Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SHAWN-LAMAR JONES, ) CASE NO. 1:22-CV-02155

)

Petitioner, ) JUDGE CHARLES ESQUE FLEMING

)

vs. ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARMEN E.

) HENDERSON

WARDEN KENNETH BLACK, )

) OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING

Respondent. ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT

) AND RECOMMENDATION

On November 30, 2022, Petitioner Shawn-Lamar Jones (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). On May 8, 2024,

Magistrate Judge Carmen E. Henderson filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)

recommending that the Court deny and dismiss the Petition. (ECF No. 11).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) provides that the parties may object to a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

within 14 days after service. The R&R also gave the parties notice of the 14-day time limit for

filing objections. (ECF No. 12, PageID# 1342). Under the Federal Magistrates Act, a district

court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which the parties have

objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Absent objection, a district court

may adopt an R&R without further review. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991);

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 141-42 (1985). The Court ADOPTS sections II. (Factual

Background), III. (Additional State Procedural History), IV. (Federal Habeas Corpus Petition), and

V. (Applicable Law) of the R&R and incorporates those sections as if fully rewritten in this Order.

On July 26, 2024, Petitioner filed his objections to the R&R. (ECF No. 14). He objected

to a portion of the R&R quoting the decision of the Ohio court of appeals, in which the court of

appeals determined, based on Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.71, that the trial court had not violated

Petitioner’s speedy-trial right:

[W]e need not reach the issue whether the triple[-]count provision is

applicable to this case[,] [h]owever, because the record reflects that only

55 days of speedy-trial time had expired by the time Jones was brought to

trial. Therefore, even if we were to assume without deciding that the triple-

count provision applied to this case, only 55 of the 90 days expired by the

time trial commenced.

(ECF No. 14, PageID #1381) (quoting State of Ohio v. Jones, No. 110081, 2021 WL 4340826, at

*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2021). Petitioner objects, stating that the court of appeals and

Magistrate Judge “erred by not correctly counting the Petitioner’s days spent in Cuyahoga County

Jail awaiting trial.” (Id. at PageID #1382) (emphasis omitted).

The Magistrate Judge did not make any factual finding concerning the number of days in

which Petitioner was in custody awaiting trial. This is because, as the Magistrate Judge explained,

“Ohio’s statutory right to a speedy trial is not cognizable in a habeas action.” (ECF No. 11, PageID

#1368) (quoting West v. Sloan, No. 17-3704, 2017 WL 6762418, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2017)

(citing Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 328 (6th Cir. 1998))).

Instead, the Magistrate Judge reviewed Petitioner’s federal speedy trial claim and

concluded that it should be dismissed. (Id. at PageID #1370). Petitioner briefly objects to the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that “Petitioner’s failure to show prejudice ‘is alone sufficient to

tip the balance [of the Barker1 factors] in favor of the state court’s finding no violation.’” (ECF

No. 14, PageID #1387) (quoting ECF No. 11, PageID #1370) (quoting Brown v. Bobby, 656 F.3d

325, 337 (6th Cir. 2011)). Petitioner claims that litigants are presumed prejudiced when denied

1 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

access to relevant records, though he does not cite authority holding as much. (/d.). Petitioner

also did not argue any correlation between his lack of access to Cuyahoga County Department of

Children and Family Services records and the delays in his trial. The Magistrate Judge thus did

not err in concluding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the delays in his trial.’

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Grimes’s R&R, incorporates it fully

herein by reference, and DENIES and DISMISSES the Petition. The Court also CERTIFIES,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision cannot be taken in good faith,

and that there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b);

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 4, 2025 Indy Huse

CHARLES ESQUE FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

> To the extent that Petitioner challenges the law as stated in Brown, the Magistrate Judge did not err in its citation to

that case for the proposition that a failure to show prejudice is alone “sufficient to tip the balance in favor of the state

courts finding no violation.” The more complete quote states:

Although the length of the delay surpasses the threshold required to present a speedy trial

claim and Brown clearly asserted his speedy trial right, 1t is not clear that the state is more

to blame for the delay or that Brown was preyudiced by the delay. Even if one assumes

that the state 1s more to blame, Brown was not blameless and in fact was responsible for a

significant portion of the delay. Regardless, Brown has not shown that he suffered any

prejudice, in the form of either oppressive incarceration or impairment to his defense, from

this over nineteen-month delay, and this alone is sufficient to tip the balance in favor of the

state court's finding no violation. We explained in United States v. Bohn, 281 F. App’x

430, 437 (6th Cir.2008), that “a finding in the defendant's favor on each of the

four Barker factors does not necessarily warrant dismissal of the indictment,” because “[a]

violation of the right to a speedy trial arises [only] when ‘the circumstances of the case are

such that further delay would endanger the values the right

protects.’” Jd. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 522); see also United States v. Love, 178 F.3d

1297, 1999 WL 115523, at *6—8 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 1999) (finding no violation when the first

three of the four Barker factors weighed in favor of the defendant, but the defendant had

not shown any prejudice from the delay). The state court, in short, reasonably

applied Barker in Brown's case.

Brown, 656 F.3d at 337-38. Not only is the quotation accurate, but the citation stands for precisely what the Magistrate

Judge recommended here: even though two of the Barker factors weighed in Petitioner’s favor, the lack of prejudice

caused by the delay alone justifies denial of a motion to dismiss based on a violation of one’s speedy-trial right.