Royall

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 GABRIEL ADAM ROYALL, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2455-RSH-DEB

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

13 v. DISMISS

14 THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS

[ECF Nos. 4, 9]

COMPANY,

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Defendant.

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18 Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant The Sherwin-

19 Williams Co. (“Sherwin-Williams” or “Defendant”). ECF No. 4. Plaintiff Gabriell Adam

20 Royall (“Royall” or “Plaintiff”) did not timely file an opposition. See Docket. As set forth

21 below, the Court grants the motion.

22 I. BACKGROUND

23 On August 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pro se in California Superior Court

24 for the County of San Diego. ECF No. 1-3 at 13–18 (“Compl.”). The Complaint asserts

25 one claim, for “abuse of process/procedural interference,” and alleges that Defendant

26 undertook to “displace” a complaint that Plaintiff had filed “to another court or venue.” Id.

27 ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that this change of courts or venue “created procedural ambiguity and

28 cognitive load, forcing Plaintiff to expend significant energy to research, reorganize, and

1 mentally re-process the dispute from a new and uncertain posture.” Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff further

2 alleges that Defendants did this “not to resolve a dispute on the merits, but to burden, orient,

3 and delay Plaintiff’s pursuit of justice.” Id. ¶ 19.

4 Plaintiff alleges that the foregoing has “disrupted daily life” and “imposed emotional

5 stress.” Id.¶ 8. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $250,000. Id. ¶ 26.

6 On September 18, 2025, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on

7 diversity of citizenship. ECF No. 1.

8 On September 24, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff

9 has not timely filed an opposition.

10 On September 29, 2025, the case was transferred to the undersigned. ECF No. 6.

11 II. LEGAL STANDARD

12 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

13 sufficiency of the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6)

14 is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires only “a

15 short and plain statement of the claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R.

16 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum,

17 a complaint must allege enough facts to provide “fair notice” of both the particular claims

18 being asserted and “the grounds upon which [those claims] rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

19 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007).

20 In deciding a motion to dismiss, all material factual allegations of the complaint are

21 accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill v.

22 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). A court, however, need not accept

23 all conclusory allegations as true. Rather it must “examine whether conclusory allegations

24 follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978

25 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff's

26 complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

27 face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

28 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

1 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

2 556).

3 A complaint by a plaintiff proceeding pro se is “held to less stringent standards than

4 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)

5 (citation omitted). Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Id. Nonetheless, courts may not

6 “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents,

7 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A pro se litigant’s pleadings still must meet some

8 minimum threshold in providing the defendants with notice of what it is that they allegedly

9 did wrong. See Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995).

10 III. ANALYSIS

11 Defendant argues that this lawsuit should be dismissed because it fails to allege facts

12 sufficient to state a claim. The Court agrees.

13 “The tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the court’s process for a purpose

14 other than that for which the process was designed.” Brown v. Kennard, 94 Cal. App. 4th

15 40, 44 (Ct. App. 2001). “To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant must

16 establish two elements: that the defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the

17 process; and (2) committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular

18 conduct of the proceedings.” Id. “A showing of malice, whether express or implied, is

19 required.” Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier Serv., 162 Cal. App. 3d 1236, 1247 (Ct.

20 App. 1984)). “The gist of the tort is the misuse of the power of the court: It is an act done

21 under the authority of the court for the purpose of perpetrating an injustice, i.e., a perversion

22 of the judicial process to the accomplishment of an improper purpose.” Younger v.

23 Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 297 (Ct. App. 1974) (emphasis in original). Generally, such

24 an action “lies only where the process is used to obtain an unjustifiable collateral

25 advantage.” Id. (emphasis in original).

26 Here, the Complaint does not specify the prior lawsuit which he alleges that

27 Defendants wrongfully changed to another court or venue. However, the Court takes

28 judicial notice that in the space of approximately two months, Plaintiff filed five lawsuits

1 against Defendant in California Superior Court—all apparently pertaining to the same

2 dispute, and each of which Defendant removed to this Court on the basis of diversity of

3 citizenship. All five cases bear the same case caption, with the following case numbers:

4 25-cv-1994, 25-cv-2232, 25-cv-2379, 25-cv-2455 (the instant action), and 25-cv-2577. To

5 date, all four of the other lawsuits have been dismissed.

6 The Complaint here does not identify, and the Court does not find, anything

7 improper about these removals. Plaintiff has not moved to remand any of these actions to

8 state court. The removals are numerous and repetitive only by virtue of the fact that

9 Plaintiff’s lawsuits are numerous and repetitive. Reviewing the respective notices of

10 removal, the Court determines that removal in each case was properly based on federal

11 subject matter jurisdiction.

12 “A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless

13 it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by

14 amendment.” See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court

15 concludes that the deficiencies identified herein cannot be cured by amendment. The

16 Complaint in this case is based on the incorrect premise that it was wrongful to invoke the

17 jurisdiction of the federal courts through one or more removals that were proper and that

18 Plaintiff never challenged by motion. The Court also takes into account its dismissals of

19 Plaintiff’s related cases. As set forth in the Court’s respective dismissal orders, each of

20 these lawsuits has been meritless.

21 IV. CONCLUSION

22 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 4] is

23 GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend.

24 The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

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1 In light of this disposition, Plaintiff's motion for leave to electronically file

2 documents [ECF No. 9] is DENIED as moot.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘

4 || Dated: November 3, 2025 Feobkww ¢ Howe

5 Hon. Robert S. Huie

United States District Judge

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