The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
ANTHONY ROBERTSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) Civil Action No. 22-CV-12108-AK
v. )
)
CAPTAIN STANLEY THEMORA and )
LIEUTENANT RICHARD BLOOM, )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ANGEL KELLEY, D.J.
Plaintiff Anthony Robertson, a state prisoner, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that Defendants Captain Stanley Themora and Lieutenant Richard Bloom issued
supervisory directives that resulted in the “unwanton infliction of physical pain and suffering.”
[Dkt. 2 at 3]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the
“Motion”) [Dkt. 79] is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts are drawn from the summary judgment record, are undisputed unless otherwise
indicated, and are presented in the light most favorable to Robertson as the nonmoving party.
A. Factual Background
From November 23, 2018 through September 9, 2022, Robertson was a pre-trial detainee
committed to the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department at the Nashua Street Jail (“Nashua”) in
Boston. Captain Themora is regularly assigned as a shift commander at Nashua and typically
supervises approximately forty-five to fifty officers and roughly 300 detainees. Lieutenant
Bloom also serves at Nashua.
On July 20, 2022, Robertson injured his left leg and foot during recreation at Nashua and
underwent surgery at Massachusetts General Hospital on July 22, 2022. The surgery required
staples in his foot and ankle area, and left him using bilateral crutches for mobility. Upon his
return, Nashua medical staff completed special needs documentation identifying crutches and
housing accommodations and notified custody personnel, including the Defendants.
On August 20, 2022, while housed in restrictive housing, Robertson reports that his
rehabilitation had progressed and that his pain was minimal. Lieutenant Bloom instructed
housing control and unit officers by telephone to apply modified restraints on Robertson to bring
him in and out of his cell for recreation. Unit officers implemented the instruction by placing a
waist chain on Robertson, omitting leg irons, and affixing handcuffs through his crutches with an
extra set of handcuffs to permit crutch use. Defendants represent that the modified waist
chain/handcuff configuration reflects training and facility protocol for accommodating inmates
with mobility limitations, and that custody personnel routinely modify restraints where leg irons
are medically inappropriate. Robertson contends that such restraints had not been used earlier
after his surgery and that the Defendants’ directives produced a makeshift configuration that
caused him serious injury.
Robertson alleges that the restraints, which were affixed to his crutches, caused him to
fall, reopen his surgical wound, and require extended rehabilitation. Defendants dispute any
causal link between the August 20 fall and subsequent postoperative complications.
B. Procedural History
Robertson filed a pro se complaint on November 30, 2022, alleging deliberate
indifference and cruel and unusual punishment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that he filed
an internal grievance at Nashua but was transferred to a different facility before receiving a
response. Defendants answered and asserted, among other defenses, failure to state an Eighth
Amendment claim and qualified immunity.
On July 1, 2025, Defendants filed the Motion, arguing: (1) the undisputed material facts
show no Eighth Amendment violation because the supervisory directives were consistent with
medical notification, training, and institutional policy; and (2) they are entitled to qualified
immunity. [Dkt. 79]. Robertson opposes summary judgment, contending that triable issues exist
as to supervisory deliberate indifference, causation, and qualified immunity. [Dkt. 84].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant, shows no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816,
822 (1st Cir. 1991). The court determines whether: (1) a factual dispute exists; (2) that the
dispute is genuine so that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmovant; and
(3) the disputed fact is material under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying record
evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, either by negating an
essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or by showing a lack of evidence to support that
element. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant satisfies that
burden, the nonmovant must produce specific, admissible evidence creating a genuine factual
dispute; conclusory allegations, speculation, or unsupported inference will not defeat summary
judgment. See Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994); Rockwood v. SKF
USA Inc., 687 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012).
III. DISCUSSION
The Defendants seek summary judgment on two independent grounds. The Court
addresses each in turn.
A. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Robertson alleges that Defendants ordered waist chains and handcuffs affixed through his
crutches, foreseeably causing him to fall and re‑injure his surgical site. An Eighth Amendment
claim for denial of medical care requires both an objective and a subjective element: an
objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation and a defendant’s subjective, knowing disregard of
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976);
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834–37 (1994). The objective element is undisputed, as
Defendants knew Robertson had recent ankle surgery and used crutches, and Defendants
exercised supervisory authority over movement and restraint decisions in restrictive housing.
[Defs.’ Concise Statement of Facts ¶¶ 31–38, 44–48]. The dispositive question is the subjective
element: whether the supervisors knew of, or were willfully blind to, an excessive risk and
consciously disregarded. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–40. Mere negligence, medical
malpractice, or disagreement about appropriate care is insufficient. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;
Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484, 497–98 (1st Cir. 2011).
Supervisory liability requires personal participation, direction, or authorization of the
unconstitutional conduct, actual knowledge of facts giving rise to a substantial risk, and failure to
take reasonable remedial steps. Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208–09 (1st
Cir. 1990); Whitfield v. Melendez‑Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005). A single supervisory
order can give rise to liability only if the order itself was objectively unlawful and issued with
the requisite culpability. Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208–09. Reasonable security judgments that
balance penological and medical concerns do not constitute deliberate indifference. Sosa v.
Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 80 F.4th 15, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2023). Evidence that restraints were
improvised in disregard of known medical restrictions, that supervisors knew the restraint posed
an obvious and substantial risk, or that officers acted with callous or reckless indifference may
create a triable issue. See id.; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Leavitt, 645F.3d at 498–501.
Here, accepting the objective element, the undisputed record does not establish the
required subjective component. Three points are dispositive. First, medical staff documented
Robertson’s postoperative condition and need for crutches and notified custody, but clinicians
did not issue a categorical prohibition on restraints. Second, facility policy contemplates
tailoring restraints when medical conditions make standard leg irons inappropriate, and custody
staff are trained to use a waist chain with supplemental handcuffs to permit crutch use. Policy
S532 therefore authorizes alternate measures and leaves supervisors discretion to reconcile
mobility and security needs, an assessment courts treat as a penological judgment. See Sosa, 80
F.4th at 28. Moreover, the security context of restrictive housing (limited out‑of‑cell time,
keep‑separate requirements, and the need occasionally to bring multiple inmates out together)
further supports the conclusion that the Defendants’ directive was a policy-compliant,
security‑focused accommodation rather than an objectively unlawful order. Third, neither
Defendant physically applied restraints; each relayed an instruction that housing control and unit
officers implemented consistent with training and protocol. Nonmedical supervisors are
ordinarily entitled to rely on clinician judgments and facility procedures absent reason to believe
clinicians are failing to treat the inmate or that the chosen procedure is manifestly unsafe. Snell
v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474, 498 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Matthews v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 613 F.
App’x 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2015)); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). It is also
worth noting that the modified restraint here is materially analogous to the custom restraint the
First Circuit described as a reasonable balancing of medical needs and security concerns. See
Sosa, 80 F.4th at 28.
Robertson contends the telephone order alone establishes supervisory liability and argues
that the foreseeability of his fall establishes the subjective element. Foreseeability and custodial
duty do not substitute for Farmer’s subjective standard. Robertson must show that Defendants
knew of, or were willfully blind to, an excessive risk and consciously disregarded it. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–40. Evidence that prior escorts occurred without identical restraints
does not, standing alone, establish deliberate indifference because shifting security demands can
justify different restraint decisions on different days. Likewise, Robertson’s characterization of
the configuration as “makeshift” is insufficient without admissible evidence that the modification
was objectively dangerous and that supervisors knew and disregarded that danger. See Sosa, 80
F.4th at 28; Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 498–501.
Taken together, the undisputed record—medical notifications that did not prohibit
restraints, training prescribing the challenged modification, the supervisors’ nonphysical role in
issuing the instruction, and the operational needs of segregation housing—does not permit a
reasonable juror to infer that Captain Themora or Lieutenant Bloom acted with the subjective
deliberate indifference mental state required by Farmer and First Circuit precedent. The
evidence supports, at most, negligence or a disputed judgment call, not the conscious, culpable
state of mind required for an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;
Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953,956 (1st Cir. 1992). “An accident, although it may
produce added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of
unnecessary pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105. The supervisory deliberate indifference
claim therefore fails as a matter of law.
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages liability for discretionary
actions unless: (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) that right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct such that a reasonable official would
have known the conduct was unlawful. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982);
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232–33 (2009). The inquiry is fact-specific and requires that
existing precedent place the constitutional question “beyond debate” in the particular context
confronted by the official. Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). General statements of
constitutional principle do not suffice to defeat immunity. Id. at 742.
Assuming, arguendo, a constitutional violation occurred, Defendants are, nevertheless,
entitled to qualified immunity. Robertson contends qualified immunity is unavailable because
Defendants acted with reckless or callous indifference. The dispositive question is whether
precedent would have given a reasonable supervisor in Captain Themora’s and Lieutenant
Bloom’s position fair notice that ordering a training-compliant, modified waist‑chain/handcuff
restraint for an inmate using crutches in segregation violated the Constitution. The undisputed
record shows that clinicians notified custody of Robertson’s need for crutches but did not issue a
categorical restriction precluding restraints, and that the challenged modification conformed to
facility training for accommodating crutch use while preserving security. Under these
circumstances, a reasonable supervisor could have believed the directive lawful. The First
Circuit has recognized that carefully tailored restraints intended to accommodate medical needs
while maintaining security may be constitutionally permissible. Sosa, 80 F.4th at 28 (holding
prison officials who rear-cuffed plaintiff with custom-made double cuffs-length handcuffs acted
reasonably by accommodating plaintiff’s medical needs and maintaining safety and security).
Where reasonable officials could differ about the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, qualified
immunity ordinarily applies. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244–45; Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742–43.
Because Robertson points to no controlling precedent that would have put Defendants on clear
notice that the supervisory directive here was unlawful, qualified immunity protects Captain
Themora and Lieutenant Bloom from damages liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the contested facts Robertson cites are either not genuinely
disputed in a manner material to the legal issues or, even if credited, do not establish the
subjective deliberate indifference standard or overcome qualified immunity. Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 79] is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment for the
Defendants and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 31, 2025 /s/ Angel Kelley
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge