The opinion
Filed 11/3/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE ex rel. ROB BONTA,
as Attorney General, etc., et al.,
G065589
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-01393606)
v.
OPINION
CITY OF HUNTINGTON BEACH et
al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Nick A. Dourbetas, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Seth E. Goldstein and Michael S. Cohen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Peter Eliasberg and
Julia Gomez for ACLU of Southern California, ACLU of Northern California,
and ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Cooley, Kathleen R. Hartnett, Matt K. Nguyen, Kristen Adrina
Johnson and Ana Alicia Bordallo for Asian Americans Advancing Justice
Southern California, Asian Law Caucus, California Black Power Network,
and Disability Rights California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Michael J. Vigliotta, City Attorney; JW Howard/Attorneys, John
W. Howard, Scott Street, Michelle Volk, Peter Shelling, and Mitchell Stein
1
for Defendants and Respondents.
Law Office of Chad Morgan and Chad D. Morgan for James V.
Lacy, United States Justice Foundation, and California Public Policy
Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
THE COURT:*
In recent years, a vigorous nationwide debate has arisen over
whether voters should be required to present identification at the polls to
vote. Proponents of such a requirement contend it is necessary to protect
against voter fraud and ensure the integrity of elections. Opponents argue it
1
The American First Legal Foundation, James K. Rogers,
Nicholas Barry, and Ryan Gianetti are also listed as counsel on the caption of
the defendants’ Brief. Rogers, Barry, and Giannetti are not licensed to
practice law in the State of California and did not apply to this court for pro
hac vice admission. The court declines to recognize them as counsel of record
in this case.
* Before Motoike, Acting P. J., Sanchez, J., and Delaney, J.
2
is unnecessary in light of the extreme rarity of documented cases of voter
fraud and harms electoral legitimacy by discriminating against historically
disadvantaged groups for whom obtaining such identification is more
difficult.
We are not called upon to resolve this debate. Instead, this case
presents us a much narrower, simpler question: Is voter identification a
matter of “‘integrity of the electoral process,’” which our Supreme Court has
held is a matter of statewide concern, whether presented in statewide or local
elections? (Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 389, 409.) We conclude it is,
and that as a result Elections Code section 10005 preempts section 705,
subdivision (a)(2) of the Huntington Beach City Charter, which purports to
permit Huntington Beach to require voters to present identification to vote in
municipal elections.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Huntington Beach (the City) is a charter city in Orange County.
In 2023, the City Council placed on the ballot a measure to amend section
702 and add section 705 to the City Charter. (Voter Information Guide,
Primary Elec. (Mar. 5, 2024) text of Measure A.) (Measure A.) The
amendment to section 702 called for the City Charter’s election rules to
supersede the state Elections Code. The newly added section 705 stated (as
relevant here): “(a) Beginning in 2026, for all municipal elections:” “(2) The
City may verify the eligibility of Electors by voter identification.” These two
changes were packaged together as City of Huntington Beach Measure A on
the ballot for the March 5, 2024 Presidential Primary ballot. Measure A
passed by a total vote of 32,892 to 28,701.
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In response, the Legislature enacted (and the Governor signed)
Senate Bill No. 1174 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), which added section 10005 to
the Elections Code. (Stats. 2024, ch. 990, § 2.) The newly enacted section,
effective January 1, 2025, forbids any “local government” from “enact[ing] or
enforc[ing] any charter provision, ordinance, or regulation requiring a person
to present identification for the purpose of voting or submitting a ballot at
any polling place, vote center, or other location where ballots are cast or
submitted, unless required by state or federal law.” (Elec. Code, § 10005.) The
statute specifically defines the term “‘local government’” as including “any
charter or general law city . . . .” (Ibid.)
From its inception, Elections Code section 10005 was specifically
intended to respond to Measure A. The bill was sponsored by the state
senator representing the City. The reports prepared for the Legislature to
discuss the bill specifically refer to Huntington Beach Measure A. (Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1174
(2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 2, 2024.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Within weeks of the passage of Measure A, the state (through the
Attorney General and Secretary of State) filed a petition for a writ of
mandate in the Orange County Superior Court against the City and its clerk.
The state sought a writ of mandate invalidating section 705, subdivision
(a)(2) of the City Charter, an injunction prohibiting its implementation or
enforcement, and a judicial declaration that it is preempted by and violates
California law.
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The City demurred, arguing its voter identification requirement
had not yet been implemented by a scheme of ordinances, such that a
decision on the issue was not yet ripe, and because section 705 of the City
Charter was not effective until January 2026. The trial court sustained the
demurrer with leave to amend but the state declined to amend its petition
and sought immediate entry of judgment to expedite appeal. The trial court,
in turn, declined to enter judgment and ordered the petition dismissed
without prejudice.
The state appealed and separately filed a petition for writ of
mandate. This court issued a so-called “suggestive Palma notice,” indicating
its tentative conclusions that (1) the matter was ripe for decision, contrary to
the trial court’s ruling; (2) the trial court’s refusal to enter judgment was
erroneous; and (3) the trial court’s orders were not separately appealable
(meaning the trial court retained jurisdiction to alter its orders). The trial
court then vacated its orders sustaining the City’s demurrer and dismissing
the petition and instead set the matter for hearing. This court then dismissed
the state’s writ petition and appeal.
After the hearing, the trial court denied the state’s petition for a
writ of mandate. The trial court concluded “the challenged charter provision
does not violate the right to vote and does not implicate the integrity of the
electoral process.” The state timely appealed from the resulting judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE HOME RULE DOCTRINE
Under the California Constitution, charter cities like the City are
“specifically authorized . . . to govern themselves, free of state legislative
intrusion, as to those matters deemed municipal affairs.” (State Building &
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Construction Trades Council of California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th
547, 555; Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5.) This is sometimes known as the “home
rule doctrine.” (State Building & Construction Trades Council of California,
at p. 555.) When state law and a charter city’s regulations or ordinances
conflict, we apply a four-factor test to determine whether the home rule
doctrine permits or bars state law preemption. (Id. at p. 556.)
First, we analyze “whether the city ordinance at issue regulates
an activity that can be characterized as a ‘municipal affair.’” (State Building
& Construction Trades Council of California v. City of Vista, supra, 54
Cal.4th at p. 556.) Second, we consider whether the case presents an actual
conflict between state and local law. (Ibid.) Third, we “decide whether the
state law addresses a matter of ‘statewide concern.’” (Ibid.) Fourth, we
“determine whether the law is ‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of that
concern [citation] and ‘narrowly tailored’ to avoid unnecessary interference in
local governance.” (Ibid.) “‘If . . . the court is persuaded that the subject of the
state statute is one of statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably
related to its resolution [and not unduly broad in its sweep], then the
conflicting charter city measure ceases to be a “municipal affair” pro tanto
and the Legislature is not prohibited by article XI, section 5[, subdivision (a)
of the California Constitution], from addressing the statewide dimension by
its own tailored enactments.’” (Ibid.) Though we give great weight to the
factual record compiled by the Legislature and any relevant facts established
in the trial court, this is a question of law, not fact, to which we apply a de
novo standard of review. (See State Building & Construction Trades Council
of California, at p. 558.) Neither the trial court’s nor the Legislature’s factual
findings are controlling. (Ibid.)
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II.
APPLYING THE FOUR-PART “HOME RULE” TEST
A. Parts One and Two: Is This a Municipal Affair and Is There an Actual
Conflict Between State and Local Law?
The first two parts of the test are easily resolved. First, municipal
elections are a quintessentially municipal affair. (Jauregui v. City of
Palmdale (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 781, 796.) Municipal elections are even
specifically named as municipal affairs in the relevant section of our
constitution. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (b).)
