Brittain

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TIMOTHY WILLIAMS, : No. 3:25-CV-0338

Petitioner :

: (Judge Munley)

v. :

KATHY BRITTAIN,

Respondent ;

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Timothy Williams initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his most recent

denial of parole, claiming that the Pennsylvania Parole Board violated his

substantive due process rights. Because Williams has not established a

constitutional violation, the court will deny his Section 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Williams is currently serving a sentence of six years and six months to

thirteen years’ incarceration imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of York

County, Pennsylvania, for aggravated assault and person not to possess a

firearm. (See Doc. 11-2 at 9). This sentence implicates a minimum release date

of January 7, 2024, and a maximum release date of July 7, 2030. (See id.).

When he filed his petition, Williams has been denied parole on two occasions:

September 29, 2023, and November 12, 2024. (ld. at 13-14, 16-17).

In February 2025, following his second parole denial, Williams lodged the

instant Section 2254 petition in this court. (Doc. 1). He alleges that the

November 2024 parole denial was “[a]rbitrary, [e]gregious, and [c]apricious,” and

thus violated his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. 7711, 2, 6, 7). He seeks

immediate release from confinement. (Id. at p. 11).

Respondent timely filed a response to Williams’ Section 2254 petition.

(See generally Doc. 11). Williams did not file a traverse and the time in which to

do so has passed, so his habeas petition is ripe for disposition.

il. DISCUSSION

The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause “contains a substantive

component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless

the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Newman v. Beard, 617

F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125

(1990)). With respect to parole determinations, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a parole board’s decision can violate

an inmate’s substantive due process rights if it applies “standards that are

divorced from the policy and purpose of parole” or other “impermissible criteria.”

See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also

Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority

concluded that in [using arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board]

violated substantive due process in grounding its action on constitutionally

impermissible reasons.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Specifically, the

specter of a substantive due process violation is raised only when “a parole

board considers a factor that ‘shocks the conscience.’”” Holmes v. Christie, 14

F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782). If, however,

there is “some basis” for the parole board’s decision, and that basis is not

“constitutionally impermissible” or conscience shocking, a substantive due

process challenge must fail. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir.

2001).

Williams alleges that during his September 2023 parole process, the Parole

Board recommended that he complete certain rehabilitation programs concerning

domestic violence. (See Doc. 1 at p. 8). He recounts that he completed the

recommended programming and maintained a clear conduct record, but was

again denied parole on November 12, 2024. (See id. at pp. 8-9). He contends

that his parole denial was improperly based on an affidavit by York County Police

Department Officer Sherri Hansen that indicated that Williams had “chased the

victim around the vehicle while firing the weapon into the air and then shooting

her in the leg.” (Id. at p. 9; see also Doc. 11-2 at 7 (Affidavit of Probable □□□□□□

Williams asserts that this information is inaccurate and was “repeatedly denied

and refuted both at the preliminary hearing and the trial[.]” (Doc. 1 at p. 10). He

maintains that the shooting was accidental and “without any malice.” (Id.)

Williams believes that the Parole Board interviewer “allowed their personal and

emotional opinions based upon what they read in an affidavit [to] influence[] their

reasoning|[],” which he claims is “arbitrary, egregious, an[d] an abuse of their

entire discretion.” (Id.)

Williams’ claim is meritless. Without repeating the parole denial verbatim,

the Parole Board’s reasons for denying parole on November 12, 2024, include:

e Reports, evaluations and assessment/level of risk indicates [Williams’] risk

to the community;

e [Williams] minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the

offense(s) committed;

e [Williams’] failure to develop a parole release plan;

e The nature of [Williams’] crime.

(Doc. 11-2 at 16). None of the reasons provided by the Parole Board appear to

be improper.

Furthermore, while Williams may disagree with the facts contained in the

affidavit of probable cause, he has not provided any legal authority indicating tha

the Parole Board is forbidden from considering such evidence when making

parole determinations. The Parole Board is required to consider, among other

things, “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense committed,” 61 PA. CONs.

STAT. § 6135(a)(1), as well as “such additional information regarding the nature

and circumstances of the offense committed for which sentence was imposed as

may be available,” id. § 6135(a)(6). Presumably, this could include the arresting

officer's affidavit of probable cause, even if the facts stated therein were

contested at trial. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 169 A.3d

1226, 1227 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (recounting that Parole Board expressly

informed inmate that they would consider the affidavit of probable cause from his

prior conviction); Sowers v. Pa. Parole Bd., No. 272 C.D. 2023, 2025 WL

2986028, at *4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 23, 2025) (nonprecedential) (noting that

facts included in affidavit of probable cause were considered during revocation of

parole proceedings).

Additionally, the court observes that other factors—unrelated to the affidavi

of probable cause—were proffered by the Parole Board in its November 2024

denial. Those factors include Williams’ minimization and denial of the nature and

circumstances of the offenses, as well has his failure to develop a parole release

plan.

Thus, despite Williams’ protestations to the contrary, none of the Parole

Board's reasons for denying parole appear to be arbitrary, “egregious,”

conscience-shocking, or based on constitutionally impermissible factors. Nor has

Williams shown “willful noncompliance, bad faith, [or] a sufficient inference of

retaliation or vindictiveness on the part of the Board[.]” Mickens-Thomas v.

Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2004). “[F]ederal courts, on habeas review,

are not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’ and the requirements of substantive duc

process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.” Hunterson v

DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487).

Because there is “some basis” for the Parole Board’s decision, even beyond the

contested affidavit of probable cause, Williams has failed to establish a

substantive due process violation and his Section 2254 petition must be denied.

lll. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court will deny Williams’ petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court will likewise deny a certificate

of appealability, as Williams has failed to make a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), or that “jurists of

reason would find it debatable” whether this court’s procedural rulings are

correct, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). An appropriate order

follows.

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