Huizar

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

FABIAN HUIZAR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 4:22-CV-85-PPS

)

EXPERIAN INFORMATION )

SOLUTIONS INC., )

)

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Fabian Huizar purchased an SUV using a loan obtained from Horizon Bank.

Huizar eventually fell behind on his car payments which led Horizon to repossess it.

But Horizon botched the repossession according to a state court judge which resulted in

Huizar obtaining a judgment absolving him of any responsibility to pay his delinquent

car bill. Following the judgment, Huizar began to dispute the Horizon debt as it

appeared in his consumer reports prepared by the “big three” consumer reporting

agencies—Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion.

After seven dispute letters to Experian, none of which resolved to his satisfaction

the alleged inaccuracy in his credit report, Huizar turned to the courts. He filed this

lawsuit against Experian under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681

et seq., seeking to recover damages for what he believes is inaccurate reporting of the

Horizon Bank debt in his consumer reports. Huizar and Experian have filed cross

motions for summary judgment each seeking judgment in its favor on all claims. [See

DE 172; DE 179]. Because there remain genuine issues of material fact about the

accuracy of Experian’s reporting of Huizar’s credit history and the reasonableness of its

investigation, both motions for summary judgment will be DENIED.

Factual Background

Huizar’s Car Loan and the Tippecanoe Circuit Court Proceedings

On January 12, 2018, Fabian Huizar used a loan serviced by Horizon Bank to

purchase a 2015 Ford Explorer for $22,767.93 for his wife (then his fiancée). [DE 196 at

¶21]; [DE 172-4 at ¶1]. It didn’t take Huizar long to get behind in his payments. By July

2018, Huizar and his wife had missed several monthly payments towards the Horizon

loan. [DE 196 at ¶21].1 Because of these missed payments, Horizon employed a repo

company to repossess Huizar’s car on July 24, 2018. [DE 196 at ¶22]. After the

repossession, Huizar called Horizon to negotiate the missed payments and retrieve his

car. [DE 190-1 at 1].2 Instead, Horizon told Huizar it had accelerated his loan, which

required him to repay the loan in full before Horizon would return the car. [Id.] A

couple months later, Horizon sold Huizar’s car at an auction for $16,000, which Horizon

claimed left a deficiency balance of $7,679.08 on Huizar’s loan. [Id. at 2]. Thereafter,

Horizon demanded Huizar pay the deficiency balance and Huizar responded by

demanding the return his vehicle. [DE 172-4 at ¶¶41–42].

1 DE 196 cited throughout the Factual Background is Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.

2 DE 190-1 cited throughout the Factual Background is Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s

Statement of Facts.

2

Huizar sued Horizon on November 22, 2018, in Tippecanoe County Circuit

Court in Indiana concerning the circumstances of Horizon’s repossession of Huizar’s

car. [DE 190-1 at 2]. Huizar prevailed at a February 2020 bench trial, and in a July 7,

2020, order, the Circuit Court held Huizar had “defaulted on the loan and Horizon was

entitled to accelerate the loan” but that Horizon’s repossession breached the peace. [DE

172-4 at 3-4]. As a result, the Circuit Court ruled in Huizar’s favor on his consumer

protection claims and awarded damages. [DE 172-4 at 10]. Importantly, as another form

of relief, the Circuit Court “eliminate[d] [Horizon’s] deficiency judgment” and therefore

reduced Huizar’s awarded damages by the $7,679.08 deficiency judgment amount. [DE

172-4 at 9]. The judge also denied Horizon’s counterclaim for breach of contract and

deficiency judgment. [DE 172-4 at 10–11]. Horizon received the Circuit Court order

sometime before August 6, 2020. [DE 190-1 at 15].

The Circuit Court later entered a Final Appealable Order on September 21, 2020,

that modified the July 7, 2020, order to dismiss one of Huizar’s claims and reduce his

total awarded damages. [See DE 182-8]. The Final Appealable Order did not amend, and

in fact restated, the conclusions of law in the July 7, 2020, order that eliminated

Horizon’s deficiency judgment and reduced Huizar’s damages by that sum. [Id.] In

sum, excluding attorney’s fees, the Court awarded Huizar damages in the amount of

$4,580.03. [Id. at 11]. Horizon appealed, and on October 13, 2021, the Indiana Court of

Appeals affirmed all but a portion of the Circuit Court’s Final Appealable Order

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concerning attorney’s fees awarded to Huizar. [DE 196 at ¶26; see also Bank v. Huizar,

178 N.E.3d 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)].

Huizar’s Dispute Letters to Experian

Immediately after obtaining the July 7, 2020 order, Huizar mailed his first

dispute letter to Experian concerning the Horizon debt. [DE 190-1 at 2]; [DE 172-5, Ex.

6]. The parties refer to debts reported in a credit report as a “tradeline” which is

evidently a term of art in the credit reporting business. I’ll follow the parties’ lead with

use of that term. Anyway, Huizar’s July 8, 2020, dispute letter stated, “I do not owe

anything to Horizon” and “It is showing as a balance of $7,594 but I don’t owe

anything.” [DE 172-5 at 1]. As shown above, what Huizar said in the letter was

undoubtedly true—he didn’t in fact owe Horizon any money by virtue of the state court

judgment he had received against Horizon. Huizar’s letter went on to explain that he

was worried he would not be able to buy a home for his family because of the reporting

and that he attached proof showing he doesn’t owe money to Horizon. [Id.] The dispute

letter included a copy of the judgment that was entered against Horizon. [Id. at 8-18].

After receiving Huizar’s July 2020 dispute, Experian sent an Automated Credit

Dispute Verification (ACDV) form to Horizon for completion. [DE 196 at 17]. This is a

form sent from the credit reporting agencies to the furnishers of the information to

verify the accuracy of a debt. In August 2020, Experian received Horizon’s response

indicating that Huizar owed $7,641 and that his account was “charged off.” [DE 190-1 at

4]. After receiving the completed ACDV form from Horizon, Experian sent the dispute

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results to Huizar showing an outstanding balance of $7,641 and stating that the account

was “charged off” with $22,558 being written off. [Id.]; [DE 172-9, Ex. 20]. The dispute

results did not mention the judgment in Huizar’s favor. [DE 190-1 at 4]; [DE 172-9, Ex.