Second, there is plainly an actual conflict between Elections Code
section 10005 and section 705, subdivision (a)(2) of the City Charter. One
expressly grants the City permission to conduct voter identification checks
beyond those required by state and federal law, while the other forbids such
checks. The City argues (as it did in its demurrer on the issue of ripeness)
that it is not yet possible to know whether the City’s ordinance will actually
conflict with Elections Code section 10005. The City posits it might
ultimately decide only to impose identical requirements to those imposed by
state and federal law, such that no conflict exists. We find this argument
unpersuasive in light of the nature of the City’s amendments to its charter,
which expressly purport to grant it authority not only to conduct voter
identification checks, but also to do so in violation of the state Elections Code.
We ordinarily presume the Legislature or other legislative bodies do not
engage in idle acts. (Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Bd. (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 427, 445.)
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B. Part Three: Does the State Law Address a Matter of Statewide Concern?
The third part of the test—whether the state law addresses a
matter of statewide concern—was the basis for the trial court’s decision. The
trial court reasoned that this dispute “does not implicate the integrity of the
electoral process” because the United States Supreme Court held in Crawford
v. Marion County Election Bd. (2008) 553 U.S. 181 that voter identification
requirements do not violate the right to vote under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The trial court thus concluded there was no statewide concern
at issue here, distinguishing Jauregui v. City of Palmdale (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 781 (Jauregui), in which the Court of Appeal for the Second
District concluded a state law requiring the City of Palmdale to elect its city
council members via districts rather than in a citywide vote addressed a
matter of statewide concern because the state’s rules were based on concerns
about racial vote dilution. (Id. at pp. 800–801.)
The trial court’s interpretation of Jauregui was erroneous. The
Jauregui court’s reasoning was not limited to issues arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment or under the comparable provisions of article 1,
section 2 of the California Constitution. (Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 801.) Instead, “[e]ven if constitutionally mandated voting and equal
protection concerns do not constitute a statewide interest, our Supreme Court
has explained that integrity in the municipal electoral process is.” (Ibid.) In
other words, electoral integrity at the municipal level is a statewide concern
reaching beyond the individual’s constitutional right to vote. And, as the
Jauregui court went on to explain, “Electoral results lack integrity where a
protected class is denied equal participation in the electoral process . . . .”
(Ibid.)
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The state argues the City’s voter identification requirements may
interfere with the ability of eligible voters to cast their ballots by placing a
practical and financial hurdle between voters and the ballot box. Therefore,
the state argues, Elections Code section 10005 addresses election integrity by
safeguarding the right of citizens to vote against unnecessary interference by
municipalities.
On this point, amici curiae for the state provide useful historical
context. They point out that the Legislature sought to prohibit voter
identification requirements like the City’s because the Legislature found they
“have historically been used to disenfranchise low-income voters, voters of
color, voters with disabilities, and senior voters.” (Sen. Bill No. 1174 (2023-
2024 Reg. Sess.) § 1, subd. (a)(4).) Amici for the state note that California
(like many other states) has an unfortunate history of enacting facially
neutral voting restrictions that had disparate effects on different groups of
people—typically disfavoring low-income or minority voters. As examples,
amici for the state point to California’s recurrent re-registration
requirements (wherein voters were required to travel to the county clerk’s
office to re-register to vote every two years), English literacy tests, and poll
taxes, all of which were enacted in the 1800s. Poll taxes were later expressly
banned by Congress in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (see 52 U.S.C. § 10306)
and English-only elections or literacy tests were forbidden by a 1975
amendment thereto (see 52 U.S.C. § 10303(f)). The California Supreme Court
also struck down California’s English literacy voting requirement in 1970,
citing the Fourteenth Amendment. (Castro v. State of California (1970) 2
Cal.3d 223.)
These examples amply demonstrate the weight of the state’s
interest in regulating (and, where possible, eliminating) barriers to voting.
9
The state must strike a careful balance between, on the one hand, ensuring
that only eligible voters are able to vote in elections while, on the other hand,
not discouraging or preventing disadvantaged voters and communities from
participating in the political process. Permitting the City to make its own
rules, in violation of the state Elections Code, would upset the state’s delicate
balance and could impugn the integrity of the City’s elections.
The City’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. The City
does not discuss (or even cite) Jauregui. Instead, the City obliquely references
Jauregui by arguing its voter identification requirement can only help secure
the integrity of its elections because it “denies no person who is qualified and
authorized to vote[] the right and power to do so.” As described above, each
additional barrier to voting, even if facially neutral, has the well-documented
effect of discouraging certain voters—voters who are fully qualified and
authorized to vote—from participating in the political process. As amici for
the state explained and the Legislature found, these effects have historically
fallen disproportionately on low-income voters, voters of color, voters with
disabilities, and seniors.
Accordingly, we conclude Elections Code section 10005 addresses
a matter of statewide concern.
C. Part Four: Is the State Law Narrowly Drawn and Reasonably Related to
the Statewide Issue?
The trial court did not reach the fourth part of the test: whether
the state law is narrowly drawn and reasonably related to the statewide issue
it addresses. This issue, as part of the home rule analysis, is ultimately legal
rather than factual, which allows us to reach a decision instead of remanding
for a new trial. (State Building & Construction Trades Council of California
v. City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 558.)
10
Elections Code section 10005 is reasonably related to the
statewide issue it addresses: election integrity. It prevents the State’s
political subdivisions from enacting or enforcing voter identification
requirements beyond those required by state or federal law. In so doing, it
preserves the State’s careful balance of competing interests, ensuring
elections are secure from voter fraud while minimizing potentially
discriminatory barriers to voting. The statute is also narrowly tailored, as it
regulates only the narrow category of voter identification checks. Neither the
City nor its amici argue the statute fails this part of the test.
III.
THE OTHER ARGUMENTS RAISED BY AMICI FOR THE CITY LACK MERIT
Amici for the City offer two other arguments, both of which we
also reject. First, amici for the City contend article XI, section 5 of the
California Constitution grants charter cities complete authority over
municipal elections, even overriding any contrary state law, so long as the
charter city’s rules do not violate the California or United States
Constitutions. Amici for the City would not have us apply the ordinary four-
factor test at all, pointing to the language of article XI, section 5, subdivision
(b)(4) that gives charter cities “plenary authority” over “the manner in which,
the method by which, the times at which, and the terms for which the several
municipal officers and employees whose compensation is paid by the city
shall be elected or appointed, . . . and for their compensation . . . .” Amici for
the City would also have us depart from Jauregui on this point, arguing it is
wrongly decided.
However, this argument was squarely rejected by the California
Supreme Court in People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of
Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 599–600, in which the court explained that
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despite the use of the word “‘plenary’” in this context, “‘general law prevails
over local enactments of a chartered city, even in regard to matters which
would otherwise be deemed to be strictly municipal affairs, where the subject
matter of the general law is of statewide concern.’” (Id. at p. 600.) Amici for
the City suggest a contrary rule may be found in Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4
Cal.4th 389, 401–404, but at most the Supreme Court’s discussion of this
issue in that case is dicta because the court ultimately applied the ordinary
four-factor test. (Id. at pp. 398–411.)
Second, amici for the City argue Lacy v. City and County of San
Francisco (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 238 (Lacy) supports the City’s position.
Amici for the City characterize the City’s voter identification requirement as
a modification of voter qualifications—only those voters who can present
2
identification are qualified to vote. Amici for the City then argue the Lacy
court concluded charter cities had the authority to determine voter
qualifications. Thus, amici for the City contend, the City has authority to
determine that only voters who can present identification are qualified to
vote.
In Lacy, the First District Court of Appeal considered a challenge
to a proposition passed in the City and County of San Francisco (both a
charter city and a charter county) allowing resident noncitizen parents or
guardians of children living in San Francisco to vote in local school board
elections. (Lacy, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.) The challengers (who
included amici for the City) argued the proposition violated the California
2
We cannot help but note the contradiction between amici for the
City’s argument that the City is disqualifying only those voters who do not
possess the required identification from voting and the City’s own argument
that its voter identification requirement does not deny any qualified voter
access to the polls.
12
Constitution and Elections Code. (Lacy, at p. 244.) The court concluded the
California Constitution permitted charter cities to expand the range of people
who may vote in local board elections to include noncitizen parents or
guardians of local children. (Lacy, at p. 260.) As to state statutes, the court
found the challenged proposition did not conflict with state law, which
granted charter cities and counties the ability to depart from statewide
procedures in conducting school board elections. (Ibid.)
On the “voter qualification” issue pressed by amici for the City,
Lacy is, at best, distinguishable, and at worst holds the opposite. The Lacy
court explained that the dispute between the parties in that case was
3
whether article II, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution
established both a floor and a ceiling for voter qualifications or (as San
4
Francisco contended) merely a floor. (Lacy, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp.
245–249.) In other words, the parties in Lacy agreed, at least impliedly, that
article II, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution forbade
narrowing the electorate by imposing additional voter qualifications, while
amici for the City argues Lacy requires us to hold the state cannot prevent a
charter city from doing so. Moreover, the Lacy court was at pains to disclaim
3
“A United States citizen 18 years of age and resident in this
State may vote.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 2, subd. (a).)
4
The Lacy court’s use of the terms “floor” and “ceiling” on voter
qualifications is somewhat confusing. A “floor for voter qualifications,” read
literally, suggests voter qualifications may be added but not removed, while a
“ceiling” suggests such qualifications may be removed but no new ones added.
However, from context it is clear the court meant a “floor” and “ceiling” on the
electorate, such that a “floor” means the electorate can be expanded but not
narrowed, while a “ceiling” means the electorate can be narrowed but not
expanded.
13
the conclusion amici for the City ask us to reach: “Similarly, as [the San
Francisco proposition] expanded the franchise, we do not opine on charter
cities’ ability to narrow it.” (Lacy, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 260.) And, of
course, unlike in this case, the Lacy court found no conflict between state law
and San Francisco’s new proposition, meaning the primary question we face
in this case was simply not raised in Lacy.
Next, on the “plenary” authority argument separately advanced
by amici for the City, Lacy undermines amici’s position. The Lacy court
explained the “‘plenary’” language was added to the Constitution in 1914 to
“address the issue of ‘“bulky charters”’ resulting from previous judicial
constructions finding ‘laws regulating municipal elections and compensation
of municipal officers . . . could be given no effect if the city charter was silent
on that subject.’” (Lacy, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 258.) Thus, while amici
for the City contend the purpose of the word “plenary” was to immunize
charter cities and counties from state law even on questions of statewide
importance, the history of its addition to the Constitution suggests its
purpose was to address situations in which the city charter was silent, not to
limit state authority.
III.
CONCLUSION
Having concluded Elections Code section 10005 passes the four-
part “home rule” test (which we conclude is the applicable test), we hold
Elections Code section 10005 preempts section 705, subdivision (a)(2) of the
Huntington Beach City Charter.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial
court with directions to (1) issue a writ of mandate invalidating section 705,
subdivision (a)(2) of the Huntington Beach City Charter and directing
defendants to cease its implementation or enforcement; (2) enter a
permanent injunction barring defendants from implementing or enforcing
section 705, subdivision (a)(2) of the Huntington Beach City Charter; and (3)
issue a declaratory judgment that section 705, subdivision (a)(2) of the
Huntington Beach City Charter is preempted by and violates California law.
Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.
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