Z.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

J.Z., a minor child by and through )

his father and next friend, )

JAESTON ZELLARS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 3:25-cv-559-ECM-CWB

)

v. )

)

CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION )

OF AUBURN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

City Board of Education of Auburn, Alabama (the “Board”) removed this action from

the Circuit Court of Lee County on July 23, 2025 (see Doc. 1) and promptly sought to be dismissed

as a defendant (see Doc. 6). Plaintiff in turn opposed the requested dismissal and additionally

moved to sever and remand the state law claims against the other defendants. (See Doc. 9).

For the reasons explained below, it is the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that the sole

federal claim be dismissed and that the remaining claims be remanded to state court.

I. Background

This action arises out of an incident at Yarbrough Elementary School in which J.Z.,

a minor child with special needs, allegedly was thrown onto the ground by a teacher’s aide.

(See Doc. 1-1 at p. 33 ¶¶ 8-10). As parent and next friend of J.Z., Plaintiff is seeking recovery

against the teacher’s aide and his immediate employer under various state law tort theories.

(See id. at pp. 34-38). Plaintiff also is seeking recovery against the Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for an alleged violation of substantive due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. (See Doc. 1-1 at pp. 34-39).

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure

to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The standard for dismissal

was refined in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) as follows:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a

court must accept as true all the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable

to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a notable

and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior

era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing

more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for

relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim for relief will … be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where

the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility

of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that the pleader

is entitled to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations and internal edits omitted).

The Twombly-Iqbal two-step analysis begins “by identifying the allegations in the

complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth” because they are conclusory. Id. at 680;

Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Following the Supreme Court’s

approach in Iqbal, we begin by identifying conclusory allegations in the Complaint.”). After

conclusory statements are set aside, the Twombly-Iqbal analysis requires the court to assume the

veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether they “possess enough heft

to set forth ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’” Mack v. City of High Springs, 486 F. App’x 3, 6

(11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Again, facial plausibility requires more than stating facts

that establish a mere possibility. See Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1156 (“The possibility that – if even a

possibility has been alleged effectively – these defendants acted unlawfully is not enough for

a plausible claim.”) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs instead must “allege more by way of

factual content to nudge [their] claim[s] … across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 683 (internal editing and citation omitted); see also id. at 678 (“To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter … that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Count Seven of the First Amended Complaint purports to assert a claim against the Board

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well settled, however, that a school district “may not be liable

under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior.” Davis v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

233 F.3d 1367, 1375 (11th Cir. 2000). Rather, “[a] plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a

municipality (school district) under section 1983 must identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’

that caused a deprivation of federal rights.” Id.; see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

166 (1985) (“[A] governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a

‘moving force’ behind the deprivation.”) (citations omitted). In other words, to establish liability

against a governmental entity such as a school board, “a plaintiff must show: (1) that his

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the [entity] had a custom or policy that constituted

deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the

violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)); see also id. at 1290 (“This prevents the imposition of liability

based upon an isolated incident.”); Davis, 233 F.2d at 1376 n.15 (discussing the rationale behind

the “custom or policy” requirement); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

694-95 (1978).

Although invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count Seven of the First Amended Complaint makes

no allegation that the involved teacher’s aide acted under an official policy or custom approved

by the Board. See A.W. by and through J.W., 110 F.4th 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024) (“To state a

claim against the school district under section 1983, the students must allege that a policy or

custom of the district caused a constitutional violation.”) (citation omitted). Even the most liberal

reading of the First Amended Complaint suggests nothing more than a single isolated incident of

misconduct in no way tethered to the Board itself. See McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1290 (“In order

for a plaintiff to demonstrate a policy or custom, it is ‘generally necessary to show a persistent

and wide-spread practice.’”) (quoting Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.2d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir. 1999)).

Accordingly, Count Seven fails to state a plausible claim against the Board and should be

dismissed. See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we do not

require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal

particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”) (citing Pamel Corp. v.

P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980)).

B. Plaintiff’s claims under state law

Federal courts have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within [their] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case

or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), but

the exercise of such supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). When, as here, all federal claims are resolved, the court thus may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remand the remaining claims back to state court.

See Myers v. Cent. Fla. Invs. Inc., 592 F.3d 1201, 1226 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Baggett v.

First Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) (“When federal law claims

have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal

court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.”). Given the resolution of the only federal claim

presented in the First Amended Complaint, and given general considerations of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity, Plaintiff’s state law claims should be remanded for appropriate

resolution. See Baggett, 117 F.3d at 1353 (“State courts, not federal courts, should be the final

arbiters of state law.”); Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., Fla., 55 F.4th 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2022)

(“[C]oncerns of federalism—namely, of federal courts of limited jurisdiction weighing in on

state law—counsel in favor of [remanding] state-law claims after the federal claims are

dismissed.”); Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1123

(11th Cir. 2005) (“In making this decision [whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

after dismissal of all federal claims], the court ‘should take into account concerns of comity,

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.’”) (citation omitted).

C. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge hereby RECOMMENDS as follows:

• that the Board’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) be granted such that Count Seven of the

First Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice;

• that supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in Counts One through Six

be declined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3);

• that the state law claims in Counts One through Six be remanded to the Circuit Court

of Lee County, Alabama; and

• that Plaintiff’s Motion to Sever and Remand (Doc. 9) be denied as moot.

It is ORDERED that all objections to this Recommendation must be filed no later than

October 16, 2025. An objecting party must identify the specific portion(s) of factual findings/

legal conclusions to which objection is made and must describe in detail the basis for each

objection. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered.

After receiving objections, the District Judge will conduct a de novo review of the

challenged findings and recommendations. The District Judge may accept, reject, or modify

the Recommendation or may refer the matter back to the Magistrate Judge with instructions for

further proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party shall be deemed to have waived the

right to challenge on appeal a District Judge’s order to the extent it is based upon unobjected-to

findings or recommendations. The court on appeal may review unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions only for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

No party may appeal this Recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit. A party may appeal only from a final judgment ultimately entered by

the District Judge.

DONE this the 2nd day of October 2025.

AA

CHAD W. BRYAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE