebuttal argument. At the very outset of his rebuttal, the prosecutor
stated: “Six minutes [the approximate duration of the entire encounter]
doesn’t justify ten [blows]. What about [‘]six minutes doesn’t justify countless
ignored commands? Six minutes doesn’t deserve taunting somebody who is
doing their job. Six minutes doesn’t deserve officers who are working on
Thanksgiving having to put themselves in a dangerous situation . . . .[’] [L]et
me be very clear it is insulting the idea that Mr. Cabral gets to set the terms
of how officers who are working safely do their job.” This statement was a
clear response to defense counsel’s statement at the very outset of her closing
argument that “six minutes did not justify 10 blows from Officer Pool.”
Defense counsel repeated the “six minutes” theme throughout her closing
argument. The prosecutor’s retort to the defense theme does not strike us as
invoking “taunting” as a basis for convicting Cabral of resisting arrest.
At the very end of the prosecutor’s rebuttal he again used the word
“taunting.” In surmising how jurors might describe this case when asked
“What was the case about?”, the prosecutor said:
Are you going to say this is a case about a person who
testified he didn’t even know that he had been stopped,
and he got the perfect [parking] spot and all of a sudden he
saw this officer and he couldn’t hear because downtown is
so loud, and he was hard of hearing and he genuinely was
trying to clarify with the officer what happened, and he
just wanted to comply. And then these officers, like a
group of bandits, came in and they just beat him up. Used
excessive force.
No. You’re going to say this is about a person who was
stopped on Thanksgiving. And maybe he was rightfully
upset or frustrated for unfortunately running that stop
sign right in front of a police officer, but then he took it out
of hand. He was intentionally ignoring commands, he was
13
taunting officers. And the officers in that situation
couldn’t walk away from the scene. And eventually due to
him not listening to commands, they had to use force. And
then when they went into his vehicle, they found a
weapon. That was illegal because of the way he was
possessing it.
As the full context shows, the prosecutor cited Cabral’s “not listening to
commands” — not taunting — as the impetus for the officers’ use of force.
And as already noted, the prosecutor had earlier linked taunting to the
weapon-possession charge and Cabral’s mental state. We therefore conclude
this limited reference to “taunting” lacks a nexus to the resisting arrest
charge sufficient to require the trial court to instruct regarding First
Amendment principles.
Finally, the timing of Cabral’s statements also undermines the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the proposed pinpoint instruction. The
vast majority of Cabral’s taunting occurred after the officers were already
attempting to subdue him, thus refuting that the taunting was the impetus
for his arrest or prosecution.
We thus conclude — as the trial court did — that substantial evidence
did not support instructing regarding First Amendment principles.
We likewise conclude the trial court properly refused to give Cabral’s
proposed pinpoint instruction because it was potentially confusing and
argumentative. The first sentence of the proposed pinpoint instruction
states: “There is no violation of Penal Code section 148 when a citizen
verbally opposes or challenges police conduct because the citizen has not
‘resisted, delayed or obstructed’ the police.” As the People argue, this
assertion is confusing because it gives the mistaken impression that verbally
opposing police while physically resisting them “somehow immunizes a
defendant from liability for” the physical resistance. It also glosses over the
14
nuances between protected speech and criminal misconduct. (See, e.g., In re
Chase C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 107, 117 [“when a person’s words go ‘beyond
verbal criticism, into the realm of interference with [an officer’s performance
of his or her] duty,’ the First Amendment does not preclude criminal
punishment”].)
The proposed instruction is also argumentative. Its reference to the
distinction between a “free nation and a police state” is inflammatory and
unhelpful to the jury on the facts of this case. We recognize that this
language comes from Houston v. Hill (1987) 482 U.S. 451, on which Cabral
heavily relies. (See id. at pp. 462–463 [“The freedom of individuals verbally
to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of
the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a
police state.”].) Cabral fails, however, to explain how the specific issue in Hill
(the legal question of “whether a municipal ordinance that makes it unlawful
to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or her duties is
unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment” (id. at p. 453))
relates to the specific issue he wished to address here through the pinpoint
instruction (whether Cabral’s prosecution was premised on his speech rather
than his conduct). Absent such an explanation, Cabral’s reliance on a snippet
from another appellate case is unenlightening. (See People v. Colantuono
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 221, fn. 13 [“The discussion in an appellate decision is
directed to the issue presented. The reviewing court generally does not
contemplate a subsequent transmutation of its words into jury instructions
and hence does not choose them with that end in mind. We therefore
strongly caution that when evaluating special instructions, trial courts
carefully consider whether such derivative application is consistent with their
original usage.”]; People v. Adams (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 201, 204–205
15
[“Language in an appellate court opinion which may be a good statement of
law or of the reasoning of the appellate court does not necessarily make a
good jury instruction.”].)
We also note that the second paragraph of Cabral’s proposed pinpoint
instruction is a nearly verbatim excerpt from In re Muhammed C. (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 1325 at pages 1330–1331. Cabral does not discuss
Muhammed at all in his briefing. Rather, he cites it only indirectly in a page-
long block-quotation from an inapposite federal appellate decision in a civil
action for unlawful arrest that held there were triable issues of fact as to
whether officers were acting lawfully at the time of an arrest for purposes of
qualified immunity. (Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (9th Cir. 2013)
724 F.3d 1159, 1174.)
In short, the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury with
Cabral’s proposed pinpoint instruction regarding First Amendment
principles.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
16
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
17