Thomas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHARLES THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:25-CV-547-HAB-ALT

SGT. FRANKLIN, SGT. CALDWELL,

SGT. E. FLAKES, and SGT. FLAKES (Sgt.

E. Flakes’ twin sister),

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Charles Thomas, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint and a

motion for preliminary injunction. ECF 8 & ECF 9.1 “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court

must screen the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

1 Because the amended complaint supersedes the original complaint (ECF 2), the original motion

for preliminary injunction (ECF 4) will be denied as moot.

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When a plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, the court must give

his allegations liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Over five years ago, Thomas filed a lawsuit and was granted leave to proceed

against Sgt. Flakes and Lt. Jones for denying him food over a two-day period at the

Westville Correctional Facility (WCF). See Thomas v. Flakes, cause no. 3:20-CV-506-DRL-

MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Jun. 17, 2020).2 Summary judgment was granted in the

defendants’ favor, and the case was dismissed on December 7, 2022, because Thomas

had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at ECF 41.3 Additionally, Thomas

claims he was “assault[ed]” by Sgt. Caldwell while at WCF in 2020, which was

“confirmed” by Investigation and Intelligence (I&I). ECF 8 at 3. While his complaint

doesn’t provide any details about the “assault,” documents attached to it show that Sgt.

Caldwell hit him in the back of the head with a clipboard in the dining hall and told

him to leave.4

Thomas was released from WCF in early 2021, but he believes these relatively

minor incidents spawned a murder-for-hire plot against him involving not only the

2 The amended complaint in that case named “Sgt. Flakes . . . ‘Sgt. working E/C (on I-Bracket)

during dates of incidents stated on #4.’” ECF 10 at 2. The amended complaint also sued the Indiana

Department of Correction, Warden Sevier, John Galipeau, David Leonard, and Phillip Sonnenberg, but

those defendants were dismissed upon screening and are not part of the current lawsuit. See Thomas v.

Flakes, cause no. 3:20-CV-506-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Jun. 17, 2020), at ECF 10 & ECF 18.

3 Prior to the dismissal, Thomas was released from prison in January of 2021. Id. at ECF 11.

4 A grievance about an incident on July 31, 2020, alleges Sgt. Caldwell hit him in the back of the

head with a clip board and told him to get out of the “chow hall.” ECF 8-1 at 1. Thomas stated he would

“like for her to receive some type of discipline because if I had touched her with anything in the manner

she touched me, I would’ve been disciplined immediately.” Id. Thomas does not indicate he was injured

in any way during the incident. A response to that grievance indicates the “allegations had been

confirmed and that the case was referred to the Warden’s office for appropriate action.” Id. at 2.

individuals who played a part in the incidents from five years ago, but also almost

every prison official he has dealt with since his re-arrival at WCF on March 4, 2025.

Thomas’s allegations span twenty-two pages, include an additional thirty-four pages of

exhibits, and name nineteen defendants ranging from individual officers to the Indiana

Department of Correction (IDOC) Ombudsman Bureau Director. The gravamen of

Thomas’s complaint is that the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his

safety concerns, are failing to protect him from harm, and have retaliated against him.

He seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $1,200,000.00 as well as

a permanent and preliminary injunction to be transferred to another facility.

Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994). “[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.” Id. at 833. That said, not every such violent altercation violates the

Constitution. Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2023). “Rather, only deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s wellbeing is actionable: a prison official is liable for failing to

protect an inmate from another prisoner only if the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and

citations omitted). Accordingly, when an inmate is attacked by another inmate, the

Eighth Amendment is violated only if “deliberate indifference by prison officials

effectively condones the attack by allowing it to happen.” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630,

640 (7th Cir. 1996). The defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[A] complaint that identifies a specific,

credible, and imminent risk of serious harm and identifies the prospective assailant

typically will support an inference that the official to whom the complaint was

communicated had actual knowledge of the risk.” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 481

(7th Cir. 2015). General requests for help, expressions of fear, and even prior attacks are

insufficient to alert guards to the need for action. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633,

639–40 (7th Cir. 2008). “[P]risons are dangerous places,” as “[i]nmates get there by

violent acts, and many prisoners have a propensity to commit more.” Grieveson v.

Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008).

In the context of failure to protect cases, the Seventh Circuit has equated

“substantial risk” to risks so great that they are almost certain to materialize if nothing

is done.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th

835, 843 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Brown and noting that a “bare ‘increased risk’

[associated with mental health issues] does not necessarily correlate to a ‘substantial

risk’”). “[A] prisoner normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by

showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” Pope

v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). “Exercising poor judgment . . . falls short of

meeting the standard of consciously disregarding a known risk to his safety.” Lewis v.

Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 1997).

Here, as noted above, Thomas essentially claims that everyone associated with

his previous lawsuit and the clipboard incident from five years ago—plus everyone he

has encountered at WCF since his re-arrival in March of 2025—is either out to kill him

or intends to look the other way while he is harmed. Despite the complaint’s length and

level of specificity, very few factual allegations support his claims. According to

Thomas, his troubles began even before he arrived at WCF. Although he had informed

Classification Specialist S. May about the previous lawsuit and clipboard incident,

telling her he was “in fear of his life and safety” because of it, she transferred him to

WCF anyway and didn’t grant his request for a “seperatee” between Thomas and the

defendants. ECF 8 at 3. Thomas believes she violated his constitutional rights simply by

sending him back to WCF, but he is mistaken. If every inmate who filed a lawsuit

against or had negative encounters with prison officers was prevented from ever

returning to that same facility—even years later—it would be difficult to find placement

for inmates. More importantly, Thomas didn’t identify a specific and credible risk of

harm to Classification Specialist May—his speculative fears about possible harm related

to the previous lawsuit and complaint weren’t sufficient—so this claim will be

dismissed. See e.g., Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481; see also Klebanowski, 540 F.3d at 639–40 (neither

general expressions of fear nor prior attacks are sufficient).5

5 The same analysis applies to Thomas’s allegation that he sent a request slip to Warden Smiley

and Deputy Warden Gann the day after his arrival to “explain the lawsuit and safety concerns” to them.

ECF 8 at 14.

During his first few months back at WCF, Thomas describes several encounters

with staff members that made him feel uncomfortable and two instances where he was

harmed by other inmates. In a nutshell, some officers made rude comments about him

returning to WCF, remembering him from his prior stay as being a “snitch,”

transferring him to worse areas of the prison, and refusing to take his concerns

seriously.6 As for physical altercations, there were only two. His belongings were stolen,

and he was “beat up on, while being called ‘a snitch for telling on wrong guard’” about

a week after his March 4, 2025, arrival. ECF 8 at 5. Then, on April 16, 2025, after he had

been transferred to the GSC side, he was “robbed and assaulted for snitching on the

wrong Sgt. per assailant.” Id. His complaint doesn’t provide any additional details

about the attacks, the attackers, or whether he suffered injuries. Importantly, although

he allegedly told Case Manager/Counselor Kecia Green about his concerns after the

first incident and Officer Cron about them after the second incident,7 he doesn’t

plausibly allege he pre-identified a prospective assailant or provided any of the

defendants with specific information prior to the attacks other than his general worry

and speculation that the prison guards were out to get him due to the lawsuit and

incident from five years ago. These allegations aren’t sufficient to state a plausible claim

that any of the named defendants failed to protect him from the two attacks he

6 The specific comments will be discussed below in the context of First Amendment retaliation

claims.

7 Thomas claims he had his “initial meeting” with Case Manager/Counselor Kecia Green on

March 27, 2025. ECF 8 at 13. He states he first told Officer Cron about his concerns after the April 16, 2025,

incident and was informed an “investigation would take place.” Id. at 5.

experienced by other inmates. See e.g., Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481 (complaint must identify “a

specific, credible, and imminent risk of serious harm and identif[y] the prospective

assailant”); Klebanowski, 540 F.3d at 639–40 (general requests for help, expressions of

fear, and even prior attacks are insufficient).

After those physical incidents, Thomas also describes several instances where he

was allegedly threatened by inmates. On April 26, 2025, he was “threatened to be killed

and called a snitch for ratting out staff,” but he doesn’t describe the inmate(s) who

made these threats. ECF 8 at 5. He claims he “spoke with a Sgt.” the next day, but he

doesn’t identify the officer. On May 20, 2025, Thomas heard three unknown offenders

inquiring about him, so he turned around and went back to his dorm. He doesn’t

expand upon what he heard, and, in any event, nothing physical came of that incident.

On June 12, 2025, Thomas was approached by two familiar-looking but unknown

inmates who asked him if he was a snitch and requested his criminal history file. One of

the men had a “make-shift metal object (knife) in his hand, on side of his leg.” Id. at 10.

However, once those individuals determined he wasn’t a snitch, they handed him a

note that said:

[Sgt.] Franklin said that there is a nigga over there named Charles Thomas

with braids and he telling some shit. He put $500.00 on him with S.O.S.

but want it done this weekend when his shift on for confirmation. I got

$250.00 if one of them young nigggas over there wanna do it. Let me

know at next C-card Meds Lord.

ECF 8-1 at 24 (emphasis added). Thomas then told the individuals about his previous

lawsuit against the guards and the issue with Sgt. Caldwell. After hearing Thomas’s

explanation, the man said, “[T]hat aint snitching, they on some bullsh**, we not taking

this one.” ECF 8 at 10. The individuals threw the note in the toilet and left, but Thomas

retrieved the note and hid it in his sock. Later that same day, Thomas spoke with

several officers about that incident and his previous concerns. Instead of helping him,

they became angry. However, Thomas was immediately placed in a small holding cell

for twelve hours before being transferred to the E/C side.

Thomas’s own allegations cut against any failure to protect claims associated

with these alleged threats. He admits he wasn’t physically harmed or even touched by

the inmates during these encounters and that the would-be attackers decided not to

pursue him in the future. See, e.g., Kemp v. Fulton Cty., 27 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022)

(“Incarcerated people have a clearly established right to be free from physical harm

inflicted by others in the institution.”) (emphasis added)); see also Walker v. Leibert, 844 F.

App’x 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[T]o the extent Walker seeks damages based on the risk

of what could have happened to him as a result, that risk is not actionable under § 1983

without actual injury.”). More importantly, he admits he was subsequently moved to a

different area of the facility in order to remove him from the vicinity of Sgt. Franklin

and the men who had approached him.8 And, although he insists the note is evidence of

a conspiratorial murder-for-hire plot against him related to the previous lawsuit

(involving Sgt. Flakes and Lt. Jones) and the clipboard incident (involving Sgt.

Caldwell), he doesn’t explain how or why Sgt. Franklin—who wasn’t involved in either

8 That same day, he was placed in a “detox cell” and then moved to the E/C side. ECF 8 at 11; see

also id. at 5 (“Plaintiff was moved from G.S.C. side (because of incident with Sgt. Franklin) back to E/C

side.”).

of those previous matters—could reasonably have been considered to be part of that

conspiracy by any of the other defendants responsible for protecting him.9 Nor does he

provide any details to plausibly suggest Sgt. Franklin subsequently enlisted other

inmates to complete the proposed hit after it had been abandoned. Based on these facts,

it’s not plausible to infer the defendants have failed or are failing to protect Thomas

from harm. See e.g., Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481 (complaint must identify “a specific, credible,

and imminent risk of serious harm and identif[y] the prospective assailant”); see also

Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510–11 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing elements of

conspiracy and noting that evidence of it “cannot be speculative”).10

As an additional note, Thomas alleges he sent many requests and grievances to

defendants with supervisory positions such as Warden Smiley, Deputy Warden Gann,

and the Department of Administration DOC Ombudsman Bureau Director Charlene A.

Burkett. See generally ECF 8 at 14–17. However, “’[n]o prisoner is entitled to insist that

one employee do another’s job,’ and the division of labor is critical to the efficient

9 He doesn’t allege he was injured or attacked after the note was discovered, so Thomas hasn’t

stated any failure to protect claims associated with it. That said, the alleged threat will be discussed in the

context of retaliation below.

10 The court has also reviewed Thomas’s allegations in conjunction with the grievances and

requests for interviews attached to the complaint. None of Thomas’s requests for help contain the sort of

specificity necessary to establish a failure to protect claim associated with the two physical attacks or an

ongoing threat. For example, he claims Sgt. Flakes “kept staring at [him]” shortly after his arrival,

addressed him with an “attitude tone and evil smirk,” said she remembered him from the previous

lawsuit, and told him to “[b]e safe and have a good day.” ECF 8-1 at 6. He submitted a grievance on April

27, 2025, claiming he spoke with Sgt. Franklin about his concerns, but Sgt. Franklin responded with, “I

know who you are Thomas with yo snitch ass. Welcome back to Westville. Get yo ass back in [the chow]

line.” Id. at 11. His assertions that he “shouldn’t be around these people, my life is in jeopardy” (id. at 6)

and that “I need to be protected, I don’t feel safe here” (id. at 11) are based on a speculative interpretation

of relatively benign encounters. Although many of the other requests mention the prior lawsuit and

incident as well, they don’t adequately tie that information to any sort of credible and ongoing threat.

functioning of the organization.” Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir.

2017) (quoting Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009)). There is no general

respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burks, 555 F.3d at 594. “[P]ublic

employees are responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Id. at 596.

This is a high standard, designed to ensure that “supervisors are responsible for their

own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates

carry out their tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018).

Thomas’s amended complaint does not provide a factual basis for suing these high-

level supervisory defendants, especially considering Thomas admits he was moved to

various locations within the prison in response to his complaints by those who were

directly responsible for such housing decisions.

Similarly, he claims the grievance specialists Ms. S. Smith and Ms. Wozniak

“ignored Plaintiff’s right to be heard, to file complaints about the threats, abuse,

misconduct, corruption and neglect from staff.” ECF 8 at 17–18. But they cannot be sued

for simply managing the grievance process, see Burks, 555 F.3d at 595, and there is no

constitutional right to a grievance process in general. See Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d

763, 770 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that there is not a Fourteenth Amendment substantive

due process right to an inmate grievance procedure).

Finally, he claims the I&I department ignored his safety concerns “that Plaintiff

would be in imminent danger from the previous lawsuit and threats made from other

staff and offenders motivated by staff influence or gain.” ECF 8 at 21. Thomas states

they are “being sued for $100,000 as a collective group.” Id. However, he cannot

proceed against the I&I department as a whole because “it is pointless to include lists of

anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the door

to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke

v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted); see also Burks, 555

F.3d at 596; George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only persons who cause

or participate in the violations are responsible.”). Thus, Thomas has failed to state

plausible failure to protect claims against any of the defendants.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Thomas also complains about being sent to the “GSC side” of the building

because it is “known for excessive and overlooked gang activity, assaults, robberies,

theft, stabbings, and other violent activities that isn’t as common/rampant in any other

are of the facility.” ECF 8 at 4–5. According to Thomas, he was sent to the GSC side

about three weeks after he arrived at WCF where he was “robbed and assaulted” on

April 16, 2025, as discussed above. Id. at 5. However, by May 20, 2025, he was moved

“back to E/C side” (id.), later in June to the “I/C side” (id. at 7), and in response to his

concerns about Sgt. Flakes in mid-July was “moved again, back on E/C side with Sgt. E.

Flakes where he presently is, scared to death” (id.). Although it’s unclear, Thomas may

be attempting to bring Fourteenth Amendment due process claims based on these

housing moves.11

11 To the extent these assertions are part of his retaliation claims, they will be discussed separately

below.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides state officials shall not “deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. That said, due process is only required when punishment extends the duration

of confinement or imposes “an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to

the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The

Seventh Circuit has “concluded that inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding

transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for administrative,

protective, or investigative purposes.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir.

2008) (citing Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608–09 & 608 n.4 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“[R]eassignment from the general population to discretionary segregation does not

constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest.”)); see also DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d

211, 212 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]risoners possess neither liberty nor property in their

classifications and prison assignments.”); Healy v. Wisconsin, 65 Fed. Appx. 567, 568 (7th

Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates do not have a protected liberty interest in a particular security

classification.”) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486).

Although later cases have questioned the conclusion that placement in

nonpunitive segregation can “never implicate a liberty interest,” see Williams v. Brown,

849 Fed. Appx. 154, 157, n.3 (7th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added), timing plays a part in the

analysis, even when conditions are significantly harsher. See e.g., Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d

508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to remain in the

general population, but both the duration and the conditions of the segregation must be

considered in determining whether due process is implicated.”) (internal quotation

marks, parenthesis, and citations omitted; emphasis in original); Marion v. Columbia

Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 & nn.2–3 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases that held

segregation of two to ninety days does not trigger due process concerns and stating, “In

a number of other cases, we have explained that a liberty interest may arise if the length

of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals that the conditions of

confinement are unusually harsh.”) (emphasis added); Lekas, 405 F.3d at 612 (finding

that up to ninety days in segregation does not affect liberty); see also Wilkinson v. Austin,

545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (recognizing “duration” is a component that plays a part in

determining whether a liberty interest exists).12

Here, Thomas alleges he was placed on the GSC side for a little over a month.

Although he complains that the conditions there are generally regarded as being more

violent, the conditions as described aren’t atypical and—coupled with the relatively

short length of time he was there—don’t state a viable due process claim. See e.g., Isby,

856 F.3d at 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (both duration and conditions must be considered); see

also Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 777 (“[P]risons are dangerous places,” as “[i]nmates get there

by violent acts, and many prisoners have a propensity to commit more.”); Bissessur v.

Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (claim must be plausible on its

12 In a recent Seventh Circuit case, the court noted that the answer to whether disciplinary

placements in solitary confinement amount to “deprivations of a liberty interest protected by procedural

due process” also “depends on the combination of the length of solitary confinement and the actual

conditions of that confinement as compared to those the prisoners would otherwise experience.” Jackson

v. Anastasio, 150 F.4th 851, 853 (7th Cir. 2025) (emphasis added). In that case, the court concluded the

three-month disciplinary placement coupled with the “unusually harsh” and “disgusting” conditions

could be enough to trigger due process concerns. Id. at 855, 861.

face and complaint must provide adequate factual content). Accordingly, to the extent

Thomas is attempting to bring any Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, they

will be dismissed.

First Amendment Retaliation

Thomas alleges several of the defendants have retaliated against him since his re-

arrival at WCF. Under the First Amendment, an inmate can’t be punished for engaging

in certain kinds of speech. “To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a

plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he

suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future;

and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’

decision to take the retaliatory action.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir.

2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While these basic elements

remain the same whether the plaintiff is a prisoner or a non-prisoner, the details of each

element may depend on the context. Id. In the prison context, written requests for

interviews and/or grievances clearly constitute First Amendment protected activity. Id.;

see also Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A prisoner has a First

Amendment right to make grievances about conditions of confinement.”). “Inmates

retain a First Amendment right to complain about prison staff, whether orally or in

writing, but only in ways consistent with their status as prisoners.” Caffey v. Maue, 679

Fed. Appx. 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987);

Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2010)). Not all actions alleged to be

retaliatory are “actionable in and of themselves . . ..” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 552

(7th Cir. 2009). Rather, only “if the acts were taken in retaliation for the exercise of a

constitutionally protected right, then they are actionable under § 1983.” Id.

Thomas seems to imply that all of the defendants retaliated against him by

ignoring his concerns and/or by failing to protect him from harm. Such generalized

claims are redundant of the substantive failure to protect claims described and

dismissed above. The court has carefully reviewed the actions and comments set forth

in the amended complaint and finds that, as to most of the defendants, Thomas hasn’t

plausibly alleged they were personally involved in any sort of intentional First

Amendment deprivation. See Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018) (liability

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on personal responsibility and prison officials cannot be

held liable for damages solely because they hold supervisory positions); Horshaw, 910

F.3d at 1029 (“supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of

subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.”);

Burks, 555 F.3d at 596 (“[P]ublic employees are responsible for their own misdeeds but

not for anyone else’s.”). Moreover, it’s not plausible that every employee he

encountered—including supervisors and high-ranking IDOC officials—was motivated

to retaliate against Thomas because of incidents that occurred five years ago involving

three specific officers. In other words, although Thomas claims the defendants were

made aware of his concerns and his speculation that he was in danger of being harmed

due to the prior incidents, he hasn’t sufficiently tied an alleged deprivation by them to

any sort of retaliatory motivating factor. See Bissessur, 581 F.3d at 602 (claim must be

plausible on its face). Therefore, the retaliation claims against Warden Smiley, Deputy

Warden Gann, Officer Cron, Capt. Lee, Lt. Heinrich, Sgt. Laurie, Grievance Specialist

Mrs. S. Smith, Grievance Specialist Mrs. Wozniak, Classification Specialist Mrs.

Williams, UTM Corley, I&I Staff, the Indiana Department of Correction, Department of

Administration DOC Ombudsman Bureau Director Charlene A. Burkett, and Reception

Diagnostic Center Classification Specialist/Counselor Ms. S. May will be dismissed.

That said, several of his other allegations do plausibly suggest retaliation. On the

day of his arrival, Sgt. Caldwell laughed and said, “Oh you made it back to Westville,

with yo police a**. Be safe on GSC side.” ECF 8 at 4. A few days later, Sgt. Flakes

mentioned the previous lawsuit against her and “threaten[ed] to have him sent to GSC

side. Id. About two weeks later, he was sent to the GSC side “as promised by Sgt. Flakes

and [Sgt.] Caldwell, despite not having any bad conduct or work history.” Id. at 5. He

stayed on the GSC side for about a month. After he had been returned to the E/C side,

the twin sister of Sgt. Flakes said, “Did you like G.S.C. side, we know you back over

here, we heard about it, it won’t change nothing. We still got you.” Id. at 6. On June 30,

2025, Sgt. Flakes told him that “if he filed another grievance on her or her sister, [he]

would be sent to WCU (lock up).” Id. at 7. In response, Thomas wrote to I&I about what

had happened. He met with prison officials who “removed Sgt. Flakes from being

around Plaintiff.” Id. A week later, he was moved to the E/C side where he currently

remains. He states he “can’t file any more grievances on them, out of fear of going to

lock up, where he won’t be able to talk to family, his children, or see his fiancé.” Id.

Sgt. Flakes and Sgt. Caldwell were both directly involved in the previous

incidents wherein Thomas engaged in a protected activity—namely, the lawsuit and the

written incident report about the clipboard. According to Thomas, they sent him to the

GSC side because of that protected activity. The twin sister of Sgt. Flakes—who plausibly

has a vested interest in her relative’s well-being—also made statements about having

had a hand in moving him to the GSC side because of those incidents and further

threatened to send him to lock-up if he filed any more grievances in the future. While

the conditions described by Thomas on the GSC side don’t rise to the level of being

atypical for due process purposes, the fact that the GSC side was allegedly regarded by

the inmates as being “known for” additional violence, could potentially deter a person

of ordinary firmness from participating First Amendment protected activity in the

future. But see Douglas, 964 F.3d at 647 (if no “material difference” is identified between

the cell locations, the transfer is not likely to deter protected activity). Although the five-

year gap makes it less likely that their actions were a motivating factor in the decision to

send him to the GSC side, it is at least plausible at this early stage. Thus, giving Thomas

the benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled, he has stated plausible First

Amendment retaliation claims against Sgt. E. Flakes, Sgt. Flakes (the twin sister of Sgt.

E. Flakes), and Sgt. Caldwell.

With regard to Sgt. Franklin, Thomas alleges he spoke with him on April 27,

2025, to advise him of the prior lawsuits and incidents. Sgt. Franklin responded by

saying, “I know who you are Thomas, with yo snitching ass, get yo ass back in line,

welcome to Westville!” ECF 8 at 9. This brief interaction allegedly prompted Sgt.

Franklin to put a $500 hit on Thomas due to that prior protected activity in 2020. While

the hit did not come to fruition—according to the note (ECF 8-1 at 24), it was scheduled

for the weekend of June 13–15, 2025, but the inmates declined to accept it after speaking

with Thomas—the alleged threat of harm could potentially deter a person of ordinary

firmness from engaging in future First Amendment activity. See, e.g., Douglas, 964 F.3d

at 649 (“[N]ot only actual harms but also threats of harm can deter First Amendment

activity.”). Again, although the allegations are sparse as to why a lawsuit/complaint

from five years ago involving different prison guards would motivate Sgt. Franklin to

place a hit on Thomas, the court will give him the benefit of the inferences to which he

is entitled at this early stage and allow him to proceed on a First Amendment claim

against Sgt. Franklin. In addition, because “[t]hreats of grave violence can constitute

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment,” the court will allow

Thomas to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Sgt. Franklin as well.

Hughes v. Farris, 809 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Dobbey v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 574

F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2009)).13

Two other alleged situations require consideration. On June 25, 2025, Thomas

was removed from the medicine line to speak with Capt. Esbedos who said, “I don’t

care about any lawsuit you have, you don’t mess with my officers. I have my own rules

13 Immediately following the incident with the note, Thomas had a meeting with Lt. Heinrich,

Capt. Lee, and UTM Thompson where he explained what had been happening. Thomas claims they

didn’t show “any kind of concern or sympathy,” refused his request for a transfer to a new prison, and

instead became “irritated and angry.” ECF 8 at 10. These allegations aren’t sufficient to state a claim,

especially in light of the fact that Thomas admits he was moved to a small “detox cell” for the rest of the

day and then moved back to the E/C side. Id. at 11.

over here.” ECF 8 at 6. When Thomas asked him what that meant, he replied, “You’re

gonna find out.” Id. at 7. It’s true that a threat of harm can be determined to deter

protected activity. See, e.g., Douglas, 964 F.3d at 649. However, taking his words at face

value, the supposed threat was not related to the prior lawsuits; rather Capt. Esbedos

was generally warning against “mess[ing]” with his officers. First Amendment activity

by a prisoner is only protected when done in ”ways consistent with their status as

prisoners.” Caffey, 679 Fed. Appx. at 490. Therefore, even if Capt. Esbedos had been

named as a defendant in the caption of the amended complaint—which he has not—the

allegation that he issued a vague warning against “mess[ing] with” his officers is

insufficient to state a plausible First Amendment claim against him.

In a similar vein, Thomas alleges Case Manager/Counselor Kecia Green and

UTM Corley threatened him with a write-up. Specifically, Thomas states he was moved

back to the E/C side on July 14, 2025, so that he could begin working in the “Production

Kitchen.” ECF 8 at 19. By this point, he had been moved to multiple different areas of

the prison in response to his safety concerns. However, a few days after that transfer, he

“found out that Sgt. Franklin works in Production Kitchen through Aramark on days he

does not work Sgt. for IDOC.” Id. He immediately wrote to Case Manager/Counselor

Kecia Green and UTM Corley “explaining he believes his life and safety will be at risk if

he is put in the kitchen and Sgt. Franklin is the Sgt. over there.” Id. According to

Thomas, UTM Corley told him if he refused to go to his job, he would be “written up

for refusal.” Id. at 20. Thomas explains that he doesn’t want to “lose any good time or

receive [a] write up,” so he intends to continue going to the kitchen as instructed. Id.

UTM Corley’s statement can’t reasonably be construed as an actionable

threat/deprivation for First Amendment purposes. Nothing plausibly suggests

Thomas’s protected activity played any part—much less was a motivating factor—in

the decision to advise Thomas of the consequences he could face for refusing to go to

his job. Rather, UTM Corley issued a predictive statement about the penalties associated

with refusal. To the extent Thomas expressed his safety concerns to justify his

reluctance, he admits both UTM Corley and Case Manager/Counselor Kecia Green

explained to him that their roles at the prison involved getting inmates “ready to go

home and housing placements, not investigations.” ECF 8 at 20. They advised him to

contact I& I instead if he felt there was a safety issue. See Aguilar, 861 F.3d at 633; Burks,

555 F.3d at 594 (division of labor is critical in prison setting). Thus, the First

Amendment retaliation claims against Case Manager/Counselor Kecia Green and UTM

Corley will be dismissed as well.

Preliminary Injunction

Finally, Thomas has moved for a preliminary injunction. ECF 9. “[A] preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted

unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation omitted). To obtain a preliminary

injunction, the moving party “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,

that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). In general, the

purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final

resolution of the case on the merits. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. --, 145 S. Ct. 659, 667

(2025) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative

positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held and to balance the equities

as the litigation moves forward.” (cleaned up)). A preliminary injunction, thus,

“merges” into a permanent injunction entered as part of the judgment on the merits. See

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 314 (1999).

Thomas asks the court to order the defendants to cease the “retaliation and

harassment and threats” against him. ECF 9 at 2. He further asks to be “immediately

transfer[red]” to another facility where he “can feel safe.” Id. However, he has not

plausibly alleged an ongoing failure to protect claim in his amended complaint that

would warrant preliminary injunctive relief. Moreover, although he has stated plausible

claims of retaliation against several of the defendants, he hasn’t sufficiently alleged he

will be irreparably harmed pending the outcome of this case. He admits he was

transferred from the GSC side to various different locations after approximately one

month, and he doesn’t plausibly allege he is in current danger of being transferred back

there. Accordingly, the motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) DENIES the first motion for preliminary injunction as moot (ECF 4);

(2) DENIES the second motion for preliminary injunction on the merits (ECF 9);

(3) GRANTS Charles Thomas leave to proceed against Sgt. E. Flakes, Sgt. Flakes

(Sgt. E. Flakes’ twin sister), and Sgt. Caldwell, in their individual capacities for

monetary damages for having him transferred to a materially worse area of the prison

in the spring of 2025 in retaliation for filing a lawsuit against Sgt. E. Flakes and an

internal complaint against Sgt. Caldwell in 2020 in violation of the First Amendment;

(4) GRANTS Charles Thomas leave to proceed against Sgt. Flakes

(Sgt. E. Flakes’ twin sister) in her individual capacity for monetary damages for

threatening to send him to the Westville Control Unit lock-up on June 30, 2025, in

retaliation for filing grievances against her and her twin sister in the spring/summer of

2025 in violation of the First Amendment;

(5) GRANTS Charles Thomas leave to proceed against Sgt. Franklin in his

individual capacity for monetary damages for attempting to recruit other inmates to kill

Thomas on or about June 13–15, 2025, in exchange for $500 in retaliation for filing a

lawsuit against Sgt. E. Flakes and an internal complaint against Sgt. Caldwell in 2020 in

violation of the First Amendment;

(6) GRANTS Charles Thomas leave to proceed against Sgt. Franklin in his

individual capacity for monetary damages for subjecting Thomas to cruel and unusual

punishment when he threatened to have Thomas killed by other inmates on or about

June 13–15, 2025, in exchange for $500 in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

(7) DISMISSES all other claims;

(8) DISMISSES Warden Smiley, Deputy Warden Gann, Ofc. Cron, Capt. Lee, Lt.

Heinrich, Sgt. Laurie, E/C Complex Caseworker/Manager Kecia Green, UTM Ryan

Thompson, Grievance Specialist Mrs. S. Smith, Grievance Specialist Mrs. Wozniak,

Classification Specialist Mrs. Williams, UTM Corley, I&I Staff, the Indiana Department

of Correction, the Department of Administration DOC Ombudsman Bureau Director

Charlene A. Burkett, and Reception Diagnostic Center Classification

Specialist/Counselor Ms. S. May;

(9) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service

from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to

locate and serve process on) Sgt. E. Flakes, Sgt. Flakes (Sgt. E. Flakes’ twin sister), Sgt.

Caldwell, and Sgt. Franklin at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a copy of this

order and the amended complaint (ECF 8);

(10) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name,

date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive

service if it has such information; and

(11) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Sgt. E. Flakes, Sgt. Flakes (Sgt. E.

Flakes’ twin sister), Sgt. Caldwell, and Sgt. Franklin to respond, as provided for in the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which

the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

SO ORDERED on November 5, 2025.

s/ Holly A. Brady

CHIEF JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT