Maney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEBORAH MANEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) NO. 3:25-cv-01192

v. )

) JUDGE CAMPBELL

SECRET SERVICE, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) NEWBERN

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint

against the Secret Service, alleging that it has not paid her for work she was hired to do. (Doc. No.

1).

I. FILING FEE

Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP

Application”). (Doc. No. 2). The Court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying

the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915 is intended to insure that indigent persons have

equal access to the judicial system by allowing them to proceed without having to advance the fees

and costs associated with litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Adkins v. E.I.

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). Pauper status does not require absolute

destitution. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339; Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.

App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the relevant question is “whether the court costs can be

paid without undue hardship.” Foster, 21 F. App’x at 240. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a

privilege, not a right, and “[t]he decision whether to permit a litigant to proceed [in forma pauperis]

is within the Court’s discretion.” Id.

According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals $967 from

Supplemental Social Security payments, she has no cash, she has no money in bank accounts, and

her monthly expenses total $875. (Id.) Plaintiff recently acquired housing after having been

unhoused for some time. Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial

resources to pay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is

GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under

§ 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any complaint,

or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a short

and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “liberal

construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing

Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v.

Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no obligation to act as counsel

or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). Nor are they “required

to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836,

837 (6th Cir. 2003).And pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011).

III. ALLEGED FACTS

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff has been an employee of the Secret Service since 2017

and has not been paid for her work since 2021 or 2022. The complaint further alleges that “the old

secretary Blond[e] haired female” stole Plaintiff’s employment number when Plaintiff went out of

the country and that is why Plaintiff has not been getting paid. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff demands

back pay and the return of her Secret Service employment number.

IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT

After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds

that Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by res judicata.

Res judicata or “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have been

raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.” Lucky Brand

Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). See Brownback v. King, 592

U.S. 209, 215 n.3 (2021) (parties may not “relitigat[e] the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action,’ even

if certain issues were not litigated in the prior action.”).

On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed an action in this Court against the Secret Service,

raising the same allegations as those she raises in the instant case. See Maney v. Secret Service,

Case No. 3:24-cv-1131 (M.D. Tenn.) (Trauger, J.) (case dismissed on 4/30/2025). The Court

dismissed that case because the Secret Service is an agency of the United States; the United States,

as a sovereign, cannot be sued without its prior consent, and the terms of its consent define the

court’s subject matter jurisdiction; a waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed,

unequivocally expressed, and cannot be implied; and even liberally construing the complaint, there

was not a sufficient indication that the United States waived its sovereign immunity for the claims

asserted by Plaintiff against the Secret Service. Id. (Doc. No. 6 at 3-4). Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims

were subject to dismissal as frivolous or delusional. (Id.) (Doc. No. 6 at 4).

The claims Plaintiff raises in the instant lawsuit were raised and rejected in her previous

lawsuit. Plaintiff is not entitled to another bite at the apple.

V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal under

28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an

appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED. VE : J

WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE