Hudson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

MARTEZ HUDSON, : Case No. 1:25-cv-506

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Michael R. Barrett

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

:

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER LORENZO, :

et al., :

:

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Ohio inmate, brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and Ohio law against Corrections Officers Lorenzo, Wilson, and Thatcher; Lieutenant Mowery;

the Rules Infraction Board (R.I.B.) on 6-3-2025; the “R.I.B. High Rank Crip Mafia;” the “Gorilla

Stone Gangsta Crips Staff;” the “Gorilla Stone Gangsta Staff;” the “Crip Mafia Staff;” and the

“Warren Correctional Institution [W.C.I.] Staff” for alleged violations of his rights related to

disciplinary convictions he received between October 2024 and July 2025. By separate Order,

Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s initial Complaint

(Doc. 1-1) and Supplemental Amended Complaint (Doc. 5), which together constitute the

operative Complaint in this matter, to determine whether the Complaint or any portion of it should

be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted or seeks monetary relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b).

I. STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, and is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss

the Complaint, or any part of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b). Complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed

liberally and held to less stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton,

391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004). But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the

purview of the district court to conjure up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482

F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in his favor,

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). But the Court is not required to accept factual allegations that are “clearly irrational

or wholly incredible.” Ruiz v. Hofbauer, 325 F. App’x 427, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2009). Rather, “[a]

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it tenders naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. (internal quotation and quotation

marks omitted). In the end, “basic pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

In his Complaint, Plaintiff takes issue with two groups of disciplinary charges. As to the

first group of charges, Plaintiff alleges that on May 23, 2025, Defendants Lorenzo and Wilson

charged him with violating the following 6 conduct rules: Rule 2.1 (threatening bodily harm to

another person); Rule 5.2 (disobedience of a direct order); Rule 10.1 (unauthorized possession or

manufacture of drugs or another intoxicating substance); Rule 10.2 (unauthorized consumption of

drugs or another intoxicating substance); Rule 12.2 (destruction, alteration, or misuse of property);

and Rule 12.7 (possession of any other contraband). (Doc. 1-1 at 5). See also Ohio Rev. Code

§ 5120-9-06 (Inmate Rules of Conduct). On the same date, Defendant Mowery verified that the

contraband Plaintiff was charged with possessing consisted of 2.5 gallons of homemade alcohol,

pillows, and an antenna. (Id.).

A disciplinary hearing was held on June 3, 2025. (Id.). Plaintiff pleaded not guilty but

was found guilty. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, the guilty finding was based, at least in part, on a

fraudulent statement by Defendants Lorenzo and Wilson in the conduct report that Plaintiff “self

admit[ted]” to possessing the contraband. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that his purported admission

was inconsistent with his request at the R.I.B. hearing to see video showing where the contraband

was found. (Id.). Plaintiff further contends that he was targeted for and retaliated against with the

false misconduct findings because he allegedly told Lorenzo and Wilson that he had “killed CO’s

before.” (Id. at 6).

As to the second group of charges, Plaintiff alleges that between October 2024 and July

2025 he was found guilty of “false medical emergencies” based on testimony from medical,

correctional, and administrative staff that he was found intoxicated and with low blood pressure.

(Doc. 5 at 5). Plaintiff again asserts that he was targeted for and retaliated against with the false

misconduct findings. According to Plaintiff, he was found guilty of the violations in order to

“t[a]mper” with his eligibility for early release. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that he was

targeted for discipline because of his criminal history, which included gang affiliations, and

because of his failure to assist the charging officers with their “own jurisdictional status.” (Id. at

5–6).

For relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (See Doc. 1-1 at 6; see also Doc. 1-1 (Civil

Cover Sheet)).

III. ANALYSIS

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff brings claims for “fraud of property,” falsifying a

conduct report, abuse of authority, and retaliation/targeting. (See Doc. 1-1 at 6; Doc. 5 at 6).

Liberally construing the Complaint, see Martin, 391 F.3d at 712, the Court understands it to assert

§ 1983 claims for retaliation, under the First Amendment, and due process deprivations, under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and a state-law claim for fraud. For the reasons below, each of these

claims is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b).

A Unaddressed Defendants

As an initial matter, the Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

Thatcher, the “R.I.B. High Rank Crip Mafia;” the “Gorilla Stone Gangsta Crips Staff;” the “Gorilla

Stone Gangsta Staff;” the “Crip Mafia Staff;” and the “W.C.I. Staff” for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted because the Complaint fails to contain specific factual allegations

against any of these Defendants. See Rollen v. Horton, Case No. 3:08-cv-227, 2009 WL 1346119,

at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 11, 2009) (dismissing claims against the defendants whom plaintiff did not

plead factual allegations against for failure to state a claim). Moreover, even if Plaintiff had

mentioned these Defendants in the Complaint, the Court turns next to the substance of his claims

and why they are otherwise subject to dismissal.

B. Failure to State a First Amendment Retaliation Claim

As to the remaining Defendants, Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliatory or targeted discipline

fail to state a plausible claim under the First Amendment. A prisoner seeking to establish a First

Amendment retaliation claim must show that (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) the

defendant took an adverse action that was capable of deterring a person of “ordinary firmness from

continuing to engage in that conduct”; and (3) “the adverse action was motivated at least in part

by the [prisoner’s] protected conduct.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).

In this case, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is subject to dismissal for several reasons. First,

Plaintiff’s allegations that he was convicted of the disciplinary charges because he supposedly said

that he had killed corrections officers before (Doc. 1-1 at 5) and because he refused to assist the

charging officers with their “jurisdictional status” (Doc. 5 at 6) suggest nothing more than that he

disagreed with the charges he faced. As set forth above, Plaintiff was charged with, among other

things, violating Rule 2.1 (threatening bodily harm to another person) and Rule 5.2 (disobedience

of a direct order). (Doc. 1-1 at 5). Without more, the Court cannot plausibly infer the first element

of a retaliation claim—that Plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct. Allegations of protected

conduct are especially important in the context of retaliatory discipline because “every act of

discipline by prison officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds directly to

prisoner misconduct.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994). As such, Plaintiff must

allege more than his “personal belief that he [was] the victim of retaliation.” Johnson v. Rodriguez,

110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not done so

here.

Plaintiff’s contention that he was targeted because of his criminal history fares no better.

A plaintiff’s “conviction does not constitute conduct on the part of [the] plaintiff that is protected

under the First Amendment.” Ruiz v. Woodfill, No. 2:19-cv-2118, 2020 WL 6118546, at *1 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 16, 2020). And even if Plaintiff could show that his criminal history was entitled to some

form of protection under the First Amendment, see Rodgers v. Hawley, 14 F. App’x 403, 408 (6th

Cir. 2001) (noting the “First Amendment affords prisoners a right of access to the courts”), the

Complaint is devoid of allegations showing that any of Defendants were aware of it much less

motivated by it. “[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts

will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim under § 1983.’” Harbin v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th

Cir. 2005) (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir. 1987)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim should be dismissed.

C. Failure to State A Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Plaintiff’s allegations also fail to state a plausible Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of

life, liberty, and property. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Prisoners, however,

have narrower liberty interests than other citizens. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 573 (6th Cir.

2008). Indeed, a prisoner has no constitutional right to be free from false accusations of

misconduct. Jackson v. Hamlin, 61 F. App’x 131, 132 (6th Cir. 2003). A prison disciplinary

action will not implicate a liberty interest requiring due process safeguards unless the punishment

imposed will “inevitably” affect the duration of an inmate’s sentence, such as a loss of good time

credits, or will inflict an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 487 (1995) (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff challenges his misconduct convictions and asserts that they put his judicial

release “at risk.” (Doc. 1-1 at 6; Doc. 5 at 5–6). But “[f]indings of misconduct, even findings that

could lengthen a prison sentence, do not implicate a protected liberty interest so long as the parole

board retains discretion to release a prisoner based on a myriad of considerations.” Johnson v.

Mohr, No. 2:15-cv-86, 2015 WL 1526804, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2015). Under Ohio law, a

prisoner does not have a liberty interest in parole. Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir.

2007). This is because Ohio has a completely discretionary parole system. Id. The parole board

considers numerous factors in determining whether to grant parole. Johnson, 2015 WL 1526804,

at *3 (citing Ohio Admin. Code § 5120:1–1–07). “An inmate’s eligibility for parole at a certain

time under a discretionary parole system is not an ‘atypical and significant hardship’ and does not

implicate a liberty interest.” Id. (citing Michael, 498 F.3d at 378). Because Plaintiff does not

indicate that he was sanctioned with the loss of good time credits but merely that his disciplinary

convictions may affect his early release, his due process claim fails to implicate a liberty interest

and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id.

D. Failure to State a Fraud Claim under Ohio Law

Nor has Plaintiff stated a plausible claim for fraud under Ohio law. An action for fraud in

Ohio has the following elements: “a) a misrepresentation . . . , b) . . . material to the transaction at

hand, c) made falsely, . . . d) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it, e) justifiable

reliance upon the misrepresentation . . . , and f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the

reliance.” AAA Installers v. Sears Holdings Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 931, 939 (S.D. Ohio 2011)

(alterations in original) (quoting Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd., 570 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (1991)).

Plaintiff focuses this claim on his misconduct convictions for possession of contraband. (See Doc.

1-1 at 5). He asserts that those convictions were based on a false statement in his conduct report

that he admitted to possessing the contraband. (Id.). But Plaintiff nowhere alleges justifiable

reliance on that statement, one of the elements of fraud. To the contrary, he alleges that the R.I.B.

was not justified in relying on his purported admission because during his disciplinary hearing he

asked to see video footage showing where the contraband was found. (Id.). Because Plaintiff has

failed to establish the elements of fraud, his state-law fraud claim is subject to dismissal for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

E. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court should DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s § 1983 and state-law

claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

& 1915A(b)(1).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendants for retaliation in violation

of the First Amendment and deprivations of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1);

2. Plaintiff’s state-law claim against Defendants for fraud be DISMISSED with

prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1); and

3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons

an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good

faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds,

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS:

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response

to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to

the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation

omitted).

Date: October 31, 2025 s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE