Daniels

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DARRIAN DANIELS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-03089-JEH

ZORIAN TRUSEWYCH, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants Dr. Zorian Trusewych’s

and LaToya Hughes’ Motions for Summary Judgment regarding exhaustion of

administrative remedies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule

7.1(D). (Docs. 36, 45). For the reasons stated below, Defendant Trusewych’s Motion

is DENIED, and Defendant Hughes’ Motion is GRANTED.

I

Plaintiff Darrian Daniels, proceeding pro se and incarcerated at Western

Illinois Correctional Center (“Western”), filed an Amended Complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 14). The Court

entered a Merit Review Order allowing Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant Trusewych based on his alleged deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s hearing impairment and failure to refer him to an

audiologist for treatment in February 2025. (Doc. 13 at p. 9). Due to the lack of

hearing aids, Plaintiff alleged he was forced to communicate in writing, unable to

participate in video conferences with his psychologist, and unable to talk to his

family and attorney on the phone. The Court also allowed Plaintiff to proceed on

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act

(“RA”) against Defendant Hughes, in her official capacity as Director of the Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), based on the alleged denial of Plaintiff’s

hearing aids at Western. Id.

On August 11, 2025, Defendant Trusewych filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment on Exhaustion (Doc. 36), Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 47), and

Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 51).

On September 22, 2025, Defendant Hughes filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45), Plaintiff filed

a Response (Doc. 53), and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 54).

II

A

As an initial matter, the Court notes Plaintiff failed to properly respond to

any of Defendants’ Undisputed Material Facts in his Responses pursuant to the

Court’s Local Rules. (Docs. 47, 53). Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b) provides that a response

to a summary judgment motion must state, in separate subsections: undisputed

material facts, disputed material facts, disputed immaterial facts, undisputed

immaterial facts, and additional material facts. Civil LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(1)-(4). “A

failure to respond to any numbered fact will be deemed an admission of the fact.”

Id. at (6). Therefore, the Court deems Defendants’ Undisputed Material Facts to

have been admitted by Plaintiff. That being said, the Court will exercise its

discretion by reviewing the materials in the record and the arguments in Plaintiff’s

Responses, as the Court “is confident in its ability to understand which material

facts are actually in dispute.” Latko v. Cox, 2021 WL 5234863, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov.

10, 2021); White v. Felchner, 2021 WL 3223067, at *2 (C.D. Ill. July 29, 2021).

B

Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the IDOC and incarcerated at

Western. Defendant Trusewych, a physician employed by Wexford Health

Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), provided medical care to inmates at Western.

Defendant Hughes is the IDOC Director.

On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff wrote a grievance alleging Wexford

employees John and Jane Doe violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 45-1 at pp.

3-4; Doc. 45-2 at ¶ 10). Plaintiff alleged he experienced hearing loss in both ears

due to injuries, previously failed a hearing test, and was given hearing aids.

Plaintiff claimed Wexford staff tampered with his medical records, there was

nothing in his medical file to indicate he suffered from hearing loss, and he needed

to retake the hearing test.

Plaintiff did not complain about Western’s failure to provide ADA

accommodations, include any reference to Defendant Trusewych by name or

position, or allege any specific act or omission by Defendant Trusewych. Plaintiff’s

grievance, which was dated January 23, 2025, pre-dates Plaintiff’s first visit with

Defendant Trusewych in February 2025, which forms the basis of his deliberate

indifference claim. (Doc. 14 at p. 3).

On February 4, 2025, the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) received

Plaintiff’s grievance, which the ARB identified as “DOC 0046.” (Doc. 45-1 at p. 2).

On April 17, 2025, the ARB returned Plaintiff’s grievance because he failed to

submit responses from the Grievance Officer and Chief Administrative Officer

(“CAO”) with his appeal under Department Rule 504F. Id. The ARB instructed

Plaintiff to provide a copy of the Greivance Officer’s and CAO’s responses. Id.

Plaintiff did not resubmit his appeal to the ARB. (Doc. 45-2 at ¶ 16).

According to his grievance records, Plaintiff did not submit any additional

grievances regarding the allegations in his Amended Complaint. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶

11). However, Plaintiff attached an emergency grievance dated February 3, 2025

to his Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14 at pp. 7-8). Plaintiff grieved Defendant

Trusewych stated there was nothing in Plaintiff’s medical file indicating he ever

failed a hearing test or had any injuries, and as a result, Plaintiff would not be

considered an ADA offender at Western. Id. Plaintiff stated he failed several

hearing tests in the past and received hearing aids in 2022, but the hearing aids

were confiscated in 2024 for retaliatory reasons. Plaintiff stated he was on the list

to get a treatment plan from an audiologist before he was transferred to Western.

In the Relief Requested section, Plaintiff requested treatment for his hearing loss.

Id. at p. 7. Plaintiff asserts Warden Greene did not respond to his emergency

grievance and that he sent her two letters to follow up. (Doc. 47-1 at pp. 1-4).

III

A

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court has one

task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there

is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp.,

24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In making this determination, the court must

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Inferences that are supported by only speculation or

conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.” McDonald v. Vill. of

Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to successfully oppose a

motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must do more than raise a

“‘metaphysical doubt’ as to the material facts, and instead must present definite,

competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Michael v. St. Joseph Cnty., 259 F.3d 842,

845 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).

B

“The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) requires prisoners with

complaints about prison conditions to exhaust available grievance procedures

before bringing suit in federal court.” Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 464 (2025).

The defendant has the burden of proving that a plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies. Banks v. Patton, 743 F. App’x 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2018).

Parties “have a right to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is

intertwined with the merits of a claim . . . .” Perttu, 605 U.S. at 469. Here, the

exhaustion issue is not intertwined with the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. There is

no jury issue regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies.

“To exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the

place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v.

McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff was required to follow

the grievance procedures described in the regulations provided by the IDOC. 20

Ill. Admin. Code § 504.800, et seq. In Illinois, inmates may utilize (1) a normal, non-

emergency grievance procedure, or (2) an emergency grievance procedure.

Under the non-emergency procedure, inmates must follow a three-step

process. First, offenders must try to resolve their issues through their counselor.

§ 504.810. If the issue persists, the offender may file a grievance addressed to the

Grievance Officer within 60 days after the incident was discovered. Id. The

grievance must contain factual details, including what happened, when, where,

and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in

the complaint. § 504.810(c). If the offender cannot name specific individuals, the

offender “must include as much descriptive information about the individual as

possible.” Id. The Grievance Officer will then make a report of findings and

recommendations in writing to the CAO within two months, “when reasonably

feasible under the circumstances.” §§ 504.810(a), 504.830(e). The CAO will advise

the offender of the decision. Id. If the offender is not satisfied with the outcome, he

may appeal to the Director. The appeal must be received by the ARB within 30

days after the date of the CAO’s decision. § 504.850. The ARB will submit a report

to the Director, who will review the findings and make a final determination

within six months after receiving it, “when reasonably feasible under the

circumstances.” § 504.850(e).

A different procedure exists for emergency grievances. Inmates may submit

emergency grievances directly to the CAO. § 504.840. The CAO will determine if

there is “a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or

irreparable harm” to the inmate that warrants the grievance being handled on an

emergency basis. Id. at (a). If the CAO classifies the grievance as an emergency, the

CAO “shall expedite processing of the grievance and respond to the offender,

indicating what action shall be or has been taken.” Id. at (b). After receiving a

response from the CAO, if the inmate believes his problem or complaint has not

been resolved, he may appeal in writing to the ARB. § 504.850(a). When an inmate

appeals a grievance that has been deemed emergent by the CAO, the ARB “shall

expedite the processing of the grievance.” § 504.850(f).

An inmate who fails to properly take every step of the administrative

process has failed to exhaust his remedies. Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 983 (7th

Cir. 2020). The Seventh Circuit takes a strict compliance approach to exhaustion,

requiring inmates to follow all grievance rules established by the correctional

authority. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). Failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, and defendants have the

burden of proving the inmate had available remedies he did not utilize. Id. A

lawsuit filed by an inmate before he exhausted his administrative remedies must

be dismissed because the court lacks the discretion to resolve the claim on the

merits. Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Bock,

549 U.S. 199, 223 (2007).

C

Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

with his January 23, 2025 grievance because he did not grieve the allegations in his

Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff did not name or describe Defendant Trusewych or allege that

Defendant Trusewych denied him hearing aids and medical treatment or failed to

refer him to an audiologist. Plaintiff’s grievance also did not allege he was unable

to participate in video meetings with his psychologist or talk with his family and

attorney on the phone.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s January 23, 2025 grievance does not contain

sufficient factual details regarding Defendants or the claims in this case under

§ 504.810(c). A grievance that fails to complain of a defendant’s conduct does not

satisfy the purpose of the exhaustion requirement in affording corrections officials

an opportunity to address complaints internally before a lawsuit is filed. See Hacker

v. Dart, 62 F.4th 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525

(2002)); see also Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 235-36 (7th Cir. 2014) (failing to identify

the target of a grievance is fatal under Illinois law).

D

Even if Plaintiff’s January 23, 2025 grievance contained sufficient factual

details, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s failure to obtain a final determination from

the ARB bars him from filing suit.

Plaintiff did not submit his grievance to his counselor, the Grievance Officer,

or the CAO. Instead, Plaintiff submitted his grievance directly to the ARB. In his

Response, Plaintiff asserts he sent the grievance directly to the ARB due to the

seriousness of the issue. (Doc. 53 at p. 2).

The Illinois Administrative Code allows inmates to submit grievances

directly to the ARB under certain circumstances, but none of the exceptions apply

to Plaintiff’s January 23, 2025 grievance. See § 504.870(a)(1)-(4). The ARB returned

Plaintiff’s grievance without addressing it on the merits because Plaintiff failed to

attach the Grievance Officer’s report and the CAO’s decision, as required by §

504.850(a). The ARB instructed Plaintiff to resubmit his grievance with the

required forms, but Plaintiff did not do so. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff did

not exhaust his administrative remedies with his January 23, 2025 grievance.

E

In Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment,

Plaintiff argues he exhausted his administrative remedies by submitting an

emergency grievance on February 3, 2025, naming Defendant Trusewych and

requesting treatment for hearing loss. (Doc. 14 at pp. 7-8; Doc. 47 at p. 3; Doc. 53 at

p. 3). In his grievance, Plaintiff asserted Defendant Trusewych falsely stated there

was nothing in his medical records indicating he failed a hearing test or that he

injured his ears. Plaintiff asserted he failed several hearing tests in the past and

received hearing aids in 2022, which were confiscated in 2024 for retaliatory

reasons. Plaintiff stated he was on a list to get a treatment plan from an audiologist

before he was transferred to Western.

Plaintiff argues Warden Greene ignored his emergency grievance. Plaintiff

states he sent two letters to Warden Greene on February 10 and 19, 2025, to follow

up about his emergency grievance, to no avail. (Doc. 47-1 at pp. 1-4). Plaintiff

argues he waited 60 days for Warden Greene to respond to his grievance and then

filed suit on April 10, 2025. Plaintiff argues he exhausted his available

administrative remedies.

1

In her Reply, Defendant Hughes argues there is no evidence Plaintiff

submitted an emergency grievance on February 3, 2025, because his grievance is

not in his grievance records. Defendant Hughes argues there is no evidence the

grievance process was “unavailable” to Plaintiff because his grievance records

show he wrote other emergency grievances on February 12, 17, and 20, 2025, which

Warden Greene promptly responded to. (Doc. 54-1).

Defendant Hughes also argues Plaintiff’s February 3, 2025 grievance makes

no reference to requesting ADA accommodations. The Court agrees. Although

Plaintiff checked a box on the grievance form for “ADA Disability

Accommodation,” his grievance makes no reference to being forced to

communicate by writing and being unable to participate in video conferences with

his psychologist and talk with his family and attorney on the phone. (Doc. 14 at

pp. 7-8).

Even if Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance on February 3, 2025, the

Court finds it would not serve to exhaust his administrative remedies against

Defendant Hughes, as it does not contain sufficient factual information under

§ 504.810(c) to place prison officials on notice of his claims related to the ADA and

RA. Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant Hughes.

2

The February 3, 2025 emergency grievance serves to exhaust Plaintiff’s

administrative remedies against Defendant Trusewych, however. The grievance

was timely, identified Defendant Trusewych, and included sufficient information

to place prison officials on notice of the relevant issues regarding Defendant

Trusewych. § 504.810(c).

In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Trusewych asserts

Plaintiff’s grievance does not contain a counselor’s response and was not appealed

to the ARB. (Doc. 36 at p. 5, ¶ 18). However, Plaintiff checked the box on the

grievance form to indicate his grievance was an emergency. (Doc. 14 at p. 7). Under

the Illinois Administrative Code, Plaintiff was not required to submit the

emergency grievance to his counselor. Instead, Warden Greene was required to

review the grievance and determine if it constituted an emergency. § 504.840.

Plaintiff argues he never received a response from Warden Greene and wrote two

letters to follow up. (Doc. 47-1 at pp. 1-4). Defendant Trusewych does not address

these arguments in his Reply. (Doc. 51).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and the burden is on the defendant to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an administrative remedy was

available to the plaintiff and that he failed to exhaust that remedy. Westefer v.

Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005). Defendant Trusewych has not met this

burden. Defendant Trusewych failed to refute Plaintiff’s assertion that he

submitted an emergency grievance on February 3, 2025. (Doc. 51). Thus, Plaintiff’s

contention that he submitted an emergency grievance on February 3, 2025 and did

not receive a response from Warden Greene is undisputed. As no disputed issue

of material fact exists, the Court finds a hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544

F.3d 739 (2008), is unnecessary.

The Court finds the grievance process became unavailable to Plaintiff when

he did not receive a response to his emergency grievance from Warden Greene.

“Prison officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement,

however, and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond

to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a

prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (citing Lewis v. Washington, 300

F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002)). Defendant Trusewych’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Defendant Zorian Trusewych's Motion for Summary Judgment [36] is

DENIED. Defendant LaToya Hughes' Motion for Summary Judgment

[45] is GRANTED. Defendant Hughes is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendant Hughes.

2) Discovery closes on January 9, 2026, and dispositive motions are due on

February 9, 2026.

It is so ordered.

Entered: October 31, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge