Brewer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

DARRON BREWER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 25-1199

)

LATOYA HUGHES, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Big Muddy Correctional Center,

was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The case is now before the Court for a merit

review of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such

process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id.

The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the

plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements

and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to send an email to her brother that discussed the

reasons for an ongoing lockdown at the facility. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants John Doe 1 and

2 deemed the message “inappropriate” and blocked it from delivery. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Nurse denied her grievance on the issue. Plaintiff alleges that no written policy exists

regarding emails deemed “inappropriate,” but to the extent that there may have been a policy in

place, Defendant Hughes approved it in her capacity as IDOC Director.

Prisoners have a limited First Amendment right to send and receive correspondence from

individuals outside the prison. Felton v. Brown, 129 F.4th 999, 1011 (7th Cir. 2025). Outgoing

correspondence receives greater constitutional protection and a policy or practice that restricts

this type of communication is unconstitutional unless (1) the practice furthers “an important or

substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression,” such as safety and

security; and (2) the policy or practice is “no greater than necessary” to protect that interest. Id.

(citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).

Liberally construed, Plaintiff states a First Amendment claim against Defendants John

Doe 1, John Doe 2, and Nurse. Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant Hughes as her

allegations do not permit a plausible inference that this defendant was personally involved in the

alleged deprivation, and Plaintiff cannot prevail against her just because she was in charge.

Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based

on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the

individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

court finds that the plaintiff states a First Amendment claim against Defendants John Doe

1, John Doe 2, and Nurse. Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at

the court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2. This case is now in the process of service. The plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, in order to give notice to

the defendants and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. The

plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the court at this time, unless otherwise directed by

the court.

3. The court will attempt service on the defendants by mailing each defendant a

waiver of service. The defendants have 60 days from the date the waiver is sent to file an

answer. If the defendants have not filed answers or appeared through counsel within 90

days of the entry of this order, the plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of

service. After the defendants have been served, the court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

4. With respect to a defendant who no longer works at the address provided by

the plaintiff, the entity for whom that defendant worked while at that address shall provide

to the clerk said defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said defendant's

forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the clerk and shall not be

maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the clerk.

5. The defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is

sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall

be to the issues and claims stated in this opinion. In general, an answer sets forth the

defendants' positions. The court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and

until a motion is filed by the defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary

or will be considered.

6. This district uses electronic filing, which means that, after defense counsel

has filed an appearance, defense counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by the plaintiff with the clerk. The plaintiff does not need to

mail to defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that the plaintiff has filed with

the clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery

requests and responses are not filed with the clerk. The plaintiff must mail his discovery

requests and responses directly to defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or responses

sent to the clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are attached to and the subject of a

motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance

and the court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in

more detail.

7. Counsel for the defendants is hereby granted leave to depose the plaintiff at

his place of confinement. Counsel for the defendants shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

8. The plaintiff shall immediately notify the court, in writing, of any change in

his mailing address and telephone number. The plaintiff's failure to notify the court of a

change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with

prejudice.

9. If a defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within

30 days after the waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate steps to effect formal

service through the U.S. Marshals service on that defendant and will require that

defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

10. The clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order

pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

11. The clerk is directed to terminate LaToya Hughes as a defendant.

12. The clerk is directed to attempt service on Mindi Nurse pursuant to the

standard procedures.

Entered this 31st day of October, 2025.

s/Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE