Anthony Norman v. Ashlei Janak, Bobby Lumpkin, Bryan Collier, Shovanda D. Mathis, Margarita Thomas, Rocky Moore, and Tammy Shelby

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 1, 2025.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-24-00068-CV

ANTHONY NORMAN, Appellant

V.

ASHLEY JANAK, BOBBY LUMPKIN, BRYAN COLLIER, MARGARITA

THOMAS, ROCKY MOORE, AND TAMMY SHELBY, Appellees

On Appeal from the 12th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2230570

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Anthony Norman, an inmate at the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice (TDCJ), filed suit in Travis County district court asserting multiple claims

against prison officials and employees. Norman sought injunctive and monetary

relief, as well as a writ of mandamus against the Executive Director of the TDCJ.

The Travis County court granted the defendants’ motion to transfer venue to

Walker County, and the Walker County court subsequently dismissed all of

Norman’s claims as frivolous under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code with prejudice. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 14.003(a)(2).

We conclude the Travis County court did not abuse its discretion in

transferring the case to Walker County because Norman failed to properly plead

his mandamus action against the Executive Director of the TDCJ. We also

conclude that the Walker County court did not err in dismissing Norman’s claims

after transfer. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Norman is an inmate in the Wynne Unit of the TDCJ located in Huntsville,

Texas. Norman sued TDCJ employees, Ashley Janak, Tammy Shelby, Margarita

Thomas (who were members of the Mail System Coordinators Panel and referred

to collectively as the MSCP Defendants), and Warden Rocky Moore seeking

damages and injunctive relief. Norman’s claims involved allegations that the

MSCP Defendants either lost or stole his mail, a violation of his right to vote

because the MSCP Defendants allegedly stole his mail-in ballot, a policy that no

jackets could be worn in the hallways or the chow hall, and the temperature of the

facility during cold weather and the handling of water main breaks.

Norman also sought a writ of mandamus against the Executive Director of

the TDCJ, Bryan Collier, to compel him to correct the TDCJ’s internal records

reflecting that Norman has a final felony conviction because, according to Norman,

his direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is still pending, and

therefore he has not been finally convicted of a felony. Lastly, Norman sought a

writ of mandamus against TDCJ Director Bobby Lumpkin to compel actions such

as updating the prison law library resources and other policies of the law library

and to address Norman’s allegations that the law librarian was obstructing his

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access to courts. 1 The MSCP Defendants, Warden Moore, Executive Director

Collier, and Director Lumpkin are collectively referred to as “Defendants” in this

opinion.

Norman’s petition alleged venue was proper in Travis County under Section

15.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because he sought a writ of

mandamus against the Executive Director of the TDCJ. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code § 15.014. (mandatory venue rule providing that “[a]n action for

mandamus against the head of a department of the state government shall be

brought in Travis County.”).

Defendants moved to transfer the case to Walker County arguing that

mandatory venue for Norman’s claims is prescribed by Section 15.019, not 15.014.

Id. § 15.019(a) (“Except as provided by Section 15.014, an action that accrued

while the plaintiff was housed in a facility operated by or under contract with the

[TDCJ] shall be brought in the county in which the facility is located.”). In their

motion, Defendants argued that the Travis County court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over Norman’s mandamus action because a district court only has

mandamus jurisdiction to enforce its own jurisdiction. Defendants also argued that

because Norman’s mandamus action requests the district court to exercise

supervisory control over a prison official and not to protect the court’s jurisdiction,

the mandamus must be denied. Consequently, according to Defendants, venue was

mandatory in Walker County, where the Wynn Unit is located, for Norman’s

remaining claims. See id. § 15.019(a).

After a hearing, the Travis County court granted Defendants’ motion and

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Norman also alleged claims against the prison law librarian, Shovanda Mathis-Howard,

but she was never served. Norman nonsuited his claims against Mathis-Howard before

appealing.

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transferred the case to Walker County. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss

under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code on the grounds that

Norman did not follow certain procedural requirements under Chapter 14, that

Norman’s claims were frivolous, and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to

grant the writ of mandamus. See id. §§ 14.001–.014 (inmate litigation). Norman

also filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on both

motions, the court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissed Norman’s

claim with prejudice, and subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of

law. Representing himself, Norman appeals the order dismissing his claims, as

well as the Travis County district court’s transfer of his case to Walker County.

DISCUSSION

A. Venue Transfer

Norman contends that because venue was proper in Travis County, the

Travis County trial court erred in transferring the case to Walker County. We

disagree.

If a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s venue choice through a motion, the

burden is on the plaintiff to prove venue is proper in the county of suit. Tex. R.

Civ. P. 87(2)(a). The trial court is to determine venue questions from the pleadings

and affidavits. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.064(a). All facts regarding

venue shall be taken as true when properly pleaded, unless specifically denied by

the adverse party. Tex. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a). A plaintiff is not required to “prove

the merits of a cause of action, but the existence of a cause of action, when pleaded

properly, shall be taken as established as alleged by the pleadings.” Id. R.

87(2)(b); see also id. R. 87(3)(a) (“[N]o party shall ever be required for venue

purposes to support by prima facie proof the existence of a cause of action or part

thereof, and at the hearing the pleadings of the parties shall be taken as conclusive

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on the issues of existence of a cause of action.”). An improperly pleaded claim,

i.e. one that is not viable on its face, will not support venue in a particular county.

In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 218 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2007) (concluding venue not

proper in Travis County when plaintiff failed to plead viable negligent activity

claim).

Although he filed his mandamus proceeding in Travis County, potentially a

county of mandatory venue under Section 15.014, Norman failed to properly plead

a viable mandamus action against the Executive Director of the TDCJ. A party

may seek mandamus relief “to compel a public official to perform a ministerial

act.” Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. 1991). A

mandamus will issue only to compel a public official to perform a ministerial,

rather than a discretionary, act. Id. An action is ministerial when the law “clearly

spells out the duty to be performed by the official with sufficient certainty that

nothing is left to the exercise of discretion.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court has

likened a mandamus action against a government official to an ultra vires action.

Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 329, 332–33 (Tex.

2022) (explaining to fall within ultra vires exception to governmental immunity,

“suit must not complain of government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather

must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or

failed to perform a ministerial act.”) (quoting City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284

S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009)).

To properly plead a mandamus action, Norman had to plead that the

Executive Director of the TDCJ failed to perform a purely ministerial act, not a

discretionary one. Id. Norman has pleaded no such facts. Norman’s sole claim

against the Executive Director seeks to compel him to correct TDCJ’s internal

records to reflect that Norman’s conviction is not final. Assuming that the

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Executive Director has discretion to interpret the law, the only way he could act

ultra vires is if he exceeded “the bounds of his granted authority or if his acts

conflict with the law itself.” Id. (quoting Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238

(Tex. 2017)). But if his actions are not outside of his authority or in conflict with

the law, “then the plaintiff has not stated a valid ultra vires claim and governmental

immunity will bar the suit.” Id. (citing Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388

(Tex. 2021)).

Norman contends the Executive Director has a ministerial duty to change

Norman’s records at the TDCJ to reflect that his murder conviction is not final.

Norman, however, has exhausted his appellate remedies, and his conviction is

final. See Norman v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. A-21-CV-1024-LY, 2023 WL 9116687,

at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-50360, 2024 WL 64769 (5th Cir.

Jan. 5, 2024) (“Despite his assertions to the contrary, Norman stands finally

convicted of the murder of his wife.”); see also Norman v. State, No. 14–11–

00433–CR, 2012 WL 4163498, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 20,

2012, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (establishing finality of

Norman’s direct appeal); Norman v. Williamson, No. 03–19–00297–CV, 2021 WL

500415, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 11, 2021, pet. denied) (affirming grant of

plea to the jurisdiction where Norman did not allege failure to perform ministerial

acts relating to his conviction).

The Executive Director of the TDCJ has no discretion to ignore the actions

of the court system on an inmate’s appeal. In fact, he has a ministerial duty to

follow the direction of the court system and its rulings on the finality of an

inmate’s conviction. Norman’s claim is, in reality, that the Executive Director

should have used discretion—which he does not have—to ignore the ultimate

decision of the court system on the finality of his appeal.

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In other words, even accepting Norman’s pleadings as true, his suit does not

request that the Executive Director perform a ministerial duty such that mandamus

relief is appropriate; rather, he requests that the Executive Director perform a

discretionary action that he cannot legally undertake—to substitute his judgment

for that of the court system. As such, Norman has failed to properly plead a viable

mandamus action against the Executive Director, and the trial court was within its

discretion to ignore this improperly pleaded claim and to transfer the action to

Walker County. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 218 S.W.3d at 78.

Norman’s mandamus claim against the Executive Director was his only

claim that could have potentially made venue mandatory in Travis County. As a

result, the trial court was also within its discretion to transfer Norman’s remaining

claims to Walker County. We affirm the trial court’s transfer order.

B. Chapter 14 Dismissal

Norman also appeals the Walker County trial court’s dismissal of his claims

under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Chapter 14

applies when, as here, an inmate files an affidavit or unsworn declaration of

inability to pay costs. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 14.002(a). Under Chapter

14, a trial court may dismiss an inmate’s lawsuit if it is “frivolous or malicious.”

Id. 14.003(a)(2). “In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the

court may consider whether: (1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is

slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the

party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially

similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the

same operative facts.” Id. § 14.003(b).

The Supreme Court of Texas has not decided the proper standard of review

for Chapter 14 dismissals. See Ramos v. Dunbar, No. 15–24–00019–CV, 2025

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WL 543113, at *2 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Jan. 14, 2025, no pet.). We agree with

our sister courts, however, that we review a dismissal under Chapter 14 for an

abuse of discretion, while the specific issue of whether a claim has an arguable

basis in law is a legal question reviewed de novo. See e.g., Sheedy v. Frederick,

No. 01–22–00663–CV, 2023 WL 8459494, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Dec. 7, 2023, pet. denied); DeHorney v. Talley, 630 S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2021, no pet.).

On appeal, Norman argues the trial court did not “adhere” to Section

14.003(b) in dismissing his claims. Although we liberally construe pro se briefs,

litigants who represent themselves are held to the same standards and rules as

litigants represented by counsel. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d

181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978). Otherwise, pro se litigants would be given an unfair

advantage over litigants represented by counsel. Id. at 185. We will construe a pro

se litigant’s arguments to the extent they are understandable and not waived by

inadequate briefing. See Tex. R. App. 38.1(i) (brief must contain clear and concise

argument for contentions made with appropriate citations to authorities and to

record).

We conclude the trial court followed Section 14.003(b) in dismissing

Norman’s claims as frivolous. The trial court dismissed Norman’s claims for

negligence, conversion, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

with prejudice on the grounds that Defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity

in their official capacities and official immunity 2 in their individual capacities. See

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Although it is more precise to say Defendants would be entitled to “qualified immunity”

under federal law from Norman’s Section 1983 claims, “official immunity” and “qualified

immunity” are often used interchangeably to refer to a governmental employee’s immunity when

sued in his individual capacity. See Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Hernandez, 208 S.W.3d 4, n.7 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (noting “‘Official immunity,’ ‘qualified

immunity,’ ‘quasi-judicial immunity,’ ‘discretionary immunity,’ and ‘good faith immunity’ are

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e.g., Lopez v. Serna, 414 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.)

(explaining a trial court may rely on Section 14.003(b)(1) to dismiss an inmate’s

claim if facts alleged in petition show sovereign immunity would likely bar

inmate’s claim); Hosea v. Dominguez, 668 S.W.3d 704, 709–10 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2022, pet. denied), (concluding claims had no basis in law because claims

were barred by sovereign immunity); Peters v. Crank, No. 02–08–480–CV, 2009

WL 2750964 at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 28, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(affirming dismissal under Section 14.003(a)(2), in part, based on qualified

immunity grounds). The trial court also dismissed Norman’s mandamus actions on

jurisdictional grounds. See Williams v. Davis, 628 S.W.3d 946, 953 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (affirming dismissal under Chapter 14 because

trial court lacked jurisdiction). 3

Immunity and jurisdictional grounds are proper reasons to dismiss claims as

frivolous under either Section 14.003(b)(1) or (b)(2), and therefore we conclude

the trial court followed the statute in dismissing Norman’s claims as frivolous. 4 To

the extent Norman is making any arguments challenging the reasons for the trial

court’s immunity and jurisdictional conclusions, Norman did not adequately brief

all terms used interchangeably to refer to the same affirmative defense available to governmental

employees sued in their individual capacities.”). Further, qualified immunity under federal law

is analogous to state law official immunity and “protects governmental officers with

discretionary authority from liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Ballantyne

v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 427 n.3 (Tex. 2004).

3

As we already decided in Part A above, Norman failed to plead a viable mandamus

action.

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Because we conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing Norman’s claims as

frivolous, we do not address Norman’s arguments regarding whether he followed all the

procedural requirements under Sections 14.004 and 14.005. See Tex. R. App. 47.1.

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those arguments and therefore they are waived. Tex. R. App. 38.1(i).5

Lastly, Norman complains the trial court did not rule on his no-evidence

motion for summary judgment. The trial court, however, heard Norman’s no-

evidence summary judgment motion and the Defendants’ Chapter 14 motion to

dismiss at the same hearing. An express ruling on one motion may imply a

contrary ruling on an opposing motion. Salinas v. Rafati, 948 S.W.2d 286, 288

(Tex. 1997). Here, the trial court impliedly denied Norman’s no-evidence motion

for summary judgment when it dismissed Norman’s claims under Chapter 14. See

Enriquez v. Crain, No. 03–17–00363–CV, 2018 WL 3320986, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Austin July 6, 2018, no pet.). To the extent Norman is arguing he was entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on his claims based on his no-evidence summary

judgment motion, we disagree. A party with the burden of proof cannot obtain

summary judgment through a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Tex. R.

Civ. P. 166a(i) (“a party . . . may move for summary judgment on the ground that

there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on

which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.”) (emphasis

added).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Norman’s claims under

Chapter 14.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the Travis County district court’s order

transferring venue to Walker County and affirm the Walker County district court’s

judgment.

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To the extent Norman argues the trial court failed to enter findings of fact or

conclusions of law, we overrule this issue because the record demonstrates the trial court did

enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. Norman had access to the record and the trial

court’s findings and conclusions were available to him to review for this appeal.

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/s/ Scott K. Field

Scott K. Field

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

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