CARLO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RUBEN D. CARLO, SR.,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-946 (MAS) (TJB)

‘ OPINION

MICHAEL KELLY,

Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Ruben D. Carlo’s civil complaint (ECF

No. 1) and application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1-1.) Having reviewed the

application, this Court finds that in forma pauperis status is warranted in this matter, and Plaintiff s

application is therefore granted. Because the application shall be granted, this Court is required to

screen Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim that is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For

the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

L BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a state pre-trial detainee currently confined in the Atlantic County Justice

Facility. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) In his complaint, Plaintiff secks to raise a conditions of confinement

claim against the Warden of the jail, Michael Kelly, alleging that Kelly “allowed” the conditions

Plaintiff faced. The alleged conditions include being housed as the third prisoner in a two-man

cell, being repeatedly served the same three meals, a lack of natural light, inefficient toilets,

secondhand smoke despite the jail being a nonsmoking facility, and being forced to smell toilet

contents that were slow to drain. (/d. at 5.) Plaintiffs complaint, however, alleges no facts

suggesting that he ever brought these conditions to the attention of Defendant Kelly. Rather, the

complaint only states that Plaintiff “sought out informal relief from [unspecified] supervising

staff’ to no avail. Ud.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Because Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen

his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua

sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Jd “The

legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips

v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A

complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must

contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it

provides only “‘naked assertion[s|’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd. (quoting Bell

All. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Jd (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A

complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd.

(quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in

conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints

to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

IH. DISCUSSION

In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks to raise a federal civil rights claim against the warden of

the jail in which he is housed based on allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. As

Plaintiff is a state pre-trial detainee, his claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,

Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231 (Gd Cir. 2008). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a

pre-trial detainee may not be subjected to conditions which would amount to improper punishment

without a supporting conviction. Jd. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 420, 535 (1979)). In

determining whether a given set of circumstances amounts to improper punishment, a court must

consider “whether any legitimate purposes are served by these conditions, and ... whether these

conditions are rationally related to these purposes.” Jd. at 232. Conditions that are rationally

related to the state’s interests in maintaining order and managing overcrowding will therefore

generally not amount to punishment. /d. (detention including triple-celling with inmates spending

“between three and seven months” on a mattress on the floor in light of overcrowding did not

violate the Fourteenth Amendment). Of the conditions Plaintiff lists, several are clearly rationally

related to the jail’s legitimate interests: triple booking clearly serves the interest of dealing with

overcrowding, a lack of meal variety clearly does not qualify as punishment, and although Plaintiff

states that he experiences second-hand smoke, he alleges the jail is smoking free. Thus, any

second-hand smoke is not attributable to the jail which has already made rules to address the issue.

Even assuming that the remaining conditions—unsanitary and slow to drain toilets and

being exposed to remaining sewage resulting in nose bleeds—could support a conditions of

confinement claim, Plaintiff raises his claims against only one defendant, the Warden of the jail,

from whom he seeks monetary compensation. A plaintiff in a civil rights matter may not rely on

a respondeat superior theory of liability, and every named defendant can only be held liable where

he is personally involved in the alleged wrong. Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210,

222 (3d Cir. 2015); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). A supervisor,

such as a jail warden, may therefore only be held liable where he can be said to be personally

involved in the alleged wrong — either where he was directly involved, had knowledge of and

acquiesced in the alleged wrong, or put into place a policy, custom, or practice that was the moving

force behind the alleged violation. Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222; see also Natale v. Camden Cnty.

Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any direct

involvement in his conditions by Defendant. Plaintiff does not allege that he raised the alleged

claims to the warden’s attention. Instead, Plaintiff only alleges that he spoke with some

unspecified supervisor in his unit, or that the warden is otherwise aware of the plumbing issues

such that the warden can sufficiently be said to have either known of and acquiesced in the

conditions or to have been personally involved in imposing them. In the absence of some personal

involvement by the only named Defendant, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed without prejudice

at this time.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF

No. 1-1) is GRANTED; and Plaintiffs complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An order consistent

with this Opinion will be entered.

MICHAEL A. Skier

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

gq