20].

In November 2020, Huizar mailed his second dispute letter to Experian

contesting the Horizon tradeline. [DE 190-1 at 5]. In this letter, Huizar notes that the

balance “went up since last time” and “[i]f you look at the court records, you’ll see I

don’t owe this.” [Id.] Upon receiving this dispute, Experian again engaged Horizon in

the ACDV process. Horizon submitted an ACDV form to Experian indicating that the

past due balance was $7,875 and that the account was “charged off.” [Id.]; [DE 172-12,

Ex. 28]. Experian again sent dispute results to Huizar indicating that the information on

the account had been verified as accurate. [DE 190-1 at 6]; [DE 172-13, Ex. 30]. Again, the

dispute results did not mention the judgment in favor of Mr. Huizar. [DE 190-1 at 6];

[DE 172-13, Ex. 30].

Continuing with this dance, Huizar mailed another dispute letter to Experian in

January 2021 again challenging the Horizon tradeline. [DE 190-1 at 6]; [DE 172-15, Ex.

38]. In this letter Huizar stated “[t]he Horizon account is still incorrect.” Huizar also

complained that Experian was “still including incorrect information even after I

explained.” [DE 172-15 at 1, Ex. 38]. Predictably, Experian again engaged in the ACDV

process with Horizon to address the dispute. [DE 190-1 at 6]. In February 2021, Horizon

submitted an ACDV response to Experian indicating that Huizar owed $7,920 and that

5

the account was charged off. [Id. at 7]; [DE 172-17, Ex. 42]. In February 2021, Experian

sent the dispute results to Huizar. [DE 190-1 at 7]; [DE 172-18, Ex. 44]. The dispute

results again made no mention of the judgment in Huizar’s favor. [DE 190-1 at 7]; [DE

172-18, Ex. 44].

In November 2021, Huizar sent another dispute letter to Experian challenging

the accuracy of the Horizon tradeline. [DE 190-1 at 7-8]; [DE 172-23, Ex. 56]. In this one,

Huizar told Experian that “I’ve disputed with you multiple times . . . [p]lease help me.”

[DE 172-23 at 1]. Huizar also stated that the account shouldn’t be reporting because it

was “wiped away by a Court of Law.” [Id.] Huizar included an account info screenshot

showing a Horizon Bank balance of $8,388. [Id.] The account info screenshot states

“$22,588 written off” and “$8,388 past due as of Nov 2021.” [Id.] In December 2021,

Experian provided Huizar with dispute results indicating no balance but showing that

Horizon had charged off $22,558. [DE 190-1 at 8]; [DE 172-26, Ex. 64; DE 172-27, Ex. 65].

The dispute results again showed no mention of the judgment in Huizar’s favor. [DE

172-26, Ex. 64; DE 172-27, Ex. 65].

In December 2021, Huizar mailed yet another dispute to Experian regarding the

Horizon tradeline. [DE 190-1 at 8]; [DE 172-29, Ex. 71]. In this letter, Huizar told

Experian that Horizon “credited the amount they claim I still owed.” [DE 172-29, Ex.

71]. Huizar also states “[n]ow it’s showing as being written off.” [Id. at 1]. Experian

again engaged in the ACDV process with Horizon and in January 2022, Horizon

submitted an ACDV response to Experian indicating that Huizar’s account was charged

6

off, without further context. [DE 190-1 at 9]; [DE 172-31, Ex. 75]. Yet again, there was no

mention of the judgment in favor of Mr. Huizar. [DE 190-1 at 9].

In April 2022, a balance and amount past due of $8,572 somehow returned to the

Horizon tradeline in Huizar’s Experian file. [DE 190-1 at 9]; [DE 172-35 at 7, Ex. 79].

Huizar again sent a dispute letter to Experian regarding the Horizon tradeline stating

“[t]here should be no balance, no past due amount, and this should not be reporting as

a [c]harge-off.” [DE 190-1 at 9]; [DE 172-36 at 1, Ex. 82]. The Parties dispute whether

Huizar’s April 2022 dispute letter reached Experian with Experian claiming that “the

last dispute letter that Experian received from Plaintiff was processed in January 2022.”

[DE 196 at ¶ 50]. Huizar has included a proof of delivery from the United States Postal

Service showing that his April 2022 letter was, in fact, received by Experian. [DE 172-37,

Ex. 83]. While it is unclear what happened to Huizar’s April 2022 letter after Experian

received it, the evidence in the record shows that Huizar sent it, and Experian received

it.

Finally, in July 2022, Huizar sent another dispute letter to Experian disputing the

Horizon tradeline. [DE 190-1 at 10]; [DE 172-40, Ex. 91]. In this final letter Huizar again

states “[t]here should be no balance, no amount past due, and this should not be

reporting as a [c]harge off.” [DE 172-40 at 1, Ex. 91]. In response to this dispute,

Experian again engaged in the ACDV process with Horizon. [DE 190-1 at 11]. On

August 4, 2022, Horizon sent an ACDV form to Experian which listed the balance on

the account as $0. [Id.]; [DE 172-41, Ex. 93]. The ACDV form again made no mention of

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the judgment in favor of Huizar. [DE 172-41, Ex. 93]. On August 4, 2022, Horizon also

submitted an Automated Universal Data (AUD) form to Experian which updated the

Horizon tradeline to indicate a $0 balance.3 [DE 190-1 at 11]; [DE 172-42, Ex. 94]. On

August 9, 2022, Experian sent dispute results to Huizar indicating that the Horizon

account was paid and closed, with $22,588 written off. [DE 190-1 at 11]; [DE 172-44, Ex.

97].

Standard of Review

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a

party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its

version of the events.” Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). On a motion for summary judgment, all facts and reasonable inferences are

construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Waukegan Potawatomi

Casino, LLC v. City of Waukegan, 128 F.4th 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2025).

Discussion

Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et

seq., “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking

system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52

3 AUDs are initiated by the data furnisher to request out-of-cycle credit history updates. [DE 190-

1 at 11]. See also, https://www.e-oscar.org/gettingstarted (last visited 11/5/25).

8

(2007). As collectors and distributors of consumer credit information, Consumer

Reporting Agencies (“CRAs”) are important players within the FCRA’s statutory

scheme. The FCRA defines CRAs as:

[A]ny person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit

basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or

evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers

for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which

uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of

preparing or furnishing consumer reports.

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). There is no dispute that Experian is a CRA.

Huizar alleges Experian violated three provisions of the FCRA: (1) 15 U.S.C. §

1681e(b); (2) 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a); and (3) 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c). I will address Huizar’s

claims under § 1681i(a) and § 1681e(b) together because those theories overlap in many

ways. I will then turn to Huizar’s claim under § 1681i(c) relating to whether Experian

include a notification of Huizar’s dispute in subsequent reports after receiving Huizar’s

disputes letters.

I. Accuracy of Huizar’s Consumer Report

First, “[a] threshold requirement for claims under both [§ 1681e(b) and § 1681i] is

that there must be an inaccuracy in the consumer’s credit report.” Chuluunbat v.

Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 4 F.4th 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2021); Walton v. BMO Harris Bank N.A.,

761 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Although the reasonableness of a credit

reporting agency’s procedures under § 1681e(b) is not typically a summary-judgment

question, [a CRA] cannot be liable as a threshold matter if it did not report inaccurate

9

information.”). Though left undefined by the FCRA, the Seventh Circuit defines

“accuracy” to encompass “both truth and completeness—a report that is misleading or

materially incomplete is inaccurate.” Chaitoff v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 79 F.4th 800, 809

(7th Cir. 2023). Indeed, “[a] credit report is inaccurate under § 1681e(b) and § 1681i(a) if

it omits accurate information that could reasonably be expected to adversely affect a

consumer’s creditworthiness.” Id. at 812. And as is important here, “the information

needs to be factually inaccurate, not legally inaccurate.” Thorton v. Experian Info. Sols.,

Inc., 2025 WL 1951743, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2025) (citing Denan v. Trans Union LLC, 959

F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 2020)).

Huizar alleges his Experian credit reports contained two categories of

inaccuracies. First, Huizar points to inaccurate balance and amount past due figures for

his Horizon account. Second, Huizar argues Experian’s reporting of the Horizon

account as “charged off” and with a listed charge off amount was inaccurate or at least

misleading. Experian responds that its reports accurately reported Huizar’s late

payment history and the fact that Horizon had written off the debt (reflected by the

“charged off” notation). According to Experian, federal regulations obligated Horizon to

report Huizar’s account as charged off once his payments were 120 days past due. In his

response, Huizar says he “is not suing over late payment history.” [DE 194 at 9].

Confoundingly, Huizar has provided the Court with only one copy of a credit

report he says was inaccurate. Instead, the Parties’ designated evidence primarily

consists of Huizar’s dispute letters (which purportedly cite and sometimes include

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screenshots of his credit reports), Horizon’s ACDV responses, and Experian’s responses

to his disputes.

I begin with Huizar’s alleged inaccuracies concerning the balance and amount

past due figures for his Horizon account. Huizar says his July 2020, November 2020,

and January 2021 disputes highlighted these inaccurate balance amounts and balance

past due figures on his credit reports. Experian’s August 7, 2020, response lists a $7,641

balance as past due for his Horizon account. [DE 172-9 at 2.] The ACDV forms and

Experian’s response to his November 2020 dispute list the balance amount on his

Horizon account as $7,875 [DE 172-13, Ex. 30]. The ACDV forms and Experian’s

response to his January 2021 report list his balance past due as $7,920 for his Horizon

account. [DE 172-18, Ex. 44].

Experian argues that Huizar’s claims of inaccurate balance and balance past due

figures fail because he asked Experian to resolve a legal dispute instead of a factual one.

In response, Huizar argues the state court proceedings resolved the question of whether

he owed a balance on his Horizon account as a matter of law. CRAs are statutorily

obligated to investigate and ensure protection against “factual inaccuracies” but

addressing “legal inaccuracies” is “outside the competency of the consumer reporting

agencies.” Chuluunbat, 4 F.4th at 567. “The paradigmatic example of a legal dispute is

when a consumer argues that although his debt exists and is reported in the right

amount, it is invalid due to a violation of law.” Id. “In contrast, examples of factual

inaccuracies include the amount a consumer owes, and what day a consumer opened an

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account or incurred a payment.” Id. at 568.

At first glance, Huizar’s argument that Experian’s listing of a balance amount

and balance past due on his credit reports was inaccurate because of the state court

orders seems a “paradigmatic” example of a legal dispute because he asks Experian to

determine that his debt was invalid as a matter of law. But Chuluunbat recognized a key

carve out: “[a] legal question may also be resolved as a matter of fact if a tribunal—such

as a court or arbitrator—has adjudicated the matter.” Id. at 568. Let’s suppose Huizar

had never taken Horizon to court, and he filed a dispute letter with Experian that he

didn’t owe Horizon any money because Horizon had breached the peace during the

repossession. That would be an unresolved legal question that Experian would have no

duty to report on. By contrast, once a legal dispute is resolved—as in this case—with a

finding the debt is no longer valid, that becomes a factual matter that Experian must

report accurately.

Experian argues that following the July 7, 2020 order, the case continued to be

litigated on appeal and that the final judgment in the case was not entered until July

2022 shortly before this litigation began. [DE 181 at 13]. That’s just not true; final

judgment was entered by the Tippecanoe County Circuit Court. In any event, Experian

cannot simply throw its hands up when it receives a court order. Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 815

(noting “CRAs can read and understand legal documents”). Huizar did exactly what

the Seventh Circuit advised in Chuluunbat: “If the plaintiffs presented court judgments

to the consumer reporting agencies showing that the legal ownership of their debts

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have been adjudicated, the investigation may have been factual in nature.” 4 F.4th at

569.

Although Huizar previously owed money to Horizon, beginning on July 7, 2020,

the state court orders “eliminate[d]” his obligation to make future payments towards

that debt. In other words, Huizar no longer owed money to Horizon after that date. Under

these circumstances, the Court finds there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether the

Experian reports that continued to report a balance currently due on the Horizon

account after the July 7, 2020, Order created a materially misleading impression about

Huizar’s payment and credit history. Huizar has not provided sufficient evidence to

establish this theory of inaccuracy as a matter of law at this juncture.

In addition, Huizar argues that Experian’s reporting of his Horizon account as

“charged off” was inaccurate and that the amount of the charge off ($22,558) was

inaccurate because it did not include the $16,000 Horizon recovered from the auction of

his car. Based on the Court’s own review of the record, Experian’s February 2021,

response to Huizar’s January 2021 dispute listed a charge off and written off amount of

$22,558 for his Horizon account. [DE 172-18, Ex. 44]. Moreover, it was not until August

2022 that Experian reported Huizar’s Horizon account as having a $0 balance. [DE 172-

44, Ex. 97].

Experian’s reporting of Huizar’s account as “charged off” and with a charge off

amount presents a different question of accuracy than Experian’s reporting of Huizar’s

balance amount and balance past due because charge off reporting does not necessarily

13

reflect a current debt. Instead, “charge off” refers to “a creditor’s decision ‘[t]o treat (an

account receivable) as a loss or expense because payment is unlikely; to treat as a bad

debt.” Borowski v. Ally Financial Inc., 2023 WL 4207784, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 27, 2023)

(citing Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). After all, “a credit report is intended to

include more than a person’s current debt; it also includes bill-payment history and

other information that a reasonable lender might consider important in deciding

whether and at what rate to extend credit.” Herrell, 218 F.Supp.3d at 792. Indeed, Huizar

does not dispute that he missed previous payments. [DE 196 at 11].

Huizar argues Experian’s reporting of his Horizon loan as charged off and the

amount of the charge off were both inaccurate. These theories of inaccuracy present

different factual questions. On the one hand, I find that Experian has satisfied its

burden on summary judgment to establish that its mere fact of reporting the Horizon

account as charged off (setting aside the amount and when) is not inaccurate under the

FCRA. It is undisputed that Horizon did in fact charge off Huizar’s loan. Huizar’s last

payment occurred in June 2018, and he concedes he did not repay in full Horizon’s loan.

Moreover, Horizon’s sale of his car at an auction did not recover the full amount of the

loan to Huizar. And unlike the state court orders that “eliminated” his deficiency owed

to Horizon, Huizar points to no language (nor could he) in the state court orders that

held as a matter of law Horizon could not report the account as charged off.

On the other hand, there is a triable question of fact on the accuracy of Experian’s

reporting the amount of the charge off on Huizar’s credit reports. Experian reported a

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$22,558 charge off amount on its reinvestigation responses to Huizar’s disputes. [DE

172-13; DE 172-18]. Huizar says this figure does not account for the approximately

$16,000 Horizon recovered in the sale of his vehicle at a private auction on September 6,

2018. [DE 190-1 at 2.] Experian fails to provide a fulsome response on this point. One

can imagine how a charge off amount of over $22,000 on a credit report instead of

roughly $7,000 could negatively impact Huizar’s credit score. But Huizar’s briefing on

this point falls short to conclusively establish the point. This will be another factual

question for trial.

II. Reasonableness of Experian’s Conduct Under §1681i(a) and § 1681e(b)

After establishing an inaccuracy, “a CRA’s liability under both § 1681e(b) and §

1681i(a) turns on whether a CRA acted reasonably.” Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 816. Section

1681e(b) of the FCRA requires CRAs to “follow reasonable procedures to assure

maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom

the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). By contrast, section 1681i requires consumer

reporting agencies to “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation” to determine the accuracy

of the disputed information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).

While both claims require evaluation of the reasonableness of the CRA’s conduct,

they differ in their scope and requirements. The Seventh Circuit has noted that

“reasonable procedures under § 1681e(b) are not proof of a reasonable reinvestigation

under § 1681i(a).” Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 817 (emphasis added). This makes sense given

that the purpose of § 1681i(a) is to provide an avenue to dispute purportedly incorrect

15

information that cleared initial screening and ended up on a consumer’s report. Thus,

the Seventh Circuit recognizes that “§ 1681i(a)’s reinvestigation requirement mandates a

more thorough investigation than § 1681e(b).” Id. at 818.

Because this dispute largely focuses on Experian’s reinvestigation process, I’ll

begin by addressing the reasonableness of Experian’s reinvestigation process under

§1681i(a). But to be clear, Huizar’s complaint about Experian’s handling of the state

court order and its use of the ACDV process undergird his claims of both an

unreasonable reinvestigation under § 1681i(a) and a procedure ill designed to assure

maximum possible accuracy under § 1681e(b). [DE 176 at 17-24]. As such, my discussion

of each section of the statute will be related.

a. Reasonableness of Reinvestigation (15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a))

The FCRA provides a process for consumers to notify a CRA, such as Experian,

that they dispute the accuracy or completeness of their consumer report. As mentioned,

the CRA then must conduct a “reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the

disputed information is inaccurate,” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A), including by considering

“all relevant information submitted by the consumer.” Id. § 1681i(a)(4). The cost benefit

analysis for the reasonableness of a CRA’s reinvestigation is different because CRA’s

that receive notice of a dispute can “target its resources in a more efficient manner and

conduct a more thorough investigation.” Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286–87

(7th Cir. 1994). Thus, while the “parameters of a reasonable investigation will often

depend on the circumstances of a particular dispute, it is clear that a reasonable

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reinvestigation must mean more than simply including public documents in a

consumer report or making only a cursory investigation into the reliability of

information that is reported to potential creditors.” Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 818 (citation

omitted).

Here, Huizar disputed the information contained in the Horizon tradeline of his

Experian consumer report on seven different occasions between 2020 and 2022. [DE 190-

1 at 2-11]. Recall that on six of those occasions (not counting the April 2022 dispute

which Experian says it never received) Experian engaged the ACDV process to

reinvestigate the disputes. [Id.] What does this actually mean? Teresa Iwanski, a Senior

Litigation Analyst for Experian, helped to explain. She testified that when Experian is

notified that a consumer believes information in their credit file is inaccurate Experian

will initiate its reinvestigation process. [DE 182-1, Ex. A, Iwanski Decl.¶ 18]. As part of

this process Experian will first consider and review all relevant information provided

by the consumer to properly identify the consumer and the items that are believed to be

inaccurate, along with the nature of the inaccuracy. [Id.] Iwanski states that if the

consumer provides supporting documentation with the dispute, an Experian agent will

review the documentation to determine whether the supporting documents are

sufficient to delete or update the account as requested by the consumer, or whether an

internal policy allows Experian to make the requested update. [Id.]

So, was Experian’s reinvestigation process reasonable in this case? Recall that

Huizar provided Experian with the Tippecanoe Circuit Court Order with his first

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dispute. [DE 172-5 at 8-18, Ex. 6]. Huizar asserts that “[a]ll Experian had to do was read

the Judgment to determine that Mr. Huizar owed nothing, and the credit reporting was

inaccurate.” [DE 176 at 12]. Viewing the evidence of Experian’s handling of the court

order in a light most favorable to Experian, there is a genuine question as to whether it

should have taken action to modify the information provided by Horizon upon

receiving the court order.

A quick review of the order shows that it’s not entirely clear how Huizar’s debt

to Horizon should have been reported after the judgment in Huizar’s favor. The

“Findings of Fact” section of the order acknowledges that Huizar and his wife (then

fiancée) fell behind on their car payments. [DE 172-4 at 1-3, Ex. 4]. The “Conclusions of

Law” section of the order states that “Huizar defaulted on the loan and Horizon was

entitled to accelerate the loan.” [Id. at 3]. Conversely, the order also states that “Horizon

failed to act in a commercially reasonable manner during the collection process and . . .

[a]s result, the Court hereby restrains Horizon from collecting a deficiency judgment.”

[Id. at 9]. The order makes it clear that Huizar never paid the $7,679.08 he owed on the

SUV, but it also makes it clear that he was no longer required to. In other words, the

debt was extinguished. Id.

The question of how this should be reported in a consumer report presents a

difficult conundrum. On the one hand, obtaining a favorable judgment doesn’t make a

delinquent borrower automatically creditworthy. Indeed, there’s no dispute that Huizar

repeatedly failed to pay his bills. That seems like something a would-be credit provider

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might want to know about Huizar. On the other hand, a consumer’s credit report

should not reflect an amount owed when the consumer—by virtue of a judgment—in

fact no longer owes the money.

All of this is to say that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether the

judgment was enough that Experian should have changed its reporting, and that is

enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Ellison v. United States Postal Serv., 84

F.4th 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2023) (“A genuine issue of material fact exists when, based on

the evidence, a jury could find for the non-moving party.”); Brock v. City of Belleville,

2018 WL 2320511, at *1 (S.D. Ill. May 22, 2018) (explaining that a genuine issue of

material fact exists where a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party on the evidence presented.).

Moving on to Experian’s ACDV process, Iwanski explains that if the supporting

documentation from the consumer is not sufficient to delete or update the account,

Experian then contacts the data furnisher—Horizon Bank in this case—through an

Automated Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV”) form sent through an online

platform called e-Oscar. [DE 181-1, Ex. A, Iwanski Decl.¶ 18]. The purpose of the ACDV

form is to request that the data furnisher investigate and verify or update the account.

[Id.] Presented with a judgment that, arguably, makes it unclear whether the

information provided by Horizon should be deleted or changed, Experian moved

forward with its ACDV process.

In his briefing, Huizar argues that Experian’s ACDV process constituted an

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unreasonable reinvestigation because it did nothing more than parrot back whatever

Horizon included in its ACDV forms. [DE 176 at 11]. As I’ve stated, the judgment made

clear that Huizar was no longer on the hook to pay Horizon, but it didn’t make clear

that Horizon’s reporting was inaccurate such that it should have been deleted or

changed. In that situation, it seems reasonable to check with Horizon and see what their

investigation turns up. However, Huizar disputed the Horizon tradeline in his

consumer report on seven different occasions between 2020 and 2022 and every single

time Experian did nothing but engage in the same ACDV process. As one court put it,

the ACDV process is not per se reasonable in every circumstance. Dulworth v. Experian

Info. Sols. Inc., 2024 WL 2319958, at *16 (S.D. Ind. May 22, 2024).

This is one of those cases. A reasonable juror could conclude that Experian’s

reflexive reliance on the ACDV process is precisely the type of “cursory investigation”

that has been deemed by the Seventh Circuit as impermissible. Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 818

(citation omitted). This is especially true in the face of the Tippecanoe Circuit Court

Order showing that Huizar no longer owed the debt. As the Seventh Circuit noted, “it is

disputable whether Experian's reliance on an ACDV response that conflicted with other

documents in its possession amounted to a reasonable reinvestigation.” Id. at 821. See

also, Losch v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 995 F.3d 937, 946 (11th Cir. 2021).

While, as pointed out by Experian, the ACDV process has been found reasonable

in some instances, a reasonable reinvestigation under § 1681i(a) requires more of a CRA

than “merely parroting information.” Moran v. Embark Card Servs., LLC, 2025 WL

20

2803261, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2025) (citing Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220,

225 (3d Cir. 1997)). Parroting information from Horizon is exactly what Huizar claims

Experian did in response to each of his disputes. [DE 176 at 11].

To support his position that a reasonable reinvestigation did not take place,

Huizar points to deposition testimony from Experian dispute agents Margaret Akpan,

Cheryl Beste, Sam White, Jodi Grimes, and Blanca Reyes. [DE 176 at 5-10]. Margaret

Akpan testified during her deposition that she noted what Huizar was disputing,

selected a dispute code and dispute reason, if any, and sent that data to the data

furnisher. [DE 176 at 5]; [DE 175-1, Ex. 104, Akpan Dep. at 89:16-21]. Akpan testified

that Experian has never allowed her to determine whether disputed information is

accurate or inaccurate. [DE 176 at 6]; [DE 175-1, Ex. 104, Akpan Dep. at 91:7-12]. Huizar

also points out the fact that Akpan acknowledged that she reviewed the July 7, 2020,

order but did not “fix” the disputed information in Huizar’s file because she was

following Experian’s policies and procedures. [DE 176 at 6]; [DE 175-1, Ex. 104, Akpan

Dep. at 108:20-109:5]. Akpan testified that she would have fixed the information if

Experian allowed her to. [DE 176 at 6]; [DE 175-1, Ex. 104, Akpan Dep. at 97:8-10].

Cheryl Beste, a Senior Regulatory Agent at Experian, testified that she has

worked as an ACDV operator with Experian.4 Similar to Akpan, Beste testified that her

role is to review information from a consumer’s dispute and process that dispute by

4 Although Ms. Akpan’s title is “Senior Regulatory Agent” she testified that her role fits the

definition of an “ACDV operator” used during her deposition. [DE 175-2, Ex. 105, Beste Dep. at 18:1-

18].

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selecting dispute codes and sending it off to the furnisher to determine whether

information is accurate or not. [DE 176 at 7]; [DE 175-2, Ex. 105, Beste Dep. at 171:1-8].

Beste testified that she has no training regarding a court order or what effect a court

order or judgment has on a debt. [DE 176 at 7]; [DE 175-2, Ex. 105, Beste Dep. at 183:11-

22].

Sam White, another ACDV operator for Experian, testified that he has not

received training or information about courts orders or how to interpret them. [DE 176

at 9]; [DE 175-4, Ex. 107, White Dep. at 65:24-66:11]. White also testified that verifying a

judgment would be a reasonable thing to do and that it would be unreasonable for

ACDV operators not to forward court orders to counsel or other internal departments

that handle such documents. [DE 176 at 9]; [DE 175-4, Ex. 107, White Dep. at 62:17-25;

63:21-64:8].

Finally, Huizar points to the deposition testimony of longtime Experian

employees Jodi Grimes and Blanca Reyes to support his claim that Experian’s

reinvestigation process is unreasonable. Grimes testified that she worked at Experian

for 33 years. [DE 176 at 9]; [DE 175-5, Ex. 108, Grimes Dep. at 38:7-13]. Grimes stated

that once the ACDV form is received from the data furnisher, she is not aware of

anything else Experian agents do other than processing the information received from

the furnisher and sending the results to the consumer. [DE 176 at 9]; [DE 175-5, Ex. 108,

Grimes Dep. at 36:19-37:18]. Blanca Reyes testified that she worked for Experian for 23

years. [DE 176 at 9]; [DE 175-8, Ex. 118, Reyes Dep. at 29:10-12]. Reyes explained that

22

she was an agent in Experian’s “back-end” department which receives the completed

ACDV from the furnisher. [DE 176 at 9]; [DE 175-8, Ex. 118, Reyes Dep. at 29:13-19].

Reyes testified that Experian’s back-end department manually enters the information

received from the furnisher’s ACDV form into Experian’s s file and then sends a result

to the consumer. [DE 176 at 10]; [DE 175-8, Ex. 118, Reyes Dep. at 29:16-25]. Reyes stated

testified that she doesn’t do any investigations. [DE 176 at 10]; [DE 175-8, Ex. 118, Reyes

Dep. at 30:1-6].

The testimony Huizar has pointed to in the record illustrates an ACDV process

which is highly deferential to the data furnisher. However, I am not convinced that this

proves as a matter of law that Experian’s reinvestigation process is unreasonable. Even

assuming that the ACDV process led to a consumer report that contained an inaccuracy,

that fact alone does not mean that the procedures in place are unreasonable. Denan v.

Trans Union LLC, 959 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he FCRA does not require

unfailing accuracy from consumer reporting agencies.”); Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29

F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A credit reporting agency is not liable under the FCRA if

it followed ‘reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy,’ but

nonetheless reported inaccurate information in the consumer's credit report.”). The

evidence in the record raises a question of fact as to whether Experian engaged in a

reasonable reinvestigation when handling Huizar’s disputes. Whether it was reasonable

for Experian to rely completely on information from Horizon in the face of numerous

disputes and a court order is a genuine issue of material fact.

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Nothing in Denan v. Trans Union LLC, 959 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2020), a case relied on

by Experian, mandates a different result. For starters, Denan is readily distinguishable

from this case. In Denan, consumers who borrowed from Indian tribes at interest rates

prohibited by state usury laws contended that their credit reports were inaccurate

because they reported the debts even though the debts were (in their view) uncollectible

since they violated state law. Denan, 959 F.3d at 292-93. In Denan, unlike in our case, no

court had answered the question as to whether the loans were invalid. Indeed, that’s

what makes Denan actually cut against Experian’s position. As the Seventh Circuit

noted in that case: “[i]f a court had ruled the loans invalid and Trans Union had

continued to report it as a valid debt, then plaintiffs would have grounds for a potential

FCRA claim.” Id. at 296. That describes exactly what happened to Huizar; essentially,

the state court in this case ruled that Horizon’s loans were no longer valid. So, far from

supporting Experian, Denan actually props up Huizar’s argument.

In sum, a reasonable jury could conclude that a procedure other than the ACDV

process continually used by Experian could have uncovered an inaccuracy in the

Horizon tradeline. While neither party has definitively shown that Experian’s repeated

use of the ACDV process was an unreasonable reinvestigation of the disputes as a

matter of law, they have raised it as a genuine issue of material fact which should be

decided at trial.

b. Reasonableness of Procedures to Assure Maximum Possible Accuracy

(15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b))

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“The reasonableness of a reporting agency’s procedures is normally a question

for trial unless the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the procedures is beyond

question.” Sarver, 390 F.3d at 971. The reasonableness of a CRA’s procedures does not

turn solely on whether a consumer’s report contains an inaccuracy. Indeed, “a mistake

does not render [the CRA’s] procedures unreasonable.” Id. at 972. CRA’s are permitted

to rely upon information “received from a source it reasonably believes is reputable . . .

unless the agency receives notice of systemic problems with its procedures.” Id. Given

the volume of credit information and disputes CRAs process daily, the Seventh Circuit

recognizes that “[w]hether a CRA’s procedures are reasonable turns, predictably, on

balancing the costs of a marginal return to accuracy against the potential harm to

consumers from declining to incur those costs.” Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 817.

Section 1681e(b) states:

Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall

follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the

information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.

15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).

In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgement, Experian lays out its

procedures. Experian starts by describing its procedures for determining which

financial institutions will be allowed to provide it with information about creditors.

Experian explains that it obtains and reports information from financial institutions,

only after first investigating them to ensure they are reputable and understand their

obligations as a furnisher under FCRA. [DE 181 at 4]; [DE 182-1, Ex. A, Iwanski Decl.

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¶7]. Experian explains that furnishers must complete Experian’s on-boarding process

and must execute contracts agreeing to comply with the obligations imposed by FCRA

to furnish accurate information and follow industry-reporting standards. [DE 181 at 5].

This element of Experian’s process primarily concerns the formation of its relationship

with furnishers and the reasonableness of this part of Experian’s procedures are

unchallenged by Huizar.

Like his claim of an unreasonable reinvestigation under §1681i(a), Huizar’s

issues with Experian’s procedures to ensure “maximum possible accuracy” focus on

Experian’s reinvestigation process. Nowhere in his briefing does Huizar allege that

Experian’s acceptance of Horizon as a data furnisher resulted from an unreasonable

process or procedure. Huizar takes issue with Experian’s use of the ACDV process in its

reinvestigation procedures arguing that “[t]he ACDV system is insufficient as a

reinvestigation by any CRA.” [DE 176 at 1].

Huizar’s complaints regarding Experian’s failure to act on the Tippecanoe Circuit

Court order and its use of the ACDV process all take place after his first dispute. Young

v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 3d 721, 739 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (“the § 1681e(b)

inquiry concerns the steps the CRA takes before consumers dispute the accuracy or

completeness of the report; the matter of the CRA's reasonableness in responding after a

consumer has pointed out an inaccuracy is considered under the ‘reasonable

reinvestigation’ provision”).

As Experian explains, Horizon Bank is a legitimate financial institution which

26

Experian had no reason to suspect was providing it with inaccurate reporting. Sarver v.

Experian Info. Sols., 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that requiring CRAs to

engage in background research on information furnished by financial institutions

would balloon the costs of their services, which in turn would be passed to consumers).

Huizar makes no argument in his summary judgment briefing and points to no

evidence suggesting that, prior to his first dispute, Experian had reason to doubt

Horizon’s reporting.

Given Horizon’s demonstrated reliability, it was reasonable for Experian to trust

that Horizon’s original information was complete and accurate. Sarver, 390 F.3d at 972

(CRA's procedures not unreasonable unless the agency has reason to believe a

furnisher's information is unreliable). However, once Experian was put on notice by

way of Huizar’s first dispute (and the Tippecanoe Circuit Court Order) that there was

reason to believe that Horizon’s reporting was unreliable, it is unclear whether there

were reasonable procedures in place to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of

Huizar’s file. Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 817 (“Whether a CRA's procedures are reasonable

turns, predictably, on balancing the costs of a marginal return to accuracy against the

potential harm to consumers from declining to incur those costs.”).

As Huizar states, his initial dispute of the Horizon tradeline “put Experian on

notice that Horizon was not a reliable source, as the Judgment provided to it directly

contradicted the information Horizon supplied to Experian.” [DE 176 at 3]. And, as

explained by Experian dispute agents during their depositions, there was potentially

27

more Experian could have done to ensure maximum possible accuracy. Potential

procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy, as pointed out by Experian dispute

agents, include allowing dispute agents to review public court dockets to verify an

order or allowing dispute agents to forward court orders to an internal legal

department for review. [DE 176 at 5-10]; [DE 175-1, Ex. 104, Akpan Dep at 91:7-12]; [DE

175-2, Ex. 105, Beste Dep at 185:13-24]; [DE 175-4, Ex. 107, White Dep at Ex. 63:21-64:14];

[DE 175-5, Ex. 108, Grimes Dep at 36:19-23]; [DE 175-8, Ex. 118, Reyes Dep at 30:1-6].

Because Experian failed to do anything, other than repeatedly engage in the ACDV

process, after being put on notice that Horizon’s reporting contained potential

inaccuracies, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Experian has in place

reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information in a

consumer’s file.

For these reasons, summary judgment on this point in not warranted in favor of

Huizar or Experian. See, e.g., McClelland v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2006 WL 2191973, at

*3 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2006) (explaining that in most cases, the reasonableness of a CRA’s

procedures is a question for the jury); Quinn v. Experian Sols., 2004 WL 609357, at *2

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2004) (“In the vast majority of cases, reasonable procedures should be

determined by a jury.”).

III. Huizar’s Section 1681i(c) Claim

In addition to his § 1681i(a) and § 1681e(b) claims, Huizar seeks summary

judgment on a § 1681i(c) claim. I discussed above the requirement that CRA’s

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reinvestigate consumer disputes. If a CRA’s reinvestigation does not resolve the

dispute, a consumer may then “file a brief statement setting forth the nature of the

dispute.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b). If such a statement of dispute is filed, and “unless there is

reasonable grounds to believe that it is frivolous or irrelevant”, the CRA “shall, in any

subsequent consumer report containing the information in question, clearly note that it

is disputed by the consumer and provide either the consumer’s statement or a clear and

accurate codification or summary thereof.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c) (emphasis added). Only

Huizar moves for summary judgment on this claim.

To establish that Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c), Huizar must show: (1) he

disputed inaccurate information contained in his credit file; (2) Experian’s

reinvestigation did not resolve his dispute; (3) he filed a statement of dispute with

Experian upon completion of the reinvestigation; and (4) the statement he filed was not

included in subsequent credit reports released by Experian. Quinn, 2004 WL 609357, at

*7.

Huizar has not advanced sufficient undisputed facts to establish he is entitled to

judgment on his § 1681i(c) claim as a matter of law. Huizar argues Experian “never

added a proper statement of [his] dispute to his credit file.” [DE 176 at 19]. This

underbaked argument is unsupported in two key respects. First, Huizar fails to point

the Court to any statement within his dispute letters that was either not included or was

not accurately summarized by Experian in subsequent credit reports. And while there

are “no magic words a consumer must incant to request the inclusion of a dispute

29

statement”, Chaitoff, 79 F.4th at 820, Huizar’s briefing does not identify any language in

his dispute letters that he says requested Experian to add a § 1681i(c) dispute statement

to his credit report. I won’t go hunting for such language in the massive record in this

case nor will I make Huizar’s argument for him. See, e.g., United States v. Dunkel, 927

F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in

briefs.”).

Second, Huizar provides no explanation for what information his credit report

omits (his “proper statement”) that he requested Experian include. In support of his

argument, Huizar blankly points to Exhibits 35 and 48 to his motion, which are a

December 18, 2020, Experian credit report and a July 24, 2021, Experian credit report.

[DE 176 at 19]. [See also, DE 172-14, Ex. 35; DE 172-19, Ex. 48]. Huizar provides no

explanation of the statement of dispute these credit reports purportedly lack. Taking all

reasonable inferences in Experian’s favor as I must, Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC,

128 F.4th at 873, Huizar has failed to present evidence to prevail on his § 1681i(c) claim

on summary judgment.

IV. Willfulness, Negligence, and Damages

If all else fails, Experian tells me it is entitled to summary judgment because

there is no proof that Huizar was damaged as a result of the inaccurate credit reporting.

Huizar alleges both a negligent (actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o) and willful

(actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n) violation of the FCRA. The Seventh Circuit has

made it clear that courts should first answer the “antecedent question of whether a

30

violation [of the FCRA] occurred” before analyzing a defendant’s mental state. See

Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th 1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 2021).

To prove a negligent violation of the FCRA, Huizar must establish “actual

damages.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1). “Actual damages require a ‘causal relation’ between

the statutory violation and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.” Persinger, 20 F. 4th at

1194 (citation omitted). To prevail on its motion for summary judgment as to Huizar’s

negligence claims, Experian must show that there is no genuine dispute as to whether

Huizar suffered actual damages because of Experian’s violation of the FCRA. Bagby v.

Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 162 F. App’x 600, 603-04 (7th Cir. 2006).

Not surprisingly, a willful violation is treated differently under the FCRA. “A

willful violation is one committed with actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the

FCRA’s requirements.” Persinger, 20 F. 4th at 1195 (citing Safeco, 551 U.S. at 57). A

company acts with reckless disregard for the FCRA if its actions were “a violation

under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms,” and the company “ran a risk of

violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was

merely careless.” Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69.

In its summary judgment briefing Experian argues “if the Court were to decide

that Experian violated either § 1681e(b) or § 1681i, the Court should still grant summary

judgment in favor of Experian on Plaintiff’s claim that Experian willfully violated

FCRA.” [DE 181 at 17]. Experian seeks summary judgment on damages stating that

Huizar’s claims under §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i require him to show that he suffered actual

31

damages and that those damages were cause by the inaccuracy. [DE 181 at 19]. On my

reading of the record, Huizar has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

he has suffered actual damages such that summary judgment should not be granted in

favor of Experian. Huizar asserts that he lost opportunities to purchase a home for his

family due to being denied conventional financing. [DE 195 at 11]. Huizar points to a

Xactus consumer report used in his mortgage applications in January and April of 2021

which showed that he owed a balance on the Horizon account. [DE 172-46 at 4, Ex. 100].

Huizar states that Experian’s reporting of the Horizon tradeline lowered his credit score

to 619, one point lower than the 620-score needed to secure the loan. Huizar has pointed

to evidence in the record showing that his Experian credit score increased above the

620-score required once the Horizon tradeline did not report a balance. [DE 195 at 14];

[DE 172-50 at 68:18-23, Ex. 110].

Huizar has also pointed to the deposition testimony of Allison Van Pelt, a loan

originator at Flanagan State Bank, as evidence that he has suffered actual damages. [DE

195 at 12-13]. Van Pelt testified that upon receiving a mortgage application she pulls the

applicant’s credit and decides whether the applicant qualifies for certain mortgage

programs. [DE 172-50 at 20:22-21:14, Ex. 110]. Van Pelt testified that when she pulled

Mr. Huizar’s credit, if the Horizon tradeline balance should have been zero but was a

positive number it would have negatively impacted his ability to obtain a mortgage. [Id.

at 70:13-19].

Finally, Huizar points to statements from his own deposition testimony to

32

illustrate that he has suffered actual damages. During his deposition, Huizar provided

testimony regarding the stress Experian’s allegedly inaccurate reporting has caused

him, the anxiety medication he takes, and the embarrassment he has suffered from not

being able to purchase a home like his peers and co-workers. [DE 195 at 17-19]. Without

engaging in a full-blown analysis of Huizar’s potential damages at this stage, Huizar

has pointed to evidence raising a genuine issue as to whether he has suffered actual

damages such that the issue should be presented to a jury. Because a reasonable jury

could find that Huizar has suffered actual damages, summary judgment should not be

granted in Experian’s favor. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 2017 WL 2505002, at *3

(S.D. Ill. June 9, 2017) (“A genuine issue of material fact remains (and summary

judgment should be denied), if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.”).

* * *

The record before me illustrates that there are genuine issues of material fact that

should be presented to a jury at trial. Factual questions which remain are: (1) Whether

Experian’s reporting of the Horizon tradeline in Huizar’s file contained inaccurate

information, (2) Whether Experian failed to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation by

failing to consider the Tippecanoe Circuit Court Order and using the ACDV process for

each of Huizar’s disputes, (3) Whether Experian has in place reasonable procedures to

assure maximum possible accuracy, and (4) Whether Huizar has suffered actual

damages. As such, a grant of summary judgment in either direction is not appropriate,

33

and this case should proceed to trial.

ACCORDINGLY:

Plaintiff Fabian Huizar’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DE 172] is

DENIED. Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [DE 179] is also DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: November 5, 2025.

/s/ Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

34