Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOSEPH DANE BROWN, CIVIL ACTION

ET AL.,

Plaintiffs

VERSUS NO. 25-1960

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF SECTION: “E” (1)

AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Volkswagen Group of

America, Inc. (“Volkswagen”).1 Plaintiffs Joseph Dane Brown and Ashley Courtney Brown

did not file an opposition.

BACKGROUND

On September 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Louisiana.2 Plaintiffs allege they bought a 2024 Volkswagen Atlas

from a dealership in Baton Rouge and that the vehicle was “defective in materials and

workmanship.”3 Accordingly, Plaintiffs sue Defendant seeking recession of the sale and

damages due to the alleged defects under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and under

Louisiana law for redhibition, breach of the express warranties, and breach of the implied

warranties of the sale.4

1 R. Doc. 6.

2 R. Doc. 1.

3 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 6, 12.

4 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16-50.

On October 17, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.5 It argues this

Court is an improper venue for this action and that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.6

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Venue is proper in the Middle District of Louisiana.

The Court begins by determining whether this action was filed in the proper venue.

Defendant argues that, because the alleged sale occurred in Baton Rouge, the action

should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.7 Section 1391(b) provides:

A civil action may be brought in—

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are

residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is

the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as

provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is

subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.8

Section 1391(b)(1) does not establish venue in the Eastern District of Louisiana for this

action because, according to Plaintiffs’ allegations, Volkswagen is a resident of New Jersey

and Virginia, and therefore no Defendant resides in Louisiana.9 Venue is proper under

Section 1391(b)(2) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

because the sale of the vehicle, which constitutes “a substantial part of the events or

5 R. Doc. 6.

6 Id.

7 R. Doc. 6-1 at pp. 6-8.

8 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

9 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 2.

omissions giving rise to the claim,” occurred in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.10 Baton Rouge is

located within the Middle District of Louisiana.11 Venue is not proper in the Eastern

District of Louisiana under § 1391(b)(3) because that provision applies only “if there is no

district in which an action may otherwise be brought.”12 As explained above, the Middle

District of Louisiana is a proper venue under § 1391(b)(2); therefore, § 1391(b)(3) is

inapplicable.13 Accordingly, the Court finds that venue is proper in the Middle District of

Louisiana and improper in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

II. The Court transfers venue under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) and 1631.

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed

a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest

of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been

brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court finds that there

is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,

transfer such action . . . to any other such court . . . in which the action . . .

could have been brought at the time it was filed.14

10 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 6; Smith v. Fortenberry, 903 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (E.D. La. 1995). The Court notes that,

while Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the car was purchased from Southpoint Volkswagen, they do

not specify the dealership’s location. R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 6. In its motion to dismiss, Defendant cites Southpoint

Volkswagen’s website as evidence that the dealership is located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. R. Doc. 6 at p.7

n.38. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court is generally limited to reviewing (1) the facts set

forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the compliant, and (3) matters of which judicial notice

may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P’ship v. Blue Cross &

Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2018). Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides

that “[t]he Court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID.

201(b). The Court finds that Southpoint Volkswagen’s official website is an authoritative source for the

dealership’s location, and that its accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See United States v. Flores,

730 Fed.App’x. 216, 219 n.1 (5th Cir. 2018); Hours & Directions, SOUTHPOINT VOLKSWAGEN,

https://perma.cc/L7H2-E5WM. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice that Southpoint Volkswagen is

located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and properly considers that location in ruling on the motion to dismiss.

11 Court Information, U.S. DIST. CT. M. DIST. OF LA, https://perma.cc/7CWA-MWQL. For the same reasons

stated in footnote 9, the Court takes judicial notice that the Middle District of Louisiana encompasses Baton

Rouge, Louisiana. See supra note 10.

12 Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 56 (2013) (“[T]he third paragraph

provides a fallback option.”); Smith, 903 F. Supp. At 1021.

13 Atl. Marine Const. Co., 571 U.S. at 56; Smith, 903 F. Supp. At 1021.

14 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of proper venue under §§ 1406(a).15 However, the

Court finds that a transfer is warranted in lieu of dismissal.

“Section 1406(a) ‘requires a transfer’—rather than an outright dismissal—‛when

venue is improper but justice nonetheless weigh[s] in favor of transfer to a proper venue

rather than dismissal.’ . . . [T]he Court need not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant

before transferring this case under Section 1406(a).”16 The purpose of section 1406(a) is

“‘to remove whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of

cases and controversies on their merits,’ so that plaintiffs would not be penalized by ‘time-

consuming and justice-defeating technicalities.’”17 Accordingly, “‘[i]n most cases of

improper venue, the courts conclude that it is in the interest of justice to transfer to a

proper forum rather than to dismiss the litigation.’”18 The decision of whether to transfer

venue under § 1406(a) is discretionary.19

Although Defendant requests dismissal of this action, the Court finds that

transferring the case to the Middle District of Louisiana, rather than dismissing it, is in

the interest of justice.20 “[T]ransfer ‘would be more efficient [and] economical’ than

dismissal because transfer would avoid the expense of refiling another lawsuit in the”

Middle District of Louisiana.21

15 R. Doc. 6-1 at p. 7.

16 Eng’g & Inspection Servs., LLC v. New Rise Renewables, Reno LLC, No. 23-6844, 2024 WL 3374345, at

*2 (E.D. La. July 10, 2024) (internal citations and alterations omitted) (first quoting Franco v. Mabe

Trucking Co., 3 F.4th 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2021); then citing Franco, 3 F.4th at 793)).

17 Franco, 3 F.4th at 793 (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (citing Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369

U.S. 463 (1962)).

18 Eng’g & Inspection Servs., 2024 WL 337434514, at *3 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 3827 (4th ed. 2021)).

19 Id. (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3827 (4th ed. 2021)).

20 R. Doc. 6-1 at p. 7.

21 Eng’g & Inspection Servs., 2024 WL 3374345, at *3 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 3827 (4th ed. 2021)).

Accordingly;

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned case _ is

TRANSFERRED to the MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of November, 2025.

SUSIE soap

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE