Opinion

Blank

Court
District Court, M.D. Louisiana
Filed
Oct 31, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.1%

district court did not abuse discretion in granting capital habeas petitioner’s discovery motion and ordering Kentucky State Police Crime Lab to provide petitioner with hair samples and microscope slides for “examination by petitioner's experts, with appropriate safeguards.”

How later courts described this case

  • district court did not abuse discretion in granting capital habeas petitioner’s discovery motion and ordering Kentucky State Police Crime Lab to provide petitioner with hair samples and microscope slides for “examination by petitioner's experts, with appropriate safeguards.”
  • finding authority under the All Writs Act

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DANIEL JOSEPH BLANK CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

DARREL VANNOY NO. 16-00366-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER

This is a death penalty case. Before the Court is the State’s Motion for

Expedited Reconsideration of the Court’s October 22, 2025 Order. (Doc. 162).

Petitioner opposes the Motion. (Doc. 163). For the following reasons, the State’s

Motion (Doc. 162) is DENIED.

The Order at issue—the Court’s October 22, 2025 Order (“October 22, 2025

Order,” Doc. 161)—accomplished the following: (1) set a hearing; and (2) required

Counsel for the Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) to be present at the hearing.

(Doc. 161). Now, after a lengthy pattern of ignoring the Court’s Orders, the State

threatens that if this Court does not vacate its October 22, 2025 Order by

October 31, 2025, then Respondent, and potentially LSP, “will be forced to seek

mandamus relief from the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Fifth Circuit.”

(Doc. 162 at 1 (emphasis added)). Because the Court plainly has the authority to set

a hearing and require attorneys to appear before it, the State’s Motion is wholly

without merit.

The procedural history of this case provides critical context for Respondent’s

2025 request for reconsideration.

A. Petitioner’s Unopposed 2019 Discovery Motions and Court

Order Granting Same.

Approximately six years ago, on October 7, 2019, Petitioner filed three

discovery motions (the “2019 Discovery Motions”). The Court previously described the

2019 Discovery Motions as follows:

The first, titled Motion To Conduct Habeas Rule 6 Discovery (Doc. 27,

the “DNA Data Motion”), seeks an order directing the FBI to produce

the “DNA profiles and raw data” generated from the bat used to murder

Mr. Rossi, the fingernail scrapings collected from Mr. Arcuri, and the

cigarette butts collected from the Millet crime scene.

(See Doc. 27-2 at 1).

The second, titled Motion For The Transfer Of Evidence To Defense

Expert Bode Technology (Doc. 28, the “Physical Evidence Motion”),

seeks an order directing the State to produce the actual (physical) Rossi

murder weapon, Arcuri fingernails, and Millet cigarette butts, for DNA

testing and analysis by Petitioner’s DNA expert, Bode Technology. (See

Doc. 28-3).

The third, titled Motion To Transfer Respondent opposed only one of the

three Motions, and that opposition Fingerprint Evidence For Defense

Expert Evaluation (Doc. 29, the “Fingerprint Motion”), seeks an order

directing the State to produce a subset of the fingerprint evidence

collected from each of the various crime scenes for examination and

analysis by Petitioner’s fingerprint expert, Max L. Jarrell. (Doc. 29-3).

(Doc. 101 at 5–6).

As the Court has previously emphasized: “The State offered no opposition

whatsoever to the Physical Evidence Motion or the Fingerprint Motion[,] and “[t]he

State filed an untimely and perfunctory (two-page) opposition to the DNA Data

Motion. (Doc. 43).” (Doc. 101 at 5–6 (emphasis added)).

Although Respondent failed to oppose the 2019 Discovery Motions, the

Magistrate Judge denied Petitioner’s request for discovery. (Doc. 79). Petitioner

timely moved the Court to review the Magistrate Judge’s Order denying the

requested discovery. (Doc. 82). Respondent again failed to oppose Petitioner’s

Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order.

On September 13, 2021, after full consideration of the arguments, the Court

granted Petitioner’s Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order. (Doc. 101). The

Court also granted Petitioner’s 2019 Discovery Motions and ordered the State to

produce and transfer certain items on or before September 27, 2021. (Id. at 16–20).

The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.

B. Petitioner’s Unopposed September 16, 2021 Motion to Amend

Discovery Order and Court Order Granting Same.

On September 16, 2021, Petitioner moved to amend the Court’s

September 13, 2021 Order, asking the Court to order the transfer of the evidence at

issue to a different expert because Petitioner’s expert had passed away. (Doc. 103).

Respondent did not oppose Petitioner’s Motion. Also on September 16, 2021, the

Court granted Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Discovery Order. (Doc. 104). In doing so,

the Court provided the State until September 30, 2021, to produce and transfer the

evidence at issue. (Id.).

The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.

C. Respondent’s Notices of Compliance with the Court’s Order

Granting 2019 Discovery Motions.

On September 27, and 30, 2021, Respondent filed two Notices of Compliance,

stating that each entity in possession of the evidence at issue complied with the

Court’s Order by producing and transferring the evidence at issue as the Court

ordered. (Doc. 105; Doc. 106). As exhibits to the Notices of Compliance, Respondent

attached September 17, 2021 letters from Louisiana Assistant District Attorney

Donald D. Candell to the following entities: (1) LSP Crime Lab; (2) Ascension Parish

Clerk of Court; (3) St. John the Baptist Sheriff’s Office; (4) Ascension Parish Sheriff’s

Office; and (5) Gonzales Police Department. (Doc. 105 at 3–5; Doc. 106 at 3–6). The

September 17, 2021 letters are written on letterhead for the State of Louisiana,

District Attorney’s Office for the 23rd Judicial District of Louisiana. (Id.).

Critical here, the letters direct each entity, including LSP Crime Lab, as

follows: “[P]lease be advised that pursuant to Order of Judge Brian A. Jackson,

US District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, you are tasked with the submission

of any and all items [described in] the attached ruling and order.” (Id. (emphasis

added)). The letters then provide instructions on where each entity must direct the

evidence at issue. (Id.). Finally, the letters provide: “Upon submission by you of the

evidence required, please notify this office immediately so that we may inform the

court of the State’s compliance with the Court’s order.” (Id. (emphasis added)).

To be clear, the letter to the LSP Crime Lab provided:

Cae RICKY L. BABIN rT

* /* B / \ / \

□□ DISTRICT ATTORNEY Esta3

ee 23®° JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

P.O. Drawer 1899

Gonzales, LA 70707

Telephone: 225-644-3333 :

a . Facsimile: 225-644-1535

Louisiana State Police Crime Lab

Attn: Latent prints division

376 E Airport Ave

Baton Rouge. LA 70806

Re: Daniel Joseph Blank v Gerald Vannoy 16-00366-BAJ-RLB

September 17, 2021

Confirming our telephone conversation, please be advised that pursuant to Order of Judge Brian

A. Jackson, US District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, you are tasked with the submission

of any and all items listed on page 18 of the attached ruling and order.

Same should be forwarded to Ron Smith & Associates, attention Lauren Smith, 9335 Highway

19 North, Collinsville, Mississippi 39325 on or before September 30, 2021. Upon submission by

you of the evidence required, please notify this office immediately so that we may inform the

court of the State's compliance with the Court's order. If you have any questions, please contact

me at (225) 644-3333.

Sincerely,

Chel bed!

Donald D. Candell

Assistant District Attorney

(Doc. 106 at 6).

Respondent also attached e-mails, letters, and FedEx receipts from each

respective agency as additional exhibits to the Notices of Compliance, which confirm

that the agencies either shipped the evidence at issue to the proper party pursuant

to the Court’s Order, or conducted a search of their files and determined that the

evidence at issue had already been returned to another agency, such that that agency

no longer had access to the evidence. (Doc. 105 at 6–12; Doc. 106 at 7–13).

D. Petitioner’s Unopposed September 7, 2022 Motion to Amend

Discovery Order and Court Order Granting Same.

On September 7, 2022, Petitioner moved the Court to order that a qualified

LSP Crime Lab technician must perform searches of 29 relevant prints identified by

Petitioner’s Counsel in the manual Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification

System (“IAFIS”) in the presence of Petitioner’s expert witness. (Doc. 120 at 3).

Petitioner’s Motion indicated that since his expert received the evidence at

issue, Petitioner’s expert microscopically evaluated dozens of fingerprints to identify

which were of sufficient quality for entry into IAFIS. (Id. at 2). Petitioner’s expert

determined that 29 fingerprints and/or palmprints, less than 10% of the total prints

collected from crime scenes in this case, were sufficient for comparison to prints in

the IAFIS system. (Id.). Petitioner represented:

“[The LSP Crime Lab] previously compared the 29 prints to

[Petitioner’s] prints and determined that he was excluded as the

contributor of the prints.”

(Id. (emphasis added)). Petitioner’s expert thus sought to determine whose

fingerprints were left at the crime scenes. (Id.).

LSP indicated that Petitioner’s expert could not access IAFIS because she was

not a member of law enforcement. (Id.). LSP Crime Lab further indicated that the

dissemination of information obtained from IAFIS/Next Generation Identification

(“NGI”) is limited to agencies “where such disclosures may promote, assist, or

otherwise serve law enforcement” interests. (Id.). Based on these roadblocks,

Petitioner asked the Court to order a qualified LSP Crime Lab technician to conduct

the search instead of Petitioner’s expert. (Id. at 3).

The State failed to oppose Petitioner’s Motion. (Doc. 120).

On November 30, 2022, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed Motion and

ordered that a qualified LSP Crime Lab technician, in the presence of Petitioner’s

expert, shall perform the manual IAFIS/NGI searches of 29 relevant fingerprints

and/or palmprints identified by Counsel for Petitioner as described in Petitioner’s

Motion. (Doc. 121).

The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.

E. Petitioner’s Unopposed March 20, 2023 Motion to Compel and

Court Order Granting Same.

Four months later, on March 20, 2023, Petitioner moved the Court to compel

the State to comply with the Court’s November 30, 2022 Order requiring LSP Crime

Lab to perform the manual IAFIS/NGI searches of 29 relevant fingerprints and

palmprints Petitioner’s Counsel identified. (Doc. 122). Apparently, LSP refused to

comply with the Court’s November 30, 2022 Order unless Petitioner released LSP

Crime Lab from any liability should a search of IAFIS reveal the source of the prints.

(Id. at 1). Petitioner signed such a waiver on his own volition, although it was not

required by the Court’s Order. (Doc. 123-1).

The State, yet again, failed to oppose Petitioner’s Motion to Compel.

On December 13, 2023, the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion to Compel,

emphasizing: “Incredibly, despite having refused to submit to the Court’s

November 30 Order, the State offers no response to Petitioner’s motion to compel, or

his ‘Statement Of Waiver Of Liability.’” (Doc. 125 at 2). The Court stated: “Absent

any response or objection, it is incomprehensible that the State would flout this

Court’s November 30 Order requiring IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially

exculpatory prints in the presence of [Petitioner’s expert.]” (Id. (emphasis added)).

Thus, the Court again ordered the State to comply with its November 30, 2022

Order, without additional preconditions to compliance, by December 23, 2023.

(Id. at 3). The Court further ordered that “upon satisfactory completion of the

required the IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially exculpatory prints, the State

shall immediately file written notice of the same.” (Id.). The Court emphatically

ordered that “[t]he terms of this Order and all Orders of this Court will be

enforced through civil contempt proceedings, as necessary.” (Id.).

The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.

F. The Court’s August 23, 2024 Order Addressing the State’s

Noncompliance with Court Order.

On August 23, 2024, the Court ordered a status conference to discuss the status

of the State’s compliance with its November 30, 2022 and December 13, 2023 Orders.

(Doc. 126). The Court emphasized: “On December 13, 2023, [] [t]he Court ordered []

that the State ‘immediately file written notice’ of the satisfactory completion of the

required IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially exculpatory prints, and ordered

that such searches were to be completed” by December 23, 2023. (Id.). The Court

further noted: “To date, [as of August 23, 2024,] no written notice has been filed.”

(Id.). Thus, the Court set a status conference to ascertain the status of discovery.

Following the status conference, the Court ordered Petitioner to provide

results of the fingerprint cross-comparisons to Respondent and ordered the parties to

submit a proposed scheduling order. (Doc. 128).

G. Petitioner’s November 13, 2024 Unopposed Motions to

Compel and Court Orders Granting Same.

On November 13, 2024, Petitioner filed two Motions to Compel. (Doc. 137;

Doc. 138). One Motion to Compel asked the Court to order LSP Crime Lab to perform

a DNA database search of the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), including the

National DNA Indexing System (“NDIS”), State DNA Indexing System (“SDIS”), and

any local indexing system, to compare the two partial DNA profiles obtained by the

FBI from the cigarette butts collected at the Millet crime scene against the DNA

profiles contained in those databases. (Doc. 137 at 1).

The State failed to oppose Petitioner’s Motion to Compel.

Petitioner’s second Motion to Compel asked the Court to order the State to

transfer the original DNA samples taken by crime scene investigators from the Rossi

murder weapon and stored in vials at the Ascension Parish Sheriff’s Office to the

Serological Research Institute (“SERI”) for testing. (Doc. 138). Petitioner argued that

SERI is an accredited DNA lab capable of testing the DNA samples with the most

advanced technology. (Id.). Petitioner further asserted that SERI had a current

agreement with a law enforcement agency to conduct CODIS searches to compare the

DNA profiles at issue. (Id. at 2).

The State, again, failed to oppose Petitioner’s Motion.

The Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed Motions to Compel, and ordered

the following:

[O]n or before July 7, 2025, the State shall cause the transfer from the

Ascension Parish Sheriff’s Office to the Serological Research Institute

(SERI) the sealed evidence bag containing, inter alia, (1) Victor Rossi’s

known sample, marked as K1 (or any variation reflecting concentration

or dilution, including “K1 1:10,” “K-1 1:100”); (2) the sample from the

baseball bat, marked as Q5 (including Q5 1:10 and Q5 1:100); and

(3) any negative or control samples.

(Doc. 141 at 1). The Court also ordered:

[T]he Louisiana State Police (LSP) Crime Laboratory shall perform a

DNA database search (i.e., a full search, a keyboard search, and/or an

emergency upload and request search) of the Combined DNA Index

System (“CODIS”), including the National DNA Indexing System

(“NDIS”), State DNA Indexing System (“SDIS”), and any local indexing

system, to compare the two partial DNA profiles (one male, one female)

obtained by the FBI from the cigarette butts collected at the Millet crime

scene against DNA profiles contained in those databases[.]

(Doc. 142). The Court further ordered that:

[S]hould the LSP receive any “candidate matches,” “partial matches,” or

“hits” from CODIS/NDIS/SDIS, it shall promptly carry out its

confirmation procedures, as set forth in the NDIS Guidelines, to

determine whether there is a “confirmed match” and release this

information to the parties.

(Id.).

The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.

H. Respondent’s July 2, 2025 Motion to “Clarify” and Court’s

Order Denying Same.

At 6:30 P.M. on July 2, 2025, one business day before the Court’s July 7, 2025

deadline to transfer certain evidence and conduct certain searches, and after the

expiration of the time window in which the State could have moved the Court to

reconsider its June 4, 2025 Orders, Respondent moved to “clarify” the Court’s

June 4, 2025 Orders. (Doc. 146). The Court denied Respondent’s Motion, finding it

both procedurally improper and wholly without merit. (Doc. 147). The Court again

emphasized:

The Court notes this is part of a pattern of delay by the State, and the

LSP in particular, having already been threatened with sanctions by the

Court in connection with its delays related to the same evidence.

(Doc. 125). The Court considers this baseless Motion—filed just before

the expiration of the July 7th discovery-related deadline and just before

the July 4th Holiday—as yet another attempt at delaying execution of

the Court’s discovery Orders. This type of gamesmanship is

unacceptable, especially given the nature of these proceedings and what

is at stake for Blank. Counsel for Vannoy and the State are advised that

these delay tactics will not be tolerated going forward and that sanctions

will be considered should a pattern of contumacious conduct ensue.

(Id. at 4 n.1).

I. Court’s September 25, 2025 Order Requiring Joint Status

Report.

On September 25, 2025, after hearing nothing further from Respondent, and

with no similar Notice of Compliance filed into the record, the Court ordered the

parties to file a Joint Status Report within 14 days of the issuance of the Order. The

Court emphasized that by September 25, 2025, which was 113 days after the Court’s

June 4, 2025 Order, and 80 days after the Court-ordered July 7, 2025 deadline,

“[f]orensic testing and database searches should be well underway, if not complete.”

(Doc. 157). Thus, the Court ordered that the Joint Status Report detail the following:

• The joint Status Report should provide detailed information

updating the Court on the status and any results of the “forensic

testing or analysis as granted by the Court” in its two discovery

Orders (Docs. 141, 142) issued on June 4, 2025. (Doc. 143 at 1).

• If Petitioner’s “forensic testing or analysis” has been completed

(Doc. 143 at 1), the parties should indicate, for all tested evidence,

both the results of testing and the date of completion.

• If the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory’s DNA database

searches have been completed (Doc. 142), the parties should indicate

both the results and date the parties were informed of those results.

• If the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory has not completed its

DNA database searches (Doc. 142), Respondent will provide a

detailed update from the LSP on the status of those searches and an

anticipated date of completion.

• Respondent should also explain whether he has begun (or intends to

begin) any forensic testing of his own (Doc. 143 at 1) and provide the

Court with an anticipated timeframe in which to complete that

testing.

(Doc. 157).

J. Parties’ October 8, 2025 Joint Status Report.

In the parties’ Joint Status Report, Respondent, incredibly, indicated that it

had “no update” regarding the Court-Ordered discovery because Respondent

“assumed” that Petitioner’s Counsel would coordinate testing with LSP.

(Doc. 159 at 5). Respondent further represented that it was only the Court’s Order

“directing the parties to provide a status [that] brought this glaring

miscommunication to the forefront.” (Id.).

After reviewing the parties’ Joint Status Report, the Court determined that a

hearing was appropriate. Thus, the Court issued its October 22, 2025 Order setting

a hearing, requiring LSP’s Counsel to be present at the hearing, requiring the State

to serve LSP’s Counsel and the LSP Crime Lab Director with the Court’s Order, and

requiring the State to file notice of same to avoid any “further assumptions as to who

is responsible for informing the LSP and its counsel, Faye Morrison, of this Order.”

(Doc. 161).

Now, Respondent appears to threaten the Court, arguing that if the Court does

not vacate its October 22, 2025 Order by October 31, 2025, then Respondent will be

“forced” to seek a writ of mandamus before the Fifth Circuit. (Doc. 162).

Respondent strays into a procedural no-man’s land—the same Respondent who

failed to oppose Petitioner’s seven discovery motions over a five-year period. (Doc. 27

(dated October 7, 2019); Doc. 28; Doc. 29; Doc. 103; Doc. 120; Doc. 122; Doc. 137;

Doc. 138 (dated November 13, 2024)). In fact, the one time Respondent did respond

to a discovery Motion, his Opposition was untimely and perfunctory (two pages).

(Doc. 43).

The Court has issued eight Orders granting Petitioner’s unopposed discovery

motions and governing the scope of discovery over four years. (Doc. 101 (dated

September 13, 2021); Doc. 104; Doc. 121; Doc. 125; Doc. 126; Doc. 128; Doc. 141;

Doc. 142 (dated June 4, 2025)). Respondent failed to timely move to reconsider any of

the Court’s eight discovery Orders. Without a proper procedural avenue before him,

Respondent filed an untimely Motion to “Clarify,” which the Court flatly rejected.

(Doc. 146; Doc. 147).

Now, Respondent threatens to seek a writ of mandamus to the Fifth Circuit,

asking the Circuit to overturn the Court’s October 22, 2025 Order, which merely sets

a hearing. (Doc. 161; Doc. 162). The October 22, 2025 Order does not order additional

discovery. (Doc. 161). The October 22, 2025 Order does not require the State to do

anything other than appear at a hearing, serve the Court’s Order on LSP, and file

notice of service into the record. (Id.). The State’s delay tactics are nothing short of

astounding, and a direct repudiation of a Federal Court Order, particularly when the

Court has already emphasized:

• “The terms of this Order and all Orders of this Court will be

enforced through civil contempt proceedings, as necessary.”

(Doc. 125 at 3, December 13, 2023 Order).

• “Absent any response or objection, it is incomprehensible that the

State would flout this Court’s November 30 Order requiring

IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially exculpatory prints in the

presence of [Petitioner’s expert.]” (Doc. 125 at 2 (emphasis added),

December 13, 2023 Order).

• “On December 13, 2023, [] [t]he Court ordered [] that the State

‘immediately file written notice’ of the satisfactory completion of the

required IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially exculpatory

prints, and ordered that such searches were to be completed” by

December 23, 2023. [] To date, [as of August 23, 2024,] no written

notice has been filed.” (Doc. 126, August 23, 2024 Order).

• “The Court notes this is part of a pattern of delay by the State, and

the LSP in particular, having already been threatened with

sanctions by the Court in connection with its delays related to the

same evidence. (Doc. 125). The Court considers this baseless

Motion—filed just before the expiration of the July 7th

discovery-related deadline and just before the July 4th Holiday—as

yet another attempt at delaying execution of the Court’s discovery

Orders. This type of gamesmanship is unacceptable, especially given

the nature of these proceedings and what is at stake for Blank.

Counsel for Vannoy and the State are advised that these delay tactics

will not be tolerated going forward and that sanctions will be

considered should a pattern of contumacious conduct ensue.”

(Doc. 147 at 4 n.1, July 9, 2025 Order).

K. The Law.

It bears repeating that this is a death penalty case. Petitioner’s life is at stake.

The victims’ families deserve closure. The Court has twice informed the State that it

would hold it in contempt of Court if it continued with its pattern of conduct. What’s

more, the Order to which the State takes offense does not grant any relief to

Petitioner, nor does it make any ruling adverse to the State. Instead, it does nothing

more than set a hearing. Nonetheless, the State now threatens to pursue a writ of

mandamus if the Court fails to vacate its October 22, 2025 Order.

This Court has the authority to require Ms. Morrison, LSP’s counsel, to appear

at the hearing to further explain LSP’s continued failure to assist the State in

complying with the Court’s discovery Orders. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,

provides that any court established by an “Act of Congress may issue all writs

necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the

usages and principles of law.” Because of this Act, federal courts may “issu[e] orders

appropriate to assist them in conducting factual inquiries,” and that authority

“extend[s] to habeas corpus proceedings.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299–300

(1969).

Relevant here, the “power of the Act extends” to persons or entities not

technically named as parties, but who “are in a position to frustrate the

implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice.”

United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) (district court had

authority to compel nonparty phone company to assist the FBI’s implementation of a

pen register and noting: “[Under] the facts of this case, we do not think that the

Company was a third party so far removed from the underlying controversy that its

assistance could not be permissibly compelled.”).

And again, it matters not that LSP is a state agency that may otherwise be

entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The State confuses this habeas

proceeding with traditional civil litigation.1 Here, the Court has issued Orders

compelling Respondent, the Warden of Angola, to comply with discovery. But as the

Supreme Court has long recognized, the AEDPA’s requirement that a warden act as

respondent in a habeas proceeding is itself a legal fiction; the warden has no personal

knowledge of the underlying facts. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296 (1969)

1 The Court was aware of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Russell v. Jones, 49 F.4th 507, 515

(5th Cir. 2022) when it stated that “the Eleventh Amendment does not shield the Louisiana

State Police from assisting the Respondent in complying with the discovery ordered by the

Court in this habeas proceeding . . . .” (Doc. 161 at 3 n.5) (emphasis added). Unlike the present

case, Russell involved Rule 45 subpoenas to “Felony Judges” who had previously been

dismissed as defendants on grounds of sovereign immunity. Russell, 49 F.4th at 515

(“Plaintiffs may not obtain by third-party subpoena what they could not obtain from the

Felony Judges as defendants.”). Russell, while exhaustive and well-written, presented a

distinct set of facts and issues.

(“Rule 33 . . . provides for written interrogatories to be served by any party upon any

‘adverse party.’ As the present case illustrates, this would usually mean that the

prisoner’s interrogatories must be directed to the warden although the warden would

be unable to answer from personal knowledge questions relating to petitioner’s arrest

and trial.”). And so, responding to discovery in habeas proceedings necessarily

requires the assistance of closely-related state entities who are not the respondent—

i.e., those with personal knowledge of the underlying facts, or possession, custody or

control of the records.2

For that reason, “literal application” of civil discovery rules to “habeas corpus

proceedings would do violence to the efficient and effective administration of the

Great Writ.” Harris, 394 U.S. at 297. Instead, courts “may fashion appropriate modes

of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial

usage.” Id. (finding authority under the All Writs Act). Indeed, “it is the duty of the

court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry,”

when discovery is allowed. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997). What those

facilities and procedures may be are left to the court’s discretion under Rule 6(a).3

2 Again, discovery has been requested from Respondent and the Court has granted discovery

Motions directed at Respondent. Discovery requests, including Rule 45 subpoenas, have

never been served on LSP, and LSP has never been ordered to directly comply with discovery.

Instead, the Court’s Orders have required its assistance and participation, which is necessary

for Respondent to provide the discovery ordered by the Court. The State’s counsel fails to

recognize this distinction. See Harris, 394 U.S. at 296 (“Presumably the warden could solicit

answers from the appropriate officials and reply ‘under oath,’ as the rule requires; but the

warden is clearly not the kind of ‘adversary party’ contemplated by the discovery rules, and

the result of their literal application would be to invoke a procedure which is circuitous,

burdensome, and time consuming.”).

3 In 1976, Congress adopted the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The Advisory Committee

Exercising this discretion, federal courts have often required state agencies or

officials—police departments, prosecutors, crime labs—to provide information or

otherwise assist the respondent in complying with discovery orders in habeas

proceedings. See Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 777 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“[T]he

proper individuals to whom this Court should look to provide the information Cherrix

needs to develop his habeas petition are the Attorney General and the Clerk of the

trial court, who are the equivalents to ‘parties’ to this suit under the common notions

of who constitutes a party for discovery purposes.”); Hall v. Davis, 2022 WL 16574136,

at *3 (D. Idaho Nov. 1, 2022) (ordering state agencies and custodians of evidence to

preserve all evidence in their possession and cooperate with petitioner’s investigation

and noting “death penalty cases are different from regular civil cases in that third-

party law enforcement agencies generally function as decades-long custodians of

critical evidence upon which the defendant’s life or death may turn.); Clark v.

Schweitzer, 2020 WL 6823118, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2020) (rejecting warden’s

objections that he could not answer discovery because he lacked personal knowledge,

as well as custody or control of requested records, and finding a Rule 45 subpoena

was “not required” to obtain information from “[t]he police, prosecutors and

Attorney General’s Office (the entities with custody and control over the requested

discovery),” who were ordered to “work with” respondent to answer discovery); Hill v.

Mitchell, 2007 WL 2874597, at *7–8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2007) (granting petitioner’s

Notes to Rule 6 point out that the rule “contains very little specificity as to what types and

methods of discovery should be made available to the parties.” Rather, district court judges

are allowed to “fashion their own rules in the context of individual cases.”

motion to compel discovery, including deposing attorneys within the Hamilton

County prosecutor’s office regarding its “policies, procedures, and guidelines

regarding who should be charged with capital murder”); Warden, Kentucky State

Penitentiary v. Gall, 865 F.2d 786, 788 (6th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse

discretion in granting capital habeas petitioner’s discovery motion and ordering

Kentucky State Police Crime Lab to provide petitioner with hair samples and

microscope slides for “examination by petitioner's experts, with appropriate

safeguards.”); Jenkins v. Scully, 1992 WL 32342, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1992)

(granting capital habeas petitioner’s discovery motion for “an order directing the Erie

County District Attorney (not a party to the instant proceeding) to produce the hair

samples in question so that they can be subjected to DNA fingerprinting tests at an

appropriate facility.”). Because these state entities—police departments, crime labs,

district attorney’s offices, attorney general’s offices, and clerks of court—are the ones

with personal knowledge of the criminal proceedings, or actually have possession,

custody or control of the records, they are “the equivalents to ‘parties’” in habeas suits

“under the common notions of who constitutes a party for discovery purposes.”

Cherrix, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 777.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's Motion for Expedited

Reconsideration (Doc. 162) is DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 31st day of October, 2025

J Pas BRIAN Jen

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

20

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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