Opinion

Robertson

Court
District Court, D. Massachusetts
Filed
Oct 31, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

____________________________________

)

ANTHONY ROBERTSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

) Civil Action No. 22-CV-12108-AK

v. )

)

CAPTAIN STANLEY THEMORA and )

LIEUTENANT RICHARD BLOOM, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ANGEL KELLEY, D.J.

Plaintiff Anthony Robertson, a state prisoner, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that Defendants Captain Stanley Themora and Lieutenant Richard Bloom issued

supervisory directives that resulted in the “unwanton infliction of physical pain and suffering.”

[Dkt. 2 at 3]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the

“Motion”) [Dkt. 79] is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the summary judgment record, are undisputed unless otherwise

indicated, and are presented in the light most favorable to Robertson as the nonmoving party.

A. Factual Background

From November 23, 2018 through September 9, 2022, Robertson was a pre-trial detainee

committed to the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department at the Nashua Street Jail (“Nashua”) in

Boston. Captain Themora is regularly assigned as a shift commander at Nashua and typically

supervises approximately forty-five to fifty officers and roughly 300 detainees. Lieutenant

Bloom also serves at Nashua.

On July 20, 2022, Robertson injured his left leg and foot during recreation at Nashua and

underwent surgery at Massachusetts General Hospital on July 22, 2022. The surgery required

staples in his foot and ankle area, and left him using bilateral crutches for mobility. Upon his

return, Nashua medical staff completed special needs documentation identifying crutches and

housing accommodations and notified custody personnel, including the Defendants.

On August 20, 2022, while housed in restrictive housing, Robertson reports that his

rehabilitation had progressed and that his pain was minimal. Lieutenant Bloom instructed

housing control and unit officers by telephone to apply modified restraints on Robertson to bring

him in and out of his cell for recreation. Unit officers implemented the instruction by placing a

waist chain on Robertson, omitting leg irons, and affixing handcuffs through his crutches with an

extra set of handcuffs to permit crutch use. Defendants represent that the modified waist

chain/handcuff configuration reflects training and facility protocol for accommodating inmates

with mobility limitations, and that custody personnel routinely modify restraints where leg irons

are medically inappropriate. Robertson contends that such restraints had not been used earlier

after his surgery and that the Defendants’ directives produced a makeshift configuration that

caused him serious injury.

Robertson alleges that the restraints, which were affixed to his crutches, caused him to

fall, reopen his surgical wound, and require extended rehabilitation. Defendants dispute any

causal link between the August 20 fall and subsequent postoperative complications.

B. Procedural History

Robertson filed a pro se complaint on November 30, 2022, alleging deliberate

indifference and cruel and unusual punishment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that he filed

an internal grievance at Nashua but was transferred to a different facility before receiving a

response. Defendants answered and asserted, among other defenses, failure to state an Eighth

Amendment claim and qualified immunity.

On July 1, 2025, Defendants filed the Motion, arguing: (1) the undisputed material facts

show no Eighth Amendment violation because the supervisory directives were consistent with

medical notification, training, and institutional policy; and (2) they are entitled to qualified

immunity. [Dkt. 79]. Robertson opposes summary judgment, contending that triable issues exist

as to supervisory deliberate indifference, causation, and qualified immunity. [Dkt. 84].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to

the nonmovant, shows no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816,

822 (1st Cir. 1991). The court determines whether: (1) a factual dispute exists; (2) that the

dispute is genuine so that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmovant; and

(3) the disputed fact is material under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying record

evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, either by negating an

essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or by showing a lack of evidence to support that

element. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant satisfies that

burden, the nonmovant must produce specific, admissible evidence creating a genuine factual

dispute; conclusory allegations, speculation, or unsupported inference will not defeat summary

judgment. See Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994); Rockwood v. SKF

USA Inc., 687 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012).

III. DISCUSSION

The Defendants seek summary judgment on two independent grounds. The Court

addresses each in turn.

A. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

Robertson alleges that Defendants ordered waist chains and handcuffs affixed through his

crutches, foreseeably causing him to fall and re‑injure his surgical site. An Eighth Amendment

claim for denial of medical care requires both an objective and a subjective element: an

objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation and a defendant’s subjective, knowing disregard of

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976);

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834–37 (1994). The objective element is undisputed, as

Defendants knew Robertson had recent ankle surgery and used crutches, and Defendants

exercised supervisory authority over movement and restraint decisions in restrictive housing.

[Defs.’ Concise Statement of Facts ¶¶ 31–38, 44–48]. The dispositive question is the subjective

element: whether the supervisors knew of, or were willfully blind to, an excessive risk and

consciously disregarded. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–40. Mere negligence, medical

malpractice, or disagreement about appropriate care is insufficient. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;

Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484, 497–98 (1st Cir. 2011).

Supervisory liability requires personal participation, direction, or authorization of the

unconstitutional conduct, actual knowledge of facts giving rise to a substantial risk, and failure to

take reasonable remedial steps. Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208–09 (1st

Cir. 1990); Whitfield v. Melendez‑Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005). A single supervisory

order can give rise to liability only if the order itself was objectively unlawful and issued with

the requisite culpability. Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208–09. Reasonable security judgments that

balance penological and medical concerns do not constitute deliberate indifference. Sosa v.

Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 80 F.4th 15, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2023). Evidence that restraints were

improvised in disregard of known medical restrictions, that supervisors knew the restraint posed

an obvious and substantial risk, or that officers acted with callous or reckless indifference may

create a triable issue. See id.; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Leavitt, 645F.3d at 498–501.

Here, accepting the objective element, the undisputed record does not establish the

required subjective component. Three points are dispositive. First, medical staff documented

Robertson’s postoperative condition and need for crutches and notified custody, but clinicians

did not issue a categorical prohibition on restraints. Second, facility policy contemplates

tailoring restraints when medical conditions make standard leg irons inappropriate, and custody

staff are trained to use a waist chain with supplemental handcuffs to permit crutch use. Policy

S532 therefore authorizes alternate measures and leaves supervisors discretion to reconcile

mobility and security needs, an assessment courts treat as a penological judgment. See Sosa, 80

F.4th at 28. Moreover, the security context of restrictive housing (limited out‑of‑cell time,

keep‑separate requirements, and the need occasionally to bring multiple inmates out together)

further supports the conclusion that the Defendants’ directive was a policy-compliant,

security‑focused accommodation rather than an objectively unlawful order. Third, neither

Defendant physically applied restraints; each relayed an instruction that housing control and unit

officers implemented consistent with training and protocol. Nonmedical supervisors are

ordinarily entitled to rely on clinician judgments and facility procedures absent reason to believe

clinicians are failing to treat the inmate or that the chosen procedure is manifestly unsafe. Snell

v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474, 498 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Matthews v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 613 F.

App’x 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2015)); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). It is also

worth noting that the modified restraint here is materially analogous to the custom restraint the

First Circuit described as a reasonable balancing of medical needs and security concerns. See

Sosa, 80 F.4th at 28.

Robertson contends the telephone order alone establishes supervisory liability and argues

that the foreseeability of his fall establishes the subjective element. Foreseeability and custodial

duty do not substitute for Farmer’s subjective standard. Robertson must show that Defendants

knew of, or were willfully blind to, an excessive risk and consciously disregarded it. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–40. Evidence that prior escorts occurred without identical restraints

does not, standing alone, establish deliberate indifference because shifting security demands can

justify different restraint decisions on different days. Likewise, Robertson’s characterization of

the configuration as “makeshift” is insufficient without admissible evidence that the modification

was objectively dangerous and that supervisors knew and disregarded that danger. See Sosa, 80

F.4th at 28; Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 498–501.

Taken together, the undisputed record—medical notifications that did not prohibit

restraints, training prescribing the challenged modification, the supervisors’ nonphysical role in

issuing the instruction, and the operational needs of segregation housing—does not permit a

reasonable juror to infer that Captain Themora or Lieutenant Bloom acted with the subjective

deliberate indifference mental state required by Farmer and First Circuit precedent. The

evidence supports, at most, negligence or a disputed judgment call, not the conscious, culpable

state of mind required for an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;

Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953,956 (1st Cir. 1992). “An accident, although it may

produce added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of

unnecessary pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105. The supervisory deliberate indifference

claim therefore fails as a matter of law.

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages liability for discretionary

actions unless: (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) that right was

clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct such that a reasonable official would

have known the conduct was unlawful. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982);

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232–33 (2009). The inquiry is fact-specific and requires that

existing precedent place the constitutional question “beyond debate” in the particular context

confronted by the official. Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). General statements of

constitutional principle do not suffice to defeat immunity. Id. at 742.

Assuming, arguendo, a constitutional violation occurred, Defendants are, nevertheless,

entitled to qualified immunity. Robertson contends qualified immunity is unavailable because

Defendants acted with reckless or callous indifference. The dispositive question is whether

precedent would have given a reasonable supervisor in Captain Themora’s and Lieutenant

Bloom’s position fair notice that ordering a training-compliant, modified waist‑chain/handcuff

restraint for an inmate using crutches in segregation violated the Constitution. The undisputed

record shows that clinicians notified custody of Robertson’s need for crutches but did not issue a

categorical restriction precluding restraints, and that the challenged modification conformed to

facility training for accommodating crutch use while preserving security. Under these

circumstances, a reasonable supervisor could have believed the directive lawful. The First

Circuit has recognized that carefully tailored restraints intended to accommodate medical needs

while maintaining security may be constitutionally permissible. Sosa, 80 F.4th at 28 (holding

prison officials who rear-cuffed plaintiff with custom-made double cuffs-length handcuffs acted

reasonably by accommodating plaintiff’s medical needs and maintaining safety and security).

Where reasonable officials could differ about the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, qualified

immunity ordinarily applies. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244–45; Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742–43.

Because Robertson points to no controlling precedent that would have put Defendants on clear

notice that the supervisory directive here was unlawful, qualified immunity protects Captain

Themora and Lieutenant Bloom from damages liability.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the contested facts Robertson cites are either not genuinely

disputed in a manner material to the legal issues or, even if credited, do not establish the

subjective deliberate indifference standard or overcome qualified immunity. Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 79] is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment for the

Defendants and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 31, 2025 /s/ Angel Kelley

Hon. Angel Kelley

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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