Johnson v. Smith

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

____________ Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 24-30791 November 5, 2025

____________

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Jamie Johnson, in her capacity as tutor for R.C., a minor child,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Randy Smith, Sheriff; Chris Vado, Deputy; Bill Johnson,

Sergeant; John Connolly, Deputy,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:24-CV-170

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Ho, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

Jamie Johnson alleges St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s department of-

ficers used excessive force against her minor daughter R.C. Johnson brings

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Louisiana Constitution, and Louisiana

state tort law. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers.

We AFFIRM.

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

I.

We review the grant of summary judgment in the light most favorable

for Johnson, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Griggs v.

Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016). And as three different video

recordings captured the events at issue, we must “give greater weight, even

at the summary judgment stage, to the facts evident from video recordings

taken at the scene.” Id. (citing Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187

(5th Cir. 2011)); accord Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (“The

Court of Appeals . . . should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the

videotape.”); Scott v. City of Mandeville, 69 F.4th 249, 254 (5th Cir. 2023)

(“[W]hen there is video evidence available in the record, the court is not

bound to adopt the non-moving party’s version of the facts if it is

contradicted by the record, but rather should view the facts in the light

depicted by the videotape.”) (cleaned up).

On January 17, 2023, R.C. was at a school classmate’s home in

Covington, Louisiana. While R.C. was there, three officers from the St.

Tammany Parish Sheriff’s department arrived—Lieutenant Bill Johnson,

Deputy Joel Bratton, and Deputy Christopher Vado—searching for a person

of interest in a recent burglary. The officers approached the house, and while

standing on the porch, smelled marijuana. They also saw what appeared to

be a burnt marijuana cigarette on the outside table. And when Andree Prados,

the classmate’s mother and the homeowner, opened the door, the officers

faced a strong marijuana odor from inside. So, the officers entered the house

to investigate.

The scene quickly turned chaotic. A male minor ran out of the house.

Catching him in the backyard, Lieutenant Johnson found him carrying a

knife. When another male minor fought the officers while being patted down,

they brought him to the ground, handcuffed him, and escorted him out of the

2

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

house. Then, Lieutenant Johnson found the person of interest hiding in a

closet.

The officers began bringing everyone to the living room, and as

Lieutenant Johnson escorted Prados there, R.C. tried to stop him. Video

from a security camera memorializes part of the fray, showing R.C. fighting

Lieutenant Johnson and Deputy Vado: lunging at them, swinging at their

heads, and screaming in their faces as they try to get control of her. The two

officers finally wrestled R.C. to the floor and handcuffed her as she continued

to struggle. She then sat against the back of a couch.

Deputy John Connolly arrived right afterward. Two more video files

document what happened next. One video file is from Deputy Connolly’s

body camera, and the other comes from someone’s cell phone camera in the

living room. In the body camera footage, just after Connolly comes into the

living room, R.C. is visible sitting on the floor against the couch. Deputy Vado

is next to her; Connolly goes to the other side of the room to check for

weapons.

Suddenly, unannounced, R.C. starts to get up. Deputy Vado shouts

“Stay on the ground!” The cell phone video shows Deputy Vado grab R.C.

by the arm and bring her back to the floor as R.C. screams back “Move

[inaudible]! No! No!”

Deputy Connolly starts walking back over to assist, and R.C.

continues screaming at Deputy Vado. As Connolly rounds the corner of the

couch, his body camera records R.C. lying on her side, visibly struggling as

Deputy Vado continues to hold her down by the arm. R.C. starts to kick at

the officers and shouts “Get off of me!” Connolly yells “Calm down!” and

puts his hand on R.C.’s leg; she screams back and continues to kick and

struggle. One of the officers says “Stop!”

3

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

Connolly bends down and tries to restrain R.C.’s leg using his knee

and shin. She jerks her leg away, screaming “Get the f--- off of me, bro!”

Although Deputy Vado is holding her by the arm, R.C. flips from her side

onto her stomach and keeps kicking. Then, Deputy Connolly kneels against

R.C.’s left buttocks and lower left back. The body camera pans up, showing

both officers’ arms as they pull R.C. off her stomach and try to keep her on

her side. R.C. keeps screaming as Connolly continues to kneel. A male voice

off camera says “Watch her face, she can’t breathe.” One of the officers

responds, “If she can’t breathe, she needs to chill out.”

After ten seconds, just as R.C. stops physically resisting, Connolly

lifts his knee. The officers stand up R.C. and take her to the sheriff’s

department building in Covington. R.C. later pled no contest to two counts

of battery of a police officer and one count of resisting an officer.

A year later, on January 17, 2024, Johnson (R.C.’s mother) sued St.

Tammany Parish Sheriff Randy Smith and five Doe defendants in the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Three of the Does were

later identified as Sergeant Johnson, Deputy Connolly, and Deputy Vado.

Johnson twice amended her complaint, eventually trimming the list of

defendants to Sheriff Smith, Deputy Connolly, and Deputy Vado.

In the now-operative complaint, Johnson alleges that “Vado and

Connolly’s actions fractured R.C.’s T11 vertebra, causing R.C. intense pain

and restricting her ability to walk, move, sit, and stand”; that “R.C. was

hospitalized with the fractured vertebra”; that “[d]octors prescribed her

Norco to address the pain and placed her in a back brace that she had to wear

at all times for at least five weeks”; and that “R.C. continued to have

movement limitations for the next year, causing her falls and further

injuries.”

4

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

Johnson advanced both federal claims and Louisiana state law claims.

Against Deputy Connolly and Deputy Vado, Johnson brought excessive force

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Louisiana Constitution, or (in the

alternative) failure-to-intervene claims. She also made state law negligence

and battery claims against Connolly and Vado, and sought to hold Sheriff

Smith liable under state law on a respondeat superior theory.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. As a preliminary matter,

because of R.C.’s no contest plea on battery and resisting charges, the

defendants argued Johnson’s § 1983 claims were barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 1 Then, pointing to the video evidence, the

officers claimed they used reasonable force to restrain an actively resistant

subject. The officers sought qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims,

contending they acted permissibly under clearly established law, and were

not liable under state law for using reasonable force during a lawful arrest.

The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on

December 6, 2024. As to Connolly and Vado, the court found that Johnson

did not show clearly established law prohibited the officers’ conduct, and

dismissed the § 1983 claims on qualified immunity grounds. The district

court next dismissed the failure-to-intervene claims, finding there were no

predicate constitutional violations in which either Connolly or Vado could

have intervened. Finally, with no federal claims left, the court dismissed

Johnson’s state law claims without prejudice to their reassertions in the

Louisiana courts.

_____________________

1

In the § 1983 context, Heck requires courts to “consider whether a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of [a prior] conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate

that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

5

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

II.

A.

Johnson appeals all but the dismissal of her failure to intervene claims,

for which she has explicitly waived appeal. We begin with the excessive force

claims against Deputy Vado and Deputy Connolly. We agree with the district

court that both Vado and Connolly have qualified immunity, and are not

liable for excessive force.

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.”

Timpa v. Dillard, 20 F.4th 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 2021). Ordinarily, summary

judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But qualified immunity changes the

calculus. A “‘good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual

summary judgment burden of proof,’ shifting it to the plaintiff to show that

the defense is not available.” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015)).

To overcome qualified immunity, Johnson must show both “‘(1) that

the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right

was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Id.

(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). “Courts of appeal are

free to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to

address first.” Id.

The constitutional right at issue is the Fourth Amendment’s bar on

excessive force. To establish that force was unconstitutional, a plaintiff

“must show: ‘(1) an injury (2) which resulted from the use of force that was

clearly excessive to the need and (3) the excessiveness of which was

objectively unreasonable.’” Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir.

6

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

2013) (quoting Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 2011)). “The

second and third elements collapse into a single objective-reasonableness

inquiry.” Ramirez v. Killian, 113 F.4th 415, 424 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Peña

v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2018)).

As the officers assert qualified immunity, it is Johnson’s burden to

prove “that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness

of the [officers’] conduct.” King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 654 (5th Cir.

2016). We must pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each

particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). “[T]he ‘totality of the

circumstances’ inquiry into a use of force has no time limit,” and “earlier

facts and circumstances may bear on how a reasonable officer would have

understood and responded to later ones.” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80

(2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As did the district court, for each officer, we start and end with the

“clearly established law” prong of the qualified immunity analysis. We do so

because Johnson offers no clearly established law applicable to either officer’s

conduct, and that is fatal to her arguments for both Connolly and Vado. It is

Johnson’s burden under the qualified immunity framework to “identify[] a

case in which an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have

violated the Fourth Amendment” and to “explain[] why the case clearly

proscribed the conduct of that individual officer.” Joseph ex rel. Joseph v.

Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 345 (5th Cir. 2020). “The Supreme Court strictly

enforces the requirement to identify an analogous case and explain the

analogy.” Id. at 346.

B.

7

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

We address the excessive force claim against Deputy Vado first.

Johnson has offered no case demonstrating Vado’s conduct was unlawful;

instead, she pursues an inapposite line of “clearly established” principles.

Johnson argues that even if R.C. was fighting Vado before, R.C. was no longer

resisting by the time she stood up, making Vado’s next use of force excessive

because the threat had dissipated. Johnson cites cases for the “clearly

established” principle barring later, gratuitous force just because of an

arrestee’s “conceptually distinct” prior resistance.

This case does not fit that mold. As the Supreme Court recently

reiterated in Barnes v. Felix, we “must look too, in this and all excessive-force

cases, at any relevant events coming before” the use of force in question.

Barnes, 605 U.S. at 83. Context is critical. And moments before the force in

dispute, the living room security camera recorded R.C. aggressively

confronting Deputy Vado and Lieutenant Johnson. She lunged and swung at

the officers, shouted in their faces, resisted their movements, and struck

Lieutenant Johnson in the head. The footage proves R.C. is tall and strong

enough to put up real resistance, showing that two officers struggled to

subdue her. Officers finally got R.C. handcuffed, but even then, the body

camera footage shows her continuing to resist and shout.

As Johnson’s brief points out, the force in dispute took place only

“about a minute” after R.C.’s first outburst of violence against the officers.

“[L]ater, in-the-moment facts cannot be hermetically sealed off from the

context in which they arose.” Barnes, 605 U.S. at 80 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). R.C. was not resisting across different

“conceptually distinct” incidents; she was resisting over the course of one

ongoing encounter with the officers. It is true that in the seconds before she

stood up, R.C. wasn’t actively fighting back. But R.C.’s previous resistance

reasonably influenced Vado’s reaction after she suddenly stood up—not to

mention that, as the district court assumed, an arrestee standing up

8

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

unannounced and screaming at officers is resistance all on its own. “Prior

events may show why a reasonable officer would perceive otherwise

ambiguous conduct as threatening.” Barnes, 605 U.S. at 73–74 (citing

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014)).

The right question, then, is whether clearly established law barred

Deputy Vado from using “force with measured and ascending actions that

correspond[ed] to [the] suspect’s escalating verbal and physical resistance”

in the overall context of the encounter. Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332–33 (cleaned

up). Johnson’s best case is Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 2015).

But as the district court observed, “the facts in this case are significantly

different than those in Curran.” Curran is not “a case in which an officer

acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Fourth

Amendment.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 345. 2

In Curran, a police officer (Aleshire) twice pushed a female teenager

(Curran) into a wall. For both uses of force, there were factual disputes about

whether Curran had been resisting. The district court therefore denied

Aleshire’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, our court reiterated

that “the qualified immunity defense required the resolution of disputed fact

issues” not suitable for summary judgment, including “whether Curran was

resisting, threatening others, or attempting to escape when Aleshire used

force against her.” Curran, 800 F.3d at 659. We dismissed Aleshire’s appeal

so those facts could develop in district court. But before doing so, we offered

_____________________

2

The district court separately rejected Johnson’s arguments about Curran because

Johnson cited the district court opinion in that case instead of the later, published Fifth

Circuit opinion. Johnson now cites that precedential Fifth Circuit opinion, which we

consider because it predates the events at issue here (making it relevant to the “clearly

established law” analysis).

9

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

guidance: if the district court later found Curran was not resisting, then

gratuitously shoving her into the wall violated clearly established law. 3

This principle from Curran is inapposite because R.C. was resisting.

The security camera footage clearly depicts her resisting as she battered and

fought Johnson and Vado. She resisted again moments later when she stood

up and struggled against Deputy Vado and Deputy Connolly, caught on both

Connolly’s body camera and the cell phone video. And she pled “no contest”

to criminal charges for battery and resistance. Unlike Curran, the district

court in this case saw no dispute about resistance. We reach the same

conclusion. Curran, which at best summarized clearly established law as to

non-resisting arrestees, says nothing about Vado’s conduct toward a resisting

arrestee. Neither do Johnson’s other cases, which similarly discuss arrestees

who have stopped resisting. 4

_____________________

3

Curran, 800 F.3d at 663 (“[T]he district court found a fact dispute concerning

whether the battery and the first use of force were temporally disconnected . . . We cannot

assess, given our limited interlocutory review, whether this fact dispute is not genuine. And

we agree with the district court that the fact dispute is material. We therefore find no legal

error in the district court’s conclusion that slamming a student’s head into the wall after

her resistance had ceased is a violation of clearly established law.”).

4

See Timpa, 20 F.4th at 1034 (“We hold that the state of the law in August 2016

clearly established that an officer engages in an objectively unreasonable application of

force by continuing to kneel on the back of an individual who has been subdued.”) (emphasis

added); Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 177 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 998

(2016) (“[T]he deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law for injuries

Barnes sustained after he was handcuffed and restrained and after he stopped resisting

arrest.”) (emphasis added); Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 416 (5th Cir. 2021)

(“If the Officers unnecessarily placed Aguirre in the maximal-restraint position when there

was no reason to believe he had committed a serious crime, that he posed a continuing

threat to the Officers or public safety, or that he was resisting the Officers’ seizure or holding

of him, the Officers violated Aguirre’s clearly established constitutional rights.”) (emphasis

added).

Johnson also cites Killian, but as she concedes, that case was decided more than a

year and a half after the events at issue here. We must examine “the law at the time of the

10

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

Johnson offers no on-point cases to support that Vado mishandled

R.C., likely because Vado’s response was not objectively unreasonable. Up

until the disputed use of force, Deputy Vado had watched R.C. continuously

escalate the scene. She impeded officers from searching the house to secure

their own safety, she hit and tried to tackle the officers, and she screamed and

distracted them as they tried to get information. Given her hostile behavior

only “about a minute” before, it was reasonable for Deputy Vado to expect

that R.C., standing up unannounced, planned to escalate things again. And

the video confirms she did just that. Deputy Vado ordered R.C. to “stay on

the ground,” grabbing her to stop her from standing up, but R.C. screamed

“No! No!” and resisted again.

Because Johnson does not show clearly established law prohibited

Deputy Vado’s use of force against a resisting arrestee, she has not rebutted

his assertion of qualified immunity. The district court correctly granted

summary judgment for Vado on the § 1983 claim against him.

C.

Turning to Deputy Connolly, we reach the same conclusion. Johnson

recycles the same “clearly established law” arguments that she used for

Vado, which again fail to demonstrate that clearly established law barred

Connolly’s restraint techniques.

The body camera footage shows that when Deputy Connolly arrived,

R.C. was already handcuffed on the ground. She was screaming at Deputy

_____________________

incident” to ascertain clearly established principles. Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 500 (5th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 395 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004)). To the

extent Killian discusses the law during the encounter with R.C. in January 2023, it merely

restates the same inapplicable concept just discussed in Curran: “[a]n officer may not

constitutionally use force on a non-threatening subject offering no resistance or merely

‘passive’ resistance.” Killian, 113 F.4th at 424 (emphasis added).

11

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

Vado as Deputy Connolly entered. While Connolly surveyed the room, Vado

said to R.C., “You just fought the police!” Connolly testified that these

events raised his alert about R.C. as he first stepped on the scene.

Then, while Deputy Connolly helped secure the house, R.C. began to

stand up and struggle with Deputy Vado. The video footage shows that R.C.

resisted Vado for thirteen more seconds before Deputy Connolly made it

over to help; although the body camera footage is sometimes obstructed,

screaming and scuffling can be heard while Connolly walks over. The video

makes clear that by the time Connolly applied his knee, R.C. was actively

resisting—kicking, thrashing, and screaming. Only then did Connolly kneel

down. Connolly left his leg in place for ten seconds, and the video shows him

get up as soon as R.C. became more still.

As with Deputy Vado, Johnson frames the clearly established law

question as whether “officers may . . . use serious force against restrained

individuals who are not actively resisting.” But we are to “view the facts in

the light depicted by the videotape[s].” City of Mandeville, 69 F.4th at 254

(cleaned up); accord Harris, 550 U.S. at 380–81. Multiple videos prove

Connolly applied force in context of an actively resistant arrestee—not, as

Johnson claims, a “restrained individual[] who [was] not actively resisting.”

Viewing the facts as they appear on video, the real question is (again) whether

under clearly established law, Connolly unreasonably used additional force to

restrain an actively resistant R.C.—force that he removed once the resistance

stopped. And in asking that question, we must remember that “the qualified

immunity defense protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.’” Killian, 113 F.4th at 421 (quoting Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

As with Deputy Vado, Johnson points to no clearly established law

supporting that Connolly acted unreasonably or unlawfully. She again cites

12

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

cases about arrestees who have stopped resisting, but that is a different

factual predicate that the videos disprove. “[E]xisting precedent must

squarely govern the specific facts at issue, such that only someone who is

plainly incompetent or who knowingly violates the law would have behaved

as the official did.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 337 (cleaned up).

If anything, our decisions only underscore that escalating force is a

valid response to continued resistance. Poole v. City of Shreveport, a factually

analogous case, illustrates the point. See 691 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2012).

Analyzing a scenario where an officer “pinned Poole down when he refused

to comply with [another officer’s] commands,” we held that “[v]iewed

objectively, [the officers] responded with ‘measured and ascending’ actions

that corresponded to Poole’s escalating verbal and physical resistance.” Id.

at 629. Because Poole “‘actively resist[ed]’ the officers’ instructions,” we

explained, pinning him down until he stopped resisting “was not ‘clearly

excessive.’” Id. So too here.

Johnson cites no clearly established law holding that conduct like

Connolly’s is impermissible. Because she has not met “the requirement to

identify an analogous case and explain the analogy,” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 346,

Johnson has not carried her burden to rebut Connolly’s assertion of qualified

immunity. The district court correctly granted summary judgment for

Connolly on the excessive force claim against him.

III.

Finally, Johnson appeals the dismissal of her Louisiana state law

claims. She alleged Vado and Connolly committed battery, state law

negligence, and violations of the Louisiana Constitution. She also sought

liability from St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Smith under a respondeat superior

theory. After granting summary judgment for defendants on the federal

claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

13

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

these remaining state law claims. “We review the decision to retain

jurisdiction over the pendent state claims for abuse of discretion.” Parker &

Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992)

(citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 401 (1970)). We find no error.

Federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims

“that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction

that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

After all federal claims are gone from a case, however, statutory and common

law criteria shape supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims.

Under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, “[t]he district courts

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” after considering four

factors: “(1) whether the state claims raise novel or complex issues of state

law; (2) whether the state claims substantially predominate over the federal

claims; (3) whether the federal claims have been dismissed; and (4) whether

there are exceptional circumstances or other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.” Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). And at common law, the “general rule is to dismiss

state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are

dismissed,” although that rule is “neither mandatory nor absolute.” Enochs,

641 F.3d at 161 (citations omitted). Courts must “balanc[e] the values of

economy, convenience, fairness, federalism, and comity.” Parker & Parsley,

972 F.2d at 585 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350

(1988)).

The statutory factors support dismissal, as the district court correctly

found. By granting summary judgment for defendants, all federal claims

would be dismissed. That necessarily means the remaining state claims

predominate over the federal claims. Sending state claims to state court

would “promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-

14

Case: 24-30791 Document: 65-2 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/05/2025

No. 24-30791

footed reading of applicable law” (United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))—particularly because Louisiana constitutional

claims are involved. And the “heavy balance of the common law factors in

favor of remand constitutes another compelling reason to decline

jurisdiction.” Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159.

The common law factors also promote dismissing the state claims. As

the district court succinctly and correctly explained (citations omitted):

Judicial economy would not be undermined as this

Court has not made any ruling on state law or [a]ffecting the

state-law claims. With respect to fairness, it is not unfair for

these parties to litigate Louisiana-law claims in Louisiana state

court. In fact, it is fairer for the parties to litigate the state-law

claims in state court because it would “procur[e] for them a

surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Lastly, comity

demands that federal courts do not pronounce needless

decisions of state law. “Needless decisions of state law should

be avoided . . . as a matter of comity.”

We find the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The district

court correctly dismissed these claims without prejudice so that Johnson may

pursue them in Louisiana state court.

IV.

As Johnson fails to demonstrate that either Connolly or Vado violated

clearly established law, she does not overcome the officers’ assertion of

qualified immunity. We therefore AFFIRM summary judgment for

Connolly and Vado on the § 1983 claims against them. We also AFFIRM

the dismissal of Johnson’s state law claims without prejudice. Having

disposed of all the claims on other grounds, we do not reach defendants’

argument that Johnson’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

15