Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GREATER GUIDE, INC. D/B/A CIVIL ACTION

AMERICAN SERVICE PETS

VERSUS NO. 25-428

SAPS LLC ET AL. SECTION: “J”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint for Damages

and Injunctive Relief (Rec. Doc. 48) filed by Defendants SAPS LLC; Prevent ESA

Fraud, Inc.; Prevent ESA Fraud (“PEF”); and Dominick Latino, III (hereinafter

collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff Greater Guide Inc. d/b/a American Service Pets

(“ASP”) filed an opposition (Rec. Doc. 64), to which Defendants replied (Rec. Doc. 74).

Having considered the motions and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable

law, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At its most basic level, this litigation arises out of business competition

between Plaintiff and Defendants in the emotional support animal industry. More

specifically, Defendants mailed complaints to state regulatory agencies concerning

independent mental health professionals who contracted with Plaintiff, and these

complaints led the mental health professionals to terminate their contracts with

Plaintiff.

1

Both Defendant SAPS and Plaintiff are companies that sell Emotional Support

Animal (“ESA”) certification letters by connecting consumers to contracted mental

health care providers through their websites, and both companies appear to have

nearly identical business models. Plaintiff operates a website,

www.americanservicepets.com, through which individuals can apply for ESA

certification. The individual fills out an online questionnaire, complete with a request

for an evaluation from a contracted medical provider. Within this application, users

must accept the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s website, which include an

agreement not to submit any false information.

Defendant Dominick Latino, III serves as president and owner of Prevent ESA

Fraud, which holds itself out as a nonprofit organization that does what its name

suggests. He also serves as counsel for SAPS LLC, which owns the US Service

Animals website, a direct competitor of Plaintiff. According to a quote from Mr. Latino

on the Prevent ESA Fraud website, the goal of Prevent ESA Fraud is, in part, “to stop

invalid ESA letters from harming people and businesses.” The website also includes

a quote from Matt Handal, who is listed as the founder of US Service Animals, which

is the website owned by Defendant SAPS.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are connected entities, with Mr. Latino

serving as legal counsel for SAPS and as president-owner of PEF. As a basis for its

claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to harm Plaintiff’s business.

Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendants used an investigator to submit at least

thirty-one fictional online applications on Plaintiff’s website which served as

2

Defendants’ basis for state regulatory complaints. These complaints led to various

mental health care providers terminating their agreements with Plaintiff. Further,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants lodged these complaints with regulatory agencies in

retaliation after Defendants’ lawsuit in Louisiana state court was dismissed.

Plaintiff insists that Defendants’ actions (1) amount to civil conspiracy and

fraud, (2) violated its website’s terms and conditions, and (3) were designed to harm

business competition. Plaintiff raises actions that include violations of the Sherman

Antitrust Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and civil Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, in addition to a number of state-law claims.

The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Computer

Fraud and Abuse Act, the Sherman Act, and Plaintiff’s civil RICO claims pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the

remaining state-law claims. Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), averring that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine

bars Plaintiff’s claims generally and, in the alternative, contending that the

individual claims lack merit. Plaintiff opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The

3

factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[D]etailed factual allegations” are

not required, but the pleading must present “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must

accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the plaintiff. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).

However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual

conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Beavers v. Metro. Life Ins.

Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants assert that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine bars all of Plaintiff’s

claims in the First Amended Complaint, and alternatively, that Plaintiff’s claims fail

as a matter of law. Because the Court is not persuaded that Defendants’ affirmative

defense bars all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court will address each of these

claims separately.

In its opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff correctly notes that

Defendants’ invocation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine constitutes an affirmative

defense; however, Plaintiff misstates the legal consequences of this fact. Plaintiff

relies on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852

(5th Cir. 2000) to argue that Noerr-Pennington is “not a basis for dismissal at the

pleading stage” (Rec. Doc. 64, at 5), but Bayou Fleet does not support this conclusion.

A primary issue in Bayou Fleet was whether the defendants had waived their

4

right to assert immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because they had

failed to raise the defense timely. Bayou Fleet, 234 F.3d at 860. The district court had

erroneously held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was not an affirmative defense,

id., but even despite this error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision

to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims, holding that defendants’ conduct was immune under

Noerr-Pennington, id. at 862–63.

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that “when a successful

affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleadings, dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) may be appropriate.” Kansa Reins. Co. v. Cong. Mortg. Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d

1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th

Cir. 1986)); see also Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov’t, 17 F.4th 563, 571 (5th Cir.

2021) (holding that “‘[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds is

appropriate when the elements of res judicata are apparent on the face of the

pleadings’”); Miller v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 726 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir.

2013) (quoting Kansa Reins., 20 F.3d at 1366, and concluding that the defendant “was

permitted to raise the statute of frauds as a defense in its Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).

Furthermore, “[w]hile the district court must accept as true all factual allegations in

the complaint, . . . it need not resolve unclear questions of law in favor of the plaintiff.”

Kansa Reins., 20 F.3d at 1366 (citations omitted).

Here, the availability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as an affirmative

defense appears on the face of the pleadings and exhibits that Plaintiff attached

thereto. Therefore, the Court will consider the applicability of this defense in

5

evaluating Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the five exhibits Defendants

attached to their Motion to Dismiss should be excluded under Rule 12(b)(6), and

therefore, the Court has not considered these exhibits.

The Court will first address Plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the

Sherman Act because these claims are based directly on the regulatory complaints

Defendants made. Because the Court finds that the Noerr-Pennington serves to

immunize Defendants’ conduct regarding the filing of regulatory complaints with

state agencies, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims under the Sherman Act

should be dismissed.

A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the Sherman Act

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has developed from two Supreme Court cases:

Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127

(1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).

Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a party who petitions the government for

redress is generally afforded immunity from antitrust liability. Bryant v. Mil. Dep’t

of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2010). “The essence of the doctrine is that parties

who petition the government for governmental action favorable to them cannot be

prosecuted under the antitrust laws even though their petitions are motivated by

anticompetitive intent.” Video Int’l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc’ns, Inc.,

858 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988). However, the doctrine's immunity does not

extend to petitioning activity that qualifies as a “sham.” Bryant, 597 F.3d at 690.

6

Determining whether litigation, or other petitioning conduct, is a sham

requires the Court to distinguish between objectively reasonable claims and those

claims that “‘lead[ ] the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial

processes have been abused.’” Id. (quoting Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking

Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)). Courts employ a two-part test articulated by

the Supreme Court in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures

Industries, Inc. to determine whether litigation is a sham. 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). The

first step is to determine whether the action is “objectively baseless in the sense that

no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.” Id. If the

litigation is objectively meritless, then the court examines the litigant’s subjective

motivation and explores “whether the baseless lawsuit conceals ‘an attempt to

interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor,’ through the ‘use

[of] the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an

anticompetitive weapon.’” Id. at 60-61 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

The petitioning conduct at issue in the instant case are the complaints that

Defendants made to state regulatory boards after creating allegedly fraudulent

accounts and thereby engaging the services of third-party mental health

professionals through ASP’s website. ASP argues that the sham exception applies to

Defendants’ conduct, and thus, Noerr-Pennington does not protect it. Defendants, on

the other hand, urge that the complaints they made regarding mental health care

practitioners who provided services in conjunction with ASP were objectively

reasonable and that a “reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the

7

merits.” Id. at 56.

Under the Professional Real Estate test, this Court must first evaluate whether

Defendants’ conduct was “objectively baseless.” At this stage in the litigation, ASP

only needs to allege facts that plausibly entitle it to relief. Plaintiff alleges that acting

in concert, Defendants used an unknown investigator to set up fraudulent accounts

on Plaintiff’s website, American Service Pets, and through these accounts, were

connected to independent, third-party mental health professionals. Then, according

to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Defendants, “using their ill-motivated and

fraudulently obtained access to the Plaintiff’s website and network of licensed

providers,” filed “a number of fake/manufactured and maliciously motivated

regulatory ‘complaints’ with several State . . . regulatory bodies and agencies.” (Rec.

Doc. 31, at 2).

Throughout its pleadings, Plaintiff characterizes Defendants’ complaints to

state regulatory boards as “indiscriminate” and “baseless” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 17); as

“fake complaints” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 26); as “fabricated” (Rec. Doc. 16); and as

“objectively baseless” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 39). Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants’ complaints to state boards relied on “fictitious industry standards” (Rec.

Doc. 31, at 4) that Defendants, namely Prevent ESA Fraud, unilaterally created and

imposed, “without reference to local law or regulation” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 18), and that

“no bona-fide grievances existed” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 16). In fact, Plaintiff defines what

it means by “indiscriminate complaints” by saying, “As used herein, the term

‘indiscriminate complaints’ means complaints that rely solely on Defendants’

8

privately drafted ‘Code of Conduct & Ethics’ and may only reference state law or laws

of other states.” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 18).

One thing Plaintiff has not alleged, however, is that Defendants’ complaints to

state regulatory boards are untrue.

Attached to its First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff included a detailed list of

the complaints Defendants mailed to state regulatory agencies (Exhibit 5: Detailed

PEF Mailed Complaints List, Rec. Doc. 31-5). Of the eight complaints that Plaintiff

included in this list, all but one of them is based on Defendants’ (Prevent ESA Fraud

and Dominick Latino III specifically) allegation that an independent mental

healthcare provider issued an ESA certification letter to an “investigator” based

solely on an online evaluation. (Rec. Doc. 31-5, at 2). In its pleadings, Plaintiff does

not refute this allegation.

While the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ complaints “were based

entirely on fake or fraudulent consumer/patient interactions with ASP’s systems and

providers” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 21), that does not mean that the complaints themselves

were “objectively baseless.” Assuming that Defendants’ allegations were true, these

complaints are not based solely on a standard that Defendants unilaterally created

and imposed. Instead, for the complaint filed in Louisiana, for example, the allegation

is based on state law.1

1 Based on Plaintiff’s exhibit (Rec. Doc. 31-5), Defendants mailed complaints to state regulatory boards in the

following states: Arizona, California, Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Washington. Similarly to Louisiana’s statute,

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 122318 prohibits a health care practitioner from providing documentation “relating to an

individual’s need for an emotional support dog unless the health care practitioner,” among other requirements,

“establishes a client-provider relationship with the individual for at least 30 days prior to providing the documentation

9

In 2024, the Louisiana Legislature passed the Louisiana Support and Service

Animal Integrity Act. See La. Stat. Ann. § 46:1971 et seq. Section 1974 of the Act

establishes that healthcare providers are prohibited from producing “documentation

relating to an individual’s need for a support animal unless” the provider complies

with a list of six requirements, two of which are that the healthcare provider must

“engage[] with an individual in person or remotely in at least two sessions before

issuing documentation determining that the individual requires a support animal,”

and “perform[] a clinical evaluation of an individual no less than thirty days before

producing documentation regarding the individual’s need for a support animal.” La.

Stat. Ann. § 46:1974(A)(5), (6). Based on this statutory scheme and a similar statute

in California, for example, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ complaints to state

regulatory boards relied solely on Prevent ESA Fraud’s unilaterally created

standards is unfounded.

Therefore, Prevent ESA Fraud and Dominick Latino’s complaints to state

regulatory boards were grounded in standards that are more widely accepted than

Plaintiff suggests. Based on the summaries that Plaintiff provided, these complaints

appear to have a basis in at least some states’ laws, and thus, the complaints

requested regarding the individual’s need for an emotional support dog” and “[c]ompletes a clinical evaluation of the

individual regarding the need for an emotional support dog.” Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 122318(a)(3)(B), (a)(4).

Under Florida law, a request for accommodation of an emotional support animal under the Fair Housing Act must

be “reasonable,” and an “emotional support animal registration of any kind, including, but not limited to, an

identification card, patch, certificate, or similar registration obtained from the Internet is not, by itself, sufficient

information to reliably establish that a person has a disability or a disability-related need for an emotional support

animal.” Fla. Stat. § 760.27. While not all states have enacted laws that lay out requirements for a healthcare provider

and emotional support animal letters, the cited statutes suggest that the complaints that Defendants filed were not

based solely on unilaterally created standards.

10

presumably have an objective and reasonable basis unless they contain untrue

allegations.

Plaintiff has had the opportunity in more than one pleading to assert that

Defendants’ complaints were false, but Plaintiff has not done so. Instead, Plaintiff

has made conclusory statements regarding the “indiscriminate” and “baseless”

nature of Defendants’ complaints without providing factual support. Therefore, it is

reasonable to assume that Plaintiff cannot make this showing. Plaintiff’s “continued

iteration that [Defendants’] actions are objectively baseless does not make them so.”

721 Bourbon, Inc. v. Willie’s Chicken Shack, LLC, 2020 WL 587886 (E.D. La. 2020).

Under these circumstances, Defendants have demonstrated that their complaints to

state regulatory boards were not “objectively baseless,” and therefore, the sham

exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity would not apply.

Moreover, the fact that Defendants’ anonymous “investigator” was able to

create fictitious accounts on Plaintiff’s website and presumably receive ESA letters

from Plaintiff’s affiliated independent mental health professionals based on these

fictitious personas seems to confirm the complaints Defendants made to state boards.

In sum, the availability of Defendants’ affirmative defense, the Noerr-

Pennington doctrine, appears on the face of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and

attached exhibits, and therefore, this defense may be considered in ruling on

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, Defendants have met their burden of

proving that the “sham exception” to Noerr-Pennington does not apply in this case

because their complaints to state regulatory agencies were not “objectively baseless,”

11

and therefore, Defendants’ petitioning conduct is immunized under Noerr-

Pennington. Finally, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine arose specifically in the antitrust

context, and accordingly, this immunity acts to bar Plaintiff’s claims under the

Sherman Act. Therefore, these claims are dismissed.

The Court will now consider Plaintiff’s claims under the Computer Fraud and

Abuse Act.

B. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

Plaintiff also claims that Defendants violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse

Act (“CFAA”) when they allegedly accessed Plaintiff’s website (American Service

Pets, www.AmericanServicePets.com) “without authorization” multiple times

between January of 2023 and September 30, 2024. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that

on approximately thirty-one occasions, Defendants created fraudulent customer

profiles with falsified information, including fictitious names, birthdates, addresses,

and billing information, in order “to obtain medical services and confidential business

information.” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 33). Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that Defendants

created these fictitious accounts in express violation of its website’s terms and

conditions.

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants do not deny this conduct but instead

acknowledge that the investigations conducted by Defendant Prevent ESA Fraud

(“PEF”) “involve[d] the creation of user profiles to access websites selling ESAs for

the purpose of testing compliance with applicable legal and professional standards

for ESA issuance.” (Rec. Doc. 48-1, at 5). According to its self-professed business

12

model, when PEF “determines there is non-compliance, then PEF files complaints

with the appropriate state boards.” Id.

Through this investigative technique, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

violated three provisions of the CFAA. First, Section 1030(a)(2) of the CFAA imposes

criminal and civil liability on “[w]hoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer

without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains— . . . (C)

information from any protected computer.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Next,

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4), which imposes

liability on “[w]hoever . . . knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected

computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access,” thereby furthering

the fraud and obtaining “anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the

thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is

not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4). Finally, Plaintiff

claims that Defendants also violated § 1030(b) by conspiring or attempting “to commit

an offense under subsection (a).” Id. § 1030(b).

What neither party has acknowledged, however, is that the Computer Fraud

and Abuse Act is primarily a criminal statute, and it is 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) that

provides the civil cause of action under the Act. This section begins as follows: “Any

person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may

maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and

injunctive relief or other equitable relief.” Id. § 1030(g) (emphasis added).

Furthermore, the statute explicitly defines “damage” as “any impairment to the

13

integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information,” id. § 1030(e)(8),

and “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to

an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program,

system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost

incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service,”

id. § 1030(e)(11).

In the instant case, Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ alleged violation of the

CFAA “caused a loss to Plaintiffs [sic] in excess of $5,000 during a one-year period . .

. including but not limited to costs associated with identifying and responding to

fraudulent activity, enhancing security measures, and addressing harm to business

operations.” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 34). However, Plaintiff makes these conclusory

allegations without providing any substantive support. Furthermore, based on

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and its opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, the “harm to business operations” that Plaintiff suffered was not of “the type

unauthorized users cause to computer systems and data,” but instead, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants’ complaints to state regulatory boards caused its loss because

these complaints led independent mental health professionals to terminate their

contracts with Plaintiff. This loss is not the kind of “technological harm” anticipated

under the CFAA, nor is it one for which the CFAA provides a civil remedy.

Moreover, Plaintiff discovered that Defendants had violated its website’s terms

and conditions only after Defendants filed complaints with state regulatory agencies.

In other words, Plaintiff’s costs to “identify[] and respond[] to fraudulent activity”

14

were directly related to the complaints Defendants made to state regulatory agencies,

conduct which is immune under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Even accepting all of Plaintiff’s well-pled allegations as true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff’s claims to relief under the CFAA

are not plausible on their face.

C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

Plaintiff also brings claims against Defendants under the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). RICO statute 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it

unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in,

or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or

participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through

a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants operated as an association-in-fact enterprise, and

that this enterprise committed the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud under

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 “with the shared purpose of suppressing ESA-PSA

certification market presence through fraud, CFAA violations, and sham regulatory

complaints.” (Rec. Doc. 31, at 41).

In response, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to state valid RICO

claims on three primary grounds: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint “alleges no

distinction between the alleged enterprise and the persons who formed that

enterprise,” (Rec. Doc. 48-1, at 34); (2) Plaintiff has not pleaded its claims regarding

Defendants’ predicate acts with particularity; and (3) Plaintiff lacks standing based

15

on a lack of injury.

In accord with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co,

473 U.S. 479 (1985), the Fifth Circuit has made clear that “a violation of § 1962(c)

‘requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering

activity.’” Montesano v. Seafirst Com. Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1987)

(quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496). The RICO statutory scheme defines a “pattern of

racketeering activity” as requiring “at least two acts of racketeering activity.” 18

U.S.C. § 1961(5) (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed two predicate acts: wire

fraud and mail fraud. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants committed mail

fraud when they mailed their complaints against independent mental health

professionals to the various state regulatory boards. However, because this conduct

is protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity, Plaintiff’s complaint does not make a

plausible showing on its face of two predicate acts. Therefore, assuming that Plaintiff

could prove that Defendants committed wire fraud, Plaintiff would not be able to meet

its burden in proving the elements of its RICO claims.

Furthermore, because the Court concludes that all of Plaintiff’s claims under

federal law should be dismissed, the Court will no longer have supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First

16

Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief (Rec. Doc. 48) is

GRANTED, and that Plaintiff Greater Guide, Inc.’s federal claims against SAPS

LLC; Prevent ESA Fraud, Inc.; Prevent ESA Fraud; and Dominick Latino, III are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs state law claims against

Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of October, 2025.

dh KY Shue

LALXLA CG

CARL J. BARBIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17